+485 UAVs is the 2nd highest daily loss.
+2 Aircraft are Be-12 “Chaika” anti-submarine amphibious aircraft and
+1 Mi-8 helicopter loss on same operation in Crimea.
Troop loss 7-day average rises to 1,021/day.
Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
Kyiv Independent (22 Sep):
Drones that entered Poland on Sept. 10 carried no warheads, Tusk says.
President Trump meetings and address tomorrow (Tuesday, 23 Sep) at the UN.
Kyiv Independent (22 Sep):
U.S. President Donald Trump and President Volodymyr Zelensky are scheduled to meet face-to-face on Sept. 23 in New York, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt announced during a press briefing.
The meeting will take place on the sidelines of the 80th United Nations General Assembly, which is expected to bring together leaders from nearly 150 countries.
In addition to his meeting with Zelensky, Trump will hold bilateral talks with U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Argentine President Javier Milei, and senior European Union officials.
The U.S. president is also set to convene a multilateral summit with leaders from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. (Gaza?)
Trump is expected to deliver a speech during the opening of the 80th UN General Assembly session, Leavitt added.”
Shockingly I disagree
Prior to 2022did Russia experience the following
Decrease in petro revenue
17% interest rates
10+ inflation
0 GDP GROWTH(their words not mine)
22% vat tax
Lots thased to hold vast quantities of Soviet legacy equipment and ammunition and are now empty or only with useless junk
Dependent on China, NK, and Iran for ammunition, equipment, manpower, cars…
Epidemic of window accidents
Shrinking helicopter, aircraft, and ship inventory
Yup nothing will change
Is there any further word on the results of the recent attack on an FSB dinner party and possible meeting near Yalta and at Sevastopol? Also has the suggested follow-up tonight on that attack taken place? Some good work seems to be happening in Crimea, and it is also good to hear the Flamingos are flying.
For you in case you missed this excellent chart showing all the major refineries so far struck by Ukraine, the dates hit, and the distance from Ukraine. It appears about 8 refineries are likely within striking distance of the new Flamingo weapons. Several are among the large ones, although there are a number of smaller refineries that are too far away for current Ukraine attack weapons. Hopefully that will change soon thanks to Ukraine fighting creativity.
Does anyone know why one refinery is graced with “blue” flames unlike the rest that have been hit and have RED flames?
Blue flame versus yellow flame colour is a question of complete combustion versus incomplete combustion. LPG (propane) and natural gas (methane) flame colour are both blue. A blue flame colour and temperature means complete combustion. Red flames or yellow gas flame colour may be a sign of incomplete combustion, wasted gas and a serious safety hazard. Blue flame versus orange flame, blue flame versus red flames and blue flame versus yellow flame are all the incomplete combustion issue.
Flame colour meaning can be indicative of temperature, type of fuel or the completeness of combustion. For example, a blue flame is the hottest followed by a yellow flame, then orange and red flames. Hydrocarbon gases burn blue whilst wood, coal or candles burn yellow, orange or red. A blue gas flame colour is also indicative of complete combustion.
If you ever took a high school chemistry class and had a chance to use a Bunsen burner, you know how adjusting the air (oxygen) supply affects the colour and temperature of the flame. When you adjusted the Bunsen burner to increase the air supply you got more complete combustion, less soot, a higher temperature and a blue flame colour.
https://lpgjets.com/blogs/news-2/blue-flame-versus-yellow-flame-versus-red-flames-gas-flame-colour
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on September 22 that Russia will adhere to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year following its expiration in February 2026 and used threats to urge the United States to do the same. Putin claimed that Russia is prepared to continue to adhere to New START’s nuclear arms limitations for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[1] New START limits the number of deployed US and Russian strategic nuclear warheads and bombs to 1,550; the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for nuclear missions to 700; and the number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and bombers to 800.[2] New START went into effect in 2011, and Russia suspended its participation in the treaty in February 2023, claiming that the United States was developing new nuclear weapons.[3] Putin claimed that Russia will decide between continuing its “voluntary self-restraint” in February 2027. Putin called on Russian agencies to monitor US adherence to New START until then and threatened that Russia “will respond accordingly. ” Putin claimed that completely abandoning New START would be a “mistake” and “short-sighted.” Putin claimed that Russia can respond to any threats “not with words but through military-technical measures.” Putin's veiled threats are the latest in Russia's nuclear saber rattling, a tool that the Kremlin often employs as part of its wider reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia.[4]
Putin blamed the West for undermining Russian-US arms cooperation and violating bilateral arms agreements—ignoring how Russia has violated numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties in the past decades. Russia has violated multiple treaties since Putin first became president in 2000.[5] Russia exploited provisions of the Open Skies Treaty (which provided for mutual surveillance flights over member states’ territory) to collect imagery for intelligence purposes and instituted illegal overflight restrictions and airfield designations to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and Georgia.[6] Russia suspended its adherence to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (which placed limits on the deployment of heavy military equipment in Europe) in 2007 and continues to violate the treaty by stationing troops in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine without these states’ consent.[7] Multiple US State Department Compliance Reports published since 2015 have noted how Russia selectively implements provisions of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Vienna Document on the exchange of data about armed forces between OSCE states, including Russia.[8] A 2020 State Department report noted that Russia “no longer feels bound” by the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives that the United States and Russia agreed to in the early 1990s on the non-deployment and elimination of Russia's arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons and that Russia maintained up to 2,000 such weapons in its stockpiles.[9] Russia has repeatedly violated the Chemical Weapons Convention (which prohibits the use of chemical weapons and the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their precursors) both on the battlefield in Ukraine and with its poisoning of political opponents in Europe; Russia has refused to fully declare its chemical weapons stockpiles and production and development facilities.[10] The State Department noted in response to Russia's suspension of its participation in New START in 2023 that Russia refused to comply with the treaty's requirements that the parties exchange data, including ICBM location and status updates and missile launch telemetry data; Russia denied US inspectors’ right to inspect ballistic missile sites in Russia.[11] The United States suspended its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which banned US and Russian ground-launched nuclear and conventional intermediate- and shorter-range missiles) in February 2019 due to Russian violations with its development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles.[12] Russia has also used Oreshnik ballistic missiles (which reportedly have a range banned under the INF Treaty) against Ukraine in November 2024 and announced that the missile entered into service in August 2025.[13]
Putin is attempting to pressure the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement and extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, as ISW forecasted Russia would in August 2025.[14] Putin claimed that US implementation of his New START initiative, coupled with the “entire range of efforts to normalize bilateral relations,” could create an atmosphere “conducive to substantive strategic dialogue” with the United States.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks in front of the United States to secure Russia's desired demands in Ukraine and deflect from Russia's responsibility for the lack of progress in Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations.[16] Russia has been trying to manufacture an escalation in recent months, including by withdrawing from the INF Treaty in August 2025, to coerce the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks.[17] Putin has notably used New START to try to extract concessions about Ukraine from the United States in the past, linking Western aid to Ukraine and his decision to suspend Russia's participation in New START in February 2023.[18] Putin's September 22 statements aim to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States, and Putin has been trying to posture Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union's “superpower” status since Trump assumed office in January 2025.[19] Putin's posturing aims to reinforce the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, so Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia's maximalist demands now out of fear that Russian aggression will only worsen in the future.[20]
Some Russian defense industrial enterprises are reportedly struggling to expand their production and workforces due to economic constraints, while the Kremlin is prioritizing funding for high-priority enterprises such as drone and missile manufacturers. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported on September 22 that wages within the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) are declining for the first time during Russia's full-scale invasion and that expansion is slowing due to economic constraints.[21] The Georgia-based open-source intelligence organization Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) reported to Novaya Gazeta that the Russian DIB reached “saturation” in 2024, at which point the DIB’s need for new employees began to decline, and that many defense industrial enterprises need to build new production facilities, equip new production lines, and purchase more machine tools to expand production. Novaya Gazeta noted that limitations in the market, including supply chains, and issues with employee retention are restricting production expansion efforts, however. Novaya Gazeta reported that the Russian DIB is struggling to further expand, as current factories are already operating at capacity and cannot afford to build new factories and production lines. Novaya Gazeta noted that current financial constraints and inflation issues are limiting Russia's ability to offer subsidized loans to all defense industrial enterprises, limiting the enterprises’ ability to increase production and hire new employees.
Novaya Gazeta reported that Russia is prioritizing directing funding toward the production of higher demand weapons, like drones and missiles, further restraining production within other defense industrial enterprises. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers, such as Tactile Missile Weapons, Zaslon, Agregat, and Kalashnikov, are reportedly increasing salaries. CIT reported that many defense industrial enterprises that produce lower priority products do not see the point in expanding production, including armored vehicle manufacturers, which are primarily repairing and modernizing vehicles as Russia reduces its use of armored vehicles on the battlefield, and aircraft manufacturers, which are already able to replace Russian military aircraft losses. The Kremlin's prioritization of drone and missile manufacturers underscores the ways the Russian DIB is evolving to address Russia's needs on the battlefield. ISW has previously assessed that Russia is increasing its domestic drone production while decreasing its frontline use of armored vehicles in Ukraine—in line with reports that the Kremlin is increasing funding to drone producers and not vehicle producers.[22] Russia's emphasis on building up the DIB throughout the war has, in part, led to many of Russia's current economic issues, such as inflation.[23] ISW continues to assess that the Russian government is overprioritizing investment in the DIB at the expense of other sectors and that the Russian economy continues to flag under the weight of the war in Ukraine.[24]
The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of casualties from Russian drone strikes targeting Ukrainian civilians has increased by 40 percent so far in 2025 as compared to 2024. UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Head Erik Møse reported on September 22 that the commission found that Russian forces conducted strikes against Ukrainian civilians walking or using transport, residences, and critical infrastructure in Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts since July 2024.[25] Møse also noted Russian forces are systemically conducting “double tap” strikes against Ukrainian rescue workers responding to Russian strikes. The commission concluded that Russia's deliberate drone strikes against civilians violate international law, amount to the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible population displacement, and are in accordance with a concerted state policy that aims to sow terror among the Ukrainian population. ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian drone strikes and war crimes against civilians throughout 2025, and Ukrainian authorities have reported on numerous such instances in the past day alone. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on September 22 that Russian forces shot and wounded an elderly civilian riding a bike in Kupyansk and wounded a civilian during a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian car in Borova.[26] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne published on September 21 footage that a resident filmed on September 19 of a Russian drone dropping an unknown explosive device, reportedly a PFM-1 Lepestok anti-personnel land mine, on a street in central Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast, as civilian vehicles travelled along the road.[27]
Ukrainian forces may have targeted high-ranking Russian officials in a reported strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a resort area in occupied Crimea, killing two and injuring 15 others.[28] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed on September 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a sanatorium in occupied Foros, Crimea.[29] Several Russian sources reported that there was a closed-door private party at the sanatorium and that high-ranking Russian officials, possibly including military officials, were present at the time of the reported strike.[30] Ukrainian forces conducted a separate confirmed strike against a Russian airfield near occupied Kacha, Crimea. Ukraine's Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 22, and geolocated footage confirmed, that it conducted a strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to 22.[31] The GUR reported that it struck two Russian Beriev Be-12 maritime patrol aircraft and one Mi-8 helicopter.
The ban on the simultaneous use of two smartphones will be considered next year. Instead of it, a fine may be introduced
We wrote: the State Duma proposed to ban Russians from having and using two or more smartphones at the same time. This is due to the intentions of a number of our citizens to buy a second gadget, install the Max messenger there and not install it on their main phone. Decisions in this direction are expected next year.
“By the beginning of 2026, almost all Russian citizens should have Max on their phones. I think that as of early next year, we can start checking who this necessary app hasn't installed. And start, for example, confiscating devices that do not have it. A ban on the simultaneous use of two smartphones would help a lot here,” a source in the State Duma told us.
At the same time, he does not rule out that softer measures will be taken. For example, fines for those who did not install Max on their smartphone or use a second phone without a messenger at the same time. And, if fines do not help, it will be possible to move on to prohibitions. The Kremlin generally approved the idea of fines and a ban on the use of two smartphones at once. But they were instructed to seriously finalize them and bring them in line with Russian legislation, a source in the Presidential Administration told us about this.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6207
Max (stylized in all uppercase; Russian: Макс, [ˈmaks] MAKS) is a Russian messenger and E-commerce app released by VK in 2025.
As of September 2025, the Max app has been pre-installed on all smartpones sold in Russia, while the Russian communications regulator Roskomnadzor is imposing restrictions of the use of WhatsApp and Telegram. Reports indicate that the application collects and stores user metadata, including IP addresses, contact lists, and activity timestamps, with its privacy policy allowing potential transfer of this data to third parties, including state authorities.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Max_(app)
The Kremlin wants the ability to intercept all conversations.
https://bsky.app/profile/antongerashchenko.bsky.social/post/3lzgtc44ipc2p
3 min video
Russian ‘Z-singer’ SHAMAN stated that Alaska is historically Russian territory.
“People close to us live there, people who originally have been imbued with our Russian culture&our spirituality.People who remember their ancestors and who have Russian names live there,” he said
https://bsky.app/profile/antongerashchenko.bsky.social/post/3lzh5hiqtrc2p
23 s video
In a Russian school in Kursk, a cadet class for first-graders has opened. Children were prepared for enrollment back in kindergarten, “being introduced to military uniforms and traditions of military service.”
https://bsky.app/profile/antongerashchenko.bsky.social/post/3lzh35okxs22p
1 min video
Flamingos ....Ukraine will be producing 7 per day by October-November. Russia can kiss goodbye to its oil refineries - oil storage tanks — and very important, its oil export terminals. You hit the ships and terminal when oil is being transferred. KABOOM!!!
Up in smoke!
!!!
Thank you for the information about blue flames, but I was specifically asking why there was ONE refinery in comment 20040 with blue flames shown whereas all the others had red flames.
Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the Kanevskaya traction substation in Staroderevyankovskaya, Krasnodar Krai, overnight September 21 to 22.[32] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on September 22 that the substation provides electricity supply to railway transport and receives high-voltage electricity at 220 kV.[33] Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami noted that the substation is near Primorsko-Akhtarsk—a location from which Russian forces launch a significant number of Shahed-type drones.[34]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Varachyne, and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka.[xxxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka, Oleksiivka, Stepne, and Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[36]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against Ukrainian positions in Zelena Dibrova (northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[37]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and reportedly limited elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[38] Other elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in a windbreak near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[39] Elements of the 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 22 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk, in and near Synelnykove, and near Tykhe (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[41]
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchansk and near Vovchanski Khutory, Synelnykove, and Tykhe on September 21 and 22.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[43]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on September 22 that the number of Russian attacks is constantly changing, ranging from about five to 20 per day.[44] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces frequently use infiltration tactics and then concentrate for future assaults and that Russian forces are accumulating in Vovchansk and can easily replenish troops and supplies due to Vovchansk’s proximity to the Russian border. The spokesman’s statement underscores Ukrainian forces’ requirement to strike Russian force concentration areas and support zones in Russian forces’ near and intermediate rear areas; Vovchansk is only five kilometers from the international border. The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that Russian forces have begun advancing near Lyptsi in small groups without mechanized equipment.[45] The Ukrainian commander noted that the Russian military command is constantly replenishing elements in the area but that the new soldiers are poorly trained. The commander stated that Russian forces try to attack in groups of three to four, while leveraging foliage for concealment. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are constantly monitoring the T-21-04 Vovchansk-Chuhuiv highway near the Pechenihy Reservoir dam (roughly 45 kilometers south of Vovchansk).[46] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely blocked the highway but maintain constant fire control over the road. The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have increased their strikes near Kozacha Lopan, Hraniv, Zolochiv, and Prudyanka (all northwest to north of Kharkiv City near the international border).
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk along the Milove-Khatnie line and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on September 21 and 22.[48]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove, north of Kupyansk near Zapadne, and toward Kutkivka, southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka, and toward Pishchane, and south of Kupyansk toward Novoosynove on September 21 and 22.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrove.[50]
Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov refuted Russian claims that Russian forces have encircled Kupyansk.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that eastern Kupyansk is contested due to the high number of drones in the area and that Myrove and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk) are contested “gray zones.”[52]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Kontora Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Novoyehorivka, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on September 21 and 22.[54]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st GTA (MMD) are reportedly positioning first-person view (FPV) drones along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Borova and striking Ukrainian vehicles.[55]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Derylove and east of Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman).[56] ISW assesses that the Russian advance north of Derylove likely did not occur in the past 24 hours.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Novyi Myr (north of Lyman).[57] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control the central part of Torske (east of Lyman) but that the southwestern part of Torske is a contested “gray zone.”[58]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Derylove, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Terny; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on September 21 and 22.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ridkodub and Karpivka (both north of Lyman).[60]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on September 22 that Ukrainian forces have not observed Russian forces conducting mechanized assaults in the past month (since about August 22) due to the efficacy of Ukrainian drone strikes.[61] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces have observed Russian forces using tanks as artillery from closed positions and that Russian forces attempt to advance in groups of two or four wearing anti-thermal imaging cloaks to conceal their heat signature during the day. The spokesperson stated that the Russian force’s misuse of the cloaks likely comes from poor training or a lack of knowledge of the cloaks’ purpose.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Hyperion Battalion of the 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[62]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and southeast of Siversk toward Vyimka on September 21 and 22.[63]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces on the southern flank of the Siversk direction.[64] Elements of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in the Slovyansk (Siversk) direction.[65]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 22 that elements of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) destroyed vehicles and ammunition in a September 18 strike against an ammunition depot of the Russian 17th Tank Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th CAA, SMD) near occupied Bohdanivka, Luhansk Oblast.[66] A Ukrainian open-source analyst reported on September 22 that satellite imagery shows damage to the depot near Bohdanivka.[67]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 22 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced southeast of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[68]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Mayske (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and are advancing along the railway near Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka); east of Poltavka (south of Druzhkivka); and toward Volodymyrivka and Sofiivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[69]
Geolocated footage published on September 17 indicates that Russian forces conducted an infiltration within southern Pleshchiivka.[70] ISW does not assess that this infiltration constitutes a confirmed change in control of terrain at this time.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Katerynivka, Kleban-Byk, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 21 and 22.[71]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Predtechyne, Kleban-Byk, and Volodymyrivka.[72]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area published footage on September 21 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault near Yablunivka, destroying a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and damaging another IFV.[73]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Poltavka and Nova Poltavka (south of Poltavka).[74] Drone operators of the Metis crew of the Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces near Stepanivka.[75] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Kostyantynivka.[76] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka highway.[77] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian forces north of Chasiv Yar.[78] Drone operators of the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[79]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger acknowledged on September 22 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into northeastern Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely advanced, as Russian milbloggers do not have an incentive to acknowledge false Ukrainian gains.[80]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[81]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Mayak, Pankivka, Shakhove, and Nove Shakhove; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on September 21 and 22.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[83]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on September 22 that Ukrainian forces liberated 1.3 square kilometers in the Dobropillya tactical area and cleared 2.1 square kilometers.[84] Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 2.5 kilometers in unspecified directions of the Dobropillya tactical area. Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces are unable to effectively consolidate infiltration positions in the Dobropillya tactical area and are slightly overextended, which Ukrainian forces are leveraging.[85]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on September 20 and geolocated on September 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to central Novopavlivka (south of Pokrovsk).[86]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[87]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Novoekonomichne, and Myrolyubivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Novopavlivka, and Chunyshyne; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on September 21 and 22.[88] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk, Boikivka, Novotoretske (both northeast of Pokrovsk), and Chunyshyne.[89]
Trehubov reported on September 22 that the Pokrovsk direction remains the most active sector of the Ukraine theater and that fighting is extremely active, including Ukrainian counterattacks.[90] A Ukrainian formation operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on September 22 that Russian forces have intensified assault operations and continue to target Ukraine’s GLOCs.[91] The Ukrainian corps noted that Russian forces continue to leverage infiltration tactics with small groups to penetrate Ukraine’s near rear and that Russian forces are conducting continual reconnaissance. The Ukrainian formation reported that Russian forces deploy up to 600 first-person view (FPV) drones daily.
Ukrainian forces reportedly recently struck Russian military targets in occupied Avdiivka. Geolocated footage published on September 22 shows significant damage after a reported Ukrainian strike against a Russian military site along the T-0505 Donetsk City-Orlivka highway in occupied Avdiivka (roughly 37 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian rear).[92]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on September 21 and 22.[93]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have enveloped Novopavlivka.[94] (Not to be confused with the Novopavlika south of Pokrovsk.)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on September 22 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on September 22 that Russian forces seized Kalynivske (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) participated in the alleged seizure.[96] Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Oleksiy Belskyi denied the Russian MoD’s claim, stating that Russian forces are sending a large number of small groups consisting of two to five soldiers to infiltrate settlements to film footage of alleged seizures.[97] Belskyi stated that Russian forces can infiltrate deep into the Ukrainian near rear due to their use of camouflage, including anti-thermal imaging cloaks, but that Ukrainian forces quickly destroy the Russian groups. Geolocated footage published on September 22 shows three Russian servicemembers raising flags in northwestern Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka).[98] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely conducted infiltration missions into Kalynivske but did not seize the settlement. A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[99]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Novoselivka; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Sosnivka, Ternove, Maliivka, Komyshuvakha, Vorone, Zaporizke, and Novomykolaivka; and south of Velykomykhailivka near Kalynivske on September 21 and 22.[100]
Russian milbloggers claimed on September 22 that Russian forces conducted an unguided glide bomb strike against a bridge in Havrylivka (northeast of Velykomykhailivka), likely to set conditions for ground assaults.[101]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Novoivanivka and Olhivske and toward Novohryhorivka and east of Hulyaipole near Poltavka on September 21 and 22.[102]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske, west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on September 21 and 22.[103]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on September 22 that Russian forces conducted a motorized assault with buggies and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on September 21 and assaulted from two directions, likely conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions to probe for new routes for future mechanized assaults.[104] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct assaults with infantry or light equipment while accumulating armored vehicles. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces then conduct small, mechanized assaults with up to two tanks and five infantry fighting vehicles and that infantry attempt to penetrate Ukrainian lines in between mechanized assaults.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the southern outskirts of Prymorske.[105]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 22 but did not advance.[106]
The head of an unmanned systems unit of a battalion operating in the Kherson direction stated on September 22 that Russian forces are conducting combined strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, including remotely mining roads, in addition to striking Ukrainian military targets and drone operators.[107] The head of the Ukrainian unit stated that Russian drone operators are hunting for civilians. The head of the Ukrainian unit reported that Russian forces continue to assault in small groups under the cover of heavy foliage and anti-thermal imaging cloaks and that Russian forces are primarily assaulting on foot but also use ATVs and motorcycles to reach positions and move personnel more quickly.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 141 Shahed and decoy drones, of which approximately 80 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Chauda, Crimea.[108] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 132 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes hit seven unspecified locations and that debris fell in eight unspecified locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a strike against Zaporizhzhia City on September 22 with guided bombs launched from the airspace over occupied Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast, and killed and injured civilians.[109] Other Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes affected Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts and damaged residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv and Sumy cities.[110]
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78051
[2] https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/new-start-glance
[3] https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-russian-federation-on-measures-for-the-further-reduction-and-limitation-of-strategic-offensive-arms/; https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/new-start-glance; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70565
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-5/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-9/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030524
[5] https://www.state.gov/u-s-countermeasures-in-response-to-russias-violations-of-the-new-start-treaty; https://2017-2021.state.gov/Russian-Arms-Control-Compliance-and-the-Challenge-of-the-Next-Agreement/
[6] https://2017-2021.state.gov/Russian-Arms-Control-Compliance-and-the-Challenge-of-the-Next-Agreement/
[7] https://2017-2021.state.gov/Russian-Arms-Control-Compliance-and-the-Challenge-of-the-Next-Agreement/
[8] https://2017-2021.state.gov/Russian-Arms-Control-Compliance-and-the-Challenge-of-the-Next-Agreement/
[9] https://2017-2021.state.gov/Russian-Arms-Control-Compliance-and-the-Challenge-of-the-Next-Agreement/
[10] https://www.opcw dot org/media-centre/news/2020/10/opcw-issues-report-technical-assistance-requested-germany; https://www.state.gov/condition-10c-annual-report-on-compliance-with-the-chemical-weapons-convention-cwc; https://www.state.gov/condition-10c-annual-report-on-compliance-with-the-chemical-weapons-convention-cwc
[11] https://www.state.gov/u-s-countermeasures-in-response-to-russias-violations-of-the-new-start-treaty; https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2022-New-START-Implementation-Report.pdf
[12] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/article/article/1924779/us-withdraws-from-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty/; https://www.nato dot int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm#:~:text=It%20eliminated%20a%20whole%20category,significant%20risk%20to%20Alliance%20security.; https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-28-2024
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112124
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/
[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78051
[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025/
[18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/70565
[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025/
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/
[21] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/09/22/tanki-uperlis-v-potolok
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-weakness-offers-leverage-2/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025/
[25] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/09/statement-chair-independent-international-commission-inquiry; https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/coiukraine/a-hrc-59-crp2-en.pdf
[26] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1120942-u-kupansku-rosijski-vijskovosluzbovci-strilali-z-avtomata-u-civilnogo-akij-ihav-na-velosipedi/ ; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/25043; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1120518-u-borovij-na-harkivsini-cerez-udar-fpv-drona-zaginuv-colovik-se-dvoe-poraneni/
[27] https://t.me/suspilnechernihiv/42462; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1120116-novij-vid-ataki-rosiani-z-droniv-skinuli-nevidomi-vibuhovi-recovini-na-odnu-z-centralnih-vulic-nizina/; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-drones-drop-unknown-munitions-on-nizhyn-residents/
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/56843
[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/339019; https://t.me/tass_agency/339020; https://t.me/Aksenov82/8222; https://t.me/Aksenov82/8221; https://t.me/razvozhaev/14787; https://t.me/razvozhaev/1478
[30] https://t.me/stranaua/210900 ; https://t.me/astrapress/92689 ; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/41444 ; https://t.me/tvrain/94514 ; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/4964
[31] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6958; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/vpershe-v-istorii-prymary-hur-u-krymu-spalyly-dva-vorozhi-litakyamfibii-be12-chaika.html; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/vpershe-v-istoriyi-u-krymu-spalyly-dva-vorozhi-litaky-amfibiyi-be-12/ ; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1970026321494343798 ; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1970030126609080376
[32] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1969901834455167157; https://x.com/oleg_fedor_/status/1969928035726975243; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/1969900086164381710 ; https://t.me/astrapress/92693
https://t.me/exilenova_plus/12489 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/43828
https://t.me/severrealii/31609
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5PcwCiskpuU; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTDraSzc24w; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/12489; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-forces-strike-kanevskaya-traction-substation-in-krasnodar-krai/
[34] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1969954986663825624
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42576 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5160 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29371
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/79857 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/5160 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/11969
[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/56851
[38] https://t.me/severnnyi/5158
[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/5160
[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34041
[41] https://t.me/smotri_z/49152; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20886; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34035; https://t.me/wargonzo/29371
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434; https://t.me/dva_majors/79857; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14196; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20886;
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34035; https://t.me/severnnyi/5160; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14196
[44] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1120710-na-pivnoci-harkivsini-zbilsilasa-kilkist-rosijskih-sturmiv-so-pro-situaciu-kazut-vijskovi/
[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/vsi-yihni-sproby-anulyuvaly-vidrazu-rosiyany-masovo-vmyrayut-v-ubyvchij-zoni-na-harkivshhyni/
[46] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14196
[47] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6024
[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/79857; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34056
[51] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1120782-rosijski-vijska-sturmuut-kupanskij-napramok-iz-pivnoci-osuv-dnipro/
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34056
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/79861
[54] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434;https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292
[55] https://t.me/epoddubny/24858
[56] https://t.me/operationall_space/6582; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10060
[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34032
[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34032
[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42585;https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34032
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34032
[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/vony-dumayut-shho-cze-yak-u-hogvartsi-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-chorni-pryamokutnychky-bigayut-tudy-syudy/
[62] https://t.me/Giperion_25A/41; https://t.me/milinfolive/156950
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42599
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/42599; https://t.me/shock3OA/2514
[65] https://t.me/dva_majors/79907
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29306
[67] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6626
[68] https://t.me/VARTOVI_36/705; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10064; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1970122511749898689
[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/29371; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34058 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25881
[70] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1970145050915967134; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1759
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434; https://t.me/wargonzo/29371; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34059; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34058
[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34058; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34059
[73] https://t.me/azov_brigade_ngu/516; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/tank-ta-dvi-bmp-azov-vidbyv-vorozhyv-shturm-v-rajoni-yablunivky/
[74] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14318
[75] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14319; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100258
[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34041
[77] https://t.me/sashakots/56453; https://t.me/epoddubny/24863
[78] https://t.me/Sever_Z/16453; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180502
[79] https://t.me/sashakots/56461
[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34059
[81] https://t.me/rusich_army/25881
[82] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29371 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34059 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321
[83] https://t.me/wargonzo/29371
[84] https://t.me/osirskiy/1278
[85] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/09/22/trishky-znahabnily-za-czyu-pomylku-vidpovidno-platyat-poblyzu-dobropillya-rosiyan-postupovo-vidtisnyayut/
[86] https://t.me/shershni68/776; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10057
[87] https://t.me/rusich_army/25881
[88] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/79857 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34059 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25881
[89] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34059 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29371 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25881
[90] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/09/22/trishky-znahabnily-za-czyu-pomylku-vidpovidno-platyat-poblyzu-dobropillya-rosiyan-postupovo-vidtisnyayut/
[91] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/09/22/u-7-mu-korpusi-dshv-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-protyvnyka-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/
[92] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1970068908611964937; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1970081388742541545; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1970080290698924196
[93] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321
[94] https://t.me/tass_agency/339078 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34043
[95] https://t.me/mod_russia/56857 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/56859 ;https://t.me/tass_agency/339203
[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16971; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100242
[97] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1121108-u-minoboroni-rf-zaavili-pro-zahoplenna-sela-kalinivske-na-dnipropetrovsini-komentar-recnika-osuv-dnipro/
[98] https://t.me/voin_dv/16971; https://t.me/osintpen/1812; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1970046024992669932; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10058;
[99] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100242
[100] https://t.me/wargonzo/29371; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434
[101] https://t.me/voin_dv/16970; https://t.me/Sib_army/7448; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/25842; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/25843; https://t.me/milinfolive/156981
[102] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29321 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16969
[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29292; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29290; https://t.me/wargonzo/29371 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/79857
[104] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/na-pozycziyi-zayizhdzhaly-dvoma-marshrutamy-poblyzu-orihovogo-okupanty-vlashtuvaly-nevdalyj-shturm-na-bagi-ta-kvadroczyklah/
[105] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34041
[106] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34060
[107] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnrp2S2L6qk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/hochut-stvoryty-bezlyudnu-zonu-poblyzu-dnipra-na-hersonshhyni-okupanty-atakuyut-pihotoyu-bpla-ta-aviacziyeyu/
[108] https://t.me/kpszsu/42846
[109] https://t.me/kpszsu/42846; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/25769; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/25770; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/rosiya-zavdala-udaru-po-zaporizhzhyu-zrujnovani-budynky-ye-zagybli-j-poraneni/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1970016548132618666
[110] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/7103; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/rosiyany-atakuvaly-kyyivshhynu-odna-lyudyna-otrymala-oskolkovi-poranennya/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1120460-na-kiivsini-cerez-ataku-droniv-spalahnuli-pozezi-u-zitlovih-budinkah/; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/49409; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/22/naslidky-udariv-rf-na-sumshhyni-poshkodzheno-dytsadok-pochatkovu-shkolu-i-bagatopoverhivky/; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1970016548132618666
The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Even using the low figure of 20,000, the cost of drones is well north of 10 million$, not including missiles.
Over a month you are looking at far north of 300 million dollars. Replacing air defenses(if they can) are in the billions, and who knows the cost of repairing infrastructure (again if they can).
▪️The sanctioned Russian cargo ship ASTROL-1.
▪️The tanker PUSHRA, which sails under the flag of Benin and has been sanctioned for transporting Russian oil
https://bsky.app/profile/militarynewsua.bsky.social/post/3lzjeletht22m
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