Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

ORYX ^ | Since February 24, 2022 and daily | ORYX

[JonPreston]

🍈

I included her Charlie Kirk post - #19956 - in my reply to you. I'm sorry it confused you but I'm not responsible for your incapacitation.

Now, why haven't you BlueSky folks mentioned the assassination?

[gleeaikin]

On the map, what is the difference between the yellow and the red threads. I saw that some of the red threads are straight line, so suspect they are missiles, but other red threads wander around the same way the yellow ones do.

[JonPreston]

Polish officials provided additional clarification on the impacts of the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace. Poland's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that as of 1900 local time on September 11, Polish law enforcement agencies found 17 total drones throughout eastern and northern Poland.[1] Polish media reported that at least one drone crashed near a Polish Territorial Defense Force unit in Nowe Miasto nad Pilicą (southwest of Warsaw).[2] A Polish defense analyst stated that at least 15 of the recovered drones were Gerbera decoy drones, many of which were equipped with fuel tanks that doubled their range to as far as 900 kilometers.[3] The Polish Air Navigation Services Agency announced that it will limit air traffic in eastern Poland along the borders with Ukraine and Belarus until December 9 in response to the September 9-10 drone incursion.[4] Polish media reported on September 11 that about 40,000 Polish troops will deploy to the Poland-Belarus border area as a result of heightened tensions following the drone incursion and the upcoming Russia-Belarus Zapad-2025 joint military exercises, which begin on September 12.[5] Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds stated that Latvia will also close its airspace along its eastern border with Belarus and Russia until at least September 18, following in Poland's footsteps.[6] Poland's allies reiterated their support for Poland following the drone incursion, condemning Russia for purposefully conducting the incursion to test NATO readiness. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz reported on September 10 that Sweden has provided an emergency package of air defense assets and aircraft to Poland; that the Netherlands is providing Poland with systems such as Patriots, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and anti-drone systems; and that other allies are also providing Poland with concrete declarations of support.[7] Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced during a phone call with Kosiniak-Kamysz that Czechia will provide a helicopter unit with specially modified Mi-171 helicopters to Poland following the drone incursion.[8] Several NATO member states, including the Netherlands and Czechia, summoned Russian ambassadors due to the drone incursion.[9] Bloomberg reported on September 11 that a source familiar with the matter stated that NATO is preparing unspecified defensive military measures in response to the drone incursion into Poland, in addition to a political response.[10] German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that Russia deliberately provoked NATO during the drone incursion and noted that this was “part of a long series of provocations” along NATO's entire eastern flank.[11] ISW assessed on September 10 that the Russian drone incursions were part of a multipronged and longstanding Russian effort to test NATO's technical capabilities and political resolve in preparation for a potential future war with NATO.[12] Ukrainian officials responded to the drone incursion by drawing parallels to Russian cycles of aggression and escalation against Ukraine and offered to share Ukraine's now-institutional counter-drone knowledge with Poland. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a meeting with Finnish President Alexander Stubb on September 11 that Russia flew drones into Poland on September 9-10 in order to test NATO's military and political abilities to respond to Russian kinetic provocations.[13] Zelensky noted that the psychological effects of the drone incursion mirror the psychological impacts of Russia's deployment of “little green men” to Crimea before the illegal occupation of the peninsula in 2014. Zelensky implied that Russia hopes to use these drone strikes to push the Overton Window of what NATO is willing to absorb as an “acceptable” escalation, much like Russia did when it deployed unmarked, illegal combatants to Crimea to seize the peninsula in 2014. Zelensky also reaffirmed that Ukraine has offered to help train Polish forces to shoot down Russian drones.[14] Ukraine has developed invaluable tactics and technologies to effectively counter Russian drone strikes, and NATO states must work to absorb and institutionalize this experience the way Ukraine has in order to properly respond to potential Russian kinetic aggression against the alliance. The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik on September 9 in Moscow and gave a press conference following the meeting.[15] Lavrov stated that he and Dodik met on the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Accords, which ended NATO “aggression” in Bosnia and Herzegovina during NATO's 1995 Operation Deliberate Force. Lavrov stated that Russia is one of the guarantors of the December 1995 Dayton Accords and accused the West of “trampl[ing]” on the accords to gain “undivided control” over Bosnia and Herzegovina and strip the Serbs of their rights. Lavrov stated that “external interference” in Bosnia and Herzegovina is inadmissible and that Russia condemns Western attempts to remove “undesirable” Serbian leaders from power, referencing the fact that the appeals court in Bosnia and Herzegovina recently sentenced Dodik for disregarding the decisions of an international peace envoy and defying the Constitutional Court.[16] Lavrov claimed that “destroying the consensus that underlies Bosnia and Herzegovina is… an invitation to another war in the Balkans.” Lavrov praised Dodik for planning a referendum in Republika Srpska in October and claimed that “the West does not like referendums,” including the “transparent” referendum in Crimea. Lavrov and Dodik notably met on the same day that Russia launched a major drone incursion in Polish airspace, which likely also sought to test NATO and EU unity.[17] The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in Europe, and undermine the US-backed Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.[18] Russian state media is acknowledging the growing gasoline shortages in Russia, but is downplaying the role that Ukraine's deep strike campaign is playing in generating these shortages. The Russian Independent Fuel Union, an association of gas station owners, stated in an interview with Russian state newspaper Izvestiya on September 10 that over 10 Russian federal subjects are experiencing fuel shortages, including Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, and Rostov oblasts, Far Eastern regions, and occupied Crimea and that fuel shortages are also reaching central regions such as Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[19] Russian State Duma Anti-Monopoly Committee Expert Council member Dmitry Tortev told Izvestiya that local fuel shortages are becoming widespread in Russia. Russian Independent Fuel Union representatives stated that many gas stations have not received refinery deliveries for several weeks, forcing some gas stations to shut down. Russian officials downplayed the impact of Ukraine's strike campaign, attributing the fuel shortages to peak vacation season and agricultural demands in August and September 2025.[20] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia's domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[21] It is noteworthy that Russian state media is more openly discussing gasoline shortages, as it suggests that the issue is beginning to permeate into more mainstream Russian society.

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-11-2025/

Russian and Belarusian forces began joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on September 12 for the first time since Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Belarusian and Russian officials reported that the Zapad-2025 exercise will occur in Russia and Belarus, including Belarus’ Vitebsk, Minsk, and Grodno oblasts, and in the Baltic and Barents seas from September 12 to September 16.[1] Belarusian military officials indicated that Russian and Belarusian forces are using the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Barysaw, Minsk Oblast for the Zapad-2025 exercises.[2] Belarusian Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated on September 12 that the Zapad-2025 exercises consist of two stages: the first stage consists of air and ground defense operations, and the second stage consists of clearing territory of enemy forces and conducting counteroffensive operations.[3] Belarusian and Russian officials have not publicly confirmed how many troops are participating in Zapad-2025. Lithuanian Second Operational Services Department Head Colonel Mindaugas Mazonas reported on August 25 that 30,000 total Russian and Belarusian troops will participate in the Zapad-2025 exercises, but noted that only 8,000 of these troops will actually be within Belarus.[4] Mazonas stated that of these 8,000 troops exercising in Belarus, 2,000 will be Russian and 6,000 will be Belarusian soldiers.

Elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD), and the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (reportedly formerly the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly arrived in Belarus in May 2025 and August 2025 to participate in Zapad-2025.[5] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division recently participated in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) joint military exercises in northern Belarus in early September 2025, and it is unclear if these units remained in Belarus for Zapad-2025.[6] ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating largely near Chasiv Yar and Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast since at least April 2023.[7]

Elements of the Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade, 120th Mechanized Brigade, 336th Rocket Artillery Brigade, and 116th Assault Air Base, along with other unspecified elements of the Northwestern and Western operational commands and Air Force and Air Defense Forces, are reportedly participating in the Zapad-2025 exercises.[8] Russia and Belarus have historically conducted Zapad joint exercises biannually but canceled the Zapad-2023 exercises, very likely due to Russia's equipment and manpower requirements for itswar in Ukraine.[9] The Zapad-2025 exercises are notably much smaller than the Zapad-2021 exercises, which involved roughly 200,000 total Russian and Belarusian personnel.[10]

Russia and Belarus may have walked back efforts to use Zapad-2025 to support nuclear saber-rattling operations against the West, at least temporarily. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin claimed in early August 2025 that the Zapad-2025 exercises would focus on the use of nuclear weapons and Oreshnik missiles in response to militarization on Belarus's western and northern borders and as part of strategic deterrence.[11] Belarusian officials have significantly softened their rhetoric in recent days, however, potentially in response to increased tension with NATO due to the September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on September 12 that the Zapad-2025 exercises are “purely defensive in nature” and that their goal is “to work out issues related to ensuring the military security of the Union State.”[12] Volfovich claimed that Russia and Belarus moved the exercises “deep inside” Belarus, “far from the state borders,” and claimed that the Belarusian military communicated their plans for the exercises with the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on September 11 that the Zapad-2025 exercises “are not aimed against anyone,” but that Russia and Belarus need to practice force integration.[13] These statements are a notable walking back of prior comments ahead of the Zapad-2025 exercises. ISW continues to assess that Russia does not seek nuclear escalation and that Russia's use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely.[14] Russia and Belarus may assess that nuclear saber-rattling efforts would be unwise due to NATO's developing response to the September 9-10 drone incursion.

Belarusian and Russian officials blamed Poland for overreacting to the threat of Russian aggression in response to Poland's decision to close its border with Belarus due to Zapad-2025. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the border closure on September 9, citing security concerns related to the Zapad-2025 exercises, and the border closed indefinitely on September 12.[15] A Belarusian customs official told Belarusian state news agency Belta on September 12 that the border between Belarus and Poland experienced significantly higher traffic than normal ahead of the border closure.[16] Belta published images purportedly of Polish authorities installing barbed wire along the border following the border closure.[17] The Belarusian State Border Committee claimed that Belarus is ready to increase traffic through checkpoints on the Latvian and Lithuanian borders in response to the Polish border closure.[18] The Belarusian State Border Committee also claimed that Belarus does not plan to close its border checkpoints with Poland.[19] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Poland of ignoring the fact that Russia and Belarus moved maneuver exercises away from the border with Poland and reduced the number of personnel and military equipment in the exercise as signs of goodwill, and the fact that Belarus invited representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including Poland, to observe the exercises. Belarusian and Russian officials are downplaying aggressive posturing against NATO in order to claim that NATO does not need to prepare defenses against Russia or Belarus. Belarus has previously weaponized its border with Poland to instigate crises within the EU, most notably in November 2021 when Belarus attempted to force thousands of migrants across the Polish border as part of the Kremlin-backed effort to pressure the EU.[20]

NATO announced the Eastern Sentry operation on September 12 in response to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US Commander of European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich announced that NATO is launching the Eastern Sentry operation to bolster NATO's eastern flank and that it will involve assets from Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other NATO allies.[21] Grynkewich stated that the immediate focus of this operation is Poland, but that “this situation transcends the borders of one nation” as “what affects one Ally affects us all.” Grynkewich stated that the operation will integrate air and ground-based defenses, increase information sharing among NATO allies, incorporate unspecified enhanced capabilities, and strengthen NATO posturing to protect the Alliance. Grynkewich also stated that NATO will rapidly test and field new technologies, including counter-drone sensors and systems, during Eastern Sentry. Rutte stated that NATO is a defensive Alliance and reiterated that Russia's behavior toward Poland was “reckless” and “deeply dangerous.”[22] Rutte stated that NATO must make clear its resolve and ability to defend its territory in response to Russia's violation of NATO airspace. ISW assessed that Russia likely launched the drones into Polish airspace in part to gauge NATO's capabilities and reactions in order to apply lessons learned to potential conflict scenarios with NATO.[23]

The Russian Central Bank likely prematurely lowered its key interest rate for the third time since June 2025 in an attempt to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability. The lowering of the key interest rate will likely continue to exacerbate Russia's economic instability. The Russian Central Bank announced on September 12 that it lowered its key interest rate from 18 to 17 percent.[24] The Central Bank previously lowered its key interest rate from a record 22-year high of 21 percent to 20 percent in June 2025 and lowered it again to 18 percent in July 2025.[25] The Central Bank claimed that officials measured annual inflation at 8.2 percent as of September 8 and forecasted that annual inflation in Russia will decline to between six and seven percent for the remainder of 2025 and four percent for 2026. The Central Bank acknowledged that the Russian economy is still highly susceptible to pro-inflationary rises associated with high inflation expectations and deteriorating Russian foreign trade. The Central Bank's decision to lower the key interest rate will likely adversely affect the Russian economy and raise inflation by weakening consumer purchasing power, devaluing the ruble in the medium-to long-term and creating deeper macroeconomic instability.[26]

Ukraine's partners continue to sanction Russia. The United Kingdom announced on September 12 that it introduced 100 new sanctions targeting the Russian military sector and illicit shadow fleet.[27] The UK sanctions targeted 30 entities and individuals that supply key equipment to Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), including electronics, chemicals, and explosives that Russia uses to manufacture missiles and other weapons systems. The United Kingdom sanctioned 70 additional ships connected to Russia's shadow fleet. Japan announced on September 12 that it expanded sanctions against Russia, freezing the assets of 14 individuals and 51 organizations, including Russian officials, company executives, and pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine.[28] Japan lowered the current oil price cap from $60 to $47.60 per barrel in alignment with the recent EU price cap on Russian crude oil. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters reported on September 12 that New Zealand is also lowering the price cap on Russian crude oil from $60 to $47.60 per barrel and sanctioned Russian actors involved in cyber-attacks against Ukraine.[29] EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas reported on September 12 that the EU extended its sanctions on Russia.[30] Additional Western sanctions targeting Russian oil revenues will likely exacerbate greater economic challenges that can degrade Russia's long-term ability to continue its war in Ukraine.

Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Leningrad and Smolensk oblasts on the night of September 11 to 12. A source within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on September 12 that the SBU conducted drone strikes against the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, Russia's largest Baltic Sea oil port, starting fires on a ship in the port and at the pumping station that forced port authorities to suspend oil shipments.[31] The SBU source assessed that Russia transports roughly 60 million tons of oil worth $15 billion through the port per year. The source stated that the SBU also struck the NPS-3, NPS Andreapol, and NPS-7 oil pumping stations of the Transneft Baltic Pipeline System-2 that supply crude oil to the port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko claimed on September 12 that Russian air defenses downed over 30 Ukrainian drones over Leningrad Oblast overnight and that authorities extinguished fires on a ship in the port of Primorsk and at a pumping station.[32] Geolocated footage published on September 11 shows fires after a drone strike on a Lukoil oil depot in Kardymovo, Smolensk Oblast.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 42 drones over Smolensk Oblast overnight.[34]

US senators Lindsey Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, and Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to the US Senate on September 11 to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children that Russia deported. The bill proposes that the United States label Russia and Belarus as state sponsors of terrorism if they refuse to return the more than 19,000 Ukrainian children that Russia illegally deported during the war.[35] The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab notably believes that Russia has illegally deported upwards of 35,000 Ukrainian children, however.[36] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/

[AdmSmith]

Russian arsenal: Putin's factories feed the black market of the Italian mafias

Through Sicilian ports and Friulian passes, Kalashnikovs without serial numbers and the latest generation ammunition from Russian state factories arrive. The gangs keep stocks not only to resell them, but as a strategic reserve, on behalf of suppliers.

The same weapons that kill Ukrainians today are used by Italian organized crime, exploiting the routes of Putin's ghost fleet and making a qualitative leap to the black market. No longer worn-out products from the early 2000s, but newly manufactured material, without serial numbers, straight out of the factories.

Russia, as we previously reported in this newspaper, has a ghost fleet of cargo flying flags of convenience, used to evade sanctions and transport oil, but part of these ships can also act as a carrier for small shipments of weapons. “It is plausible that deliveries officially destined for third countries will be partially unloaded in secondary ports in the central Mediterranean,” reads the Estonian services document. In Sicily, suspicious dockings were reported between Augusta and Pozzallo, just in the weeks in which new load analyses were multiplying in Catania among the circles of organized crime. Weapons come in barrels of oil, fuel or lubricant. This is done both to evade controls and to preserve the weapons as best as possible, thus avoiding oxidation.

These stories of hidden weapons, illicit trafficking, exchanges of favors between gangs tell once again of the strong link that exists between the Russian regime and transnational organized crime, a link that is revealed in many aspects of the Kremlin's hidden economy.

https://www.linkiesta.it/2025/09/armi-russe-mafie-italiane-traffici-italia/

[AdmSmith]

Estonian Defense Ministry published a map showing the approximate route of the Russian MiG-31 jets that violated Estonian airspace.

https://bsky.app/profile/theukrainianreview.bsky.social/post/3lzb5wicuac2p

[AdmSmith]

On the map, what is the difference between the yellow and the red threads. I saw that some of the red threads are straight line, so suspect they are missiles, but other red threads wander around the same way the yellow ones do.

Looks like the yellow lines are tracks for Geranium/Gerbera UAV, the red lines are KR “Kh-101/59” and the orange are Iskander-M BR.

My estimate is based on this https://t.me/monitoringwar/20504

[AdmSmith]

UAV - unmanned aerial vehicle;
OTRK - operational-tactical missile system;
SLCMs - sea-based cruise missile;
KRPB - air-launched cruise missile;
ARPB - air-launched aeroballistic missile;
PRR - anti-radar missile;
air defense system - anti-aircraft missile system;
PU is a launcher.

KAR - guided aircraft missile;
KAB - guided aerial bomb;
ZKR - anti-aircraft guided missile;
Armed Forces of Ukraine - Armed Forces of Ukraine;
SOU - Defense Forces of Ukraine;
RTV - radio engineering troops;
ZRP - anti-aircraft missile regiment;
info — information;
IPKR — simulated launches of cruise missiles.
Air Force - Air Force;
DKU - state border of Ukraine;
PU foam - airspace of Ukraine;
APM - Black Sea water area;
AAM - water area of the Sea of Azov;
TOT is a temporarily occupied territory.
Regional State Administration - Regional State Administration;
RMA - Regional Military Administration;

Air Force - Air Force;
SZ - satellite image;
TO - temporarily occupied/y.AB
- home aerodrome;
DK - state border;
PT - air alert;
SB - Strategic Bomber;
LV - missile danger;
KR - cruise missile;
BR - ballistic missile;
AR - aircraft missile;
TA - tactical aviation;
Yes, it’s a long-range aircraft.
LV - locationally lost;
PCs - air targets;
PR - launch lines;
SP - direction
, O/S - personnel.

Missile modifications:
9M723 - Iskander-M BR;
9M727 — Iskander-K cruise missile system;
5V55 — S-300 air defense system;
48N6DM — S-400 air defense system;

BDRD — Long-range ballistics.

updated on 12.01.25

https://t.me/monitoringwar/11198

[AdmSmith]

2JUL2025 China will invade Siberia, not Taiwan
by John Lonergan
China's threats against Taiwan get a lot of attention. But a far more audacious plan is unfolding in Beijing. Emerging evidence — drawn from internal Chinese deliberations and a leaked Russian intelligence document — suggests that China's ambitions are pivoting north, to Siberia.

This shift — driven by Chinese resource hunger, geopolitical opportunism and Russia's weakening grip — could reshape the global order in ways the West has yet to fully grasp. Moreover, the staggering costs of invading Taiwan, and Siberia's role in fueling China's economic growth, make the northern pivot increasingly likely by 2027. China's fixation on Taiwan, fueled by national pride and Xi Jinping’s vision, remains a rhetorical cornerstone. However, a full-scale amphibious invasion would be a logistical and economic nightmare.

The economic fallout would be catastrophic. A 2024 analysis by Bloomberg Economics estimated that a war over Taiwan would cost the world approximately $10 trillion, equivalent to 10 percent of global GDP. Taiwan's dominance in semiconductor production means any disruption would cripple global supply chains, including China's own tech sector. These prohibitive costs, coupled with the high risk of a broader, protracted conflict with America and its allies, make a near-term invasion of Taiwan increasingly improbable.

In contrast, Siberia offers a tantalizing prize with fewer immediate risks. Its vast reserves of oil, gas, gold, diamonds, rare earth minerals and fresh water are critical to sustaining China's resource-strapped economy.

Read the article: https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5379824-china-wants-to-invade-siberia-not-taiwan/

[AdmSmith]

Day 1,303 of the Muscovian invasion. 1,070 [average is 844/day], i.e. more than 44 Russians and Norks/h. Now more than 1.1 million ! Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 155% and artillery more than 20% above average.

[JonPreston]

An Iranian delegation headed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China on August 31 and September 1. Iran views multilateral institutions such as the SCO as necessary to counter and undermine the US-led international order. The SCO, which Iran joined in 2023, is a multilateral forum that was established by Eurasian countries, including China and Russia, to coordinate on political, military, and economic issues.[7] Representatives from China and Russia, among other countries, attended the summit. Iran, China, and Russia jointly seek to counter Western influence, bypass international sanctions, and undermine US interests. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated prior to departing for China that the SCO aims to “confront unilateralism and totalitarianism.” Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh similarly stated that organizations such as the SCO and BRICS can help Iran confront “unilateralism.”[8]

Iran seeks to deepen its ties with SCO member states to undermine international sanctions. Pezeshkian proposed the formation of a “shared digital infrastructure” using central bank digital currencies to circumnavigate financial sanctions during his speech at the summit.[9] Pezeshkian met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian and Putin discussed economic cooperation and political alignment on Iran’s nuclear program.[10] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, on the sidelines of the summit.[11]

Israel located and killed Iranian officials during the Israel-Iran War by tracking their bodyguards’ cellphones, according to Israeli and Iranian officials speaking to the New York Times on August 30.[12] Israel used the cellphone location of Iranian officials’ bodyguards to attack a Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) meeting on June 16. The SNSC is Iran’s highest foreign policy and national security decision-making body and includes the heads of Iran’s three branches of government and senior military commanders, among other officials.[13] Israeli and Iranian officials told the New York Times that Iranian bodyguards’ “careless” use of cellphones played a “central role” in Israel’s ability to kill Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists during the war.[14] Israel similarly exploited lapses in Hezbollah’s operational security following the Israeli pager and walkie-talkie attacks in September 2024 to kill senior Hezbollah officials.[15]

The Iranian regime has continued to crack down on Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War. Three senior Iranian officials and a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times that Iranian authorities have arrested or placed under house arrest dozens of military, intelligence, and government officials, including high-ranking officials, for spying for Israel.[16] The Iranian regime has also arrested hundreds of civilians since the end of the war for allegedly spying for Israel.[17] The IRGC Intelligence Organization recently announced on August 30 that it arrested eight individuals linked to Mossad in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Razavi Province.[18] The IRGC Intelligence Organization claimed that the individuals had provided Mossad with coordinates for “vital and sensitive” Iranian sites and information about Iranian military officials during the war. The IRGC Intelligence Organization added that the individuals planned to conduct attacks targeting unspecified important sites in Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-

Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[1] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[3] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[4] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance” of JCPOA commitments.[5] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.

The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[6] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[7] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.

Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[8] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[9] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[10] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[11] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[12] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.

[AdmSmith]

It will be interesting to see if the OCD diagnosis is confirmed again today.

[JonPreston]

Wyh do you post BlueSky links here?

[ANKE69]

>> " On the map, what is the difference between the yellow and the red threads." <<

You can't read granny??

[gleeaikin]

It certainly does make more sense for China to grab territory in Siberia. Both China and Russia will do better if they drop their historical neuroses over currently independent territories like Taiwan and Ukraine (not to mention other chunks of Europe). China is reported annoyed that Russia is running way late in finishing the pipeline (Pride of Siberia, or some such name) which was supposed to convey oil from Siberia to China. I think they were even considering asking for a second pipeline their hunger for fuel is so great. But have lost faith in Russian capacity to deliver.

Russia has killed off many of the younger men in non Slavic Siberian tribes with this foolish war, so few there to fight the Chinese even if they would want to buy this time. Rather than having to fight in these areas and conquer Russia. they might even be able to develop friendly vassals like Russia had done in Ukraine before the Maiden revolt happened.

What we will need to do is convince the Chinese that we will not be too upset if this kind of thing happens, and that China would do well to NOT expand it’s military, but rather use production to have a happy population. With Siberian resources China might have less pressure to make mischief in Africa and other far off places. We could actually have a better safer world. Could this be part of Trump’s plan?

[BeauBo]

“Saratov refinery is burning nicely this evening.”

Another night, another Russian refinery in flames.

During the week of 8-14 September, Russian seaborne oil exports crashed 22%, down over 900,000 bpd (to 3.18 Million). The attack on the Primorsk export terminal contributed, as did reduced Indian purchases.

[BeauBo]

“it is planned to raise VAT to 22% soon.”

As the hunger for more revenue for more war continues to grow, and oil revenue crashes, I offer a modest proposal - a new tax on taxes.

Everything else in the Russian economy is shrinking. Taxes are the only thing growing, that they can tax. The war machine must be fed, with money, and Russian blood - a flood of each.

[BeauBo]

“What is the difference between an Oblast and a Krai?”

Both are roughly what we would think of a State, but Krais are generally less populated, and have a bit different legal/administrative structure - like the Yukon or Northwest Territories in Canada, as opposed to full Canadian Provinces.

[BeauBo]

Russia offers glory to Satan, naming their flagship nuclear missile used to target the United States, after Satan himself.

From Wikipedia:

“The Russian Satan missile, officially known as the R-36 or SS-18 Satan, is an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) developed during the Soviet era, capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads. It has been succeeded by the RS-28 Sarmat (”Satan” in Russian), also referred to as Satan II”

[BeauBo]

“China’s ambitions are pivoting north, to Siberia.”

As they say in Chinese, hide the knife behind a smile.

Friends with Russia, until they ain’t...

[BeauBo]