Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 25, 2025
Putin continues to reject Trump’s and Zelensky’s proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump’s efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement. The US readouts for both its meetings with Russian and Ukrainian delegations noted that Trump’s “imperative that the killing on both sides” of the war must stop, “as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement” — likely in reference to the unconditional 30-day general ceasefire on the frontline that Trump and Zelensky have already agreed upon, but that Putin rejected on March 18.[13]
The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[14] The Kremlin stated that unspecified actors — presumably the United States — must also reconnect Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations to SWIFT and lift restrictions on trade finance transactions. Additionally, they must lift sanctions restricting companies producing and exporting food and fertilizers and their insurance companies, lift restrictions on servicing ships in ports and sanctions against ships operating under the Russian flag involved in trading food and fertilizer products, and lift restrictions on supplying agricultural machinery and other tools used in food and fertilizer production to Russia. The United States did not provide Russia such demanded sanctions relief when Ukraine and Russia agreed to the grain deal in July 2022.[15] The White House and Kremlin readouts of the US-Russian meetings noted that the “United States will help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions,” but the US readout notably did not include explicit language suggesting that Russia‘s acceptance and adherence to the Black Sea ceasefire would be conditional on preliminary US sanctions relief.[16] The United States will likely require European Union (EU) cooperation in order to lift some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and fertilizer markets.[17] US President Donald Trump responded to a question about the United States lifting some sanctions on Russia before Russia implements measures in the Black Sea and stated that the US is considering lifting some sanctions against Russia.[18] Establishing the initial grain deal in July 2022 did not require any sanctions relief, and reinstating the grain deal likely similarly does not require preliminary sanctions relief.[19] Establishing a temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea does not require preliminary sanctions relief.
The Kremlin’s official statements are vague, stipulate requirements for the ceasefire that neither the United States nor Ukrainian official statements mention, and leave room for disagreement among the parties that would be involved in interpreting the agreements, lifting sanctions, and monitoring potential violations. The official Kremlin statement is vague on the specific sanctions and restrictions the Kremlin is demanding that the West preliminarily lift and the specific financial organizations and companies involved. The Kremlin statement also does not specify the actors that will interpret the parameters of these restrictions, monitor lifting these restrictions, and verify all parties’ compliance. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States issued separate statements because the US-Ukrainian meetings did not discuss US-Russian efforts to assist restoring Russian access to agricultural and trade markets.[20]
The Russian military continues to deny rotations to soldiers who have been fighting in the war in Ukraine for years. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting of the Council for Culture and Arts on March 25 that the Russian MoD is considering issues surrounding rotations for servicemembers who went to the front earlier in the full-scale invasion.[73] Putin stated that the “issue is acute” and vaguely claimed that Russian authorities “will proceed from the realities that are developing on the frontline.” Putin claimed that many mobilized servicemembers who have not had rotations have gained so much combat experience over the years that “many of them have become professional soldiers” and work alongside personnel from professional military units, like naval infantry and airborne (VDV) elements.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025
Russia continues to seek rewards ahead of any deal.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26, 2025
Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump’s recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March 19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can take control of the ZNPP.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP’s territory or control over it to Ukraine or any other country is “impossible” and that the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country is “unacceptable.”[11] The Russian MFA added that it would be “absurd” to allow any international organization to help operate the ZNPP. The Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia’s illegal occupation of the ZNPP by claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s October 2022 decree legally brought the ZNPP under Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia is not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States.[12] The Kremlin routinely falsely portrays itself as the only safe operator of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian forces occupied the area in March 2022.[13] Russia has notably stored military equipment near the ZNPP reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP grounds to launch strike drones.[14] The Kremlin also routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these narratives to spoil ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.[15]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025