Introduction
To deter and win future wars, America must be able to seize the initiative against any actor it may need to fight. Wars are rarely won through reactive approaches.
Russia is on a trajectory toward protracting and expanding the current war. As long as the Kremlin perceives that it has the initiative, it has little reason to compromise its aims in Ukraine, to reduce its intensified attacks against NATO, or to limit its cognitive warfare offensive on US decision-making. The US must contest the initiative in Ukraine, Europe, and in the cognitive space to alter Russia’s current trajectory toward a longer and larger war. Only by seizing the initiative can the U.S. impose its will on Russia or any opponent.
Russia has been fighting with a free hand because of the West’s decision to grant it effective safe havens by restricting the range and capabilities of systems provided to Ukraine and by a policy of gradual change that gives the Kremlin time to adapt. Russia has been allowed to build up its defense industrial base with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and to keep its manpower and materiel safely in rear areas — often as the result of restrictive Western policies ostensibly aimed at avoiding “escalation.”
The United States and partners can change this dynamic by changing their approach. No single measure will yield a decisive advantage against Russia — but achieving momentum through a continuous series of actions can. Pressure on Russia needs to shift from a stream to a waterfall, from linear incremental changes to a campaign of pressures that generate mass, velocity, and cascading effects.
The Kremlin’s strategy, unlike ours, recognizes Russia’s vulnerability to momentum. The Kremlin’s main effort is ensuring that we never think in terms of seizing the initiative against Russia: that we discuss tactics, not strategy; focus on reactive countermeasures, not proactive and sustained campaigns; and deploy individual measures, not massed effects.
The Problem: Fractured Initiative
Initiative is the ability to act proactively to control the tempo and set the terms of events. Momentum is the ability to maintain initiative by overwhelming an opponent’s ability to react, often through a sustained rate of operations.[1]
US and partner support to Ukraine has prevented Russia from taking more Ukrainian lives, lands, and, possibly, Ukraine’s statehood. The West has also shown that it is more than capable of contesting Russia globally. The most recent example is the US forcing Swiss commodity trader Gunvor to pull its offer to buy the assets of Russian energy company Lukoil, which is disrupting Lukoil’s business and undermining the reliability of a key pillar of Russia’s power.[2]
Certain US and partner approaches have nevertheless conflicted with the very idea of initiative, contributing to Russia’s ability to sustain the war against Ukraine and global operations aimed at fracturing NATO and undermining US power.
Largely reactive stance. The US misperceived a brief period of relatively non-assertive Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s as a new norm, rather than an anomaly, and lost focus on the Russian challenge.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, has proactively pursued the same set of aims for the last 25 years in increasingly extreme ways, while the West reacted with limited countermeasures, if at all. The US has periodically been forward-looking (with the provision of Javelins to Ukraine helping build capacity within Ukraine’s military, among other examples), as individual teams and organizations have had the foresight and capability to act alongside moments of policy clarity.[4] The West has nevertheless largely remained in a reactive stance vis-à-vis Russia for over two decades and remains reactive today. Increased US sanctions are a reaction to Russia’s unwillingness to come to the table. Increased Western provision of military aid during Russia’s full-scale invasion often was a reaction to Ukraine’s battlefield setbacks and Russian advances.[5] Europe is reactively responding to Russia’s long-standing hybrid operations and Russia’s recently intensifying attacks and malign acts against NATO. The West’s reactive posture allows Russia, not the West, to set the pace and terms of the events.
Incrementalism. Incrementalism in the provision of military aid repeatedly disrupted Ukraine’s battlefield momentum and provided time for Russian forces to adapt and build their defenses in depth; it gave the Kremlin time to surge Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and secure support from North Korea, China, and Iran.[6] Incrementalism reduced domestic pressures on Putin, allowed him to manage individual war-related crises in isolation without suffering the consequences of their massed effects, masked Russia’s weaknesses, and undermined the effectiveness of America’s own policies.[7]
‘Gamechangers.’ Ukraine’s partners regularly argue about whether any particular weapons system or activity will be a gamechanger. Such debates were prominent regarding the provision of specific weapons systems such as ATACMS, policies such as sanctions, and events such as Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive.[8] Certain capabilities, such as long-range strikes, have mattered more than others. No single capability, however, is likely to yield a decisive advantage against Russia given the scale of this war. Focus on individual “gamechangers” has distracted from the requirement to grow a combined arsenal of defense assets in the West and Ukraine early enough and at a large enough scale to generate decisive effects, and to invest in better warfighting concepts that would organize limited resources for greater effects.[9]
‘Next Decisive Phase.’ Ukraine’s partners hoped that each next phase of Russia’s war against Ukraine or “peace talks” with Russia will be decisive. The Kremlin has been explicit in word and action — shortly after Russia’s failed 2022 blitzkrieg — about its intent to fight a long war.[10] The Kremlin continues to be explicit about its intent to fight a long war against Ukraine and to set conditions for a possible war with NATO.[11] Western preoccupation with a decisive phase — the idea that Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive would be decisive by itself, for example — has distracted from the requirement to deprive Russia of the initiative over the long run by resourcing Ukraine’s sustained operations.[12] The lack of forward-looking resourcing of Ukraine’s operations in the West, in turn, diminished the Ukrainian military’s ability to plan, reducing the tempo of Ukraine’s operations and force generation efforts, allowing Russia to seize the initiative on the battlefield and in the information space.[13]
The hope of ending the war without helping Ukraine impose a major military setback on Russia. The idea that some amount of non-military pressure can compel Putin to end the war will continue to be tempting and will continue to fail. Putin has shown that he is willing to normalize enormous casualties and economic suffering as long as Russian forces are able to continue creeping battlefield advances. Degrading Russia’s wartime economy is key to degrading Russia’s ability to fight. But increasing economic pressure does not obviate the requirement to help Ukraine strip Russia of its offensive potential on the battlefield. Empowering Ukraine to inflict greater damage onto the Russian military is also key to forcing the Kremlin to pay a steeper price for its war efforts. The Kremlin uses its cashflows to bribe Russian society into accepting high casualties, reduced quality of life, and military service.[14] Military setbacks are also key to making Putin feel domestic pressure. Russian nationalists are key to Putin’s regime and his ability to sustain the war. They provide societal, manpower, and crowdfunding support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.[15] They seek victories, not defeats. Russian military failures have driven Russian nationalists to pressure the Kremlin in the past and will likely continue to do so in the future.[16] A combination of military setbacks and economic pressures could impose a dilemma on the Kremlin to accept increased political risks to his power in order to sustain the war effort.
Separating Ukraine policy from policy toward Russia’s global activities. Western policies often viewed Russia’s war against Ukraine and Russia’s global operations in siloes. That’s not how Russia operates. Putin’s strategy has long been to offset pressures in one area through operations in another. Russia’s operations in Africa provide valuable resources for the Kremlin, an information platform to challenge the West, and ways to counter sanctions.[17] Securing supplies of North Korean artillery ammunition allowed Russia to achieve an artillery advantage against Ukraine despite the failings of its own economy.[18] Securing Iran’s transfer of Shahed drone technology and China’s support in scaling Russian domestic production of Shahed-type drones allows Russia to launch large-scale drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s civilian and military infrastructure.[19] Our compartmentalization is what gives the Kremlin the wingspan to do more than the limits of what Russia’s real power allows and to limit the potential of any momentum the West can generate against Russia. Seizing the initiative against Russia requires both helping Ukraine and contesting Russia globally.
Pivoting from Russia to China. Separating US adversaries and resourcing all critical US national security requirements will always be the right goals. Pivoting US attention and resources away from Russia to China, however, undermines both efforts in the current context. This approach ignores the dependency of China’s threat to the United States and its partners on the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The PLA is learning from Russian operations in Ukraine and will be more militarily effective in a future Taiwan scenario.[20] The longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, and the better Russia does in that war, the more the PLA learns and improves. Iran and North Korea are learning lessons as well.[21] Russia’s ability to threaten NATO — which will only grow if Russia succeeds in Ukraine — aids China by requiring NATO to keep forces in Europe rather than respond to China. It also increases Russia’s ability to threaten US allies in Asia, particularly with unmanned systems, should Russia choose to aid China in an Asian conflict. Treating the China threat as distinct from the Russian threat limits the potential of the US and its Pacific allies learning from the Ukrainian military and its innovations and inhibits the United States from fostering new cross-regional cooperation frameworks (i.e., Ukraine-Taiwan-Japan-US) that could help prepare our Asian allies and partners to deter and defend against China’s aggression in the Pacific. The pivot inhibits Ukraine from receiving necessary resources, such as long-range missiles, to destroy drone factories in Russia that largely rely on Chinese components and enable Chinese manufacturers to learn from Russian modern warfare.
Opportunity: Russian Vulnerabilities
The West’s lack of initiative masks Russian vulnerabilities and weaknesses. The gap between the Kremlin’s goals and its means persists. Putin has yet to achieve almost any of his stated — and unchanged — maximalist objectives in Ukraine nearly four years into the full-scale invasion, despite an estimated 1.2 million Russians killed and wounded.[22] Russia depends on the will and capability of others to sustain the war, including support from China and North Korea. Russia depends on its ‘shadow fleet’ — an illicit shipping network that Russia operates but does not own — to enable its energy trade. Russia’s efforts to reestablish control over other former Soviet states by force or manipulation have had mixed results. Russia suffered a recent setback — even if possibly temporary — in Moldova. A pro-European party decisively won the 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections despite enormous Kremlin investment in trying to sway the election in Russia’s favor.[23] Russia is stretched thin and knee-deep in many places. The Kremlin failed to support its ally, the Bashar al Assad regime, in Syria in December 2024 because Russian resources were tied down in Ukraine. Russia offered no meaningful aid to Iran during the Iran-Israel war for the same reason and despite the help Iran had provided to Russia. Russia depends on a set of powerful but limited strategic assets to advance its objectives. Energy trade is a key example and an opportunity to asymmetrically affect Russia across the board. The Kremlin is accumulating risks. The Kremlin has surged its DIB and innovating technologies and techniques to adapt on the battlefield, but the Kremlin is still eroding the basis of its defense production, including its macroeconomic stability, access to advanced technologies, and workforce.[24] The cost of Russian manpower recruitment has grown to the point that Putin is beginning to return to involuntary mobilization, which will generate considerable societal cost.[25] The Kremlin is accumulating other societal risks, as the structural clash between Russian ultranationalists, whom Putin needs to sustain the war and the regime, and Putin’s fundamentally imperial model of ruling Russia as a multiethnic, multi-religious state is growing.[26]
Vulnerabilities only matter if they are exploited, however. Western reactive approaches, on the contrary, have masked and mitigated Russian weaknesses by providing the Kremlin time and space to adapt, strengthening the Kremlin’s ability to absorb risk.
No single Russian weakness is a gamechanger. Pressure on any given Russian weakness is unlikely to be the decisive reason why the Kremlin no longer can or wants to protract and expand the current war. Russian weaknesses and risks also mature on different timelines and respond to different pressures.[27] The requirement is not to accurately predict a decisive pressure point – but rather to build a strategy of momentum that stresses the entire system in a way that exceeds the Kremlin’s capacity to manage it.
The Kremlin is vulnerable to campaigns that stress various parts of the whole system in a coordinated fashion. The effects of Western and Ukrainian concerted pressure on Russia’s energy in 2025 and Ukraine’s initiative against the Russian forces in 2022 are examples of what momentum can achieve against Russia. A combination of Ukraine’s sustained strikes and US economic pressure on Russia’s energy sector is driving energy shortages in Russia — one of the biggest global energy producers; driving Lukoil into a crisis (the company had to declare force-majeure in Iraq, for example), and compelling foreign buyers to reduce imports of Russian energy.[28] The Kremlin also struggled to respond to the Ukrainian initiative during the Fall 2022 counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, which exposed the vulnerabilities of Russian force generation, information systems, and decision-making. The counteroffensives imposed the dilemma in which the Kremlin had no other option but to assume the political risks associated with an involuntary reserve call up and exposing the broader Russian society to war. The shock of consecutive counteroffensives drove fissures within Putin’s nationalist base and laid the foundation for the spat between the late PMC Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian military establishment, which eventually resulted in Prigozhin’s rebellion in 2023.[29]
One can rightfully note that these effects can be ephemeral if not sustained and debate the best use of limited capabilities against any particular Russian pressure point. The principle nevertheless stands — an uninterrupted campaign targeting pillars of the Kremlin’s power and its ability to sustain war exerts pressure on the system, illuminates masked vulnerabilities, and forces Putin to make increasingly hard choices, stretching his ability to manage risk.
The Kremlin’s strategy, unlike ours, recognizes Russia’s vulnerability to Western initiative. The main purpose of Russia’s cognitive warfare effort is to ensure that the United States and NATO continue to be reactive and do not think in terms of taking the initiative against Russia.[30] Recent Russian cognitive warfare efforts to prevent the United States from taking the initiative include alternating nuclear blackmail, mixed diplomatic signals like sending Kremlin negotiator Kirill Dmitriev to appeal to US audiences, and blaming the West and Ukraine for Russia’s own failure to engage in peace negotiations.[31] Russia intensified attacks and malign acts against NATO seek, among other things, to keep Europe in a reactive stance and to prevent NATO from formulating a unified and organized response to Russia.
The American Initiative: Make Russia React to the US
Altering Russia’s trajectory toward protracting and expanding the current war requires contesting the Russian initiative in Ukraine and in Europe, as well as its global cognitive warfare effort against US decision-making. The United States and NATO will otherwise face growing risks and costs in countering the Russian challenge. The ability to seize the initiative is a requirement for America to deter and win wars.
Alternating sticks and carrots against Russia in hopes that the Kremlin comes to the table is a form of incrementalism and will have the same effect as previous policies — it will prolong Russia’s will and ability to fight. Linearly combining diplomatic, information, military, and economic pressures (DIME) against Russia is necessary but not sufficient against the complex system of Russia’s intent and capability to wage wars.
The United States and partners should think in terms of velocity and massed effects. A single measure is unlikely to be decisive, but momentum can be.
To seize the initiative, the United States must abandon its reactive mindset and seek control over the tempo of events to set the terms on which Russia must engage. Russia’s intent is clear; its capability is knowable; Russia’s global operation is mappable. The United States should proactively work with partners to degrade Russia’s capability to wage war and slow Russian reconstitution by denying the Kremlin time and space to adapt.
- The right focus — facilitating Russia’s military failure in Ukraine. Putin’s theory of victory relies on Russia’s ability to sustain creeping advances on the battlefield in Ukraine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine will also have an enormous effect on Russia’s power and its ability to threaten US interests.[32] Russia’s ability to reconstitute, to subjugate its neighbors, and to confront NATO; the Kremlin’s ability to shape America’s will and perceptions; and the strength and capability of Russia’s anti-American coalitions depend on whether Russia keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine or makes significantly more gains. Stripping Russian forces of their offensive potential in Ukraine is a core requirement.
- Longer planning horizon. Putin counts on outlasting the West in Ukraine. The United States can strip Putin of this hope by planning ahead. The United States should work with European partners on a multi-year DIB plan to resource both European security and sustain Ukraine’s military operations (if the peace breaks out, those resources can be used to build deterrence against future Russian attacks) in ways that support the modernization and reconstitution of US military forces and the American DIB.
- Tempo. Putin counts on having pauses in which to adapt. A longer planning horizon is necessary but not sufficient. Momentum against Russia can only be generated through a sustained rate of operations that denies the Kremlin time to adapt its capabilities and normalize a new and worse reality inside of Russia. What degraded Iran’s global proxy capabilities was the momentum of Israel’s kinetic actions that overwhelmed the network. A similar, suitably modified, approach can succeed against Russia.
- Seizing the initiative from Russia in Europe while it is still feasible to do at a relatively low cost and risk. Russia’s intensified attacks and malign acts in Europe have two sets of objectives.[33] The Kremlin aims to break the newly found — even if slow — DIB momentum in Europe and to make sure its output never reaches Ukraine. Russian attacks also seek to reinforce Europe’s reactive approach to Russia. The Kremlin is also setting conditions for a possible war with NATO. Russian attacks in Europe are ‘reconnaissance by fire’ to assess NATO’s response to Russia’s actions, as well as being information and psychological shaping operations.
- NATO can still contest Russian initiative in Europe at a relatively low cost and risk. Even as Russia is intensifying its attacks against NATO in Europe, Russia’s attention and resources are tied up in Ukraine, especially while the Russian forces are conducting offensive operations there. Russia depends on its external ‘gig economy’ to conduct its sabotage in Europe, as many Russian operatives have been expelled following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[34]
- NATO is both behind the curve of the Russian threat and also underutilizing the opportunity to contest Russian initiative at a relatively low risk and cost compared with the challenge it will face when the rate of the Russian attacks can grow exponentially as Russia turns greater focus and more resources toward Europe.
- Seizing the initiative from Russia in Europe requires the United States and NATO to recognize that Russia operates on different timelines and under different readiness assumptions than NATO, as Russia’s ill-prepared full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrates. Russia has been conducting force reforms, ramping up its DIB, and reforming its mobilization systems for possible confrontation with NATO.[35] Although these changes are long-term, the Kremlin may not consider it necessary to complete these reforms before engaging in a confrontation if it sees a window of opportunity to seize the initiative before Europe is prepared to respond. The Kremlin, for example, may attempt to seize the initiative against NATO before increased European defense production actually raises European combat readiness enough to contest a Russian attack effectively.
- Speed of Knowledge and Action: Global intelligence picture — localized action, with partners. Putin counts on offsets — using operations and partnerships in one region to offset the limits of Russia’s capability in another.[36] To control the tempo of events, the United States and partners require a common picture of Russia’s global operations — to know where Russia is advancing, where it is facing setbacks, where it is adapting — to inform decisions about opportunities to act. US partnerships are key to the US ability to take a timely local action to contest Russia once the right opportunity emerges.
- Syria is an example of what the right could have looked like — but did not. Russia suffered a strategic setback in Syria in 2024. The US could have better exploited the moment. Entering the Syrian war 10 years ago was a part of Putin’s strategic goal of reinstating Russia’s ability to project its power. Syria became an anchor of Russia’s power projection in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, a pillar of its cooperation with Iran, a way to contest the US, and support its operations in Africa and pressure NATO’s southern flank.
- The 2024 overthrow of Assad created a major Russian vulnerability, as the new Syrian regime was inclined to view Russia with suspicion, if not hostility. Russia lost its major political ally in the Middle East. Russia’s strategic basing along the Mediterranean was at risk.[37] Russia’s war in Ukraine limited Russia’s ability and bandwidth to support Assad as his forces collapsed. Russian operations in Syria also relied heavily on Lebanese Hezbollah, significantly weakened by Israel at the time.
- The collapse of the Assad regime in 2024 was the time to block Russia’s further pivots and expel Russia from Syria. Russia was instead able to shift some of its assets to Africa, has navigated its relationship with the new Syrian government to retain its bases so far, and, as of November 2025, reportedly aims to resume its military flights to the Hmeimim airbase in Syria.[38] The United States could and should work with the new Syrian leadership to expel Russia from Syria fully. This effort would have required a proactive US posture: a global perspective on emerging opportunities to contest Russia and the ability to act on them. The Trump Administration is leaning forward to support the new Syrian government. It should use its relationship with that government to push the Russians out entirely.
- “No sanctuary” approach. Russia benefits from sanctuaries on and off the battlefield. The US restrictions on Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons on Russian territory at different points of Russia’s full-scale invasion provided Russia with sanctuary on its territory.[39] Russia presently enjoys relative sanctuary at the operational depth (100-120 kilometers behind the front line) on the battlefield in Ukraine, given the limited number of munitions effective at that distance amid evolving battlefield dynamics.[40] A proactive stance would look to help Ukraine to remove battlefield sanctuaries for the Kremlin by providing Ukraine the weapons and assistance it needs to strike them. The US and partners should accelerate investment in Ukraine’s and partner production of intermediate and long-range strike capabilities.
- The Kremlin’s strategic assets — key to Russia’s war — enjoy sanctuaries in the shadow of the West’s reactive posture. One such example is the largely unsanctioned Rosatom enterprise — Russia’s state nuclear energy cooperation that is key to Russia’s operations in Europe, in the Arctic, and in Africa. Rosatom is complicit in human rights violations at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which it illegally occupies.[41] Rosatom competes with US efforts to export American nuclear technology. It establishes long-term footholds for Russia around the world by creating dependence on Russia for fuel and maintenance of essential infrastructure. Russia has succeeded in developing new strategic assets like the ”shadow fleet” to enable its energy trade, key to Russia’s ability to sustain the war. The US and partners are more than capable of driving a long-term divestment strategy from Rosatom, as well as of an effort to proactively illuminate the shadow fleet to degrade its operations faster than its new elements emerge. But the success of such an effort requires the US to think proactively with the goal of denying Russia its sanctuaries.
- Stripping Russia of its emerging advantage – before it matures. Ukraine’s partners missed the opportunity to halt Russia’s ability to scale Shahed-type drones with Iran’s and then China’s support. The Kremlin is now able to launch hundreds of Shahed-type drones at Ukrainian infrastructure a night, overwhelming Ukraine’s defenses and outpacing — at present — Ukraine’s ability to develop innovative counters, like unmanned interceptors.[42] Shahed-type drones are not only Ukraine’s problem; it is a capability of the triple entente (Russia, Iran, China). This capability is out in the world — with Russia providing imagination for the kinds of effects it can achieve. The United States and partners require a better picture for this Russian emerging advantage and how to counter it. Above all, we must be asking, what are the next Shaheds?
- Smarter systems that turn innovation and scale into advantage. Ukraine’s warfighting challenge exceeds the requirement to produce more or more innovative systems. Ukraine’s increasing challenge — as is Russia’s — is organizing capabilities for better and more lasting effects against the adversary in a timely manner. That means smarter systems. That means an intelligence and operations cycle driven by an iterative assessment of what can meaningfully affect the adversary — based on an iterative understanding of Russia’s centers of gravity, vulnerabilities, and critical requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war — with a feedback loop to Ukraine’s and partner DIB and warfighting concepts. That is not a trivial requirement. But it is one that not only Ukraine, but also the United States needs to master to be ready for an effective contest or war.
- Stripping Russia of its cognitive warfare advantage. Above all, Putin’s strategy relies on Russia’s ability to shape the will and decisions of the West. That’s Putin’s center of gravity, as ISW has long assessed.[43] The United States and its allies can strip Russia of its cognitive warfare advantage by understanding what premises the Kremlin wants us to believe, which decisions of ours it is trying to shape, and in support of which aims — and then by rejecting the very premises the Kremlin is trying to establish in its effort to have us reason to decisions that benefit Russia. The main premise Russia wants us to believe at present is that the United States should choose inaction and stay on the sidelines — to compel us to remain in a perpetually reactive stance.[44] There is no reason the United States and partners should not be able to contest the initiative against Russia in all three major global theaters. The collective power of the alliance is enormously greater than the power Russia can bring to bear. The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of NATO countries, non-NATO European Union states, and America’s Asian allies is over $63 trillion. The Russian GDP is on the close order of $2 trillion. If we lean in, Russia loses.[45]
- Fighting the instinct to disrupt our own initiative against Russia once the United States and partners start gaining the momentum. The escalation anxiety that has driven Western incrementalism in provision of military aid to Ukraine will be the main risk to our own initiative once we regain it vs. Russia.