3SEP2025 Кремлевская табакерка
Nabiullina wrote an appeal to Putin about mobilization and scares with a disaster.
Opinions in the Kremlin are divided. The head of the Central Bank handed over an appeal to Vladimir Putin, in which she urges not to start a new large-scale mobilization in any case. According to our source in the Central Bank, the document sent to the president consists of 34 pages, contains a large number of figures and graphs with which Elvira Nabiullina justifies her call.
“Mobilization will mean that the NWO [war in Ukraine] will drag on, most likely, for several years. This will lead to catastrophic consequences that Russia will overcome for a long time. I ask you to listen to this opinion and not allow a negative scenario,” the channel's interlocutor quoted part of the address of the head of the Central Bank. Recall that Valery Gerasimov calls on the president to mobilize 350-400 thousand people in September. From time to time, there are proposals to begin the total mobilization of several million new soldiers.
Opinions in the Kremlin and in the Russian elites as a whole are divided on this issue. About 60% of the people to whom Vladimir Vladimirovich listens are in favor of mobilization. About 40% are against. Among the opponents of mobilization, for example, remains Yuri Kovalchuk. At the same time, all our sources in the same Presidential Administration note that the special military operation will not end soon. And they are surprised that Nabiullina does not understand this and “continues to draw her useless figures.”
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6128
Yury Kovalchuk is a Russian billionaire businessman and financier who is "reputed to be Vladimir Putin's personal banker".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yury_Kovalchuk
“It's the economy, stupid”
The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces have seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized 210 square kilometers and 13 settlements just in northern Sumy Oblast — likely also since March 2025. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces occupy 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 79 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 76 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 74 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. Gerasimov additionally claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk and seized 10 settlements in the Lyman direction since March 2025: Myrne, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Lypove, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Serednie.[2] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized five settlements in the Velykomykhailivka direction since March 2025: Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Zaporizske.
ISW assesses that Gerasimov is inflating most of his claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements since March 1. Gerasimov’s claims notably inflate Russian gains by roughly 1,200 square kilometers and 19 settlements. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained 212 square kilometers in northern Sumy Oblast, but only occupy nine settlements in northern Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy roughly 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 76.7 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 73.2 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 73 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces have only seized 6.3 percent of Kupyansk and that Russian forces have not seized all of Myrne, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Kolodyazi, Serednie, Vorone, Sichneve, or Komyshuvakha. Gerasimov is not the first senior Russian military official in recent days to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed on August 29 that Russian forces are currently seizing 600 to 700 square kilometers per month, but ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced only 440 to 500 kilometers per month in June, July, and August 2025.[3] The Kremlin is likely attempting to influence Western policymaking by creating the false impression that Russian advances and victory are inevitable. The Kremlin appears to be trying to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield. The Kremlin is trying to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals on the battlefield, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia’s advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) suggests that at least 93,000 Russian military personnel died in 2024 — almost twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000).[4] The outlets used a predictive model to estimate that at least 56,000 Russian soldiers had died since the start of 2025. The outlets caveated that the RND data is imperfect for assessing Russian losses as relatives of deceased have at least 180 days to open an inheritance case for dead or presumed-dead Russian soldiers, so the last six months’ worth of data (since about February 2025) is significantly incomplete. The outlets stated that the number of inheritance cases rose to 2,000 per week by mid-2025. There was a sharp increase in the second half of 2024 of Russian court cases recognizing missing persons as dead (including but not limited to missing in action [MIA] Russian soldiers whom the court deemed killed in action [KIA]). The outlets found that there was only an increase of cases involving missing persons in the RND since mid-2024 among men — not women — a phenomenon that the outlets stated can only be consistent with an increase in fatality rates in the war.
Russian forces have been suffering from especially high casualties since Winter 2024, and these losses have come at disproportionately small territorial gains.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s high losses are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.[6] Russia’s gains have been largely gradual and creeping for many months, and Russia’s rate of advance is incredibly slow under the norms of modern mechanized warfare. Russian forces have been using light motorized vehicles (such as buggies, ATVs, and motorcycles) and infiltration tactics to make gains across the front, but Russia’s rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace.[7] Russian forces have also not been able to consolidate and exploit their infiltrations, such as the recent penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[8] Any assessment of Russia’s battlefield performance and strength must examine both the tempo of advance and the resulting losses to make those gains. The Kremlin’s presentation of likely inflated territorial gain statistics without critical context for the losses for those gains is likely an attempt to manipulate perceptions about Russia’s military performance and buttress a longstanding Kremlin narrative that Russia’s victory on the battlefield is inevitable. It is not.
Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai and 37 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast, the Black Sea, and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 537 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatlovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 510 drones; six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; and 32 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 24 drones struck seven locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 21 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least one civilian and injuring dozens.[10] Zelensky reported that Russian drones and missiles struck primarily civilian infrastructure in Volyn, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the Russian strike on Kyiv City lasted 10 hours and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure.[11] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspline reported that the strike damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the US administration.[13] Russia will likely escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[14]
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The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree on August 29 abolishing the Presidential Administration’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Department for Cross-Border Cooperation, instead creating the Department for Strategic Cooperation.[15] Kremlin Presidential Administration Deputy Head Dmitry Kozak supervised both these departments prior to their dissolution. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on August 29, citing two sources close to the Presidential Administration and another source in the office of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug, that Kozak is a candidate to become the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug.[16] Two additional sources indicated to Vedomosti that there are discussions within the Kremlin about Kozak’s resignation from his Presidential Administration post — effectively pushing Kozak out of the Kremlin and Putin’s inner circle. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after he advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia’s security services.[17] Kozak had been one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine and Moldova before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko after February 2022.[18] Reports indicating that the Kremlin is preparing to push an established senior Kremlin official from his position after expressing a desire to end the war in Ukraine are further indicators that the Kremlin has no plans to end the war, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly stated since the August 15 Alaska summit.[19]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian elements, including from the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO), conducted drone strikes against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast and the Krasnodar Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Syzran Refinery can produce 8.5 million tons of gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, fuel oil, and bitumen per year and that the Krasnodar Refinery can produce three million tons of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel per year. The General Staff reported that there was a fire at the Syzran Refinery and numerous explosions at the Krasnodar Refinery. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows a fire at Krasnodar Refinery.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at Syzran Refinery.[22] The Krasnodar Krai Operation Headquarters claimed on August 30 that drone debris damaged a processing unit at Krasnodar Refinery and caused a 300-square meter fire at the enterprise.[23] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[24]
A Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 30 that the GUR destroyed a Russian explosives warehouse in Tula Oblast near the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant, which produces pyroxylin powder for small arms ammunition, artillery systems, and rocket engines.[25]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025
Day 1,283 of the Muscovian invasion. 810 [average is 842/day], i.e. more than 33 Russians and Norks/h. Vehicles and fuel tanks more than 125% and artillery more than 75% and artillery more than 5% above average.
19,518 posted on 8/31/2025, 5:45:16 AM by AdmSmith (GCTGATATGTCTATGATTACTCAT)
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Кремлевская табакерка
Surprised”. The government clarified information about the introduction of food cards in Russia
Our publication that food cards may be introduced for the most vulnerable categories of Russians in the fall, caused a rather heated discussion and even distrust. Which surprised the government representatives who gave us this information. “Food cards are a completely normal practice in the face of economic difficulties. We are not transferring Russia to a rationing system, there is no question of any shortage! We just want to help vulnerable categories of citizens. Do they die of hunger due to the fact that prices will rise, and someone simply does not like the words “food cards?” - one of the sources was indignant.
“We are surprised by the reaction to the plans for food cards. This is a normal practice in difficult times,” said another source in the government. At the same time, he noted that the decision on the cards has not yet been made. Vladimir Putin is now thinking about it.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6113
“God said that Russia will fight for another 16-17 years”
Philosopher Alexandr Dugin told us this. Earlier, Alexandr Gelevich said that Russia would fight for another 10 to 15 years (such expectations were later confirmed by some of the channel’s interlocutors in the Kremlin and among the military). Now Dugin has contacted us to share new information.
“I had a revelation from God. I am speaking in all seriousness, I saw God in traditional Russian clothes, he talked to me. And he said that Russia would fight for another 16-17 years. Then there will be a period of post-war difficulties, and only after that there will be prosperity and power of Russia around the world,” the philosopher told us. He asked not to question his words. And he noted that he had already handed them over to Vladimir Putin.
The Kremlin confirmed to us that Dugin had recently passed some information to the president, but they did not specify what exactly. And the military proposes not to give any predictions about how many years the [war in Ukraine] or any other conflicts in which Russia will take part will last.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/6114
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, august 28, 2025
Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City.[7] A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs.[8] The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs.[9] Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.
Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan.[10] The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia’s main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.[11]
Iran Update, September 4, 2025
Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
US and Israeli airstrikes on the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) between June 12 and 24 reportedly destroyed components of Iran’s nuclear program that would be necessary for weaponization.[1] The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the ENTC, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[2] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb.[3] The Institute for Science and International Security reported on June 24 that the plant was not operational before it was struck.[4] Israel launched an air campaign on June 12 with the stated objective of degrading, disrupting, and removing the threat of the Iranian nuclear program.[5] The destruction of Iran’s metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran’s ability to turn weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon. The Israeli campaign has also “effectively destroyed” Iran’s enrichment capacity. [6]
Iran may have begun repair operations at the Natanz Enrichment Complex. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on June 27 shows that Iran has filled in a crater that was formed by US GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The imagery shows what appears to be two tents and a truck present at the impact site. Israeli media and open-source watchers claimed that Iran may be trying to extract enriched uranium buried at Natanz.[7] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.
US and Israeli strikes may have targeted Iranian enriched uranium stockpiles at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC).[10] Israel’s June 13 strike on the ENTC damaged the Tehran Reactor Fuel Manufacturing Plan (FPFP) and the Central Chemical Laboratory. The FPFP produces natural uranium metal and stored approximately 85 percent of Iran’s 20 percent enriched uranium stockpile and 83 percent of Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile as of August 2023. It is unclear how much, if any, of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile was at FPFP at the time of US and Israeli strikes. The ENTC includes several uranium conversion facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, natural and enriched uranium storage, and uranium metal production facilities. US and Israeli airstrikes on ENTC and other enrichment facilities could have buried enriched uranium underground, which would limit access to the material, but could not have destroyed the material.
Israeli strikes targeted senior Iranian military and security officials across multiple branches, likely in an effort to degrade Iran’s command and control structure. The IDF targeted Iranian Artesh personnel, including members of the Artesh Air Defense Force, during its air campaign.[11] Iranian media confirmed on June 28 that the IDF killed 56 Artesh members, including at least three Artesh generals and 16 conscript soldiers.[12] The generals include 71st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Commander General Ali Hossein Mohammadi and two senior Air Defense Force officers, General Ali Piri and General Gholam Ali Najafi.[13]
Iranian media confirmed that the IDF killed 41 IRGC members in its June 22 strike on the IRGC Ground Forces Imam Hassan Mojtaba Provincial Unit in Karaj, Alborz Province.[14] CTP-ISW previously reported some of these deaths on.[15]
