https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1_%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B8_%D0%91%D0%BE%D0%B3
Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
“In #Russia, state-run energy firm Gazprom is postponing several major offshore exploration projects in the Arctic amid record losses, Western #sanctions in response to the invasion of Ukraine and China’s reluctance to sign a new contract for Russian #gas”
https://x.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1832028089343258908
“The UK will send Ukraine 650 Martlet missiles worth $213 million. The first shipment is expected to be delivered by the end of this year, according to the country’s Ministry of Defense.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1831932666767446435
“Russian invader catches 🇺🇦Ukrainian FPV drone and runs with it, then drops it and it exploded…”
https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1831649982673240337
[1] An anonymous US official confirmed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that Iran delivered the missiles to Russia and a senior European official stated that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected.[2] Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.[3] It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Reuters reported on July 7 that Iran expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran since August and October 2023 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia.[4] Russia recently intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles.[5] Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy. military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and disrupt Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia. CTP-ISW has reported extensively on how Moscow and Tehran have expanded their economic, media, military, and political cooperation since Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[6] Iran seeks to benefit economically and militarily from its expanding partnership with Russia. Iran has sought cash for its ailing economy in return for selling weapons to the Kremlin, as CTP-ISW reported in September 2023.[7] Iran has also sought to procure Russian Su-35 fighter jets and Iranian officials “pressed” Russia for the delivery of Su-35s during a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Tehran in August 2024.[8] The acquisition of Su-35s could enable Iran to more readily and independently project air power, given that the current Iranian air fleet is outdated and poorly maintained.[9] Iranian leaders have separately sought Russian support in upgrading their cyber capabilities and missile and space programs as part of the expanding military collaboration.[10] The United States and unspecified European countries have reportedly prepared a sanctions package against Iran for this contingency.[11]
The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology. Russian President Vladimir Putin created the “Rossiya” National Center in Moscow on July 1 to preserve the “Rossiya” (“Russia”) Exhibition and Forum that ran from November 2023 to July 2024.[42] Putin signed a decree on September 6 creating an organizing committee for the “Rossiya” National Center, which will “demonstrate [Russia's] achievements, strengthen national identity,...create a sense of pride for the country, [and] develop the professional skills of children and youth.”[43] Putin appointed Kiriyenko as the chairperson of the center's organizing committee, which will plan the center's activities, propose events that include representatives of foreign governments, and assist Russian media with their coverage of the center's events. Kiriyenko has a prominent role overseeing multiple Kremlin information operations targeting Russian, Ukrainian, and Western information spaces, and his appointment to supervise the development of the center suggests that the center will play a role in shaping domestic and foreign perceptions of Russia.[44] The “Rossiya” National Center will likely continue these informational efforts to legitimize Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories and to promote Russia's justification of its war against Ukraine. The eight-month-long “Rossiya” exhibition forum featured exhibits claiming that Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts are part of Russia.[45] The Kremlin has recently appeared to be taking steps to codify a Russian state ideology while bypassing the Russian Constitution, which forbids Russia from establishing a state ideology, by vaguely defining Russia's “traditional values,” and the “Rossiya” National Center's emphasis on Russia's “national identity” will likely further these Kremlin ideological efforts.[46]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2024
The relics of the great saint were secretly brought to Kursk. They prayed for victory over the enemy and protection from American missiles.
The relics of Saint Matrona of Moscow, near which Andrei Belousov repeatedly prayed, were brought to Kursk in the strictest secrecy. A prayer service was held near them with the participation of a number of high-ranking military and local officials, including Acting Governor Alexei Smirnov. “We prayed for victory over the enemy. For the liberation of our lands from the occupiers. And so that the Americans would not allow the Kiev regime to fire their long-range missiles deep into Russia. Such permission could cause a lot of trouble. We believe that God will protect us from this,” a source in the Ministry of Defense said. According to him, the prayer service was secret so that enemy troops would not strike it.
The relics of Matrona of Moscow were brought on the personal order of the Minister of Defense. “Andrey Removich prayed near them before the successful missile strikes on Poltava and Lvov. And he believes that the holy relics will improve the situation in the Kursk region, and protect our Russia from NATO weapons,” said another source in Belousov’s entourage. If the prayer service leads to “tangible results,” a previously planned religious procession against the invasion and advance of Ukraine will take place in Kursk. Now it has been paused.
It should be noted that not everyone is happy with such events. For example, Apti Adaudinov believes that “excessive attention” to Christian shrines offends the “Akhmat” fighters - the Muslims who are part of it. And who, according to the general, “play a vital role in the defense of the Kursk region and all of Russia.”
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4616
When they run out of resources, they turn to delusion.
Gott mit uns
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1_%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B8_%D0%91%D0%BE%D0%B3
How to Train a Russian Tank Crew
You too could command and destroy your very own tank, by simply passing this course. No T-55’s were harmed during the making of this video. Mostly because nobody saw us filming and engaged us with a primitive weapon. Anyway, enlist in Squire’s army today and receive cracking benefits -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hzl_wcNfis
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
Reporting From Ukraine Uncensored Combat Footage (from this and past Reports) is found on Telegram:
https://t.me/RFUEnglish or @RFUEnglish
[ You need to have the Telegram app to view the larger videos. ]
The complete transcript.
—
[ Months of Russian Plans Ruined by Small River ]
—
Today [ Sept 7 ], there are a lot of updates from the Kurakhove direction.
Here, the Russians launched a daring assault on Prechistivka, a tactically crucial settlement just ten kilometers from Vuhledar. As the Russians are accumulating forces for a large push here, both sides are aware that further actions in this area will significantly alter the dynamics and complexity of the battle for Vuhledar.
The Russian strategy aims to encircle Ukrainian forces in Vuhledar with coordinated assaults from the northeast and southwest. As mentioned in the previous report, the northern pincer is formed by Russian attacks toward the South Donbas coal mine and Vodiane, while the southern pincer is advancing through Prechistivka.
The objective of the Russian operation in the southeast is to capture the village of Prechistivka. Securing this location would allow the Russians to establish a logistical hub and conceal equipment for future operations to the north. The capture of Prechistivka would enable Russian forces to launch an attack on the town of Novoukrainka.
Simultaneously, Russian troops assaulting Vodiane would push westward. The final phase of this strategy involves a coordinated assault from Novoukrainka and Vodiane on Bohoyavlenka, aiming to complete the encirclement of Vuhledar.
The Russian command had been preparing this offensive for some time, subjecting Ukrainian positions in Prechistivka to 3 months of intense bombardment using artillery, multi-barrel rocket systems, aviation, and FPV drones.
Russian officers believed that sustained firepower would suppress Ukrainian defenders and weaken their resistance. However, the prolonged period of shelling gave the Ukrainians enough time to recognize and anticipate the Russian plan.
The overwhelming Russian firepower forced Ukrainian forces, defending Prechistivka, to withdraw north of the Kashlahach River. This tactical withdrawal allowed the Ukrainians to establish a more stable 2nd line of defense along the Berestova gully, positioned in front of Novoukrainsk.
By doing so, the Ukrainians were able to strengthen their defenses and prevent the Russians from using the town as a key position in their encirclement attempt.
By withdrawing to fortified positions north of Prechistivka, Ukrainian forces effectively neutralized the strategic advantage of the Russian capture of the village. The Russians are now forced into grinding infantry battles in the trenches north of Prechistivka, facing the prospect of severe losses in the open fields between the village and Novoukrainsk.
Without securing this high ground, their operation is bound to fail. If we look at the topographic map, we can see that the Ukrainian defensive line lies at a higher elevation than Prechistivka, which is situated in a gully. This elevated position provides the Ukrainians with complete fire control over the lowlands, giving them a significant tactical advantage.
After months of intense bombardment and shelling of an almost empty Prechistivka, the Russians deployed an assault group consisting of up to 12 armored vehicles and around 100 stormtroopers. Contrary to their expectations, the battle for the village lasted only about 2 days.
The main Ukrainian forces had already withdrawn to fortified positions to the north, leaving behind a minimal defensive force in Prechistivka. This small Ukrainian contingent was purposefully left to confront the Russian assault groups, inflict significant casualties, and then withdraw north to more fortified positions.
Combat footage from the area shows a Russian drone flying over Prechistivka, recording the now-abandoned Ukrainian positions, highlighting the short-lived Russian victory in the village.
A Ukrainian fighter from the area reported that the Russians have significantly changed their approach to conducting offensive operations. He noted that the Russian command no longer recklessly throws infantry into casualty-heavy assaults across the front without a clear plan. Instead, they now carefully plan these high-casualty infantry attacks, focusing on the tactical importance of specific points along the front.
The Russians have also begun to ensure they have the necessary reserves in place to launch more concentrated and deliberate assaults, indicating a shift towards more calculated and focused operations.
He predicts that the Russians will attempt to methodically deploy infantry to assault Ukrainian positions north of Prechistivka. However, the Ukrainian command has also foreseen this possibility, and in response they have carefully constructed strong fortifications in the area.
These defensive lines are designed to slow down Russian advances, buying the Ukrainians crucial time to respond and adapt to the evolving situation. By doing so they can reinforce different sectors of the front as needed, ensuring that they are prepared for any concentrated Russian assaults.
Overall, the Ukrainians realized that Russian’s plant to launch a large scale offensive. so they optimized their defense to meet it.
The Ukrainian forces strategically withdrew from the lowlands, to minimize losses, repositioning their main defense on elevated terrain to maximize their chances of repelling Russian assaults. By leveraging the heights and well- constructed fortifications, they gained a significant advantage over the approaching Russian forces.
Holding the secondary defense line, centered around the Berestova gully allows the Ukrainians to synergise their defensive efforts and build a fortified Network around the area. This approach ensures that reinforcements can arrive in time, strengthening their overall defense and making it increasingly difficult for Russian forces to break through.
Mystery Munition Appears Under Ukrainian Su-24 Fencer Attack Jet’s Wing
Ukraine is in great need of more air-launched stand-off munitions and ones that can be used without foreign restrictions.
https://www.twz.com/air/mystery-munition-appears-under-ukrainian-su-24-fencer-attack-jets-wing
“France will spend income from frozen Russian assets on purchasing weapons for Ukraine, - French Defense Ministry.
By the end of the year, the EU will purchase weapons for Ukraine from the French military-industrial complex for €300 million.”
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1832338292135579850
“Iran has supplied Russia with over 200 Fath-300 ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 112 km, according to The Times. This significantly enhances Russia’s capability to strike Ukraine and may pave the way for supplying missiles with a longer range.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1832353179184378158
Vodka?
“On September 5, 2024, a traffic accident occurred in the Oryol region involving military personnel transporting a T-80 tank. The driver lost control of the KAMAZ truck and crashed into a concrete barrier. The tank was being transported towards the Kursk region. As a result, a Sergeant died, and a Lieutenant sustained multiple leg fractures.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1832352323680559107
“Head of Ukraine’s Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated that new drone systems, developed by top experts including those from GUR, now have the capability to strike military targets within Russia at distances of up to 1,800 kilometers.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1832347553209180365
“Another ammunition depot was destroyed overnight in the Voronezh region, prompting local authorities to announce the evacuation of residents from several nearby settlements.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1832283172848939402
Thought question
If you could chose one piece of comprehensive intel what would it be
Here are some of my options, I am sure you all may have others
Command and control locations
Artillery positions
Troop and equipment concentrations
Anti aircraft positions
Aircraft positions
Radar locations
Ammunition depots
POL storage areas
Drone operator locations
Repair facilities
“New fact sheet on the UDCG’s National Armaments Directors Meeting has a lot of information on a number of efforts, will highlight a few additional things in replies below.
▶️ US 155mm production has reached 40,000/month. Unclear if this is from the partial operationalization of the first new line at GD-OTS Mesquite, or an increase from GD-OTS NEPA. The US will increase that further to 55,000/m in the next month or so, and should reach 80,000 by the end of the year per ASA Doug Bush.
▶️ 155mm MACS production is 18,000/m. This is considerably less than I expected. LAP capacity and supplier diversity for MACS is fairly strong, so it is being bottlenecked by M31A2 Triple-Base Propellant production. Efforts are underway to increase this.
▶️ GMLRS production is 1,167/m (14,000/year). Per the P-1 this was scheduled for next year, but it was previously reported that they would achieve it this year.
▶️ Javelin production is 200/m (2,400/y). This is an increase over the very recently reported 2,100/year.
▶️ AIM-9X Sidewinder production is 137/m (1,644/y). Raytheon is on contract for 2500/y by 2025, from the previous baseline of 1400/y, so they have made some modest progress.
▶️ PAC-3 MSE production of 42/m (504/y). Lockheed has previously stated that they already reached 550, so this needs further clarification.
▶️ HIMARS production of 8/m (96/y). As I have previously shared, this was already 1 year ahead of schedule, expected EOY 2024 rather than the initial date of EOY 2025, and they have beaten that further.
▶️ M776 barrel (M777 howizter) production of 18/m (216/y). I don’t recall seeing any data on this recently.”
https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1832131769518453191
“comprehensive intel”
I’ll leave it to those with military experience to discuss.
For me, I’d really like to know if Kazan lives in St. Petersburg, Moscow or Kazan?
“MI6 and CIA warn of ‘reckless campaign of sabotage across Europe’ being waged by Russia”
“Sir Richard Moore and Bill Burns did not list examples but there has been a spate of mysterious sabotage and arson attacks on infrastructure in the UK, Germany and in the Baltics.”
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