Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
“Jay discussed how much of the pro Russian X accounts are basically Russian based or financed, not shocked
Imagine it, is one of them.”
Telegram prolly not so much/ Telegram has more independents who are not bribable.
X is ok on Ukraine. But in general is awful these days for right wing material. Instead of typing out some useful opinion or information, people are posting images with captions. Same as moron, Putin’s dupe Preston here.
Last week, the price of Urals crude loading at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk plunged to as low as $36.61 per barrel, the lowest in nearly three years...
...The discount of Urals relative to the international Brent benchmark widened to an average of $23.52 a barrel in the middle of November...
_____________
To avoid oil infrastructure wreckage in Western Siberia, Putin has too move Siberian oil onto his pirate-class tanker fleet. Even at a 10$/barrel loss.
Poot has three choices to keep Siberian oil moving. Pump it onto the Siberian permafrost, pump it onto tankers, pump it into the Black Sea. If Poot pumps lakes of his crude onto the snow covered permafrost, satellites will take photos that will ruin Russia’s world status
Lies Russia has unlimited reserves😎
—
Soon Putin will get serious and unleash his real army of millions of crack troops with their mechanized units, consisting of 10s of thousands of tanks and armored vehicles. All of Ukraine will be overrun in a day.
Yup, they have been waiting in Nork tunnels for the signal to strike 😎
Blitz is a Founding member at the ENDLESS RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR LEVEL.
I suggest you start with the PUTIN IN HAGUE LEVEL FOR $19 a month
More than three years ago I asked each of you why American taxpayers should give a flying fk about this border war in Eastern Europe. I suggested you name the top three reasons why more than $200bn US tax dollars have been given to Kiev in this losing effort. To date I haven't gotten an answer.
‘A-60 laser lab’ is gone. Nice pics.
Celebrate. Sing and Dance.
“New satellite imagery from DniproOsint confirms the destruction of two aircraft during the strike on Taganrog: the rare A‑60 laser lab and an Il‑76 transport plane. The Beriev plant’s final assembly hall also sustained serious damage. An S‑400 position was hit as well, though the full impact is unclear from satellite visuals.”
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1993303220962087141
“strike on Taganrog… Beriev plant”
One of only two facilities critical to maintaining their Tu-95 (Bear) bombers.
US and Ukrainian delegations reportedly narrowed down the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan to 19 points.[1] An official briefed on the negotiations told the Washington Post that the peace plan to end Russia's war in Ukraine now has 19 points and is based on the original US proposal, but that US and Ukrainian delegations have not yet agreed upon the final number of points.[2] Oleksandr Bevz, advisor to Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, stated that Ukrainian and US negotiators agreed to remove points unrelated to Ukraine, such as those regarding US-Russian bilateral engagement and those involving Europe.[3] Bevz stated that Ukrainian and US negotiators also agreed to resolve issues about Ukraine's accession to NATO based on NATO's consensus decision-making structure.[4] Bevz stated that Ukrainian negotiators clarified to US officials that Ukraine is willing to start discussions about territory from the current frontline and does not want to engage with Russian offers to swap territory. People familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that European officials noted that the most recent version of the peace plan no longer includes proposals for roughly $100 billion in frozen Russian assets to go toward US-led efforts to rebuild Ukraine.[5] Ukrainian news agency RBK-Ukraine reported, citing unspecified sources, that the delegations adjusted a significant number of issues, such as those related to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the size of the Ukrainian military, and prisoner of war (POW) and prisoner exchanges.[6] RBK-Ukraine's sources reportedly stated that the delegations agreed that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky should discuss and agree upon points related to territorial issues and Ukraine's accession into NATO. Sources told RBK-Ukraine that the United States will work with Ukraine to agree on the final points of the plan before engaging with European partners on points that directly concern Europe.[7] The sources reportedly stated that the United States will then use “carrots and sticks” to convince Russia of the plan.
CBS reported on November 23 that a US official stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that he will take all of Donetsk Oblast “one way or another” either through a negotiated settlement or military means.[8] The Kremlin has been doubling down on spreading the false narrative that a Russian victory is inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should immediately acquiesce to Russian demands.[9] Russia's imminent seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not guaranteed, as Russia's rate of advance has been constrained to a foot pace – even in the past three months when Russian forces have been making relatively quicker gains on the battlefield.[10] ISW continues to assess that the Russian effort to seize Donetsk Oblast will be a yearslong battle that would cost Russia significant amounts of manpower and materiel.[11] Russian forces have not shown an ability to seize large population centers like those in the Fortress Belt – the backbone of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast – since 2022 and have tried and failed to seize the Fortress Belt itself since 2014.
Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continue rejecting the original and revised US-proposed peace plan drafts and are attempting to portray Europe as responsible for the Russian rejection. Russian officials and ultranationalist voices have been rejecting the 28-point US peace plan since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plan did not concede to all of Russia's absolutist war demands.[12] Russian officials and ultranationalist voices are simultaneously misrepresenting revisions to the original plan and European involvement as undermining the peace process, likely in an effort to deflect from Russia's own rejection of the deal. Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on November 24 that the European version of the peace proposal is unacceptable for Russia, and Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed that the European proposal would only continue the war.[13] Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Chairperson Svetlana Zhurova claimed that continued US changes to the peace plan will “drag on” the negotiations “endlessly.”[14] Zhurova claimed that the only two relevant negotiating parties are Russia and the United States, implying that any peace plans must exclude Ukrainian and European inputs.[15] Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, a key pro-war constituency for Russian President Vladimir Putin, continued to reject the modified peace proposal, criticize the United States for moving away from Russian demands, and claim that Europe only wants to continue the war in Ukraine.[16] The milbloggers called for Russia to achieve its war aims by force instead.[17] The Kremlin has refused to meaningfully negotiate in response to all US-led peace initiatives thus far in 2025, and has shown no willingness to make the significant compromises required of a negotiation process.[18] The Kremlin very likely aims to prolong negotiations to end the war to allow Russian forces to continue advancing on the battlefield. The Kremlin likely plans to use Russian advances to further intensify information operations aimed at convincing the West and Ukraine that a Russian military victory is inevitable and that Ukraine should capitulate to Russia's demands. The Kremlin continues to show no willingness to compromise for good-faith peace negotiations and has not set conditions for Russians to accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence and continue to counterattack within Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces likely remain unable to rapidly seize Pokrovsk at this time. Geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in northwestern Pokrovsk, where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[19] Geolocated footage published on November 24 shows Ukrainian forces patrolling in northern Pokrovsk in areas where Russian forces previously infiltrated, and a Ukrainian assault regiment operating in Pokrovsk reported that Ukrainian forces cleared central Pokrovsk of Russian forces.[20] Other Ukrainian military and media sources provided contradictory accounts of reported Ukrainian clearing operations within Pokrovsk, however. Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk and a Ukrainian journalist reported on November 23 and 24 that Ukrainian forces cleared several streets and areas near the Donetska railway and E-50 highway and that Ukrainian forces continue to control some neighborhoods within Pokrovsk.[21] A Ukrainian military source stated on November 23 that Ukrainian forces cleared “specific areas” within Pokrovsk and assessed that these advances may improve the tactical situation for Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk but would not impact the operational situation in the area.[22] Other Ukrainian military sources refuted on November 24 reports that Ukrainian forces cleared central Pokrovsk.[23] All of the Ukrainian reporting continues to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain positions and some degree of ability to operate within Pokrovsk despite weeks of intensified Russian efforts to seize the town.
Ukrainian efforts to interdict Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with drones and the disjointed nature of Russian infiltration tactics likely continue to hinder Russian efforts to mass troops necessary to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk within the town. A Ukrainian military source noted on November 24 that effective Ukrainian drone interdiction of Russian GLOCs has cut logistics to 90 percent of Russian assault groups within Pokrovsk, slowing the pace of the Russian advance within the town.[24] The Ukrainian military source added that Russian forces within Pokrovsk, who number over 500, are relatively uncoordinated and sometimes commit friendly fire incidents. The Ukrainian military source reported that Russian forces still have extensive fire control within Pokrovsk and are employing drones to significantly interdict Ukrainian GLOCs, however. The Ukrainian journalist noted that Russian forces continue to take advantage of poor weather conditions to accumulate forces and reenter areas that Ukrainian forces previously cleared, leading to back-and-forth fighting within the town.[25] ISW continues to assess that seasonal foggy and rainy weather conditions are hindering Ukrainian drone operations in eastern Ukraine, allowing Russian forces to conduct ground operations into and within Pokrovsk with less threats from Ukrainian drone reconnaissance and strikes.[26]
Russian forces continue to leverage their new offensive template, which heavily relies on battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and infiltration tactics, to advance in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Zatyshshya (roughly 2.6 kilometers east of Hulyaipole).[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also stated that Russian forces seized the settlement.[28] A Ukrainian servicemember stated on November 24 that fighting has begun for Zatyshshya.[29] Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger, claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups have been operating in Hulyaipole for a week (since roughly November 17).[30] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are assaulting the settlement, but another milblogger directly refuted this claim.[31] Russian forces have been using prolonged BAI campaigns to degrade Ukrainian drone-based defenses and logistics; infiltration missions to identify, worsen, and exploit weak points in Ukrainian defenses; and mass small group assaults to make rapid advances and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw.[32] Reports of limited Russian infiltrations into Hulyaipole are in line with this new campaign design.
Belarusian balloons continue incursions in NATO airspace in Lithuania and Latvia. Lithuanian National Crisis Management Center (NKMC) Head Vilmantas Vitkauskas reported on November 24 that the Vilnius International Airport temporarily suspended operations twice on November 24 due to an unspecified number of balloons flying towards the airport from Belarusian airspace.[33] Vitkauskas stated that authorities detected over 40 balloons over Lithuanian airspace and about 30 Belarusian balloons in Latvian airspace overnight on November 23 to November 24.[34] The Lithuanian Border Service previously closed land border crossings with Belarus on the evening of October 26 due to repeated aerial incursions into Lithuanian airspace, but reopened the border after midnight on November 20.[35] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and the ongoing Russian airspace violations are likely part of ”Phase Zero” – Russia's broader informational and psychological condition-setting phase – to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[36] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia's de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, thus, Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are part of Russia's broader Phase Zero effort.[37]
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 24 that small Russian infantry groups advanced up to the Vovchansk cemetery in southwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[49]
Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on November 23 and 24.[50]
An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking on the western outskirts of Vovchansk and attempting to bypass Vovchansk from its western outskirts and near Synelnykove, Tsehelne, and Lyman (all south of Vovchansk).[51] The officer reported that Russian forces are using rocket artillery to destroy northern Vovchansk, likely in an effort to make it challenging for Ukrainian forces to retain positions in the settlement. The officer added that Russian forces have to reach the frontline on foot rather than on vehicles over several days due to Ukrainian fire control of Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 24 that Russian forces likely intend to degrade Ukrainian defenses in southern Vovchansk by bypassing them in the forest area west of Vovchansk, accumulating manpower for assaults in the southwestern part of the city, and interdicting Ukrainian GLOCs to Staryi Saltiv and Rubizhne (both southwest of Vovchansk).[52]
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in southern Vovchansk.[53] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]) and the Kurchaloyevsky Raion Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department are reportedly operating near Vovchansk.[54] Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on November 24 that Russian forces recently seized Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk) after advancing from Bolohivka (southeast of Odradne), indicating that Russian forces also seized Bolohivka on a prior date.[56] Mashovets also reported that Russian forces advanced east of Odradne.[57] A Russian milblogger also claimed on November 24 that Russian forces seized Odradne.[58]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on November 23 and 24.[59]
Mashovets stated that elements of the 6th CAA (LMD), whose area of responsibility (AoR) spans in the Velykyi Burluk direction are focusing on offensive operations in the Milove-Krasne Pershe area (northeast to southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[60] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will likely intensify offensive operations toward Krasne Pershe and Novovasylivka (both southeast of Velykyi Burluk) in the near future and may also intensify offensive operations near Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk). Mashovets reported that Russian forces redeployed the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th AC, LMD) and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC, LMD) from the Vovchansk direction to the Velykyi Burluk direction.[61]
Ukrainian forces either maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on November 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces west of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[62]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kupyansk.[63]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on November 23 and 24.[64]
Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on November 24 that Ukrainian efforts to evacuate civilians continue but that 560 residents remain in Kupyansk.[65]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Stepova Novoselivka.[66]
Drone operators of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian ammunition dumps and forces near Kupyansk.[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 24 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Novoyehorivka on November 23 and 24.[68]
The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Borova direction stated that Russian forces are trying to infiltrate between Ukrainian positions in small groups to gain a foothold in the Ukrainian near rear.[69] The commander stated that Russian forces are exploiting foggy weather to advance but that Ukrainian forces have developed new, unspecified drone technology that enables them to conduct reconnaissance during foggy weather. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are also taking advantage of foggy weather to conduct rotations and facilitate logistics. The commander’s statements are in line with other Ukrainian military officials’ statements about Russian tactics throughout eastern Ukraine.[70]
Synehubov reported on November 24 that Ukrainian efforts to evacuate civilians continue but that 1,000 residents remain in the Borova direction.[71]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on November 24 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway south of Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[72] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are fighting for a series of strongholds along the highway.[73]
Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Yarova, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky and Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Zarichne; south of Lyman toward Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 23 and 24.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dibrova and Lyman.[75]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[76]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 24 indicates that elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently seized Zvanivka (south of Siversk) and that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Siversk.[77]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0513 Lyman-Siversk highway west of Zakitne (northwest of Siversk).[78]
Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, Zvanivka, and Sakko i Vantsetti on November 23 and 24.[79]
Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 23 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced east of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[80]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Mayske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on November 23 and 24.[81]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Rusyn Yar.[82] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Komyshuvakha (west of Druzhkivka), Kramatorsk and Pryvillya (northwest of Druzhkivka and west of Kramatorsk).[83] Loitering munitions operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[84]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on November 24 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in northern central Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), which another milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized as of November 23.[85]
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on November 23 and 24.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Toretske.[87]
Ukraine’s 1st Azov National Guard Corps reported on November 24 that Ukrainian forces killed 659 Russian servicemembers, wounded 418, and took nine others prisoner of war (POW) in the Dobropillya area between November 17 and 24, in addition to destroying eight armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), six artillery pieces, 42 other vehicles and 276 drones.[88]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Pokrovsk direction.
See topline text for recessions of unconfirmed Russian claims and reassessments of assessed Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[89] ISW assesses that this change likely did not occur in the last 24 hours. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), which Russian sources claimed Russian forces had seized as of October 25.[90]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Rivne (east of Pokrovsk).[91]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Ukrainian reports indicate that Russian forces expanded their infiltration missions to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway north of and a railway line west of Pokrovsk, in southern Myrnohrad, Hnativka (both east of Pokrovsk), Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk), and Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[92] ISW assesses that these changes likely did not occur in the last 24 hours. ISW assesses that this event did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on November 23 and 24.[93] Russian milbloggers and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske, Hryshyne and Udachne.[94]
A Russian milblogger published footage reportedly showing Russian forces conducting FAB-3000 guided glide bomb strikes against apartment buildings in Myrnohrad.[95] A Ukrainian military source noted that Russian forces are systematically conducting FAB-3000 strikes against apartment buildings in Myrnohrad.[96]
A Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction published footage on November 22 showing Ukrainian drone operators repelling an at least-reduced platoon sized Russian motorized and infantry assault on the southern outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and destroying three to four motorcycles.[97]
The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 24 that Ukrainian SSO elements conducted a raid in the Pokrovsk direction, killing two Russian servicemembers and taking another prisoner.[98] The Ukrainian SSO added that the raid allowed a neighboring unit to evacuate three wounded Ukrainian servicemembers with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs).
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), including drone operators, reportedly continue to operate within Myrnohrad.[99] Elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate within Pokrovsk.[100]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: A Ukrainian military source reported on November 20 that Russian forces advanced through a gap in a Ukrainian position to southern Novopavlivka, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Novopavlivka.[101] The Ukrainian military source reported that Russian forces also advanced to the Vovcha River east of Ivanivka and east of Havrylivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[102]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on November 23 and 24.[103]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[104]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
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