Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
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Donald J. Trump@realDonaldTrump
After getting to know and fully understand the Ukraine/Russia Military and Economic situation and, after seeing the Economic trouble it is causing Russia, I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form. With time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO, the original Borders from where this War started, is very much an option. Why not?
Russia has been fighting aimlessly for three and a half years a War that should have taken a Real Military Power less than a week to win. This is not distinguishing Russia.
In fact, it is very much making them look like “a paper tiger.” When the people living in Moscow, and all of the Great Cities, Towns, and Districts all throughout Russia, find out what is really going on with this War, the fact that it’s almost impossible for them to get Gasoline through the long lines that are being formed, and all of the other things that are taking place in their War Economy, where most of their money is being spent on fighting Ukraine, which has Great Spirit, and only getting better, Ukraine would be able to take back their Country in its original form and, who knows, maybe even go further than that!
Putin and Russia are in BIG Economic trouble, and this is the time for Ukraine to act. In any event, I wish both Countries well. We will continue to supply weapons to NATO for NATO to do what they want with them. Good luck to all!
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Sep 23, 2025, 1:55 PM
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115255130298104593
God bless him
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian partisans reportedly disrupted a railway connected to a Russian defense industrial enterprise. The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on September 21 that Atesh agents executed a successful sabotage mission against a railway in Smolensk Oblast, blowing up the track leading to the Smolensk Aviation Plant, which produces Kh-59 type missiles, drones, components for battlefield aviation, and light aircraft for the Russian military.[25] Atesh reported that the strike disabled over 10 track control elements.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 20 and 21.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast.[27]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City); elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City); and elements of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th battalions of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and the 2nd Battalion of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[28] Elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[29] Drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast, and elements of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and infrastructure in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove and toward Bochkove on September 20 and 21.[31]
Russian milbloggers, including a milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk to create a bridgehead in the area.[32] The milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that a soldier from the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in the Vovchansk direction complained that the Russian military command is sending infantry into highly attritional, infantry led assaults and does not care about the resulting high casualties.[33]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Vovchansk, and drone operators of the Black Raven detachment (purportedly a volunteer drone unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[34]
Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 21 but did not advance.[35]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 21 that Russian forces likely seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[36]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Zapadne and toward Petro-Ivanivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavivka on September 20 and 21.[37] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces detected small Russian infiltration and assault groups near the Spartak Stadium and Dovhalivska Street in northern Kupyansk and near Myrove, south of Tyshchenkivka, and north of Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[38]
Mashovets stated that Russian forces are trying to exploit their numerical advantage in combat ready infantry to organize and conduct numerous attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines in the Kupyansk direction in several areas at once.[39] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are primarily conducting combat operations on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, as Russian forces are having problems transferring heavy equipment from the east (left) bank. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are not struggling to transfer personnel across the river, however.
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are operating on the outskirts of Kupyansk.[40] Drone operators of the 1st GTA are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in Kupyansk Raion.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[43]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Derylove, and Novoselivka and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 20 and 21.[44]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are attacking from Kolodyazi toward Stavky; that elements of the 448th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are attacking in Shandryholove; and that elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are attached to the 20th CAA and attacking near Karpivka (northwest of Lyman).[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on September 20 and 21.[46]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Slovyansk direction (west of Siversk).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Yablunivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 20 and 21.[48]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian advances in the Volodymyrivka-Novotoretske direction and toward Sofiivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka) stalled due to Russian counterattacks near Mayak (southwest of Druzhkivka) and in the Poltavka-Rusyn Yar direction (south of Druzhkivka).[49] Mashovets reported that recently redeployed elements of unspecified Russian naval infantry brigades may be attacking near Sofiivka.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in the Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk direction.[50] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka highway.[51] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Kostyantynivka.[52] Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Pankivka on September 20 and 21.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[55]
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are holding a “significant” area south and southeast of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and are trying to expand the base of the Russian Dobropillya salient by attacking toward Nove Shakhove.[56] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Shakhove.[57]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) along the T-0504 Kostyantynivka-Pokrovsk highway.[58]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Chunyshyne and in central Novopavlivka (both south of Pokrovsk).[59] One Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Novopavlivka.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Pivdennyi Microraion in southern Pokrovsk and complained that other milbloggers are exaggerating Russian advances in southern Pokrovsk.[61]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, Novotoretske, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne, Novopavlivka, and Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Udachne, Molodetske, and Kotlyne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on September 20 and 21.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chunyshyne and Malynivka and toward Boikivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[63]
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of Russian 1st and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) advanced to the northern outskirts of Novoekonomichne.[64] Mashovets reported that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and likely elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking in the Malynivka-Novoekonomichne direction. Drone operators of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk-Novopavlivka area.[65] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control points in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on September 20 and 21.[67]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on September 21 that Russian forces seized Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[68]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Berezove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[69]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne, Andriivka-Klevstove, and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Vorone, Zaporizske, Berezove, and Novomykolaivka, and Maliivka on September 20 and 21.[70]
Mashovets stated that Russian forces have a quantitative advantage in manpower and equipment in the Velykomykhailivka direction and that Russian forces have three to four battalions for every one Ukrainian battalion holding the defenses, with the ratio growing to five or six Russian battalions for each Ukrainian battalion in some unspecified sectors of the front.[71] Mashovets stated that the Russian personnel advantage is complicating Ukraine’s ability to maintain a continuous defensive line, as Ukrainian forces have to organize defense into separate positions, strongpoints, and lines that leave gaps in the line. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to exploit these gaps by sending small infantry groups to penetrate Ukrainian defenses, after which Russian forces try to consolidate new positions while waiting for additional small Russian groups to arrive for the next attack.
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating between Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[72] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[73] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles northeast of Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[74]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novoivanivka, and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivske on September 20 and 21.[75]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that likely elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), with support from elements of the 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, EMD), are attacking near Novoivanivka, Novomykolaivka (northeast of Hulyaipole in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), and Olhivske.[76]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on September 20 and 21.[77]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mahdalynivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[78] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the southern outskirts of Prymorske.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on September 20 and 21.[80]
Ukrainian forces reportedly recently struck Russian helicopters and a radar in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian Mi-8 helicopters and a Nebo-U long-range air defense radar in occupied Crimea.[81] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that GUR’s footage indicates that Ukrainian forces directly hit and destroyed at least one helicopter.[82] Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian drones hit the Nebo-U antenna, putting the radar out of operation.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 54 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which about 30 were Shahed-type drones, from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 33 drones and that 21 drones struck eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, damaging civilian and residential infrastructure.[84]
Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on September 21 that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike against Ukrainian rescue workers putting out a fire after an initial Russian strike against Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast.[85]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 21 that Russian forces launched more than 1,500 strike drones, 1,280 guided glide bombs, and 50 missiles of various types against Ukraine in the past week (roughly September 14 to 20).[86] Zelensky reported that Ukrainian authorities have found more than 132,000 foreign components in Russian weapons, including components from Europe, the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Japan.[87]
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/arbat/2163
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-5/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-5/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-19-2025-2/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-plane-entered-airspace-over-baltic-sea-sunday-germanys-air-2025-09-21/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/
[8] https://nypost.com/2025/09/21/us-news/trump-warns-us-will-defend-poland-and-baltics-if-russia-keeps-escalating-we-dont-like-it/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/
[10] https://t.me/rybar/73784
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[12] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100182 ; https://t.me/sheyhtamir1974/138997; https://t.me/ukr_2025_ru/268493
[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-supply-runs-turn-to-nightmares-as-drones-menace-roads-far-beyond-the-front-3d478ac4
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/09/2025/68cfa4859a7947dc17939bf5
[16] https://www.tatar-inform dot ru/news/sensacionnye-naznaceniya-i-novye-prioritety-kto-vosel-v-komandu-rustama-minnixanova-5999763
[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/09/21/1140780-generala-lapina-mogut
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025/
[19] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/09/2025/68cfa4859a7947dc17939bf5 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/09/21/rbk-general-aleksandr-lapin-uvolen-s-voennoy-sluzhby-poslednie-poltora-goda-on-vozglavlyal-leningradskiy-voennyy-okrug; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/09/21/voyna
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-18/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_2-23/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625
[25] https://t.me/atesh_ua/8021 ; https://suspilne dot media/1120060-partizani-pidirvali-kolii-do-zavodu-u-rosijskomu-smolensku/
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/5150 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/79817
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/5156
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34014
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180484; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34014
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34005
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/5150; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34005
[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/5147
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100181; https://t.me/notes_veterans/25206
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[41] https://t.me/epoddubny/24848
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/42554 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67614
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67614 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/79823
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2989
[50] https://t.me/sashakots/56432
[51] https://t.me/sashakots/56437
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34014
[53] https://t.me/andrew_kots/921 ; https://t.me/sashakots/56433
[54] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2989
[57] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14316
[58] https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1969803102384714179; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1969803157279564162; https://t.me/soniah_hub/12400
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67613 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180448 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42556
[60] https://t.me/tass_agency/338948
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34019 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42557
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67613 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180448 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34019 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[64] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2989
[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100183
[66] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14315
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180448
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330
[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/16958
[74] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1969758677432152280 ; https://t.me/army29th/429
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34029; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266; https://t.me/dva_majors/79817
[78] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/46633
[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34029
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266
[81] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6956; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/21/prymary-gur-zdijsnyly-nalit-na-krym-znyshheno-try-gelikoptery-mi-8-ta-vorozhu-rls/ ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/helikoptery-mi8-ta-rls-niebou-v-krymu-cherhovi-rezultaty-nalotu-prymar-hur-na-pivostriv.html ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/23099 ; https://t.me/censor_net/76503 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-ghosts-unit-strikes-three-mi-8-helicopters-satellite-images-confirm-at-least-one-destroyed/
[82] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-ghosts-unit-strikes-three-mi-8-helicopters-satellite-images-confirm-at-least-one-destroyed/
[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/42807
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[86] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16189
[87] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16189
This on the day of his fourth meeting with President Zelensky.
Sounds like the door is closing for Putin's off ramp - and sounds like approval for new Allied Strategic goals.
"When the people living in Moscow, and all of the Great Cities, Towns, and Districts all throughout Russia, find out what is really going on with this War"
Air Defense was active over Moscow last night (22-23 Sep), with dozens of Ukrainian drones engaged there. Russia is forced to pull in their Air Defense assets to defend the Capital...
"this is the time for Ukraine to act."
Sounds like Green Light buy in for some significant Operation.
Nighttime freezing (20's) is now underway in Novy Urengoy, where so many Russian oil pipelines originate. Winter has come. Conditions are set.
Did Michael McCaul get a hold of Trump’s twitter account? Going to miss him.
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1970567099581186329
A month instead of 2 weeks? Maybe teleprompter got messed up.
“When asked by a journalist whether he still trusts Putin, the U.S. President said he would reveal the answer in a month.”
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1970545349417685263
Seems like an easy deal. Deal in 24 hours.
“”I think Orban will stop buying Russian oil if I talk to him. I’ll talk to him.” - Trump.”
https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1970544233691127810
Lets Nuke Moscow first. Then St. Petersburg. Then Kazan.
Everything after that can be at random.
“Reporter: “Do you think that NATO countries should shoot down Russian aircraft if they enter their airspace?”
Trump: “Yes, I do.””
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