Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 19, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly reiterated his demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk Oblast as a condition for ending the war, and suggested that Russia would be willing to “surrender parts” of occupied southern Ukraine. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing. Two senior officials told The Washington Post in an article published on October 18 that Putin told US President Trump on October 16 that Ukraine must cede the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia “as a condition for ending the war” and that he “would be willing to surrender parts” of occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange.[1] The exact terms of Putin's reported offer are unclear. It is possible that Putin may have been referring to Ukrainian-controlled parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts that Russia illegally annexed and does not occupy. Putin previously demanded the remainder of Donetsk Oblast in exchange for a ceasefire in August 2025, and ISW has continuously assessed that ceding the remainder of Donetsk Oblast disproportionately favors Russia.[2] Donetsk Oblast contains territory that is strategically vital for Ukraine's defense and defense industrial base (DIB), including the fortress belt — Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, which Ukraine has developed into a significant logistical and defense industrial hub.[3] Russian forces currently have no available means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating the fortress belt, which would likely take several years to seize at their current rate of advance. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would allow Russian forces to avoid a long and bloody struggle and continue fighting into deep rear areas of Ukraine from new positions along the Donetsk Oblast border.[4] Russian forces would have advantageous positions from which to launch attacks into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts or southern Kharkiv Oblast – areas that are significantly less fortified than the fortress belt. Such a withdrawal would also set more advantageous conditions for the ongoing Russian offensive to advance across the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast and approach Izyum. Russia would have its choice of multiple, mutually supportive offensive operations to undertake should Ukraine cede Donetsk Oblast to Russia, especially if there is no guarantee that Russia will not resume offensive operations in Ukraine.

Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources are attempting to portray limited Russian offensive operations in the Kherson direction as an ongoing offensive to recapture Kherson City — efforts that are incompatible with Putin's claimed readiness to make territorial concessions in southern Ukraine. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed on October 19 that Russian forces control an industrial part of Kherson City in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and several dacha areas on the Dnipro River Delta islands, so “therefore the [seizure] of Kherson [City] itself has already begun.”[5] The administrative boundaries of Kherson City are limited to west (right) bank Kherson Oblast, so it is unclear which areas of east bank Kherson Oblast Saldo is referring to. Russian forces withdrew from all of west bank Kherson Oblast as of November 2022 following a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and interdiction campaign.[6] Kremlin newswire TASS framed Saldo’s statement to imply that Russian forces have begun a new concerted offensive effort to seize Kherson City itself — a significant undertaking that would require Russian forces to ford the Dnipro River and dedicate more manpower and materiel than is currently operating in the Kherson direction.[7] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russian forces will seize Kherson City as it is a “constituent entity” that “must be returned to Russia,” but noted that Russian forces will not do so “anytime soon.”[8] ISW has yet to observe any indicators to assess that Russian forces are likely preparing for or have launched a renewed significant offensive operation against west bank Kherson Oblast.

Russian officials also downplayed the seriousness of Putin's reported proposal, likely in an effort to condition Russian society to accept the Kremlin's intent to continue its war effort in Ukraine. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed to Russian state media outlet Lenta on October 19 that occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts “are recognized regions of Russia,” following Russia's September 2022 sham referenda, and that any territorial concessions that Russia may have proposed “were expressed in a more relaxed manner.”[9] These Russian officials are messaging to domestic Russian audiences that the Kremlin maintains its territorial claims over Kherson City and likely all of west bank Kherson Oblast, and that Putin did not seriously make territorial concessions in Ukraine as Western reporting suggests.

The Kremlin has also failed to prime the Russian information space, particularly Putin's main constituency of ultranationalists, to accept anything less than a full victory in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger characterized Putin's reported proposal as “utter nonsense” and noted that there is no reason for Putin to willingly trade a “convenient defensive line” on the Dnipro River and a land corridor to occupied Crimea through southern Ukraine in exchange for the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Russian officials — including Saldo — similarly opposed making possible territorial concessions to Ukraine around the August 2025 Trump-Putin summit in Alaska.[11] Putin has held firm to his original war aims and territorial claims for over three and a half years of war, and ISW has not observed any indications that he is willing to make meaningful concessions on any of these aims for a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine made bilateral energy proposals to the United States. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine made proposals to the United States for gas infrastructure, nuclear power generation, and several other unspecified projects to contribute to Europe's energy independence from Russia.[13]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara and Orenburg oblasts on the night of October 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery in Samara Oblast, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows large fires and smoke plumes near the refinery's oil storage tanks.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the primary oil processing unit and are still clarifying the damage. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery produces over 20 types of commercial products and processes about 4.9 million tons of oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Orenburg natural gas processing plant in Orenburg Oblast as part of the October 18-19 strikes, and geolocated footage published on October 19 shows a fire at the plant.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Orenburg natural gas processing plant is one of Russia's largest natural gas processing complexes, processing up to 45 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 6.2 million tons of gas condensate and oil per year. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes hit one of the gas processing and purification units. Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev claimed on October 19 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at and “partially damaged” an unnamed gas plant's infrastructure in the oblast.[16] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that the Orenburg gas processing plant is the largest gas and chemical complex in the world.[17] The Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy, citing information from Russian state energy operator Gazprom, reported on October 19 that a drone strike caused the Orenburg gas processing plant to temporarily stop receiving gas from Kazakhstan's Karachaganak oil and gas project, which uses the Orenburg facility to process Kazakh-produced raw natural gas.[18] Bloomberg reported on October 19 that Karachaganak is one of Kazakhstan's top three oil and gas projects and that the Karachaganak oil and gas project cannot cut gas output without reducing crude oil, as the plant co-produces gas and oil.[19]

German officials reported observing unidentified objects resembling drones over Munich Airport on October 18. The Associated Press (AP) reported on October 19 that German authorities temporarily closed Munich Airport twice on the evening of October 18 due to several reports of unidentified drones operating nearby.[20] The AP reported that German authorities were unable to verify either instance and reopened the airport. The drone incidents, if confirmed, would mark the latest incident in an increasing trend of unidentified drone incursions near critical civilian infrastructure and military facilities throughout Europe.[21] ISW assesses that these unattributed drone sightings are likely associated with Russia's “Phase Zero” campaign — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[22]

more + maps https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2025/

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation

Nothing Significant To Report.

Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis

Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Oleksiivka, on October 12 and 13.[20] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka.[21]

A scout from a Ukrainian battalion operating in Sumy Oblast reported on October 13 that Russian forces are suffering heavy casualties in the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area).[22] The scout stated that Russian forces have significantly fewer armored vehicles and artillery systems compared to 2022-2023. The scout stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups on foot but are sometimes using light vehicles to move toward the frontline. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 28th Separate Rifle Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division, reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) from Russian border areas, where they were operating far from the first line of Russia’s border defenses, to Oleksiivka to reinforce Russian forces.[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the area are still having issues with coordination or joint planning.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly struck and destroyed a Ukrainian truck mounted Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) in Sumy Oblast.[24] Drone operators of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[25]

Russian Main Effort: Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1

Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on October 12 and 13.[26] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that counterattacked in Vovchansk.[27]

Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on October 13 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a school dormitory in Kyivskyi Raion, Kharkiv City.[28] Ukrainian news outlet Suspline reported that the strike was the first Russian FPV strike against central Kharkiv City.[29] The deputy general director of a Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) equipment manufacturer and Ukrainian Air Force reserve officer, Anatoliy Khrapchinskyi, reported to Suspline that Russian forces may have used a mothership drone to carry the FPV drone about 10 to 20 kilometers away from the target. Khrapchinskyi stated that Russian forces may have used an FPV drone with about 2.5 kilograms of explosives. Khrapchinskyi assessed that the strike was part of Russia’s terror tactics and efforts to increase the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) since Russian forces are too far away to use traditional tube artillery or mortars against Kharkiv City.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion and the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Milove and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Bolohivka on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2

Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka and Kamyanka and toward Dvorichanske and Kolodyazne; north of Kupyansk near Zapadne and toward Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on October 12 and 13.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Tiger drone detachment of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pishchane.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 13 that Russian forces seized Borivska-Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[34]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on October 12 and 13.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman); north of Stavky (north of Lyman); south of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman); west, south, and southwest of Zarichne (east of Lyman); and in central Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[36]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on October 12 and 13.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3

Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, and southeast of Siversk near Vyimka on October 12 and 13.[38]

A Ukrainian non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on October 13 that Russian forces recently conducted rotations, resupplied forces in the area, and are accumulating personnel and equipment in the rear, likely in preparation for a possible mechanized assault.[39] The NCO reported that the Russian military command recently deployed 500 servicemembers to the area from training grounds. The NCO added that Russian forces are trying to reduce the “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area), including by using infiltration tactics to reach the frontline faster.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently struck a railway overpass in the northern outskirts of Siversk with a VT-40 fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone.[40]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the northern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[41]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[42] Geolocated footage published on October 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember moving along the Severskyi Donets-Donbas Canal southeast of Novomarkove after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[43] ISW assesses that this event did not advance the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the area based on the infiltration mission.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Volodymyrivka on October 12 and 13.[44]

A Russian milblogger claimed on October 13 that Russian forces conducted an FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[45]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Shcherbynivka.[46] Drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces near Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[47] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the southern Kostyantynivka direction.[48] Drone operators of the Russian 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[49]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces seized Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[50]

Mashovets stated that the Russian military command committed unspecified naval infantry elements, which were previously operating near Poltavka and Popiv Yar (both east of Dobropillya in the Russian near rear), into battle near Volodymyrivka (east of Dobropillya on the west bank of the Kazennyi Torets River) in order to support elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) operating within the Dobropillya salient.[51] Mashovets stated that some naval infantry elements in the area are contending with “exhausting” Ukrainian counterattacks.[52] Mashovets assessed that Russian command structures, especially on the adjacent flanks of the 8th CAA (SMD) and 51st CAA between the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas, are cooperating poorly. Mashovets stated that Russian forces — likely elements of the 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) — are trying to accumulate assault groups near Dorozhnie and in the area between Ivanivka and Nove Shakhove (both just north of Dorozhnie).[53]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove; and northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar on October 12 and 13.[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shakhove.[55]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southwest of Mykhailivka (east of Pokrovsk).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced in southern Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces entered eastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[58]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad, Balahan Myrolyubivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske on October 12 and 13.[59]

Mashovets stated that small Russian infantry groups maintain positions along the railway north of Rodynske.[60] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces started counterattacking in the Rodynske-Razine direction (north to northeast of Pokrovsk), likely in part causing Russian forces to significantly reduce their activity west of the Kazennyi Torets River.[61] A commander within a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have started to use heavy equipment recently, but are still mostly attacking with infantry.[62] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) who were still in Russia only two weeks prior, and that the training levels of Russian personnel in the area vary. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have fire control over western Pokrovsk.[63] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Promin and that earlier claims that Russian forces seized Rodynske are unconfirmed.[64] The milblogger claimed that Russian drone operators are consistently disrupting Ukrainian logistics on the approaches to Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD), with support from elements of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), are accumulating forces near Novoekonomichne and Mykolaivka (just east of Novoekonomichne) while simultaneously attacking from Mykolaivka.[65] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st, 5th, and 110th motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) operating in the Sukhetske-Rodynske and Fedorivka-Krasnyi Lyman directions (all northeast of Pokrovsk) had to temporarily halt their attacks as Ukrainian forces had started to actively counterattack in the past few days in the Krasnyi Lyman direction.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on October 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) and north of Novoukrainka (south of Novopavlivka).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[67]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Dachne; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Ivanivka on October 12 and 13.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Verbove (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[69]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sicheneve; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka and Vorone; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on October 12 and 13.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[73]

Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis

Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City

Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on October 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[74]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novohryhorivka and Poltavka on October 12 and 13.[75]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on October 13 that Russian forces struck a civilian car in Zaporizhia Oblast, killing two civilians.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Novohryhorivka.[77] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) with guided glide bombs.[78]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Ukrainian military spokesperson announced on October 12 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[79]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Ukrainian Assault Forces Commander Colonel Valentyn Manko reported that Ukrainian forces partially liberated Stepove (west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in areas that Russian sources previously claimed were under Russian control.[80]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on October 12 and 13.[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Shaman detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[82] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[83]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on October 13.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are launching Molniya-2 drones to strike Ukrainian air defenses in right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[84]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 82 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 50 were strike drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 69 drones, that 13 drones struck seven locations, and that downed debris fell on two locations.[86] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Donetsk oblasts.[87]

Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks

Nothing Significant To Report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

What a Blessing this war has been ... for the USA.

“Russia’s latest big Ukraine offensive gains next to nothing, again”

“Hundreds of thousands of Vladimir Putin’s troops are losing their lives for barely any land”

“In May, Russia launched an enormous offensive aimed at breaking Ukrainian lines. Its furious attacks in the following months set the entire front line ablaze.

However, our calculations suggest it has seized just 0.4% of Ukrainian land

Russian forces have achieved no major objectives, with key cities such as Pokrovsk holding the invaders at bay…
…despite relentless attacks

The offensive has come at an enormous cost: our meta-estimate suggests over 100,000 Russian soldiers have died in the war this year.”

“WAS IT THE Tomahawks? The deadly cruise missiles are probably one reason Vladimir Putin spoke to Donald Trump on October 16th and agreed to meet him in Budapest in the coming weeks to talk about a ceasefire in Ukraine. Mr Trump claims to have told the Russian leader during their call: “Would you mind if I gave a couple of thousand Tomahawks to your opposition?” But the next day, meeting the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, he seemed to backpedal.
Regardless of whether and when America decides to supply Ukraine with the powerful missiles, Mr Putin has deeper reasons to worry. According to an analysis by The Economist, it is paying a huge cost in return for minimal gains on the battlefield.

Russia’s summer offensive is winding down. Many in the West focus on the grinding progress its troops have made, and the shortage of Ukrainian manpower it has exposed. But that is to look down the telescope from the wrong end. More striking is how little territory Russia has taken in its third and largest offensive; and the terrible cost it has paid in men and materiel. Unless something dramatic changes, Vladimir Putin will be unable to win the war on the battlefield. The fact that he nevertheless continues to try regardless suggests that he is out of ideas.

Exactly how poorly Russian forces have fared is impossible to tell. But data from satellites and shifts in areas of control suggest when the fighting is intensifying, and that permits a rough guess. This lines up well with more than 200 credible estimates of casualties from Western governments and independent researchers. Combining these data allows The Economist to estimate Russian losses and track them over time.

Our meta-estimate suggests that, from the beginning of the full-scale invasion to January of this year, Russian casualties amounted to 640,000–877,000 soldiers, of whom 137,000–228,000 have died. By October 13th, those totals had risen by almost 60%, to 984,000–1,438,000 casualties, including 190,000–480,000 dead.

Russia’s losses have not won a commensurate gain in territory. Since the battle lines stabilised after Ukraine’s first counteroffensive ended in October 2022, they have barely moved. No large city has changed hands. At the pace of the past 30 days, seizing what remains of the four regions Mr Putin already claims—Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhia—would take until June 2030. (For Russia to occupy all of Ukraine would require a further 103 years.)

Moreover, a sudden collapse in Ukraine’s defensive lines is unlikely given how the two armies are fighting the war. Constant drone surveillance, coupled with long-range precision weaponry, has made massing forces near the front suicidal. Incremental gains remain possible—though only at enormous cost—by sending small groups of men into the “kill zone” to stake out forward positions. It is hard to breach Ukrainian lines. Should a breach happen, the advance of massed forces and equipment needed to exploit it is extremely difficult.

Perhaps that is why this summer’s fighting appears to have been much less deadly for Ukraine than for Russia. There is too little data for us to generate a meta-estimate of the cost to Ukraine. However, UALosses, a website, has catalogued 77,403 deaths among Ukrainian soldiers since the full-scale invasion began (it reckons a further 77,842 are missing in action). By date of death, there has been a marked downward trend since last autumn, with 8,668 fatalities recorded this year. Crucially, that is a lower bound, and although independent investigations have confirmed the fate of soldiers in the list, no one knows how many are missing from that count. Moreover, recent deaths are less likely to be in the database, as recording them takes time (some will never be included). But even if the true number is twice the tally, the figures would imply a ratio this year of roughly five Russian soldiers killed for every Ukrainian.

At such rates, manpower may soon become a more serious constraint for Russia than for Ukraine. When the offensive began, Russians were lured with generous sign-on bonuses, and Mr Putin’s recruitment drive outpaced Ukraine’s by 10,000-15,000 per month. But Russia’s heavy casualties this summer probably nullified that advantage.

Only some of Mr Putin’s wounded will ever return to the front lines—perhaps 40%, according to one 2024 estimate by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank. And in the long term, the supply of Russian men to be sacrificed on the fields of eastern Ukraine is limited by the number reaching fighting age inside Russia. About 800,000 boys turned 18 there last year. Insatiable demand meeting limited supply may mean that even larger bonuses will be needed to get people to join up. Failing that, Mr Putin could resort to conscription—though that would be unpopular.
Our rough calculations suggest that the soldiers killed in the war amount to 0.5%-1.2% of Russia’s pre-war cohort of men under the age of 60, compared to 0.6%-1.3% for Ukraine, taking UAlosses’ record of dead, and dead plus missing, as a starting guess.

Equipment is another issue. Oryx, a Dutch open-source intelligence site, has confirmed the loss of 12,541 Russian tanks and armoured fighting vehicles; 2,674 artillery and missile systems; 166 aircraft; and 164 helicopters. All these numbers are lower bounds. Ukraine’s daring strike on Russian airfields and other targets in June, using drones hidden in lorries, wrecked perhaps one sixth of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet. Much of this can be replaced—but not cheaply, and rarely quickly.

And after the pause in American assistance in late 2023 and early 2024—when a lack of, among other things, artillery shells saw many soldiers killed—Ukraine now appears much better supported by its allies. Aid cannot bring back the dead. But, at current trends, it could keep the arithmetic of attrition in Ukraine’s favour.

The war is changing in other ways, too. For years, Ukraine’s economy has been battered by Russian missiles. It is still suffering much more than Russia is. But it is now at least hitting back at some scale, in part via relatively cheap, domestically produced missiles and drones. If the front lines remain much as they are, and the war morphs into one of installations rather than territory, it is no longer so obvious that Russia has the upper hand. Although its economy is much larger than Ukraine’s, it is tiny compared with that of Ukraine’s allies; and although they face the odd act of sabotage, they are not being battered by Russian bombs. Indeed, several of them have promised to bump their defence spending by sums exceeding Ukraine’s annual budget.

Before the recent strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, surveys—always to be taken with a grain of salt in Russia—suggested its people were bullish about the economy. Few signs point to an imminent collapse. If Western backing for Ukraine holds, the war may well grind on at enormous cost, with Russia gaining ground only slowly.”

https://archive.ph/t8e4e

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.