Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. Reuters reported on August 5 that three Kremlin sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin's belief that Russia is winning and his doubts that US sanctions will have a significant impact on Russia are driving Putin's decision to continue his war against Ukraine.[1] Two of the sources claimed that Putin's war aims take precedence over his efforts to improve relations with the United States and US President Donald Trump. One source claimed that the recent Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Istanbul were a Russian attempt to convince Trump that Putin was open to peace but noted that the talks were devoid of any real substance. One source claimed that “Putin cannot afford to end the war just because Trump wants it.” A source described Trump's reported March 2025 offer — in which Trump purportedly proposed to lift all US sanctions against Russia, to “de jure” recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and to “de facto” recognize Russian control over the other parts of Ukraine that Russian forces occupied at the time — as a “fantastic chance,” but stated that stopping a war is more difficult than starting one. Putin rejected that offer.
The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme war aims. One of Reuters’ sources stated that Putin does not see the logic in stopping Russian offensive operations, as Russian forces are making relatively more rapid advances on the battlefield.[2] The Kremlin sources implied that Putin would be willing to establish a ceasefire if Russia first occupied (or was given) the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Recent Kremlin statements, including from Putin himself, have repeatedly indicated that Putin remains committed to achieving his maximalist objectives that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation, however.[3] Putin claimed as recently as June 20 that “all of Ukraine is [Russia's].”[4] Russian State Duma Deputy Anatoly Wasserman said in an interview with Azerbaijani news outlet Minval published on August 3 that the stated goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine are “incompatible with the continued existence of Ukraine” as a sovereign state and that Russia alone will determine the end date for its war.[5] Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti published two op-eds on July 30 entitled “There is no other option: no one should remain alive in Ukraine” and “Noted: Ukraine will end very soon.”[6] Kremlin insiders are likely speaking to Western media outlets in order to socialize Putin's demands to Western policymakers and audiences, frame Russia's demand for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as reasonable, and insinuate that there is a possibility for a full ceasefire and lasting peace should Ukraine and the West acquiesce to Putin's demands.
Putin has intentionally put himself in a position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a victory to the Russian military or people. One Kremlin source told Reuters that Putin does not feel that now is the time to end the war because Russian society and the Russian military would not understand such a decision.[13] The Kremlin has been engaged in a concerted multi-year effort to justify Putin's maximalist war objectives as necessary for the existence of the Russian state and to garner societal support for a protracted war until Russia achieves such goals.[14] Russian state and independent polling from early 2025 suggested that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine, and the Kremlin is likely seizing on these sentiments, which it has actively fostered, to justify Putin's decision to continue the war.[15] Putin is also increasing Russian society's reliance on military spending by heavily investing in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), which now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.[16] ISW continues to assess that any sharp decrease in Russia's defensive spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, furthering Putin's incentive to continue a protracted war in Ukraine and instigate future military conflicts despite high Russian losses on the battlefield and critical constraints on its economy.[17] Putin has intentionally cultivated Russian society's commitment to his war aims and has not set conditions to take any off-ramps to accept a peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims.
Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia. Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, however. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed on August 4 that the conditions for Russia's “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of weapons banned under the INF Treaty are “disappearing” such that Russia “no longer considers itself bound” by the INF Treaty's restrictions.[18] The Russian MFA claimed that the Russian leadership will decide on response measures after analyzing the deployment of Western land-based intermediate-range missiles. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia has “proactively made efforts to maintain restraint” following the US suspension of the INF treaty in 2019. The Russian MFA claimed that Western states have built up “destabilizing” missiles in areas near Russia, creating a “strategic” threat to Russian security. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the MFA's announcement, stating that Russia is no longer “limited” in any way and that Russia has the right to take “appropriate measures.”[19] Peskov claimed that the West should not expect any announcements about the deployment of Russian shorter- and intermediate-range missiles as this information is “sensitive.”[20] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on August 4 on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that the Russian MFA's statement is the result of NATO states’ “anti-Russian policy” and that “this is a new reality all [Russia's] opponents will have to reckon with.”[21] Medvedev vaguely threatened that the West should “expect further steps” from Russia. Medvedev’s August 4 threat on his English-language account is the latest in a string of recent nuclear threats against the West that are part of the Kremlin's wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[22]
Russia has long violated the INF Treaty and publicly flaunted its use of shorter- and intermediate-range missiles banned under the treaty. The United States suspended participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles. Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019, but had not formally withdrawn from the treaty.[23] Russia conducted a strike against Ukraine using an Oreshnik ballistic missile (reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile, which has a range of 2,000 to 5,800 kilometers) in November 2024, and Putin publicly claimed on August 1 that Russia produced its first serial Oreshnik complex and missiles and that the missile system entered into service.[24] Russia has also routinely launched Iskander missiles, with a reported range of 400 to 500 kilometers, against Ukraine and permanently deployed Iskanders to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.[25] High-ranking Russian officials began to set conditions in the information space for Russia to permanently withdraw from the INF Treaty in June 2025, suggesting that the Kremlin had made the decision to withdraw previously.[26] The Kremlin is attempting to posture its withdrawal from the treaty as a response to Trump's August 1 announcement, however.
European and NATO allies announced that they will purchase over one billion euros worth of US weapons for Ukraine through a new NATO funding mechanism. Ukraine's Minister of Defense (MoD), Denis Shmyhal, announced on August 4 that the United States and NATO launched the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which is a new mechanism that will allow NATO members and partners to finance the supply of American weapons and technology to Ukraine through voluntary contributions.[27] Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated on August 4 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $570 million) to purchase American weapons systems, including Patriot components and missiles, through the PURL initiative.[28] NATO announced on August 5 that Denmark, Norway, and Sweden will finance a combined $500 million military aid package to purchase air defense systems, Patriot munitions, anti-tank systems, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States through the PURL initiative.[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025
Find Out Day for India and Russia has been accelerated again - it is now today.
OilPrice.com (5 Aug):
Trump Imposes 50% Tariffs on Indian Imports Over Russian Oil Purchases
“U.S. President Donald Trump has signed an executive order enacting an additional 25% tariff on Indian goods, explicitly targeting India’s ongoing imports of Russian crude oil. This order increases the total tariff rate on Indian exports to the United States to 50%, the highest level for any country under current U.S. policy.
According to the executive order (effective 21 days after signing, beginning at 12:01?a.m. ET), duties will apply to goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouses on or after that time. “
Find Out Day for India and Russia has been accelerated again - it is now today.
OilPrice.com (5 Aug):
Trump Imposes 50% Tariffs on Indian Imports Over Russian Oil Purchases
“U.S. President Donald Trump has signed an executive order enacting an additional 25% tariff on Indian goods, explicitly targeting India’s ongoing imports of Russian crude oil. This order increases the total tariff rate on Indian exports to the United States to 50%, the highest level for any country under current U.S. policy.
According to the executive order (effective 21 days after signing, beginning at 12:01?a.m. ET), duties will apply to goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouses on or after that time. “
Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine. Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets amplified commentary from Russian State Duma deputies, largely framing Witkoff as a rational actor in US-Russia negotiations while portraying Trump as irrational. Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin stated on August 4 that he hoped that the results of Witkoff’s meeting with Putin would be “specific, not emotional, like Trump's latest statements,” and Russian media amplified Karasin’s comment in reporting about the Witkoff-Trump meeting on August 6.[5] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 6 that Trump sent Witkoff to “smooth over tensions” following Trump's recently issued “ultimatums” that Russia end the war or face US sanctions, and claimed that this smoothing over could negatively affect the image of the Trump administration.[6] Alexander “Sasha” Kots, a Russian milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin's Human Rights Council, accused Trump of “handing out” daily ultimatums and suggested that Witkoff will bring Trump a proposal that Trump “will perceive as a small victory.”[7] The Kremlin has frequently attempted to sow divisions between Ukraine and its allies, as well as between the United States and Europe, as part of wider efforts to deter support for Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin appears to be employing similar informational tactics against the Trump administration to undermine ongoing US efforts to compel Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. The Kremlin also likely aims to coerce unilateral concessions from the United States regarding the war, including fostering US-Russian economic deals in Russia's favor without Trump's stated preconditions of a ceasefire and negotiations for an enduring peace.
Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions. Bloomberg reported on August 5 that Russia's oil revenue fell by approximately a third from July 2024 to July 2025 due to the global decline in crude oil prices and the appreciation of the ruble.[9] Bloomberg reported that the oil industries continue to account for roughly a third of Russia's budget and that the drop in oil revenues therefore increases pressure on Russia's already-strained federal budget. Russian State Duma deputies downplayed the impact of the fall in oil revenue on August 6, however. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with the Russian outlet NEWS.ru that Russia would not stop the war in Ukraine even if it were “twice as expensive to fill oil tanks” and that the Russian government structured a reserve into its budget forecasts for 2025 such that even a $10 decrease in the price per barrel of oil would not impact the state budget.[10] State Duma Energy Committee First Deputy Chairperson Valery Selezne stated in an interview to Russian outlet OSN that Russia should take advantage of gas shortages in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to increase Russian exports to Central Asia to protect the Russian domestic economy from the financial burden of potential tariffs against Russia — somewhat in opposition to Zhuravlev's claim that Russia's economy is impervious to changes in oil revenues.[11] State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption member Adalbi Shkhagoshev stated in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS that further US sanctions against Russia will not affect the course of the war in Ukraine, and that new sanctions would amount to economic war against Russia and its BRICS allies.[12]
Economic indicators suggest that the Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project. The Russian Central Bank reported to TASS on August 6 that the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.4 percent in the first quarter of 2025, below the originally forecasted growth projection of two percent, and by 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025, close to the forecasted growth projection of 1.9 percent.[13] The Russian Central Bank claimed that there was a “slowdown in the growth rate of household and government consumption” in April 2025, which the bank did not forecast. UK outlet Express reported on August 6 that Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade data showed that the passenger car market fell by 24 percent from July 2024 to July 2025.[14] Consumer spending is a major driver of domestic economies, and a decline in purchases of a common item such as passenger vehicles suggests that consumers either face or fear economic instability that would inhibit such purchases. The Russian Central Bank is likely attempting to use reports of GDP growth as a sign of economic stability to project confidence to the domestic Russian populace who may be worried about the impact of the war and further Western sanctions on everyday life. Russian officials and the Central Bank are also likely attempting to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia or secondary sanctions against Russia's trading partners. Increased sanctions, especially against Russian oil exports, will further hinder Russia's ability to fund its war in Ukraine. The sanctions remain critical — in tandem with continued Western defense assistance to Ukraine — to constraining Russian aggression.[15]
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the first contingent of Russian troops and military equipment arrived in Belarus on August 6 ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise in September 2025.[106] Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 total military personnel would participate in Zapad-2025.[107] ISW previously assessed that Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise, as most of Russia's forces that participated in the previous Zapad-2021 joint exercise are fighting in Ukraine.[108]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025