Iran and Belarus have continued to deepen ties, especially regarding military and military industrial matters.[32] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on August 20 to discuss expanding bilateral cooperation and sanctions mitigation efforts.[33] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[34] Belarusian state media reported that Pezeshkian and Lukashenko agreed to work toward codifying a strategic partnership treaty.[35]
Lukashenko said during the meeting that Belarus is ready to expand “military technical collaboration” with Iran, though Lukashenko did not specify what this cooperation could entail.[36] Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[37] The SZRU did not specify how Belarus could help Iran restore damaged assets, and Belarus likely lacks the domestic capabilities to do so. Russia effectively controls Belarus' air defense assets within an integrated air defense system, and Russia's delays in providing S-400 systems to Iran have been a source of friction between Russia and Iran.[38] Iran may seek to increase defense industrial cooperation with Belarus given that Israeli strikes also targeted Iranian domestic production capabilities for air defense components.[39] Belarus reportedly produces missile components for Russian air defense systems, including S-300 and S-400 systems, and Iran may hope to secure similar components from Belarus.[40] Such an arrangement would mirror the way that Russia currently uses Belarus’ industrial base to source munitions and other dual-use components to augment Russian military output and sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[41] Iran and Belarus may additionally further collaborate on drone production — Lukashenko announced in March 2025 that Russia would open a drone production facility in Belarus.[42] Iranian engineers previously traveled to Belarus in May 2023 to reportedly examine modifying local factories to produce Iranian drones, like Shahed-type models, for Russia.[43]
Iran’s deepening cooperation with Belarus ultimately benefits Russia and helps sustain the Russian war effort against Ukraine, given Minsk’s role as Moscow’s key sanctions evasion partner. The SZRU noted that looser restrictions on Belarus’ military sector may make Belarus a more compelling partner for Iran compared to Russia.[44] Iranian officials have more publicly voiced discontent with Russian military support for Iran since Russia’s non-response to the Israel-Iran war.[45] Iran’s expansion of ties with Belarus will not sideline Russia as Iran’s primary military partner, however, and will simply allow Iran to diversify the manner in which it interacts with Moscow. ISW has long assessed that Russia has de-facto annexed Belarus, and Iran may seek to benefit from this de-facto annexation without having to circumvent the same suite of sanctions that are currently levied against Russia.[46]
The United States and its European partners should view Belarus’ cooperation with Iran as an extension of Russo-Iranian engagement, with similar impacts and potential consequences. Russian efforts to de-facto annex Belarus ensure that Russia reaps any benefits brought to Belarus from cooperation with Iran.[47] Expanding military technical or defense industrial cooperation between Iran and Belarus will likely directly support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, given how the Kremlin has subsumed elements of Belarus' defense industrial base.[48] Iranian economic cooperation that reinforces the Belarusian economy bolsters Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner.[49] Iranian-Belarusian economic cooperation furthermore takes place within and reinforces Russian-led initiatives, including the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[50] Russia similarly uses Belarus’ relations with other Russian partners, such as the PRC, as a way to circumvent international sanctions and use engagement with these partners to support its war effort.[51] The United States and European partners should endeavor to levy the same suite of sanctions on Belarus as they do against Russia in order for sanctions on Russia to bear weight.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-27-2025