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Thank you for posting the various messages relating to the campaign in Charleston and the campaign in Pensacola. I see a few that I wasn't familiar with. I find the missing letter #58 from Anderson to be intriguing. It's probably something they didn't want anyone to see.

The important content of #58 would be his intelligence assessment of the force required to take Fort Sumter.

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b201037&seq=629

Gideon Welles, Fort Sumter, Galaxy vol. 10, pg 613 (#629)

At page 617 (#633):

Commodore Stringham, whom I had selected as an assistant in matters of detail in the Navy Department, had two or three conferences with General Scott and Commodore Ward in my presence, and it was not difficult to perceive that the General had no confidence whatever in any successful effort to reinforce Sumter either by land or water. In successive Cabinet meetings this subject was fully discussed—Generals Scott and Totten and Commodore Stringham being sometimes present. At one of these conferences General Totten read by direction of General Scott an elaborate argument or report which had been prepared by these two officers in obedience to orders from the President. In this carefully prepared paper they stated the impracticability of relieving the garrison should the insurgents resist by force, and that ultimately Sumter must inevitably fall. Some discussion took place between them and Commodore Stringham, while he did not decisively contradict, did not fully assent to their views. Memoranda were submitted from Major Anderson, in which all of the officers under the command united, expressing his professional opinion that Fort Sumter could not be relieved and reinforced with less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined men. These views were fully endorsed by the military gentlemen who were consulted, and had great influence on the President and the Cabinet.

See also Gideon Welles, Facts in Relation to the Reinforcement of Fort Pickens in the Spring of 1861, Galaxy (January 1871) pp. 92-107, at 105-106.

There is no denying the fact that an important vessel was at a critical period surreptitiously withdrawn from her destination and deprived of her legitimate commander by an order extracted from the President. That the President was deceived in this matter by some one, unintentionally or otherwise, there is no doubt; for as soon as he was made acquainted with the true state of the case he countermanded the order which had been extracted from him, and directed the restoration of the vessel to Mercer. Now who extracted the order, who deceived the President, and what was the object, are matters in issue on which the Quartermaster General volunteers an opinion, pronounces a judgment, and makes accusations. I merely give the facts and, so far as I know them, the actors.
The Powhatan, instead of going to Charleston and then returning North, as was ordered, where in the then feeble condition of the navy, she could have rendered valuable service, especially at Norfolk, was diverted to a quarter where she was not needed. Without the knowledge of the Secretary of the Navy and against the final express order of the President, she was sent on a useless mission, ostensibly to perform a service that she did not and could not execute. In this there was error, irregularity—perhaps worse—on the part of the some one or more. I for years, in the then condition of affairs, bore the blame and responsibility of these errors and failures, for which others, whose secret operations defeated my measures, were justly accountable. A faithful exposition, now that the condition of the country is changed, is excepted to by one of the principal actors.
In neither of the publications does General Meigs attempt any explanation of the unwarrantable and inexcusable attempt to thrust Captain Barron, a well-known secessionist, into the Navy Department, and into intimate and confidential relations with the head of that Department without consulting him. General Meigs declares that "the overt act of interference with the navy most complained of" is the matter of the Powhatan. This is a serious mistake. Highly improper as was that interference, it is vastly less exceptionable and reprehensible than the executive order to create a new naval bureau and make Barron chief, which was at the same time and by the same parties extracted from the President. Was Captain Meigs, in whose handwriting this mysterious order first appeared detailing Barron for Department duty, the author of this intrigue? Was Lt. D.D. Porter, who wrote the remarkable postscript to that remarkable order directing the Secretary of the Navy to establish a new bureau and do other illegal acts, guilty of that impropriety, disrespect, and interference with his superior? Or was there someone else who attempted to interfere with the organization of the Navy Department, and to place a rebel captain in a position for "detailing all officers for duty," whereby the most important commands could be given to rebels; "supervising charges made against officers," which would enable rebel officers to escape conviction and punishment? This interference with the organization and administration of the Navy Department was attempted by some one.

I could suggest you add one more to the list. I recall seeing a telegraph message in March from Washington DC to the Southern authorities warning them that ships were being prepared to attack them. If I recall, it was signed "a friend."

"A Friend" was James E. Harvey. South Carolinian by birth, Minister to Portugal under Lincoln.

The Life of William H. Seward, Vol. 2, by Frederic Bancroft, 1900, pg. 145

It is not so easy to deal with what is known as the Harvey incident. When the government seized the telegraph offices it was found that, on April 6, James E. Harvey had telegraphed to Charleston: "Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies go immediately, supported by a naval force under Stringham if their landing be resisted.—A Friend."¹ Harvey was a South Carolinian by birth, and had lately been a Washington correspondent for several northern newspapers. A little later he became Minister to Portugal. Upon the discovery of his dispatch, The New York Tribune, the Times, and many other newspapers demanded his immediate recall. for his act was akin to treason.² A Senate committee also made a like demand, but without effect. Why? Seward stood in the way. Not only had he given Harvey the information, but he knew of the telegram the day it was sent. Nevertheless, he allowed him to depart on his mission; and later when everybody was boiling with indignation, Seward explained that at first he himself was indignant and advised the President to revoke Harvey's commission. "But thinking it over coolly," said Seward, "I thought it wrong to punish a man for his stupid folly, when really he had committed no crime!"³
__________ ¹ War Records, 287
² Tribune, June 8, 10, 20, 1861; Times, June 7, 1861.
³ 4 Nicolay and Hay, 31, 32.

Id. at 140:

During the first days of April Seward's communications with the Confederate commissioners came to a climax. After the 1st the reports that the hostile movements were preparing grew more positive from day to day. On the 4th the commissioners credited the rumor that the United States intended to resist the acquisition of Santo Domingo by Spain. The next day they suspected that this might be a ruse. By the evening of the 6th day they thought the armaments were to be used against Fort Pickens, and perhaps against Sumter.¹ Early the following (Sunday) morning Campbell was again called in. He then sent a note to Seward, stating that various reports had caused the commissioners "anxiety and concern for two or three days"; that he had repeated to them the assurances that the administration would give notice to Governor Pickens before attempting to supply Sumter, and that he (Campbell) "should have notice whenever any measure changing the existing status prejudicially to the Confederate States is contemplated as respects Fort Pickens." He concluded with these sentences: "I do not experience the same anxiety or concern as they express. But if I have said more than I am authorized, I pray that you will advise me."² To this inquiry Seward answered, without date or signature: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see; other suggestions received, and will be respectfully considered."²
__________
¹ Telegrams to Toombs of the dates mentioned.
² This is quoted from the copy preserved by the commissioners.
³ Crawford's Genesis, etc., 340. The copy that the commissioners took of Campbell's letter, to which this was a reply, contains nothing to call forth the last eight words. It seems likely that after the commission's copy of Campbell's note was made, he added his offer to go to Montgomery, to which Crawford refers (ibid.), and to which Seward's eight words were probably an answer.

In a footnote to the Davis letter to Braxton Bragg of April 3, 1861, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, LSU Press, Vol. 7 contains a footnote at pg. 87 which may be of interest.

² For about ten days reports from Washington, New York and Florida indicated Union plans to reinforce Fort Pickens. On April 2 Secretary of War Walker notified Beauregard the Confederate government had never believed Fort Sumter would be evacuated; simultaneously, the Confederate Secretary of State instructed his commissioners in Washington that there would be no truce unless both forts were given up. On the Union side, Lincoln had struggled with the problem long before his inauguration and his cabinet was still far from unanimous on the solution in late March. Secretary of State William H. Seward urged that Sumter be evacuated to avoid war, and Pickens be reinforced to assert the government's authority. Commanding general Winfield Scott, who had pressed Buchanan to hold both forts, now recommended their evacuation as a military necessity, believing a massive land and naval effort—impossible to mount in March—would be needed to hold Sumter alone. Scott did favor holding Forts Jefferson and Taylor for their great strategic value. Buchanan had sent an expedition to Pensacola to augment the small force which had taken possession of the dilapidated fort on January 10-11. A truce, engineered by Florida senator Stephen R, Mallory, was reached on January 28: the United States agreed not land troops unless Pickens was attacked. Like Buchanan before him, Lincoln was criticized for failing to take decisive action; on March 11he ordered troops landed and on the 31st sanctioned a secret expedition, initiated by Seward, to reinforce Fort Pickens (O.R. ser1, v1, 200-201, v52, pt2, 27-28; [numerous additional citations omitted.]