Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
It looks like Iran filled in the tunnel entrances before the strike with dirt.
I’m guessing that was their attempt to prevent an Israeli ground attack.
Initially I assumed the 16 trucks in the released photos was an attempt to remove lots of equipment from underground. But it looks like the trucks were bringing dirt in.
“In satellite images after the strike, the facility’s entrance tunnels appeared filled in with dirt. Experts said that was probably a measure taken as part of Iran’s preparation for an attack, possibly in an attempt to shield the facility inside.
Satellite imagery released by Maxar Technologies showed a flurry of abnormal activity near the entrance tunnel in the three days preceding the U.S. strikes.
On June 19, there were 16 cargo trucks near an entrance tunnel. The following day, the trucks had moved northwest away from the site, but other trucks and bulldozers were near the entrance.
New dirt could be seen in the tunnel entrances on June 20, and far more is visible in satellite images taken after the strikes.”
Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran.[8] Iran's Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran's Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[9] Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario.[10] Russia's oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024.[11] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[12] The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia's high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026.[13] The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia's total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia's high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.[15]
Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine. Syrskyi stated on June 22 that the Russian military has approximately 695,000 troops stationed in Ukraine (including Russia's operational reserves) and that Russia has 13 divisions and an unspecified number of regiments and brigades (totaling roughly 121,000 troops) in its strategic reserve.[22] ISW previously noted that recent Kremlin statements indicate that the Russian military may be generating enough forces to replace personnel losses and reinforce the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite taking significant casualties in Ukraine.[23] Syrskyi’s statements suggest that Russia is also recruiting enough forces to establish reserves not currently committed to combat, although it remains unclear if these forces are truly committable throughout the theater or if Russia intends to use the forces in a specific priority sector. Russian forces are unlikely to commit this entire reserve to the frontline in Ukraine in the near future, however. Russian forces already appear to have manpower advantage in their priority frontline areas and are mainly struggling with overcoming the 15-20 kilometer-wide contested “gray zone” that Russian and Ukrainian drone operations have created — something that a significant influx of manpower is unlikely to help address.
Russia may intend to withhold most of these forces from combat in Ukraine in preparation for a future war with a NATO member state. Syrskyi noted that Russia is preparing for a protracted war of attrition and that Russia will try to “exhaust” Ukraine with manpower advantage.[24] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine is maintaining defensive operations and conducting counterattacks in vulnerable areas of the frontline. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported on June 13 that Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Russia has started preparing strategic reserves, likely to use in combat operations “not only in Ukraine.”[25] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military may be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.[26] The Russian military command will likely continue to build up this reserve to use in the future against Ukraine or NATO if Russia can maintain force generation rates sufficient to replace losses in Ukraine while also building out this reserve.[27]
Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West. Putin met on June 22 with Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) Rector Anatoly Torkunov, Scientific Director of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Chubaryan, and the Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov, who act as the editors-in-chief of the Russian Ministry of Education history textbooks for the fifth through eleventh grades, and discussed the presentation of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) in Russian history textbooks.[34] Putin claimed that Russian textbooks in the 1990s presented incongruous and “Russophobic” historical narratives or denied historical fact, especially about the Great Patriotic War and Russia's defeat of Nazism at significant national cost. Putin accused foreign governments of exploiting grant funding for textbooks to influence Russian historical narratives in the 1990s. Putin stated that Russia needs a unified history curriculum for children as young as preschool age. Kravtsov stated that all Russian state schools have adopted the unified history curriculum, which dedicates 30 percent of its content to the Great Patriotic War. Medinsky stated that the Ministry of Education edited the seventh-grade textbook to be “even more ideological” and reflect the fact that “there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood” before the Soviet Union. Kravtsov also stated that Russia will adopt a unified social studies textbook for the ninth through eleventh grades by September 2026. The Russian Ministry of Education will very likely distribute the new textbooks in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, as it did in 2023 with the unified tenth- and eleventh-grade history textbooks.[35] These textbooks describe the Ukrainian government as a “neo-Nazi state” and include a chapter justifying Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The new textbooks will also support ongoing Russian efforts to leverage traditional school programs with extracurricular “military-patriotic” organizations to militarize Russian students and ensure long-term regime loyalty and stability.[36] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand youth educational and military patriotic programs, both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine, as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[37]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2025
Oil Price https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/brent-crude-oil
I just looked at the casualty figures for Russia on June 23, and was startled to see today’s figure was over 111,000 higher than the casualty figure yesterday. My first thought was somebody must have returned a lot of bodies to Russia recently. But then I realized it could just as likely be an arithmetic error. So, I added today’s 1010 casualties to yesterdays total of 1,011,490 casualties which gave me the figure 1,012,500 rather than the new reported figure of 1,125,500. Apparently an extra 5 was entered which moved the 125 over one place thus killing or wounding more than 100,000 Russian soldiers in one day. If only war was that easy!
https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1937108240598212909
The development of naval drones will take place in cooperation with the Norwegian company Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace
https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1937087056460599796
I think the Israelis demonstrated to Moscow what a war against an opponent with powerful air assets will look like. Russian AD and aircraft(not including F-14 museum pieces) were totally ineffective as in MIA.
To this day Russian aircraft don’t fly over Ukraine, and Ukraine still has an Air Force, something the Israelis took care of in days and fly unimpeded over Iran.
So bluster away pitin, maybe you actually believe the yes men surrounding you, or your ego is too big to admit “mighty Russia” is not so mighty
https://x.com/Tendar/status/1936842192946934164
I believe this image is IIR (thermal) that has been colorized.
🇮🇷 Araghchi to Putin: "Russia’s on the right side of history. Supreme Leader and President send you their best regards."
https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1937084814651179270
Most likely pootin's double.
https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1937071877106827485
https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1937066925428760760
This is what happens to a country with no air defense.
▪️339/352 Shahed attack UAVs and simulator drones.
▪️10/11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles.
▪️5/5 Iskander-K cruise missiles.
❗️Direct hits were recorded in 6 locations, falling debris in 25 locations in Kyiv and region.
https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1937030289504546882
10/11 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles would indicate Patriot shoot downs which caused most of the falling debris.
Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos
The complete transcript:
—
[ Battle for Lyman. Russian Maneuver Turns Into Strategic Dead End! ]
Today [ June 22 ], there are a lot of interesting updates from the Liman direction. Here, the strategic battle for Lyman is intensifying as Russian forces attempt to cross the Zherebets River and push westward to seize the town. But as they stretch their supply lines thin and expose infantry columns to relentless Ukrainian drone strikes, their offensive risks are collapsing before it can break through.
The Russian logistics in this section of the front are stretched thin as the Russian forces reach the east bank of the Nitrius River, over 30km away from their only logistics hub in Kreminna. Furthermore, Russian logistics are complicated by the difficulty of crossing the Zherebets River to support their assaults, allowing them to deploy only infantry-sized units without armored support.
On the other hand, the Ukrainian forces maintain stable logistical support through the larger towns of Lyman and Izium, which are much closer to the front. This allows Ukrainians to quickly deploy a larger quantity of supplies, ammunition, and reinforcements during Russian attacks. On top of that, towns and large villages like Drobysheve, Sviatohirsk, Yampil, and Oskil allow them to concentrate their active forces close to the frontline and immediately counter the Russians as soon as they launch their assaults, while Russians have only little places to gather their forces in.
Geolocated footage reveals that the Russian soldiers must move on foot, exposing themselves to the detection and destruction of Ukrainian FPV drone operators. Russian soldiers must walk on foot from the Zherebets River to the frontline positions for 15km, leading to tremendous losses, due to prolonged exposure and lack of protection. This allows the Ukrainians to better counter the overextended Russian forces across the Zherebets River, while the overextension itself inherently lowers the intensity of Russian attacks.
The Russian overextension and minimal progress that led to severe losses are a result of their failure to advance directly from the east. Russian commanders have been deliberately overstating their progress in neighboring Yampolivka, falsely claiming it was fully captured. As a result, assault units tasked with attacking Torske expected them to launch a coordinated, two-pronged offensive, from both Yampolivka and the east, but quickly discovered they were advancing alone.
The disjointed nature of the assaults allows Ukrainian defenders to concentrate their fire and repel each attack separately. Compounding the issue, the open terrain in the east is dominated by Ukrainian drone surveillance and precision fire, which has already destroyed hundreds of Russian armored vehicles and inflicted thousands of personnel losses.
Meanwhile, to the south, the fighting in the Serebryanski forest is evolving with the rapid development of fiber-optic drone technology, which is being widely used by both Russian and Ukrainian forces in the area. This is because regular wireless drones are susceptible to signal disruptions in dense forests, hampering drone operations. The use of these drones has become so prevalent here that the forest is now covered in a thin spiderweb-like layer of fiber optic wire resting on the tree tops.
Combat footage from the area reveals how fiber optic drones allowed the Ukrainian drone operators to navigate through the thick forests without any signal disruptions and strike a group of Russian soldiers. The intensification of fiber-optic drone strikes also led to the development of unusual countermeasures, such as soldiers from both sides using simple scissors to sabotage the drones by cutting the fiber-optic wires, resulting in a loss of signal and the subsequent crash of the drones.
The prevalent use of fiber optic drones also allowed the Ukrainians to disrupt Russian logistics to all 3 sectors of the frontline. Ukrainians use fiber optic drones to fly under Russian anti-drone netting and strike Russian supplies and reinforcements coming from Kreminna.
Overall, the Russian forces are being overextended in the Lyman direction in each sector of the front; the further the Russians push, the stronger Ukrainian defenses and logistics become, while their own supply lines weaken.
With Russian casualties already mounting due to extended supply roads and extensive fiber-optic drone use by the Ukrainians, the Russian offensive effort here is once again reaching a stall. In the past, Ukrainians have taken advantage of this many times, retaken strongholds or disrupting offensive preparations by launching surprise assaults, as the current state of Russian forces here could once again open a window of opportunity for Ukrainian counterattacks against the overstretched Russian frontline.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKDsR0-iAxU
"I'm glad you are in Moscow today. This gives us an opportunity to discuss all these pressing issues and to think together about how we might find a way out of the current situation."
No public promises to help Iran from Putin so far, apart from thoughts and prayers.
It is reported that Ali Khamenei passed a letter to Putin through his minister, asking for help.
https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1937091908611777005
"...This gives us an opportunity to discuss all these pressing issues and to think together about how we might find a way out of the current situation."
At least pootin didn't say 'we have to think outside the box.'
"It all depends on what Iran needs. We have offered our mediation efforts. We have stated our position — that is also a very important step. And... It’s a form...a form of support for the Iranian side. Going forward, everything will depend on what Iran needs at this moment," he said. As I said, Russia will send thoughts and prayers.
https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1937094835552629191
pootin's card to Khamenei
1. Command centers and assets belonging to the IRGC and internal security forces
2. 𝗕𝗮𝘀𝗶𝗷 𝗛𝗲𝗮𝗱𝗾𝘂𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀 - One of the IRGC’s central armed bases of power; responsible for enforcing Islamic law and reporting civilian violations to regime authorities
3. 𝗔𝗹𝗯𝗼𝗿𝘇 𝗖𝗼𝗿𝗽𝘀 – Oversees security and military operations in the Tehran District
4. “𝗧𝗵𝗮𝗿-𝗔𝗹𝗹𝗮𝗵” 𝗖𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗖𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿 – Tasked with defending Tehran from security threats
5. “𝗦𝗮𝘆𝘆𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝗹-𝗦𝗵𝘂𝗵𝗮𝗱𝗮” 𝗖𝗼𝗿𝗽𝘀 – Responsible for homeland defense and the suppression of internal unrest
6. 𝗚𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗹 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗗𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗙𝗼𝗿𝗰𝗲𝘀 - Supervises personnel within the internal security wing and manages the monitoring and control of organizational information and media
Additionally, IAF fighter jets attacked Iranian military headquarters, missile and radar production sites, and missile storage infrastructure in Tehran, as the Israeli Air Force continues to intensify its attacks on the Iranian Regime's military capabilities and will continue to work to achieve air superiority in order to maintain the security of the State of Israel.
https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1937131262621171871
The missile, which has already been used in combat, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of about 300 km and carries a warhead weighing 480 kg - twice as powerful as the American ATACMS.
Its real range can reach 500 km.
Answering the question of whether the Sapsan will be able to fly to Moscow, Yermak said: "I think we will be able to surprise our enemies more than once."
https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1937159625180090421
“The Israeli Air Force today launched major strikes against the Iranian capital of Tehran, targeting sites and operations considered critical to the stability of the Iranian Regime”
Glorious!
De oppresso liber!
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