I don’t know how accurate recent comments quoting our current leader may be, but that leader had a chance to nip all this recent fighting in the bud back in 2016, shortly after the enemy had begun invasion of eastern Ukraine and seizure of Crimea in 2014. Talk about opportunities ignored, neglected, or lost! Blaming the problems on neglect after 2021 is SO pot calling the kettle black. I just hope our resident Russia reporter is writing wrong.

mo wor

Europe provides a counteroffer to the 28 point opening gambit. Getting the players engaged, and the negotiations underway.

Kyiv Independent (23 Nov):

“U.S. President Donald Trump is “quite pleased” with the progress made at ongoing peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said on Nov. 23, as Europe issued a counterproposal to a U.S.-backed peace plan that heavily favored Russia...

...Rubio noted the peace plan is a “living, breathing document” and is still subject to change as peace talks continue.

“Just because it’s printed on a piece of paper doesn’t indicate finality, so you get input, and based on that input, you make adjustments, and then you get more input,” he said.

Trump, on Nov. 22, said the initial peace proposal was not Washington’s final offer to Ukraine amid widespread concern that Ukraine was being rushed into an unfavorable agreement.

The initially imposed deadline of Nov. 27 could also be extended by several days, Rubio said, adding that he feels “optimistic” that a consensus will be reached “in a very reasonable period of time, very soon.”...

...In a joint statement released on Nov. 23, the U.S. and Ukraine described the opening round of consultations as productive and said they were encouraged by the pace of progress...

...Reuters reported that the counterproposal would see Ukraine’s military capped at 800,000 troops in peacetime rather than 600,000 in the initial peace plan.

Ukraine joining NATO falls on consensus among the alliance’s members, which does not exist, the reported proposal stipulates, while also prohibiting NATO from permanently stationing troops on the territory of Ukraine under its command in peacetime.

The new peace proposal drops recognition of Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s territories. The initial plan stipulated that Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, which make up the Donbas region, would be internationally recognized as belonging to Russia.

“All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children,” the proposed peace plan stipulates, as reported by Reuters.

The counterproposal also calls for U.S.—backed security guarantees that mirror NATO’s Article 5, which, when invoked, considers an attack on one member an attack on all members. NATO’s Article 5 is a defining feature of the alliance.

Several Ukrainian concessions are retained in the counterproposal, which allows Russia to rejoin the Group of Eight, which currently operates as the Group of Seven without Moscow’s participation.

Europe’s counterproposal, as reported by Reuters, also sees the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant fall under international control, with produced electricity divided between Ukraine and Russia.”

“Russia’s Central Bank Starts Selling Physical Gold From Reserves”

Physical Russian gold, apparently from reserves (above their new production quantities) has been notably hitting the market in Hong Kong, India and Dubai since last year (2024).

I wonder what is really happening, that is causing them to now admit to it?

Physical Russian gold, apparently from reserves (above their new production quantities) has been notably hitting the market in Hong Kong, India and Dubai since last year (2024).

I wonder what is really happening, that is causing them to now admit to it?
______________________

Putin is saying we can easily get past Uke missile drone attacks on Moscow electrics this winter. Refinery and oil exports terminals attacks. Loss of rubles incomes to fund Putin’s war, from much lower petro exports.

Putin looks smart unloading at $4000/oz
Same mode as Fernando Marcos, Putin considers Russian gold his own personal piggy bank. Foreigners believe this too, because this fake Tsar calls the shots. A perception that is reality.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23, 2025

US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes. US President Donald Trump stated on November 22 that the 28-point peace plan is not his final offer to Ukraine.[1] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated to Fox on November 23 that the peace plan is a “work in progress” and that there are issues that the parties must codify and explain further.[2] Kellogg stated that there likely needs to be an annex document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine. Kellogg stated that the United States does not want a repeat of the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk Agreements, Russian-preferable agreements that gave Ukraine vague security assurances in exchange for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament in 1994 and a 2015 failed ceasefire protocol that greatly advantaged Russia and led to the full-scale invasion in 2022, respectively.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that, after the US-Ukrainian-European meetings on November 23 in Geneva, the peace plan is a “living, breathing document” that changes with new input every day.[3] Rubio added that the parties in Geneva “really moved forward” and that there is no concrete deadline for Ukraine to sign the peace plan, stating that the United States wants to finalize the deal “as soon as possible,” even if that is after the initial November 27 deadline.[4] Rubio stated that the United States recognizes that Ukraine needs security guarantees as part of a peace settlement and that achieving peace will “require for Ukraine to feel as if it is safe” from renewed invasions or attacks.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated, after the Geneva meetings, that “a lot is changing” and that talks will continue later on November 23.[6] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, who is leading the newly formed Ukrainian negotiating delegation, stated that delegations will continue working on November 23 and in the coming days to create a joint proposal between the United States, Ukraine, and European allies.[7]

Western reporting also suggests that the United States is open to amending the peace plan, including points about the Ukrainian military and post-war security guarantees. The Washington Post reported on November 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration recognizes that the security guarantees in the initial 28-point plan are “not strong enough yet.”[8] US officials reportedly stated that US President Donald Trump may raise or remove the 600,000 cap on Ukraine's military or may consider supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk long-range missiles in the event of a peace agreement to bolster postwar deterrence. The Washington Post reported that a US official stated that the United States and US allies would help Ukraine build a security “wall” along the ceasefire line using unspecified advanced technology. A US official stated that Zelensky responded to the US peace proposal by proposing a ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure, but that Russia then responded by labeling such a ceasefire as a “nonstarter.”

European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan. Western outlets reported that France, the United Kingdom, and Germany drafted a counterproposal ahead of their talks with Ukrainian and American delegations in Geneva on November 23.[9] The 24-point counterproposal reportedly includes calls for an immediate ceasefire to precede discussions about territorial issues; for the cap on Ukraine's military to be 800,000 “in peacetime;” for Ukraine to receive a security guarantee from the United States similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Article 5; for the use of frozen Russian assets to fully reconstruct and financially compensate Ukraine; for Ukrainian membership in NATO to depend on consensus from alliance members; and for Ukraine to decide on the presence of foreign troops from guarantor states on Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin has already previously explicitly rejected a number of these proposals, including the deployment of foreign troops to post-war Ukraine.[10]

Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia's longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 22 that Russia cannot deviate from Russian President Vladimir Putin's stated demands at the Alaska summit in August 2025 and reiterated Russia's commitment to addressing the “root causes” of the war.[11] Ryabkov defined the “root causes” as NATO expansion, weapon deployments to Eastern Europe, and alleged discrimination against Russian people, Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Rybakov’s November 22 definition of the alleged root causes aligns with numerous other high ranking Kremlin officials’ statements on the matter.[12] Ryabkov also noted that Russia will continue to act in its national interests regardless of sanctions, signaling that the Kremlin will remain committed to its war effort in Ukraine even in the face of potential future economic pressures against Russia. Putin notably demonstrated at the Alaska summit that he had not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine.[13] Ryabkov's reiteration of the importance of eliminating the “root causes” of the war and of Putin's position at the Alaska summit further indicates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its original war aims and justifications, including demanding that NATO remove its Open Door Policy.

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the US peace plan aims to preserve a “threat on the Russian border,” likely referring to Ukraine's existence as a sovereign state and Russia's shared border with longstanding NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic states.[14] Zhuravlev claimed that the Kremlin must treat the plan with “extreme caution” and as a “starting point for negotiations” rather than an ultimate peace settlement. Zhuravlev added that the reported European counterproposal conditions are “completely unacceptable for Russia.” Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly remarked that possible Western transfers of long-range missiles, such as Tomahawks, to Ukraine under the peace plan would contradict Russia's “demilitarization” objective, which effectively aims to destroy the Ukrainian military such that it cannot protect itself from renewed Russian aggression.[15] Chepa implied that Russia perceives any security assistance or guarantees for Ukraine as a threat to Russia, and Russian state media framed Chepa’s statements as a “warning” explaining why the peace deal is “unacceptable” to Russia.[16] Member of the Belarusian National Assembly's House of Representatives Vadim Gigin, who is also a prominent propagandist in the Russian and Belarusian information spaces, stated on Russian state television that Russia cannot agree to the peace plan due to “mutual mistrust” between Russia and the United States and that there is no mechanism for implementing such an agreement.[17] These various statements continue to indicate that the Kremlin is disinterested in making any compromises in a peace deal and is setting domestic information conditions to reject the peace plan.

Russian ultranationalists, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, similarly argued that Russia should not accept any peace plan and should instead continue its war against Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that a peace plan could deprive Russia of the opportunity to seize more territory in Ukraine and interpreted Putin's November 21 remarks about the US-proposed peace plan as a reiteration of Russia's commitment to fighting while it can still advance.[18] The milblogger concluded that Russia's ability to sustain the war effort will determine the war's outcome, not a diplomatic settlement. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russia's war aims are not limited to the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but encompass all territories “enshrined in the [Russian] constitution,” referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in 2022.[19] The milblogger implied that Russia is willing to continue the war so that it can demand a demilitarized zone that extends all the way to Poland, implying that Russia maintains its maximalist territorial goals in Ukraine. Other Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reiterated that Russia would only agree to a peace plan that encompasses all of Russia's demands.[20] Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been rejecting the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and reiterating Russia's commitment to its original, maximalist war aims since Western media began reporting on the proposal on November 20.[21] These statements continue to indicate that Russia is unlikely to accept any proposed peace plan that falls short of Ukrainian capitulation. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[22]

The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning. The Kremlin has been doubling down on the false narrative that Russian battlefield successes are so widespread that a Russian victory is inevitable.[23] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable and that the “realities on the ground” show that Russia faces many obstacles in its path to seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian rate of advance intensified since the Alaska summit, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day between August 15 and November 20. Russian gains notably have still been confined to a foot pace even during this period of faster advances. Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027 at this rate of advance, assuming Russian forces can maintain the current faster rate of advance, Ukrainian defenses remain strong, and Western weapons provisions to Ukraine remain consistent. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to push Ukraine to hand over this territory to save Russia significant amounts of time, effort, manpower, and resources that it could use elsewhere in Ukraine during renewed aggression.

The actual timeline on which Russian forces could potentially seize all of Donetsk Oblast is likely even longer. Foggy and rainy weather has contributed to Russia's faster tempo in fall 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian drone operations have not been as effective.[24] These seasonal weather conditions are not permanent, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Russian advances since August 15 have also not faced heavily fortified, large population centers the size of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt.[25] Russia's recent rate of advance of 9.3 square kilometers per day was also notably across the entire theater, and the calculation that Russian forces could seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by August 2027 is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces would commit the same forces, resources, and energy that they have deployed across the frontline since August 15 to fighting in Donetsk Oblast only. The Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire front. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine could also strengthen Ukraine's defenses, possibly reversing some Russian gains and slowing this protracted timeline even further.

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by advancing on the northern shoulder of the encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[26] Additional geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[27] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are completing clearing operations in Pokrovsk.[28] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have created a “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) between Pokrovsk and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad). The milblogger claimed that Russian assault activity is increasing in Myrnohrad and that drone operators are entering the town. The milblogger claimed that it is highly probable that the rest of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is a contested “gray zone.”

Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack and maintain a limited presence within and around Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on November 23 that fighting is ongoing in central Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from accumulating enough forces to push into the northern part of the town.[29] The 7th Corps noted that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses during their attempts to advance into northern Pokrovsk via the Donetska Railway. A Russian milblogger also acknowledged on November 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain a scattered presence between Kozatske (east of Myrnohrad) and Promin (just south of Kozatske).[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in northern Pokrovsk and near Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[31]

Ukrainian forces are also conducting tactical-level air interdiction lines of effort against Russian logistics that support the Pokrovsk effort. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on November 23 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian forces participating in offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[32] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position on a dominant height at an industrial facility in Pokrovsk that Russian snipers used to exert fire control over the surrounding area. The SSO reported that Russian forces were also accumulating personnel in the area. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration in Shakhove (northeast of Pokrovsk and east of Dobropillya) of elements of the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) that were trying to close the encirclement around Pokrovsk from the north. The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a concentration point and drone ammunition depot of elements of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and in occupied Sontsivka (in the Russian tactical rear 27 kilometers south of Pokrovsk). The SSO reported a strike against another ammunition depot in occupied Dokuchayevsk (in the Russian operational rear 71 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk) from where Russian forces stored, distributed, and shipped equipment to forces attacking in the Pokrovsk direction.

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[33] Russia will likely try to exploit the eventual seizure of Pokrovsk for informational effect to forward the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Russian victory on the battlefield is not inevitable, however, and it notably took Russian forces 21 months to advance roughly 40 kilometers and begin to encircle the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.[34] A campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine's much larger and more populous Fortress Belt, would take several years of arduous battles, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt since 2022.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on November 23 that Russian-Belarusian relations can serve as a “model” for interstate cooperation and that bilateral interactions within the Union State can serve as a “benchmark” for other integration associations in Eurasia.[124] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades-long strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus through the Union State framework and seeks to replicate this approach with other former Soviet states.[125]

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/

Day 1,368 of the Muscovian invasion. 1,190 [average is 851] i.e. more than 49 Russians, Norks and Cubans/h. Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 65% and artillery more than 60% above average.

Кремлевская табакерка
24NOV202

Philosopher Dugin was in a hurry and “surrendered” Russia's plans for Ukraine. The military reprimanded him and offered to be silent

Alexandr Dugin wrote that “Ukraine will be entirely ours in a maximum of 2 years.” The channel's sources among the military criticized him for these words. “First of all, I don't understand why a respected philosopher who has access to secret information “hands it over” to the whole world. Yes, we plan to liberate all of Ukraine, but why shout about it? Now all sorts of negotiations are going on, sometimes it is worth being silent. Secondly, we will not conquer Ukraine in two years, we plan to liberate the DPR only by the beginning of 2027. Why is Dugin in a hurry?” a source in the Ministry of Defense was indignant.

Another also noted that Alexandr Gelevich “hurried” with the timing of the resolution of the Ukrainian issue. And he advised him “to be silent until some sudden trouble happens to the philosopher.” Dugin himself, in a conversation with us, responded to the claims by saying that the Ministry of Defense “should think about how the Russians should start fighting better, with great sacrifice and diligence.” And he advised to announce “total mobilization, which is long overdue.”

https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6458

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 23, 2025

Toplines

US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the initially reported US-proposed 28-point peace plan is not final and is currently undergoing changes. US President Donald Trump stated on November 22 that the 28-point peace plan is not his final offer to Ukraine.[1] US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated to Fox on November 23 that the peace plan is a “work in progress” and that there are issues that the parties must codify and explain further.[2] Kellogg stated that there likely needs to be an annex document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine. Kellogg stated that the United States does not want a repeat of the Budapest Memorandum or Minsk Agreements, Russian-preferable agreements that gave Ukraine vague security assurances in exchange for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament in 1994 and a 2015 failed ceasefire protocol that greatly advantaged Russia and led to the full-scale invasion in 2022, respectively.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that, after the US-Ukrainian-European meetings on November 23 in Geneva, the peace plan is a “living, breathing document” that changes with new input every day.[3] Rubio added that the parties in Geneva “really moved forward” and that there is no concrete deadline for Ukraine to sign the peace plan, stating that the United States wants to finalize the deal “as soon as possible,” even if that is after the initial November 27 deadline.[4] Rubio stated that the United States recognizes that Ukraine needs security guarantees as part of a peace settlement and that achieving peace will “require for Ukraine to feel as if it is safe” from renewed invasions or attacks.[5] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated, after the Geneva meetings, that “a lot is changing” and that talks will continue later on November 23.[6] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, who is leading the newly formed Ukrainian negotiating delegation, stated that delegations will continue working on November 23 and in the coming days to create a joint proposal between the United States, Ukraine, and European allies.[7]

Western reporting also suggests that the United States is open to amending the peace plan, including points about the Ukrainian military and post-war security guarantees. The Washington Post reported on November 22 that US officials stated that the Trump administration recognizes that the security guarantees in the initial 28-point plan are “not strong enough yet.”[8] US officials reportedly stated that US President Donald Trump may raise or remove the 600,000 cap on Ukraine’s military or may consider supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk long-range missiles in the event of a peace agreement to bolster postwar deterrence. The Washington Post reported that a US official stated that the United States and US allies would help Ukraine build a security “wall” along the ceasefire line using unspecified advanced technology. A US official stated that Zelensky responded to the US peace proposal by proposing a ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure, but that Russia then responded by labeling such a ceasefire as a “nonstarter.”

European leaders are reportedly working on a counterproposal to the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan. Western outlets reported that France, the United Kingdom, and Germany drafted a counterproposal ahead of their talks with Ukrainian and American delegations in Geneva on November 23.[9] The 24-point counterproposal reportedly includes calls for an immediate ceasefire to precede discussions about territorial issues; for the cap on Ukraine’s military to be 800,000 “in peacetime;” for Ukraine to receive a security guarantee from the United States similar to North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Article 5; for the use of frozen Russian assets to fully reconstruct and financially compensate Ukraine; for Ukrainian membership in NATO to depend on consensus from alliance members; and for Ukraine to decide on the presence of foreign troops from guarantor states on Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin has already previously explicitly rejected a number of these proposals, including the deployment of foreign troops to post-war Ukraine.[10]

Russian officials and ultranationalist voices continued to reject any peace plan, including the initial US-proposed 28-point plan, that does not achieve Russia’s longstanding demands for the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and the weakening of the NATO alliance. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on November 22 that Russia cannot deviate from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stated demands at the Alaska summit in August 2025 and reiterated Russia’s commitment to addressing the “root causes” of the war.[11] Ryabkov defined the “root causes” as NATO expansion, weapon deployments to Eastern Europe, and alleged discrimination against Russian people, Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Rybakov’s November 22 definition of the alleged root causes aligns with numerous other high ranking Kremlin officials’ statements on the matter.[12] Ryabkov also noted that Russia will continue to act in its national interests regardless of sanctions, signaling that the Kremlin will remain committed to its war effort in Ukraine even in the face of potential future economic pressures against Russia. Putin notably demonstrated at the Alaska summit that he had not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine.[13] Ryabkov’s reiteration of the importance of eliminating the “root causes” of the war and of Putin’s position at the Alaska summit further indicates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its original war aims and justifications, including demanding that NATO remove its Open Door Policy.

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated that the US peace plan aims to preserve a “threat on the Russian border,” likely referring to Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state and Russia’s shared border with longstanding NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic states.[14] Zhuravlev claimed that the Kremlin must treat the plan with “extreme caution” and as a “starting point for negotiations” rather than an ultimate peace settlement. Zhuravlev added that the reported European counterproposal conditions are “completely unacceptable for Russia.” Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa similarly remarked that possible Western transfers of long-range missiles, such as Tomahawks, to Ukraine under the peace plan would contradict Russia’s “demilitarization” objective, which effectively aims to destroy the Ukrainian military such that it cannot protect itself from renewed Russian aggression.[15] Chepa implied that Russia perceives any security assistance or guarantees for Ukraine as a threat to Russia, and Russian state media framed Chepa’s statements as a “warning” explaining why the peace deal is “unacceptable” to Russia.[16] Member of the Belarusian National Assembly’s House of Representatives Vadim Gigin, who is also a prominent propagandist in the Russian and Belarusian information spaces, stated on Russian state television that Russia cannot agree to the peace plan due to “mutual mistrust” between Russia and the United States and that there is no mechanism for implementing such an agreement.[17] These various statements continue to indicate that the Kremlin is disinterested in making any compromises in a peace deal and is setting domestic information conditions to reject the peace plan.

Russian ultranationalists, a key pro-war constituency for Putin, similarly argued that Russia should not accept any peace plan and should instead continue its war against Ukraine. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that a peace plan could deprive Russia of the opportunity to seize more territory in Ukraine and interpreted Putin’s November 21 remarks about the US-proposed peace plan as a reiteration of Russia’s commitment to fighting while it can still advance.[18] The milblogger concluded that Russia’s ability to sustain the war effort will determine the war’s outcome, not a diplomatic settlement. Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russia’s war aims are not limited to the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but encompass all territories “enshrined in the [Russian] constitution,” referring to Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in 2022.[19] The milblogger implied that Russia is willing to continue the war so that it can demand a demilitarized zone that extends all the way to Poland, implying that Russia maintains its maximalist territorial goals in Ukraine. Other Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reiterated that Russia would only agree to a peace plan that encompasses all of Russia’s demands.[20] Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been rejecting the US-proposed 28-point peace plan and reiterating Russia’s commitment to its original, maximalist war aims since Western media began reporting on the proposal on November 20.[21] These statements continue to indicate that Russia is unlikely to accept any proposed peace plan that falls short of Ukrainian capitulation. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions.[22]

The Kremlin is aggrandizing recent Russian military activity to push Ukraine and the West to surrender the territory in Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces are unlikely to seize without several years of campaigning. The Kremlin has been doubling down on the false narrative that Russian battlefield successes are so widespread that a Russian victory is inevitable.[23] ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable and that the “realities on the ground” show that Russia faces many obstacles in its path to seizing the rest of Donetsk Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian rate of advance intensified since the Alaska summit, with Russian forces advancing an average of 9.3 square kilometers per day between August 15 and November 20. Russian gains notably have still been confined to a foot pace even during this period of faster advances. Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027 at this rate of advance, assuming Russian forces can maintain the current faster rate of advance, Ukrainian defenses remain strong, and Western weapons provisions to Ukraine remain consistent. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to push Ukraine to hand over this territory to save Russia significant amounts of time, effort, manpower, and resources that it could use elsewhere in Ukraine during renewed aggression.

The actual timeline on which Russian forces could potentially seize all of Donetsk Oblast is likely even longer. Foggy and rainy weather has contributed to Russia’s faster tempo in fall 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, while Ukrainian drone operations have not been as effective.[24] These seasonal weather conditions are not permanent, and the rate of Russian advance will likely slow as weather conditions stabilize. Russian advances since August 15 have also not faced heavily fortified, large population centers the size of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Oblast Fortress Belt.[25] Russia’s recent rate of advance of 9.3 square kilometers per day was also notably across the entire theater, and the calculation that Russian forces could seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by August 2027 is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces would commit the same forces, resources, and energy that they have deployed across the frontline since August 15 to fighting in Donetsk Oblast only. The Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast but is unlikely to completely deprioritize other sectors to maintain the strategic initiative and pressure along the entire front. Continued European military assistance and European-financed American weapons sales to Ukraine could also strengthen Ukraine’s defenses, possibly reversing some Russian gains and slowing this protracted timeline even further.

The situation in the Pokrovsk direction remains serious and dynamic as Russian forces continue to advance to close the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket by advancing on the northern shoulder of the encirclement. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[26] Additional geolocated footage published on November 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pokrovsk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[27] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 23 that Russian forces are completing clearing operations in Pokrovsk.[28] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have created a “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) between Pokrovsk and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad). The milblogger claimed that Russian assault activity is increasing in Myrnohrad and that drone operators are entering the town. The milblogger claimed that it is highly probable that the rest of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is a contested “gray zone.”

Alexandr Dugin the clown likes to popoff and Popov vodka too. Doogy D duped Vlad, fake conservatives at FR, Tuck Qatarlson, others too.

In a matter of months, Ukraine has caused significant damage not only to the Russian economy and infrastructure, but to pitin’s image of a strongman and protector of Russia.
2 more months of this let alone 2 years will leave Russia striving for third world status.

Can pitin continue to sacrifice Russians and others on the alter of his ego, yes, but he can’t protect the industry and infrastructure that funds it.

Once the money is gone so is his power and ability to wage war

Hard to believe anything the Russians report, from frontline reports, economic reports and things like this report on sale of gold reserves.

If the Russians report GDP growth of .6%, I would imagine it is far worse.
If the Russians report sales of gold, I would imagine it is far larger as their need for revenue is growing more desperate by the day.

Even Russia’s reported vast gold reserves are finite, pitin’s need for revenue is not.

Rus gold - Bad Vlad chopping up the bannisters to heat the house, in Russian winter 2025-2026. The Kremlin Moscow winter will have more days with electric off, than on. While Siemens will not be selling them generators. Ukies get to laugh last, as vodka numbed bastards, oligarchs, FSB, politburo freeze in the dark.

At Moscow latitude, winters are plenty dark every year.
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Moscow is located at approximately 55°45′ N latitude, which places it significantly north of the equator. This latitude is comparable to cities like Ketchikan, Alaska, and is further north than many major cities in the contiguous United States, such as Seattle (47.6° N) and Minneapolis (44.9° N). Additionally, Moscow’s latitude is similar to that of Marseille, France, indicating a broader geographical comparison
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Moscow and Copenhagen are both located at approximately 56°N latitude. Specifically, Moscow is at 55.7522°N and Copenhagen is at 55.6759°N.
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**** I was in Copenhagen one summer. The sun rose completely by 3AM. This means Moscow is nighttime by 3PM in the winter.

Who would guess that massive tax increases may not result in increase tax revenue 😂

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=MgkJREIbo2U