“Some thoughts about the supplemental bill. This is good news, but it will primarily help Ukraine defend in 2024 and into 2025. Russia will still likely make further gains this year, and it doesn’t fix all of Ukraine’s issues. It should be seen as one part of a long-term strategy.
Ukraine has had three main problems since Russia seized the initiative in October: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Ukraine is making progress building fortifications and multiple defensive lines, but defenses on many of the key parts of the front are still underdeveloped, contributing to Russian advances. 2/
The bill and first PDA aid package announced this week will provide a quick boost to Ukraine’s defenses. But it is important to keep in mind that the limitations aren’t just appropriated funds but also production capacity and size of stockpiles. Greater artillery ammunition deliveries will help reduce Russia’s 5-6:1 artillery advantage, but it will not give Ukraine parity. 3/
The PDA package will also provide other critical ammunition like anti-tank mines and Javelin/TOW ATGMs. Recent Russian advances have demonstrated that increased numbers of FPVs cannot replace artillery, mines, and ATGMs. Russia’s assault on Vuhledar in 2023 and Ukraine’s offensive last summer demonstrated how effective mines can be for defending forces. 4/
Further deliveries of armored vehicles will also be important. Many Ukrainian brigades don’t have sufficient armored vehicles, and combat losses often aren’t replaced. This leads to higher casualties. Bradleys are very popular, armored humvees will help, and further M113 would be very useful for CASEVAC. 5/
Air defense is another critical Ukrainian need. Russia has resumed its missile campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and UMPK glide bombs, which played a key role in Russia’s seizure of Avdiivka, are a serious problem. More recently, Russian Su-25 attack aircraft have been operating closer to the front than normal, which indicates a lack of SHORAD and MANPADS. 6/
The USAI package announced today includes Patriot and NASAMS missiles and the PDA included Stinger MANPADS and RIM-7/AIM-9M missiles reportedly for FrankeSAM systems. Stingers could help push Su-25 further from the front line, and Patriots are critical both for defending cities and infrastructure from Russian ballistic missiles and also to counter Russian Su-34 bombers that drop UMPK glide bombs. 7/
The question is whether production of these missiles is sufficient to meet Ukraine’s continued air defense needs over time, especially with increased Russian production of Shahed UAS and missiles. F-16 fighters and their airbases will be another priority target for Russian missiles that will require air defense coverage. It also depends how successful the various FrankenSAM programs prove to be. 8/
Manpower has become the most pressing issue though, which was exacerbated by reduced deliveries of ammunition and equipment over the winter. Ukraine’s summer offensive primarily culminated when it ran out of infantry, and Ukraine has struggled to replace combat losses since then. 9/
This means that Ukrainian brigades are understrength, and Ukraine lacks sufficient reserves to respond to Russian advances, so units are pulled from one part of the front to attempt to stop advances elsewhere. Ukrainian infantry need to be rotated more often or there will be a growing risk of exhaustion. 10/
Ukraine has passed a new mobilization bill that provides incentives for volunteers and increases the pool of men available to be drafted. Hopefully, this will improve the manpower situation, but it will take time to mobilize and train soldiers/units. 11/
More concerning is that the manpower issue has been known for some time, but has not been fixed. The longer it takes to improve the manpower situation, the less likely it becomes that Ukraine can conduct a offensive in 2025. The new NATO-trained/equipped brigades last summer did not have enough time to train together, and Russian defenses will still be strong. New soldiers/units need to be mobilized to replace current losses and trained for 2025. 12/
At the same time, one of the most important factors in the war last year was that Russia was able to significantly improve its manpower situation, recruiting more than 300,000 volunteers. 13/
It isn’t just involuntary mobilized soldiers and prisoners, they are mostly getting volunteers who are willing to go into costly assaults. The quality, of course, varies, but the quantitative advantage is a serious problem. 14/
Without this manpower advantage, Russia’s artillery and airpower advantage would not be sufficient for Russia to make gains on the battlefield. The relative manpower situation is likely the most important factor that will determine the war’s trajectory, particularly if Russia can sustain recruiting 20-30k a month. 15/
The immediate problem is that Russia continues to advance on the battlefield, and has reached important locations while Ukraine faced ammunition shortages. Russia is bringing up reserves to Chasiv Yar, and will likely soon begin an assault on the city. 16/
Russian forces are also expanding their foothold in Ocheretyne, which threatens Ukrainian positions nearby, and they have advanced into Krasnohrivka and have made recent gains on the Marinka-Novomykhailivka front. 16/
Even with increased ammunition deliveries/expenditure, Ukraine might not be able to hold Chasiv Yar and other of these towns/cities, and Russia faces more favorable terrain once they get past Chasiv Yar, which could lead to an increase in the rate of advance. If Chasiv Yar falls, it will also put Ukrainian positions south of the city at risk. This is true for further Russian advances elsewhere. The delays in aid/mobilization have been costly. 18/
If Ukraine can stabilize the front and fix the manpower situation in 2024 when Russia has a number of advantages, 2025 could be more favorable because Western production capacity will increase and Russian equipment losses could become a greater issue. If the manpower situation does not improve, then the second half of 2024 will likely be more difficult for Ukraine than the first half. 19/
This bill will be vital, but it needs to be part of a broader long-term strategy for Ukraine. Western countries need to consider how to help Ukraine compensate for Russia’s current advantages, including increased deliveries of long-range missiles. 20/”
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