Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
Send more Artillery!
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is unwilling to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine that does not result in Ukraine's complete capitulation. Lavrov stated that Russia has not changed its position since the August 2025 Alaska summit, and that Russia does not need a short-term ceasefire that “leads nowhere,” but a “long-term stable peace.”[1] Lavrov responded to American demands for an immediate end to Russia's war in Ukraine by claiming that a ceasefire would not resolve the alleged “root causes” of the conflict — which Lavrov has continued to identify as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[2] Lavrov’s statements emphasize the Kremlin's determination to achieve its original war aims despite American demands for an immediate end to the conflict. Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly stated that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire until Ukraine and the West meet Russia's demands of Ukrainian neutrality, the removal of the legitimate government in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Russian government, and changes to NATO's Open Door Policy.[3] Lavrov’s statements are a continuation of the Kremlin's attempts to signal to US President Donald Trump that Trump's demands for an immediate end to the war are incompatible with Russia's war aims.[4]
Ukraine and its European allies signaled their support for U.S. President Donald Trump's proposal for an immediate ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friederich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Portuguese President António Costa, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Støre, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez published a joint statement on October 21 expressing support for Trump's proposal for an immediate ceasefire and to leverage the current frontline in Ukraine as a “starting point” for peace negotiations.[5] The European leaders noted that Ukraine is the “only party serious about peace” and that Ukraine must be in the strongest possible position “before, during, and after any ceasefire.” The European leaders reiterated their intent to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine and “ramp up the pressure” on Russia's economy and defense industrial base (DIB). ISW continues to assess that economic pressure alone is an insufficient tool to bring Russia to the negotiating table and that ending the war in Ukraine also relies on continued robust military support to Ukraine.[6]
Recent Russian war crimes in Pokrovsk highlight the humanitarian cost of Russian advances in more populated areas. Ukrainian volunteer Denys Khrystov published geolocated footage on October 19 showing several civilians that Russian forces murdered near the railway line in central Pokrovsk.[7] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed on October 21 that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group committed the murders in violation of international humanitarian law.[8] Donetsk Oblast Police Spokesperson Pavlo Diachenko reported on October 21 that Ukrainian authorities are still determining the exact number and nature of civilian casualties from the Russian attack.[9] Diachenko noted that Russian drone strikes prevent humanitarian volunteers from entering Pokrovsk and impede evacuation efforts. The recent murders reflect Russian forces’ policy of deliberately killing Ukrainian civilians, and the death toll will only increase should Russian forces continue to advance into populated urban areas such as Pokrovsk.[10]
Russia's long-range strike campaign continues to target critical Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on October 21 that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; four S-300 anti-aircraft guided missiles from Kursk Oblast; and 98 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea on the night of October 20 to 21.[11] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 58 drones and that all six missiles and 37 drones struck 10 locations and that downed debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Ukrainian critical infrastructure in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts and noted that Russian forces are striking such infrastructure daily ahead of winter.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian and energy infrastructure and caused power outages in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, and Kyiv oblasts.[13]
The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that all Ukrainian oblasts are introducing power outage schedules following the Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[14] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian forces are circling drones over damaged power facilities to prevent Ukraine from repairing its energy facilities and that there are no military targets near the energy facilities that Russian forces are striking.[15] Ukrainska Pravda previously noted that recent Russian strikes aim to create a blackout in Ukraine by creating a power deficit in eastern Ukraine, where consumption is typically higher and where Russian forces have destroyed almost all local generation capabilities, while gradually stopping the flow of electricity from west to east.[16] Bloomberg previously reported that Russian strikes had taken out roughly 60 percent of Ukraine's natural gas production as of October 3, which will likely force Ukraine to spend 1.9 billion euros on fuel imports in Winter 2025-2026.[17] Russia has conducted a series of intensified strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure each fall and winter since 2022, in what ISW continues to assess is a Russian effort to degrade Ukraine's energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[18] Russia's ongoing and ever-intensifying long-range strike campaign against Ukraine is just one indicator of the Kremlin's disinterest in peace.
Ukrainian Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed as the commander of the newly formed Joint Forces Task Force. Ukraine's new Joint Forces Task Force announced on October 20 that Drapatyi, who commanded the Dnipro Group of Forces, will command the newly-created Joint Forces Command and its subordinate Joint Forces Task Force.[19] The Joint Forces Task Force has an area of responsibility (AoR) of Kharkiv Oblast and replaces the disbanded Dnipro Group of Forces, which had an AoR from Kharkiv Oblast through Zaporizhzhia City, as part of the Ukrainian military's transition to the corps structure. This is Drapatyi’s second time commanding Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast, after heading Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group during the Spring 2024 Russian offensive into Kharkiv Oblast. Ukraine's Joint Forces Task Force noted that the new Joint Forces Task Force will exercise joint operational control over all Ukrainian units and formations that are operating in the Kharkiv direction, including elements of Ukraine's regular armed forces, the Ukrainian National Guard, and the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service.
Polish and Romanian authorities connected Russian military intelligence to attempted acts of sabotage aimed at undermining European Union (EU) support to Ukraine. The Polish National Prosecutor's Office announced on October 21 that Polish authorities detained a Ukrainian citizen on October 17 who shipped packages with explosives and incendiary devices to Ukraine at the behest of Russian military intelligence to undermine EU support for Ukraine.[20] The Polish National Prosecutor's Office noted that the suspects intended for these packages to detonate spontaneously during transport and that Romanian authorities intercepted the packages. The Romanian Intelligence Service announced on October 21 that it detained two Ukrainian citizens — whom Polish authorities stated were close collaborators of the individual detained in Poland — after they deposited packages containing homemade remotely detonated incendiary devices at the headquarters of Ukrainian courier company Nova Post in Bucharest in an attempt to burn down the building.[21] The Romanian Intelligence Service reported that this incident is part of a broader campaign targeting Nova Post infrastructure. This incident is very likely a continuation of a Russian military intelligence effort to ship incendiary packages throughout Europe that Lithuanian authorities reported in September 2025.[22]
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Minister of Internal Affairs Tomasz Siemoniak announced on October 21 that the Polish Internal Security Agency detained eight other persons suspected of preparing acts of sabotage, including reconnaissance of military facilities and critical infrastructure.[23] ISW previously forecasted on September 30 that Russia could conduct false flag sabotage attacks against Poland when Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) “warned” that Western intelligence services are preparing to blame Russia for false-flag attacks in Europe and deflect blame for actual Russian sabotage and hybrid operations.[24] These operations are likely associated with Russia's “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[25]
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A lot of talk around what was said and what was not, we will see how that plays out.
What is certain is that the war has come home to Russia and the Russian people.
Up till now most of the casualties have been from eastern Russian peasants(typical) and cost have been covered by the funds pitin took from the Russian people, but that has changed.
The gas station with a country has become an importer of fuel, food, ammunition, equipment, and civilian commodities. The Kremlin is out of spending cash.
Attacks on petro infrastructure and its effects can not be hidden from the people anymore.
The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military continues to falsely claim to have seized all of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City) but that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in southern Yunakivka.[31] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is making battleplans based on these exaggerated reports and declared control over the settlement at least three times since July 2025. The milblogger claimed that the military command is withdrawing elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from Yunakivka and replacing them with elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) to defend Yunakivka and is preparing for further offensive operations in the area.[32]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian military vehicles operating along a forested road near Ivolzhanske (northeast of Sumy City) with Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones.[33] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 18 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City), as of October 1.[35]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 17 and 18.[36]
Zolochiv Military Administration Head Viktor Kovalenko stated on October 18 that Russian forces struck a civilian car driving along the road between Postolne and Baranivka (northwest of Kharkiv City) with a fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone, killing one civilian and injuring three.[37]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) and on the northwestern outskirts of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[38]
Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka and Bolohivka on October 18.[39]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) holding a Russian flag in southwestern Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces likely seized the settlement.[40]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within Kupyansk.[41] A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces seized Kupyansk.[42]
Russian forces attacked near and in Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and Doroshivka and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka and toward Kolodyazne; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on October 17 and 18.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Sobolivka-Myrove-Radkivka line (west to north of Kupyansk).[44]
A Russian milblogger posted footage of Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk).[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 17 and 18, but did not advance.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Karpivka and Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 17 and 18.[47]
The Slovyansk Military Administration reported on October 18 that Russian forces have struck Slovyansk over 150 times between July 2025 and October 15, primarily with Geran-2 strike drones, marking a significant increase.[48] The Slovyansk Military Administration reported that Russian forces struck Slovyansk 160 times from January 1 to June 31.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced between Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk) and Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[49]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 17 and 18.[50]
An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on October 17 that Russian forces are attacking exclusively on foot in small infantry groups with drone and artillery support instead of attacking on motorcycles.[51] The Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces have now adapted tactics to isolate Ukrainian defensive positions by interdicting their logistics.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Siversk.[52] Elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the southern flank of the Siversk direction.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on October 18 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 18 that Russian forces seized Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[54]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 17 and 18.[55]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces have yet to establish full control over Stupochky or Predtechyne (both east of Kostyantynivka), refuting claims of Russian seizure as of May 24 and July 4, respectively.[56] The milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces are crossing the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal toward Markove and Novomarkove (north and northeast of Kostyantynivka) and that small assault groups are bypassing Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) and heading toward Kostyantynivka through forested areas near the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway.
The Ukrainian National Police reported on October 18 that a Russian drone struck a civilian vehicle near Pryvillya (north of Kostyantynivka) on the E-40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway, injuring three civilians.[57]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[58] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian communication equipment Andriivka, Novoandriivka, Raiske, and Rusyn Yar (all west to south of Druzhkivka).[59] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces with Lancet loitering munitions near Kostyantynivka.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on October 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on October 17 and 18.[61]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[62]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Russian forces advanced to Prokofieva Street in central Pokrovsk and to the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Dobropillya highway in Sobachivka Microraion (southeastern Pokrovsk).[63]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novoekonomichne, and Krasnyi Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Balahan, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka, Leontovychi, and Troyanda; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on October 17 and 18.[64] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 17 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Durniak Microraion (southwestern Pokrovsk).[65]
Geolocated footage published on October 18 shows Ukrainian forces attacking Russian positions south of Leontovychi in what ISW assesses was likely an infiltration mission.[66] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on October 18 that Russian forces maintain a quantitative manpower superiority south of Pokrovsk but lack full control of the area as Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack.[67] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps noted that Ukrainian forces detect and destroy Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units attempting to infiltrate Pokrovsk and that Russian forces attempted to infiltrate Novopavlivka on October 16 by leveraging poor weather conditions. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Ukrainian forces successfully conducted counter-drone measures a few weeks prior to prevent Russian strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOC) in the corps’ area of responsibility (AoR), resulting in Russian forces significantly increasing their use of KAB glide bombs against Ukrainian logistics. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps reported that Russian forces launched 121 airstrikes since the start of October 2025.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk and spot for airstrikes with FAB glide bombs.[68] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[69] Drone operators and infantry of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk and operate near Pervomaika Microraion (southwestern Pokrovsk), respectively.[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on October 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on October 17 and 18.[71]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Pryvillya (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[72]
Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and toward Orestopil; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksiivka and Verbove and toward Vovche on October 17 and 18.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnivka and Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[74]
Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows that Russian forces conducted a motorcycle assault in two groups of four personnel east of Pryvillya.[75] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that the second Russian assault group pushed forward while Ukrainian forces focused on repelling the first assault group.[76] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces killed all but one of the Russian personnel who participated in the assault.
Russian milbloggers published footage of elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) conducting glide bomb strikes against bridges over the Vovcha River on Tsentralna Street in Pokrovske and the C041411 road between Dobropasove and Kolomiitsi (all west of Velykomykhailivka).[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 657th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian logistics in Orestopil.[78]
Russian forces recently advanced and continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on October 18, but did not advance.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northern Pryvillya (southwest of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces likely recently completed the seizures of Obratne and Novoivanivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[79]
Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Hulyaipole near Novomykolaivka and Novohryhorivka and east of Hulyaipole near Vesele and Malynivka on October 17 and 18.[80]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Stepove on October 17 and 18.[81]
A Russian servicemember operating in Zaporizhia Oblast told Russian opposition outlet Verstka in an article published on October 17 that some elements of the Russian military – presumably those in deprioritized sectors of the front such as Zaporizhia Oblast – experience drone shortages.[82] The Russian servicemember claimed that some Russian units steal drones or components, including blades or engines, from other units due to these shortages.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[83] Drone operators of the 65th Airborne (VDV) Battalion (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.[84]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on October 18 but did not advance.
Russian forces continued ground attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky roadway bridge on October 17 and 18.[85]
The Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a civilian car near Bilozerka (west of Kherson City), injuring one civilian.[86]
Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on October 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast and 164 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, including at least 100 Shahed drones, from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[87] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 136 Russian drones and that 27 drones hit 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged an energy infrastructure facility in Koryukivskyi Raion, Chernihiv Oblast, causing power outages for over 12,000 energy consumers, and another energy infrastructure object that caused power outages in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[88] Ukrainian officials reported emergency power outages in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava oblasts following the energy infrastructure strikes.[89] Officials reported that Russian strikes also struck residential buildings in Cherkasy Oblast and Kharkiv City, and a warehouse in Poltava Oblast.[90]
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115391463725537040
[2] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/612 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/101 ;
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025/
[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/25383215 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/25384251 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/25383399 ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/10/18/v-rossii-otsenili-vstrechu-trampa-i-zelenskogo-v-belom-dome/ ; https://ria dot ru/20251018/zelenskiy-2049079474.html?ysclid=mgwa7uhno7311959228
[5] https://ria dot ru/20251018/zelenskiy-2049079474.html?ysclid=mgwa7uhno7311959228 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/344491 ; https://t.me/kadmitriev/380 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/612 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/101
[6] https://t.me/slutsky_l/3985
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/ ; https://x.com/RussiasPivot/status/1979234984994181561; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1979383744701030662 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/344439
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2025/ https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1979414050191888546; https://x.com/kromark/status/1979448986739024207
[9] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1979414050191888546
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2025/
[11] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1979414050191888546
[12] https://x.com/kromark/status/1979448986739024207
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/
[14] https://www.gazeta dot ru/business/news/2025/10/17/26971868.shtml
[15] https://www.gazeta dot ru/business/news/2025/10/17/26971868.shtml
[16] https://nsn dot fm/society/rossiiskih-proizvoditelei-benzina-obvinili-v-razbavlenii-topliva; https://t.me/bazabazon/41586
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025
[18] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/1979470440289444253; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/
[19] https://t.me/energyofukraine/4920; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1142274-rozpocavsa-remont-linij-elektroperedac-dla-zivlenna-timcasovo-okupovanoi-zaes-gendirektor-magate-grossi/
[20] https://t.me/znppofficial/1603
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2025/;
[22] https://t.me/ruspanorama/98992
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2025/; https://energoatom dot com.ua/en/news/degradaciya-zaporizkoyi-aes-pogliblyuyetsya-stanciya-znovu-na-mezhi-blekautu; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-25-2025/
[24] https://ria dot ru/20251018/podstantsiya-2049058631.html
[25] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1979426588992377046; https://x.com/hochu_dodomu/status/1979407297416667327 https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1979371489276367131
[26] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9929;
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/5421; https://t.me/severnnyi/5424
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/81546 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5421
[30] https://t.me/severnnyi/5421
[31] https://t.me/severnnyi/5427
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/5427
[33] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/634
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35156
[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35145; https://t.me/mod_russia/57623
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395
[37] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1142216-fpv-dron-na-optovolokni-vluciv-v-avtivku-u-zolocivskij-gromadi-odin-colovik-zaginuv-se-troe-distali-gostrogo-soku/
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10277; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DP8JQl7CD0J/
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395
[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10274; https://t.me/vpolezrenia1/10214
[41] https://t.me/rybar/74472
[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/81546
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/rybar/74472; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[44] https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[45] https://t.me/epoddubny/25179
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[48] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1142206-ponad-150-obstriliv-z-lipna-ak-zminilasa-kilkist-obstriliv-slovanska-u-drugomu-pivricci-2025-roku-dani-mva/
[49] https://t.me/rybar/74456
[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[51] https://youtu.be/vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1127741-tisk-na-limanskomu-fronti-uspih-na-dobropilskomu-nastup-na-kostantinivku-front-na-doneccini-lugansini-17-zovtna/?anchor=live_1760734438
[52] https://t.me/dva_majors/81560
[53] https://t.me/rybar/74456
[54] https://t.me/tass_agency/344516 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/57649; https://t.me/mod_russia/57648
[55] iii https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[56] https://t.me/rybar/74457 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025/
[57] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/51528
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/81580
[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14435
[60] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14436
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[62] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10269 ; https://t.me/taifun_army/443
[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43357
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395 ; https://t.me/rybar/74455 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/102006 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937
[65] https://t.me/rybar/74455
[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/43356 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1979504715399639430
[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/10/17/somyj-korpus-dshv-povidomyv-pro-sytuacziyu-v-rajoni-pokrovskoyi-aglomeracziyi/ ; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/653
[68] https://t.me/dva_majors/81540; https://t.me/dva_majors/81578
[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/81580
[70] https://t.me/notes_veterans/25574 ; https://t.me/rybar/74455
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395
[72] https://t.me/ombr_110/1244; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1979436417983119667; https://t. me/WarArchive_ua/31424
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68252
[74] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68252
[75] https://t.me/ombr_110/1244; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1979436417983119667; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/31424
[76] https://t.me/ombr_110/1244
[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/17292; https://t.me/milinfolive/158684 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/183725
[78] https://t.me/army29th/460; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1979519266027429900
[79] https://t.me/ombr_110/1244; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1979436417983119667; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/31424;
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/68252
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395; https://t.me/wargonzo/29937;
[82] https://verstka dot media/kak-ustroena-industriya-dronov-v-rossii-i-chto-s-nej-budet-posle-vojny?tg_rhash=60cd415426f69c
[83] https://t.me/dva_majors/81557
[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/35163
[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30421; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30398; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/30395
[86] https://t.me/khersonskaODA/43744
[87] https://t.me/kpszsu/44999
[88] https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/4182; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1142166-armia-rf-atakuvala-energeticnij-obekt-na-cernigivsini-bez-svitla-blizko-17-tisac-ludej/; https://t.me/GalinaMinaeva/5231; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1142068-10-vibuhiv-za-devat-hvilin-cuguivsinu-atakuvali-rosijski-bpla/; https://t.me/energyofukraine/4922; https://suspilne dot media/1142466-v-ukraini-zastosuvali-avarijni-vidklucenna-svitla/
[89] https://t.me/dtek_ua/2704; https://suspilne dot media/1142466-v-ukraini-zastosuvali-avarijni-vidklucenna-svitla/; https://suspilne dot media/1142466-v-ukraini-zastosuvali-avarijni-vidklucenna-svitla/
[90] http://t.me/ihor_terekhov/3143; https://suspilne dot media/1142078-zustric-zelenskogo-z-trampom-polskij-sud-vidmoviv-nimeccini-v-ekstradicii-ukrainca-zuravlova1333-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1760782825&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/27924; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1142106-vibuhi-u-poltavi-vnoci-18-zovtna-so-vidomo/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/10/18/nichna-ataka-rf-po-poltavi-ryatuvalnyky-borolysya-z-pozhezheyu-na-skladi-pidpryyemstva/;
VOLKSWAGEN’S €11 BILLION PROBLEM - GERMANY’S ENGINE IS STALLING
Volkswagen’s missing €11 billion.
That’s the cash shortfall threatening to grind the automaker’s operations to a halt beyond 2025.
Sales are collapsing in China, U.S. tariffs are biting, and Europe’s EV boom has turned into a slow crawl.
Add Germany’s soaring energy and labor costs, and the math starts to look fatal.
VW’s answer? Brutal cost cuts, asset sales, and a leadership shake-up that insiders say could define the company’s survival.
Analysts warn of credit downgrades, layoffs, and a blow to Germany’s industrial identity.
If Volkswagen sputters, it’s not just a car crisis - it’s a warning light for Europe’s entire economy.
Source: Reuters, Bloomberg
Keine zukunft, Deutschers.
Behold the "Green" future they promised. Globalists hollowed out the West, trading our industrial sovereignty for cheap parts from a geopolitical rival. They traded Peace for War. They wanted us dependent. Now, the masters in Beijing are simply tightening the leash as the Green Groupies scurry for cover and leave US covered in ashes.
Smooth move, Euros.
test
I miss the back and forth with Berlin_Freeper. I wonder how he plans to warm himself this winter.
lol
And speaking of idiots:
What Orikhiv doink, AImarcus?
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