The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war effort. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on June 18 that it obtained a document from the Russian Presidential Administration instructing Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets on which events to cover at SPIEF on June 18 to 21.[6] The events that Russian media should reportedly focus on include the presentation of a new civilian vehicle from a Russian car manufacturer, flag-raising ceremonies for fishing vessels, ceremonies connecting a village and factory in Tambov Oblast to gas networks, and events hosted by organizations subordinate to the Presidential Administration. The document reportedly instructs journalists to focus on events from the “Znanie” (Knowledge) Society, the board of which Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko heads; the “Russia-Land of Opportunities” non-profit organization, which runs the Kremlin's “Time of Heroes” program placing veterans in federal, regional, and local government positions; and presentations of books about war, economics, and disinformation. A political strategist who has worked for the Russian Presidential Administration told Meduza that Russian news coverage of SPIEF previously focused on foreign investment and high-profile foreign guests, but that the Kremlin now aims to project social optimism and the “appearance that everything is moving forward.” The Kremlin may have also limited internet access around SPIEF in order to better control the information space. Russian opposition media reported that Russians in and around St. Petersburg began experiencing internet outages overnight on June 17 to 18.[7] Russian authorities previously disconnected large swaths of Russia from mobile internet using the Sovereign Internet system during Victory Day celebrations on May 9 under the guise of ensuring security but likely aimed to limit reports, footage, and imagery of Ukrainian strikes that could destroy the facade of Russian victory.[8] Russian authorities may be employing similar measures during SPIEF as part of efforts to forward the Kremlin's social optimism messaging.
The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to Western audiences. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 18 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet with journalists from different countries, including “unfriendly” countries and the Global South, in order to accurately convey Putin's and Russia's point of view to Western audiences.[9] Peskov claimed that Putin will hold a question-and-answer session with journalists about global events and Russian domestic and foreign policy.[10] Peskov did not specify which journalists will attend the meeting with Putin. Russian state media has historically platformed pro-Kremlin media sources and journalists from other countries in efforts to legitimize and spread ongoing Kremlin rhetoric internationally.[11] Putin likely aims to use this meeting to promote Kremlin narratives to support Russian foreign policy objectives, including deterring Western support for Ukraine and supporting Russian efforts to improve bilateral relations with the United States.
The Kremlin continues to crack down on critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian information space. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 18 that its law enforcement sources stated that Russian authorities detained Mikhail Polynkov, the administrator of the “Soldatskaya Pravda” Telegram channel.[16] TASS’s sources claimed that Russian authorities opened a criminal case against Polynkov for abandoning his military unit. Russian state media outlet RBK reported that Polynkov’s lawyer stated that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained Polynkov and took him to the 517th Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee but that the charges against Polynkov were still unclear.[17] Polynkov reported his detention on his Telegram channel on June 18 and implied that Russian authorities may have detained him due to his previous posts criticizing Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov's stance on Israel and Iran.[18] Russian milbloggers and opposition outlets noted that Polynkov was a member of the Russian Strelkov Movement, which advocates for the release of imprisoned former officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin.[19] The Russian Strelkov Movement claimed on June 18 that Polynkov’s arrest was due to his efforts to search for Russian servicemembers who are missing in action (MIA), suggesting that Russian authorities may have detained Polynkov over concerns he would expose the scale of Russian losses.[20] The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide censorship campaign against the Russian information space since 2022, including by arresting the administrators of Telegram channels that were publicly critical of Russian political and military leadership.[21]
Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid and announce new sanctions packages against Russia. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced on June 17 that Canada will provide Ukraine with two billion CAD (roughly $1.4 billion) for the purchase of helicopters, drones, armored vehicles, and ammunition and will lend Ukraine 2.3 billion CAD (roughly $1.6 billion) for the reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure.[12] Canada is providing Ukraine with the loan through the G7 Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans mechanism, which will finance and repay the loan using future profits from seized Russian assets.[13] Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand announced on June 17 that Canada is imposing sanctions against 77 Russian individuals, 39 entities, and 201 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet and sanctioning the trade of goods, including those related to chemical and biological weapons, dual-use industrial goods and technologies, and Russian coal and metal exports.[14] The European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) recently announced additional sanctions against Russia's financial, military-industrial, and energy sectors.[15]
more + maps: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2025
The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin's public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely. Putin articulated a theory of victory during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2024 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.[1] Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Putin's discussion with foreign media at SPIEF on June 19, 2025, demonstrated that Putin still maintains this theory of victory one year later.[2] Putin claimed that Russian forces have a “strategic advantage” in all areas of the front. Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline every day and that even if Russian forces advance less on some days, they are “still advancing.” Putin claimed that the “situation has changed” since the March 2022 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul and that the terms Russia proposed in 2022 are “much softer” than the terms Russia demands today. Putin threatened that the situation may worsen for Ukraine if Ukraine does not make significant concessions and agree to a peace settlement on Russia's terms and called on Ukraine's partners to “point to the realities of today” to push Ukraine toward a settlement. Putin reiterated that Russia is prepared to achieve its war goals militarily if it is not able to achieve these goals diplomatically. Putin has repeatedly indicated that Russia's war aims include regime change in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Kremlin proxy government in Kyiv, significant limitations of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression, Ukrainian neutrality, and NATO's abandonment of its open-door policy.[3]
Other Kremlin officials also rearticulated Putin's theory of victory on June 19. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question in a June 19 interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia about what Russia should do since “international institutions do not work” and diplomacy fails to meet Russia's expectations of ensuring peace on Russia's terms.[4] Peskov claimed that Russia must be patient and take a “consistent” position — a call for Russia to not waver from its long-held demands as time will produce Russia's desired outcome. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo similarly claimed on June 19 that “Russia is a country with which is better not to fight because time...is on [Russia's] side.”[5]
Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine — conditions that the West can still change. Putin's theory assumes that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any operationally- or strategically-significant territory that Russian forces seize.[6] Russian forces are taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal tactical gains that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, but Putin's theory assumes that the Russian military will be able to maintain the theater-wide initiative and sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains longer than the West is willing to provide security assistance to Ukraine and longer than Ukraine's economy and population are able to mobilize for the war effort. ISW continues to assess that Russia will face a number of challenges in its economy and defense industrial base (DIB) in the medium-term that will impede Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war in Ukraine.[7] Continued rising oil prices following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort, but only if the price of oil remains high and if Russian oil does not come under additional international sanctions.[8] Increased Western military aid and economic instruments can enable Ukrainian forces to maintain pressure on the battlefield and exacerbate Russia's economic issues, leveraging Russia's weaknesses to achieve a strong negotiating position for Ukraine and the West and extract critical concessions from Russia to bring about a lasting and just end to the war.
Putin continued Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears to be adapting this campaign for different audiences. Putin claimed during his June 19 meeting with foreign journalists at SPIEF that Russia does not consider NATO rearmament (in line with US President Donald Trump's objective for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective security) to be a threat as Russia is able to ensure its own security and is constantly improving the Russian military and Russia's defensive capabilities.[9] Putin claimed that “whatever NATO does” will create threats, but that Russia will suppress all the threats that arise. Putin claimed that the idea that Russia is going to attack NATO states in Europe is “nonsense” - despite Kremlin statements threatening the Baltic states and Finland and Russian military preparations for a conflict with NATO in the future.[10] Putin also claimed during the June 19 meeting that Germany's possible supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine will not impact the course of military operations in Ukraine but will cause “serious damage” to German-Russian relations.[11] Kremlin officials have made similar demonstrably untrue claims about Western weapons’ inability to change the situation on the battlefield in the past.[12]
Putin's statements are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia, such as by refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine or stopping efforts to increase NATO's defensive capabilities.[13] Putin's claims about Taurus missiles and threats from NATO differ from previous Kremlin statements along these lines, however. Kremlin officials have recently framed European efforts to increase their defense capabilities as a threat to Russian national security, in contrast to Putin's June 19 claim.[14] Putin used his June 2024 meeting with foreign journalists at SPIEF to threaten that Russia might supply long-range weapons to unspecified Western adversaries to try to push the West to not lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia — a more direct and aggressive threat than Putin's June 2025 claims that Germany's supply of weapons to Ukraine would damage bilateral German-Russian relations.[15] Putin may be trying different variations of Russia's wider reflexive control campaign that cater specifically to new audiences.
Putin explicitly stated that he will not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Putin stated that he is willing to negotiate with Zelensky but claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate and that Russia will only sign legal agreements with “legitimate” authorities.[16] Putin reiterated his false claims that there is no legal mechanism in the Ukrainian Constitution or law to extend the term of a Ukrainian president under martial law, and Putin deliberately misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and law to bolster his claims. Putin also claimed that all Zelensky-appointed Ukrainian government bodies are illegitimate, alleging that if the president is illegitimate then “the entire system of power becomes illegitimate.” Ukraine's Constitution and Ukrainian law explicitly state that Ukraine cannot hold elections while martial law is in place and that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while “the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity” remains.[17] Putin's recent statement that he is willing to negotiate with Zelensky is meaningless as Putin indicated that he will not sign a legal peace agreement with the Ukrainian government. Putin and other Kremlin officials have frequently and falsely accused Zelensky and other facets of the Ukrainian government of being illegitimate with this misrepresentation of Ukrainian law since May 2024, and the Kremlin has described every Ukrainian government since 2014 as illegitimate.[18] Russian officials have occasionally proposed other Ukrainian officials and entities are possible legitimate authorities with which Russia can legally negotiate and sign a peace agreement, but Putin's statement accusing the whole government under Zelensky of also being illegitimate suggests that Russia would also not recognize an agreement signed by any member of the current Ukrainian government.[19] ISW continues to assess that these information operations are part of an effort to set informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Russia may sign with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing.[20]
Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia's economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using “free resources,” including Russia's workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system's capital reserve.[25] Nabiullina stated that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged that the Russian economy is “cooling,” but claimed that more positive trends are on the horizon and that Russia's current economic model is working.[26] The Moscow Times claimed that, according to Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Russia's unemployment rate has dropped to a historic low of just 2.3 percent and that mass emigration and military drafting of men have exacerbated labor shortages.[27] The Moscow Times further noted that, according to Rosstat, the liquid assets of Russia's sovereign wealth fund has decreased threefold to 2.8 trillion rubles (roughly $35.7 billion) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[28] Russia's Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated that Russia is on the “brink of recession” and noted that Russia's strict monetary policy is hindering the ability of industries outside of the defense industrial base (DIB) to attract investments.[29] ISW observed recent reporting that the Kremlin is trying to promote social optimism at SPIEF rather than its traditional focus on foreign investment, and Russian official statements about Russian economic issues are complicating these efforts.[30] These Russian economic officials may be attempting to temper some of the Kremlin's expectation-setting among domestic Russian audiences about the impacts of a prolonged war effort in Ukraine without completely contradicting official Kremlin rhetoric that Russia can wage protracted war against Ukraine indefinitely.
more + maps https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025