Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 3, 2025
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems. Russian MoD-run television network TV Zvezda broadcasted Russian soldiers at the Mikhailovsky Military Artillery Academy in St. Petersburg training on the “Glaz/Groza” combat operations coordination software, which provides organized command and control (C2) functions to Russian units on the frontline.[62] Russian forces have largely relied on ad hoc communications systems to coordinate combat operations in Ukraine via social media messaging applications, and a former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger previously claimed that the Russian MoD has not introduced its official “Glaz/Groza” application at a wide enough scale for Russian forces to adopt.[63]
Russian soldiers continue to complain that Russian military commanders are abusing soldiers and hiding high casualty rates. Russian opposition outlets Astra and Mobilization News reported on January 3 that Russian officers of military unit 29593 (either the 1440th Motorized Rifle Regiment or the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment [reportedly of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps]) are confiscating the personal phones of soldiers and forcing injured soldiers to pay their platoon commanders 20,000 to 50,000 rubles (about $181 to $452) in order to receive treatment at hospitals.[64] The opposition outlets reported that the Russian command of the unit may have transferred injured soldiers to “unit 44744” – which may be a fake unit – in order to hide the high casualty rates of unit 29593.[65] ISW has observed prior reports of Russian officers physically abusing subordinates and extorting them for money, likely due to poor command training and discipline.[66]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2025
Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[2]
Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks.[3] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 “new and thoroughly modernized” tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024.[4] The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities.[5] A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date.[6] The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.
Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024.[7] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults.[8] The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses.[9] Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.[10]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025