The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine. Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery from early February 2025 to May 23, 2025, shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[1] Greenpeace reported that these new powerlines are the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.[2] Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to “full capacity,” suggesting that Russia intends to bring the ZNPP’s reactors out of their current cold shutdown state.[3] Likhachev claimed in May 2024 to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment that restarting the ZNPP was currently “impossible” and that the first condition for restarting the ZNPP must be to ensure its security, either with a security guarantee or after the frontline had shifted away from the ZNPP.[4]
US President Donald Trump's April 2025 seven-point peace proposal to Ukraine included a provision for Ukraine to regain control over the ZNPP with US involvement, and the proposed Ukraine-European peace plan also contained this provision.[5] Russian officials have repeatedly rejected giving up control over the ZNPP, however.[6] Russian officials have also increased their rhetoric, invoking Russia's alleged historical ties to “Novorossiya,” which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Russian occupation authorities have recently called for Russia to control areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast near the Dnipro River that Russia has not yet illegally annexed.[7] The Russian definition of Novorossiya notably includes the area directly across from the ZNPP on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Russia's efforts to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid suggest that Russia wants to maintain its control over the ZNPP and operate it safely as Russia likely expects to significantly push the frontline away from the plant or plans to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States had received Ukraine's list of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is now waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions.[8] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to “write...down in detail” and present their versions for a possible future ceasefire, but did not specify a deadline.[9] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 27 that Russia is preparing its version of the memorandum.[10] Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated on May 27 that the success of peace negotiations will depend on the participants’ willingness to address the war's ”root causes,” reiterating long-standing Russian demands that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation.[11] The Kremlin is likely leveraging the lack of a deadline to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract more concessions and improve Russia's negotiating position by making battlefield advances.
Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin met with the supervisory board of the state-formed “Russia-Land of Opportunities” non-profit organization on May 27 and spoke with participants of the organization's programs during a highly scripted event.[12] Putin claimed that many foreigners see Russia as a “stronghold” of traditional spiritual and moral values. Putin claimed that Soviet citizens’ “spirit of devotion to their people” formed the basis of the Soviet victory in the Second World War and stated that the “internal mobilization” of each Russian citizen and Russian society as a whole is the most important thing right now for Russia. Putin stated that the future of a state depends on its independence, sovereignty, and self-sufficiency; that Russia will not exist if it is not sovereign; and that “passion within society” is important for Russian sovereignty.
The general director of “Russia-Land of Opportunities,” Andrei Betin, highlighted that Putin named 2025 the “Year of the Defender of the Fatherland” and noted that many Russian servicemembers who are fighting in Ukraine participate in the non-profit’s programs. Putin spoke during the meeting with an active duty Russian servicemember, who proposed creating additional programs that allow Russian military personnel to work with the non-profit so that the servicemembers “will say that Russia remembers [them], Russia has not forgotten [them].” Putin claimed that the Russian government is working to create conditions for the “self-realization” of Russian servicemembers returning home from the war. Putin highlighted how many graduates of the organization's programs have gone on to become leaders and politicians in the federal, regional, and municipal government, specifically noting that many participants of the non-profit’s “Leaders of Russia. Politics” program have won State Duma elections since 2020 and forecasting that more participants of the program will run in the 2026 Duma elections.
Putin and other Kremlin officials have recently focused their rhetoric on Russia's strong “traditional and moral values” and used the mythos of the Second World War to call for unity within Russian society – likely as part of an ongoing effort to foster anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and prepare the Russian population for a prolonged war in Ukraine and a possible future conflict with NATO.[13] Putin's support for programs aimed at reintegrating Russian veterans into society suggests that the Kremlin fears political instability and the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society – as ISW has assessed.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is engaged in a campaign to create a new cadre of militarized, loyal elites to unify Russian society against the perceived threat of the West, including by co-opting Russian veterans to participate in the 2026 State Duma elections.[15]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2025
Russia is unlikely to totally zero out its National Wealth Fund, but rather to shift to other methods of covering its budget shortfall (simply printing rubles, as they cannot borrow enough), before the NWF hits zero. Looks like we are entering that phase now, which will induce more inflation into the Russian economy, and devalue the ruble further. The National Wealth Fund can no longer buffer the Russian Government from oil price shocks, or declining oil export revenue - the stage is being set for a takedown. Oil revenue is the only thing preventing hyperinflationary money printing - the last leg under Russian finances and their economy.
OilPrice.com reports today:
“Russia could consider adjusting the oil price level in its so-called budget rule amid falling oil prices, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said on Wednesday.
Under the budget rule, Russia has a baseline price of $60 per barrel of oil, above which it funnels excess revenue to its National Wealth Fund, a rainy-day reserves fund. However, when the price is below $60 per barrel – as Russia’s crude grades have been for two months now – Russia taps into the fund to offset shortfalls in revenue from oil and gas exports.
Changing the so-called cut-off price for the budget rule would signal a U-turn in Russia’s fiscal policy amid significantly lower oil prices compared to the first quarter of 2025.
“We need to think about whether, when preparing the new budget for the medium term, we should review the cut-off price level, the baseline price of $60 per barrel, to what extent it currently corresponds to the levels that allow us to ensure not only the preservation but also the replenishment of the National Wealth Fund,” Russian news agency Interfax quoted Siluanov as telling lawmakers today.
“We will discuss both the baseline price and the replenishment of the National Wealth Fund, as all of this is linked to the overall budget balance,” the minister added.”
Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts. A Reuters source reportedly stated that Putin is less inclined now to make territorial compromises and continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[8] The source stated that “Putin has toughened his position” about territory. Putin first demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts, and Russian officials have often reiterated this demand since.[9] The Washington Post reported on May 27 that Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that the Russian military command has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed.[10] Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast since May 2024.[11] Russian forces also recently launched attacks to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, with Russian officials calling for Russia to seize Sumy City, likely to set conditions for Russia to annex the oblast.[12] Russia will likely struggle to seize the entirety of the four illegally annexed oblasts, especially as the seizure of the heavily fortified fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and the forcing of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast will require significantly larger force groupings than the forces currently deployed in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command would have solely concentrated its efforts on seizing all of the four oblasts if the Kremlin's territorial ambitions were truly limited to the four oblasts, but the deployment of significant forces to attack in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts suggests that Russia intends to increase its territorial demands. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains significant territorial ambitions in southern and eastern Ukraine, and Russian officials within Putin's innermost circle have even called for Russia to take control of most of the country.[13]
Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances. One of Reuters’ sources reportedly stated that Putin will try to use military victories to show Ukraine and Europe that “peace tomorrow will be even more painful” if Putin is unable to secure his desired terms in a peace deal.[14] The source stated that Putin would take advantage of any tactical battlefield opportunities to advance further into Ukraine and that Putin believes that Russia can fight for years in the face of any sanctions or other economic measures the West might place on Russia in the future. ISW has long assessed that Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances indefinitely and to outlast and overcome Western military aid to Ukraine and Ukraine's own efforts to mobilize.[15]
Russia will likely be able to continue its current tactics that are resulting in gradual, creeping advances as long as Russia is able to replenish its losses on the frontline. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on May 28 that almost 175,000 people have arrived at military units and that more than 14,000 people have joined volunteer units since the start of 2025, for a total of roughly 1,285 people per day.[16] Medvedev also reiterated Putin's May 13 claim that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month.[17] Putin's claimed recruitment rate is notably higher than Medvedev’s, and ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Reports from the Ukrainian General Staff about Russia's daily losses indicate that Russian suffered a daily loss rate of 1,550 per day in January 2025; 1,261 in February 2025; 1,312 in March 2025; 1,219 in April 2025; and 1,140 between May 1 and May 28.[18] Medvedev’s May 28 claim that 175,000 soldiers have joined Russian military units since January 2025 indicates that Russia is replenishing its units at about a one-for-one ratio to its loss rate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces, supported by Western aid, can inflict higher personnel loss rates on the battlefield that could push Putin to make difficult decisions and force Putin to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war.[19]
The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Russia is alarmed by the accumulation of NATO troops along Russia's border and that NATO's eastern expansion and discussions to bring Ukraine into the alliance triggered Russia into launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[20] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that NATO has deployed 34,200 troops on its “eastern flank” — which runs from Finland to Turkey — since February 2022.[21] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russia had deployed over 700,000 Russian soldiers to Ukraine, in contrast.[22] NATO had not significantly progressed Ukraine's path to membership in the years since the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no formal steps toward Ukrainian membership in late 2021 and 2022.[23] Putin explicitly admitted in December 2024 that former US President Joseph Biden offered in 2021 to postpone consideration of Ukraine's membership to NATO for 10 to 15 years — demonstrating that Ukraine's NATO membership was not an immediate prospect and undermining the Kremlin's attempts to blame NATO for Russia's 2022 invasion.[24] ISW continues to assess that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 because he feared NATO but because he believed that NATO was weak and aimed to destroy the alliance.[25]
more + maps
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025