Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

“Moscow’s history of unforced errors is the West’s hidden advantage”

“In challenging the West, Russia often shoots itself in the foot. It has done so again with the murder of Alexei Navalny on the cusp of a Ukraine vote in Congress.

Moscow’s mistakes are so frequent or serious that they substantially weaken Russia’s position.

The West commits unforced errors too, but Russia does more self-harm. Over the years, Moscow’s missteps have rallied support for NATO, prodded Congress toward action against Russia and angered European governments.

While policymakers cannot count on Russian blunders continuing, it’s worth considering the number of unforced errors Moscow has committed over the years and the consequences it has been forced to endure.

History may judge the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to be modern Russia’s greatest blunder. Ukraine has thwarted assaults on its largest cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa), recaptured half the land lost at the war’s outset and sunk or damaged a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. More than 400,000 Russian soldiers have been killed. Meanwhile, Ukrainians are joining Europe and likely NATO, which is rebuilding and deploying more forces closer to Russia.”

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4501326-moscows-history-of-unforced-errors-is-the-wests-hidden-advantage/

Reporting From Ukraine:
Note: other versions of this report are found elsewhere on FR, but this is guaranteed to be the complete transcript - unlike the others.
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU

[ A Sudden Russian Flank Attack Goes Terribly Wrong ]

==
Day 739: Mar 03

Today, there are a lot of interesting updates from the Kupiansk direction.

Here, after Russian forces made major adjustments to their plans in the face of disastrous operations in the Synkivka area, Russian forces launched a massive attack from a completely opposite side.

Despite their initial success in breaching the first line of defense, Russian forces failed to achieve their objective, as the purpose of the operation was to undercut and establish control over Kyslivka.

Following these developments, both Ukrainian and Russian sources report that positional fighting has resumed in the vicinity of Synkivka once again.

According to various reports, Ukrainians hold at least two major defensive belts here: one around Synkivka, which has held the line for months, and another one slightly to the southeast, around Petropavlivka.

Many analysts raised the question of how can Russian forces persist with the same tactics on this attack vector after almost a year, in which advances can be estimated at a few hundred meters.

First of all, there are a few other reasonable options for advancement in other directions.

If we look at the topographic map, we can see that the area currently controlled by Russian forces is blocked to the west by a double natural barrier in the form of the Oskil River and the remarkably high grounds just next to it. This double natural barrier basically goes up to the very border with Russia.

Finding a direct route from the edge of the forest to Kupyansk is another option. However, it has its drawbacks. The biggest shortcoming of this option is that this line is again too close to the local heights, from which Russian attacks could be neutralized with relative ease.

On the other hand, attacking from the east would mean crossing many open field areas, which are also densely mined, making it extremely dangerous to advance.

In addition, an advance from here would eventually mean suffering counterattacks from the two defensive belts.

So, considering just these geographical factors, Russians’ best option seems to be to move out from the forest and take Synkivka.

Secondly, although Russian forces already control a good part of the forest, they need to control a strong point outside the forest from which they can organize larger attacks.

Moreover, a mechanized advance through the forest will always be much more complicated as long as Synkivka remains under Ukrainian control, since they are closely guarded from there.

If Russians finally get control of this strong point, they plan to advance from there to the city through the corridor between the forest and the second defensive belt.

Therefore, Russians understand its tactical importance and a necessary next step from the forest to the city.

Thirdly, as we have previously seen in this war, there’s an evident lack of adaptation on the part of the Russian army, which seems to be the case again. So far, their strategy in the area consists only of frontal attacks from the forest towards Synkivka, with very few variations from that tactic.

Just last month, combat footage of unsuccessful frontal assaults on Synkinvka took by storm the media space. The Russian columns were completely demolished, as close air reconnaissance surveillance allowed Ukrainians to ambush the attackers, unleashing artillery, anti-tank weapons, and FPV drones. In their retreat, they also ran into dense minefields.

Even prominent Russian military analysts harshly criticized the lack of adaptability and plans for reassessment in the face of an evident repetition of failure.

In addition to this type of frontal attacks, different Ukrainian sources have reported the employment of “Wagner” tactics and Storm-Z battalions by Russian forces in the area. In this type of tactic, convict assault groups are launched forward, thus covering the creation of an echelon defense just behind them.

This way, they have a place to retreat to and carry ammunition. Both repetitive frontal attacks and “Wagner” tactics may imply that the Russian commanders simply agreed to accumulate marginal gains for months, even at the cost of wasting vast amounts of equipment and personnel.

Therefore, geographical reasons, the tactical importance of Synkivka as a necessary step to reach Kupiansk, and the lack of adaptability of the Russian commanders have meant that for months, we have witnessed a repetition of continuous Russian failures in their advance in this area.

However, two aspects could be argued from the Russian side.

First of all, several recent videos show heavy snowfalls and deteriorating weather conditions in the area. The Russian side could have tried to exploit this bad weather, since these conditions can hinder the use of surveillance and attack drones.

n this balance of forces, an occasional deficit in the availability of drones by the Ukrainian side could have unbalanced the battle.

Secondly, Russians face a narrow window of opportunity of around one month before the first spring rains and thaws, which will cause the notorious mudslides, thus completely paralyzing mechanized assault attempts.

Months of effort may be forced to a sudden halt, and the Russian command is likely trying to redouble its efforts in precedent and coming weeks in a last-ditch attempt to achieve a result.

Overall, the Russian command has established Synkivka as their priority target and is willing to persist with their plan at any cost. From now on, we could witness an attempt to establish control over the entire forest, leveraging a potential attack from several simultaneous vectors.

Once this strong point is controlled, they can plan to advance from there to the city through the corridor between the forest and the second defensive belt.

However based on recent developments in the south, it is possible that Russian forces are just trying to force Ukraine to relocate more troops to this region.

See last paragraph, which puts to rest the fallacy that Putin just wants Ukraine and has no designs on the rest of Europe.

Kremlin snuff box, 03/03/24
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets

Kabaeva threw Putin into hysterics over children

Alina Kabaeva made Vladimir Putin nervous. According to our information, they met last week, and Kabaeva threw a scandal over the future of their children together. Kabaeva gave birth to two sons from Putin.

The subject of the quarrel was Kabaeva’s desire to provide her eldest son with a Western education. In particular, they talked about the possibility of studying in Switzerland when the time comes. However, after the start of the SVO, Kabaeva came under sanctions in this country.

During the conversation in a raised voice (yes, this happens behind closed doors), Kabaeva reminded Putin of his rapprochement with Ekaterina Mizulina . Vladimir Vladimirovich reacted calmly. He told Kabaeva that their alleged affair with Mizulina was an invention of the yellow press.

Regarding the future of children, Putin advised taking a closer look at quality educational institutions in China and the UAE. At the same time, the president casually threw out the phrase: “Soon all of Europe will be ours. And maybe soon there will be no place to study there at all.”

“Trains disrupted in Russia’s Samara region after blast rocks rail bridge
Russia’s state railway company said on Monday it had been forced to cancel and re-route some trains in the Samara region after an explosion at a rail bridge, which Ukrainian military intelligence claimed was used by trains carrying ammunition.

An explosion rocked the bridge, which spans the River Chapayevka near the Russian city of Samara, around 530 miles (850 km) southeast of Moscow, early on Monday morning, Russian news agencies reported, citing emergency services.

Located on the Volga river, the Samara region is one of Russia’s heavy industry hubs.

Ukrainian military intelligence issued a statement in which it “confirmed” but did not take responsibility for the blast. It said the rail line was used by Russia to transport military cargo, including ammunition made at a factory nearby.

It forecast the bridge would be out of use for some time.

Reuters could not confirm the Ukrainian assertion. Russia regards the location of its military factories as a state secret. Russia and Ukraine have targeted each other’s infrastructure in the course of the two-year war that Moscow calls a “special military operation”.

Traffic over the bridge was suspended due to what local rail authorities called “illegal interference.” One image posted on social media and verified by Reuters showed some damage to the metal structure of the bridge on one side but the concrete support appeared intact.

Local media in Samara said sappers and Russia’s National Guard were on the scene. Unverified images posted on social media showed what looked like at least one homemade bomb on the scene which had not gone off. Nobody was reported to have been hurt in the incident.”

Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets

Serious problems arose in the presidential elections in new regions of Russia

More than 25% of residents of the new regions of our country (DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions) do not want to take part in Presidential elections. This is evidenced by the results of a closed sociological study that we have at our disposal.

“In new regions there are many different fears. We don’t yet know what to do with them, but they also influence reluctance to vote,” noted a representative of Sergei Kiriyenko’s team, who showed us the results of the survey.

In particular, more than 80% of those who do not want to participate in the elections fear a further deterioration of the socio-economic situation in their region. Also among the fears are the prolongation of active hostilities (mentioned by 76% of respondents), disbelief that “Russia will change something for the better” (62%), fears about a new wave of mobilization (51%).

They are especially afraid of mobilization in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, since “there is a threat that it will take place here thoughtlessly, following the example of the DPR and LPR in 2022, and many mobilized will die or be seriously injured.”

The election process is also influenced by the criminal activities of saboteurs in new regions. We wrote about individual cases and consequences of enemy sabotage.

In general, according to the statistics provided to us by the FSB, in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, DPR and LPR over the past month, 26 people who have one way or another to do with the organization of the elections were killed or died under mysterious circumstances.

“People are afraid and refuse to work in the elections,” a source in the Kremlin complained about this.

“The “waiters” who are still waiting for the Ukrainian army are also in the way; there are many of them here. I won’t say what percentage, but it’s a lot. We will, of course, make the necessary result.

But Vladimir Vladimirovich will definitely ask how many people actually voted for him. And we don’t yet know how to answer this question,” another AP source close to Kiriyenko honestly admitted.

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