Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
Everyday, Russian drones terrorise the civilians of Kherson. The city of Kherson, with its current population of approximately 71,000 civilians, is split by the Dnipro River. Russian troops hold positions south of the river while civilians inhabit the city to the North.
Russian troops perpetrate the Human Safari by launching drones into north Kherson - indiscriminately hunting, maiming and killing civilians. The Russians’ deliberate attempt to spread fear and test the resolve of the remaining population targets the most vulnerable - many of whom are elderly and without the ability to relocate. These war crimes have been ongoing since 2023, resulting in over 3000 casualties to date, with no sign of relenting.
Markers show approximate locations within neighborhoods of Kherson Urban Hromada, not precise incident sites.
Interactive map https://maps.tochnyi.info/humansafari/
EU won over Russia, in Moldovan elections.
Kyiv Independent (29 Sep):
“Moldova’s pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), supported by President Maia Sandu, won the country’s parliamentary elections, amid growing concerns over potential Russian interference.
With 99.91% of ballots counted, PAS secured 50.16% of the vote, giving it a clear lead and reaffirming public support for Sandu’s push toward European integration.
The opposition Patriotic Electoral Bloc, led by pro-Russian former President Igor Dodon, came in second with 24.19% of the vote.
Several other parties passed the electoral threshold, including softly pro-Russian Alternative (7.97%) and Our Party (6.20%), as well as the Democracy at Home (5.62%) party, supporting a union between Moldova and Romania.”
The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of August 26 to 27.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over northern, southern and eastern Ukraine and that 21 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes caused power outages in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, leaving more than 100,000 households without electricity.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that Russian strikes damaged a critical electrical substation in Sumy City and gas transportation infrastructure facilities in Poltava Oblast.[12] The Ministry of Energy added that Ukrainian authorities consider the strikes to be a continuation of the Russian campaign to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the eve of the heating season. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also de-energized water utilities in Sumy City and damaged an electrical substation in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; a school in Kharkiv Oblast, and an apartment building in Kherson City.[13] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that a Russian strike on August 26 destroyed the DTEK coal enrichment plant in Donetsk Oblast, which prepares coal for heating.[14] The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 27 that the Kremlin does not want to publicly discuss the issue of Western security guarantees for Ukraine and called such public discussions “unhelpful.”[15] Peskov also stated that Russia takes a “negative view” of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and that Russia will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[16] Peskov’s statement was likely in response to the August 26 Financial Times (FT) report that the United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[17] Peskov’s rejection of the Western proposals for security guarantees and his efforts to discredit public discussions of these proposals are likely part of the Kremlin's efforts to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to sideline Ukraine's European partners from providing Ukraine robust security guarantees as part of a conflict termination agreement. The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Peskov reiterated a recurrent Kremlin excuse that any Russia-Ukraine contacts at a high or top level require extensive preparations, but that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating groups remain in contact.[19] Peskov added that Russia and Ukraine have not scheduled the next round of talks between their negotiating groups. Peskov attempted to shift blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's unwillingness to organize a Putin-Zelensky bilateral meeting by claiming that the resolution of the war requires “reciprocity from Kyiv.” Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for “invading and occupying” Azerbaijan in 1920 — further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Aliyev stated in an interview with Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya published on August 27 that “the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the country” in 1920.[20] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had “created [its] own state, but the Bolsheviks took it away.” Aliyev also notably characterized Russia's war against Ukraine as an “invasion” and reiterated that Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine's territorial integrity since the start of the full-scale invasion. Aliyev recalled the “recent cooling” of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, stating that Azerbaijan will “never tolerate” any “aggression or disrespect” against Azerbaijan. Aliyev stated that Russia's downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024 and the Kremlin's reaction are “causing great disappointment and discontent” in Azerbaijan. Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been declining since a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines flight 8243 over the Republic of Chechnya in December 2024, causing the plane to crash in Kazakhstan.[21] Aliyev publicly rejected the Kremlin's attempts to cover up Russia's role in the days following the incident.[22] Russian-Azerbaijani relations continued to decline in June and July 2025 over small-scale incidents that Aliyev seized upon to reiterate his demands that Russia take responsibility for the plane crash.[23] Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City overnight on August 7 to 8. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) contingent arrived in Belarus to participate in joint military exercises connected to the Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 military exercise. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 26 and 27 that Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh forces arrived in Belarus to participate in the Interaction-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025 military exercises at the Losvido and Lepelskyi training grounds in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6. The President instructed General Andrei Mordvichev to assess and calculate the resources that are needed for the speedy (no later than the middle of next year) complete liberation of the DPR. This caused shock in Valery Gerasimov’s entourage. “Such issues should be resolved not by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, but by the Chief of the General Staff. But Mordvichev, with the help of intrigues, achieved that Vladimir Vladimirovich brought him closer to himself. Never mind, this situation will not last long. Although now Valery Vasilyevich, of course, has received a strong blow. But he was not so worried,” said a source in Gerasimov’s entourage. In turn, a source in the Ministry of Defense confirmed our insider. According to him, Putin is considering the resignation of Gerasimov due to the lack of great success at the front. And Mordvichev is now the main candidate for the post of head of the General Staff. “And how else to check the military leader, is he ready to take such a post? Set him an important task for the entire NWO,” the channel's source is sure. However, the Kremlin refused to comment on the issue of Gerasimov’s resignation. “Vladimir Vladimirovich now has to make a number of difficult decisions. Whether to announce mobilization, which section of the NWO zone to pay the most attention to, how to distribute forces and resources. The President greatly appreciates the experience of General Mordvichev. Therefore, I gave him a responsible assignment. Do not look for a double bottom where there is none,” said the source in the Presidential Administration.
Dorozhnje and the freight train station of the same name have been occupied after over a week of battles, along with Ivanivka and Nove Shakhove to the north.
DRGs continue to operate in and around Novyi Donbas and on the approaches to Dobropillya. No new DRG activity within Dobropillya's city limits has been recorded over the past 12 hours.
The 12th "Azov" Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine was deployed to Rubizhne (circled in green), which has prevented it's capture. Nevertheless, Zolotyi Kolodyaz - the focus of the initial media frenzy - has come under Russian control. DRGs continue to operate on the approaches to Hruzke.
Russian forces captured the Krasnolymanskaya Mine and the adjacent terykon. They also secured part of eastern Rodynske and made additional progress in Chervonyi Lyman.
Novoekonomichne has come under Russian control, and progress was made northwest of Hrodivka and west of Myrolyubivka.
The rest of Lysivka has moved into the grey zone, with unconfirmed reports of its capture. Suhkyi Yar and the guitar-shaped fortification continue to hold.
Russian forces continue to push north through western Pokrovsk and completed the capture of Leontovychi.
Positions were improved in northern Kotlyne and east of the village.
Southern Udachne and the town's train station was captured by Russian forces. Most of the rest of the town is a kill-zone or in the grey zone.
The remaining Ukrainian soldiers in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and the surrounding villages are about to be encircled if nothing is done very soon. Only one road remains even slightly safe for a withdrawal to take place.
I will make a full and more accurate map update tomorrow, but I thought I should share these developments sooner rather than later.
Wow has Stalingrad breakthrough been achieved😂
For assessment and re-review
Limited Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not established enduring positions in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 27 that Ukrainian forces stopped Russian advances in Zaporizske (3.75 kilometers from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) and Novoheorhiivka (730 meters from the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border) but that Russian forces are operating within both settlements and have not yet secured positions.[1] The Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 20 and 25 that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizske, respectively.[2] It is premature to characterize these reported advances as a breakthrough into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as the activity is at most a small-scale infiltration. It is also inaccurate to characterize these reported advances as Russia‘s “first“ territorial gains in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, especially as Russian forces entered Dnipropetrovsk Oblast long before the Russian MoD claimed the seizures of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka. ISW observed geolocated footage in June and July 2025 that indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Dachne and Maliivka (both northeast of Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka), and geolocated footage from August 25 further indicated that Russian forces had advanced in Vorone (west of Maliivka).[3] ISW assessed in November 2024 that the Russian military command would likely advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and attempt to envelop these positions.[4] Russian forces may also be trying to advance in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to set conditions for further operations in the region.
Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are operating in small groups of five servicemembers, who infiltrate behind Ukrainian lines, wait and accumulate, and then attack in different directions simultaneously.[5] Trehubov specifically noted that Russian tactics in Zaporizske and Novoheorhiivka are similar to those that Russian forces employed near Dobropillya, and ISW has observed reports that Russian forces have been increasingly adopting these tactics throughout the frontline.[6] Russian forces recently infiltrated east and northeast of Dobropillya but have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions and exploiting the penetration thus far.[7] Such infiltration tactics also appear to be vulnerable to well-organized Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] ISW’s Assessed Russian Advances map layer notably only shows the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) and does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and limited infiltration missions.[9] Russian forces are likely using infiltration tactics that do not automatically result in enduring positions, and Russian actors often leverage maps that attempt to show these movements to exaggerate the presence of meaningful Russian activity on the battlefield.
The Kremlin appears to be resuming its drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 95 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea on the night of August 26 to 27.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 74 drones over northern, southern and eastern Ukraine and that 21 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes caused power outages in Poltava, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts, leaving more than 100,000 households without electricity.[11] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy stated that Russian strikes damaged a critical electrical substation in Sumy City and gas transportation infrastructure facilities in Poltava Oblast.[12] The Ministry of Energy added that Ukrainian authorities consider the strikes to be a continuation of the Russian campaign to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the eve of the heating season. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also de-energized water utilities in Sumy City and damaged an electrical substation in Novhorod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; a school in Kharkiv Oblast, and an apartment building in Kherson City.[13] Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that a Russian strike on August 26 destroyed the DTEK coal enrichment plant in Donetsk Oblast, which prepares coal for heating.
The Kremlin is attempting to undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 27 that the Kremlin does not want to publicly discuss the issue of Western security guarantees for Ukraine and called such public discussions “unhelpful.”[15] Peskov also stated that Russia takes a “negative view” of European proposals of security guarantees for Ukraine and that Russia will perceive European force deployments to postwar Ukraine as an expansion of NATO's presence.[16] Peskov’s statement was likely in response to the August 26 Financial Times (FT) report that the United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[17] Peskov’s rejection of the Western proposals for security guarantees and his efforts to discredit public discussions of these proposals are likely part of the Kremlin's efforts to demand that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine and to sideline Ukraine's European partners from providing Ukraine robust security guarantees as part of a conflict termination agreement.
The Kremlin signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Peskov reiterated a recurrent Kremlin excuse that any Russia-Ukraine contacts at a high or top level require extensive preparations, but that the heads of the Russian and Ukrainian negotiating groups remain in contact.[19] Peskov added that Russia and Ukraine have not scheduled the next round of talks between their negotiating groups. Peskov attempted to shift blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's unwillingness to organize a Putin-Zelensky bilateral meeting by claiming that the resolution of the war requires “reciprocity from Kyiv.”
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's continued support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for “invading and occupying” Azerbaijan in 1920 — further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani relations. Aliyev stated in an interview with Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya published on August 27 that “the Russian army invaded Azerbaijan and occupied the country” in 1920.[20] Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan had “created [its] own state, but the Bolsheviks took it away.” Aliyev also notably characterized Russia's war against Ukraine as an “invasion” and reiterated that Azerbaijan has supported Ukraine's territorial integrity since the start of the full-scale invasion. Aliyev recalled the “recent cooling” of Russian-Azerbaijani relations, stating that Azerbaijan will “never tolerate” any “aggression or disrespect” against Azerbaijan. Aliyev stated that Russia's downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines plane in December 2024 and the Kremlin's reaction are “causing great disappointment and discontent” in Azerbaijan. Russian-Azerbaijani relations have been declining since a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines flight 8243 over the Republic of Chechnya in December 2024, causing the plane to crash in Kazakhstan.[21] Aliyev publicly rejected the Kremlin's attempts to cover up Russia's role in the days following the incident.[22] Russian-Azerbaijani relations continued to decline in June and July 2025 over small-scale incidents that Aliyev seized upon to reiterate his demands that Russia take responsibility for the plane crash.[23] Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against the Ukrainian gas compressor station in Odesa Oblast that transports Azerbaijani gas overnight on August 5 to 6 and struck the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) oil depot in Odesa City overnight on August 7 to 8.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) contingent arrived in Belarus to participate in joint military exercises connected to the Belarusian-Russian Zapad-2025 military exercise. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on August 26 and 27 that Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Kazakh forces arrived in Belarus to participate in the Interaction-2025, Search-2025, and Echelon-2025 military exercises at the Losvido and Lepelskyi training grounds in Vitebsk Oblast (in northern Belarus bordering Lithuania, Latvia, and Russia) from August 31 to September 6.
The President instructed General Andrei Mordvichev to assess and calculate the resources that are needed for the speedy (no later than the middle of next year) complete liberation of the DPR. This caused shock in Valery Gerasimov’s entourage. “Such issues should be resolved not by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, but by the Chief of the General Staff. But Mordvichev, with the help of intrigues, achieved that Vladimir Vladimirovich brought him closer to himself. Never mind, this situation will not last long. Although now Valery Vasilyevich, of course, has received a strong blow. But he was not so worried,” said a source in Gerasimov’s entourage. In turn, a source in the Ministry of Defense confirmed our insider. According to him, Putin is considering the resignation of Gerasimov due to the lack of great success at the front. And Mordvichev is now the main candidate for the post of head of the General Staff. “And how else to check the military leader, is he ready to take such a post? Set him an important task for the entire NWO,” the channel's source is sure. However, the Kremlin refused to comment on the issue of Gerasimov’s resignation. “Vladimir Vladimirovich now has to make a number of difficult decisions. Whether to announce mobilization, which section of the NWO zone to pay the most attention to, how to distribute forces and resources. The President greatly appreciates the experience of General Mordvichev. Therefore, I gave him a responsible assignment. Do not look for a double bottom where there is none,” said the source in the Presidential Administration.
OPEC+ preparing another production quota increase for November, while Russian seaborne exports declined further (Ust-Luga and Primorsk export terminals operating at only half capacity).
Conditions are well set to force Russian wells to get capped, and suffer freeze damage early this Winter. Their system is backed up, constrained by how much they can ship out or refine, and lacking robust storage capacity.
OilPrice.com (29 Sep):
“Crude futures slumped on Monday, extending their biggest single-day slide in weeks as OPEC+ signaled it may press ahead with another round of output increases...
Brent crude was at $67.88 per barrel, a drop of $2.25 or 3.21%, while West Texas Intermediate fell $2.37 to $63.35, down 3.61%. The sell-off came as reports circulated that OPEC+ ministers are preparing to add fresh barrels in November...
...new tanker-tracking data from Kpler indicated Russia’s September seaborne crude exports slid to 2.96 million barrels per day, the lowest since April 2022. The steepest drops came from Baltic and Black Sea loadings...
...Seasonal demand shifts are adding another layer, with refiners in Asia trimming spot activity while U.S. product consumption moves into its autumn lull.”
Holloywood elite gather to discuss how best to support The Zelensky and more, bigger wars
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