Forbes reports: "(Sweden's) latest aid package is its biggest: $680 million worth of artillery shells, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and a whopping 30 riverine boats.
The consignment of boats includes 10 CB90 assault craft. The 52-foot CB90 is a riverine classic: thickly-armored and heavily-armed with three crew, space for 21 infantry and a top speed of 40 knots out to a distance of up to 240 miles...
...With their top-mounted remote guns laying down covering fire and their frontal armor shrugging off enemy small arms, a squadron of 10 CB90s could land a company of marines “with a degree of survivability for both the craft and embarked troops,” according to retired U.S. Navy officer Pete Pagano, writing in Proceedings, the professional journal of the U.S. fleet...
...The CB90s with their guns and armor should fare better against Russian drones than flimsier boats have done."
The second failed test launch of UK’s Trident II SLBM essentially means UK has no nuclear deterrent, and Europe’s deterrent is limited to France’s 4 SSBN submarines and a small number of French air launched cruise missiles (that could only hit Moscow by penetrating Russian IADS inside Russia). Russia taking out a handful of submarines would leave Europe with no deterrent at all.
https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1760173603801161896
I guess this explains our sudden deployment of B61 Bombs to UK last month. If an American President were to announce “We will not protect Europe if Russia attacks them”, Putin’s nuclear threats would take on a whole new meaning. Without their own robust deterrent (a triad of at least 1,000 warheads), Europe will have little choice but to bend the knee when Putin rattles his saber.
Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
Some kind of nightmare... In the Kherson region, the enemy killed “from 50 to 60” of our military with one blow
Strike at a training ground in the Kherson region. Sources in the General Staff confirm, but so far refuse to say much. The only information verified so far is that “between 50 and 60 military personnel” were killed.
They died during construction, as in Trudovskoye in the DPR. This is what happens when our soldiers are made easy targets for the enemy, and no one is punished for it.
We will find out more details and tell you. If only you knew how tired I am of writing about the deaths of our guys...
Kremlin snuff box
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
62 soldiers were killed. We have to report three news about the attack on the training ground in the Kherson region
Sources in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff reported important news about an enemy attack on our military at a training ground in the Kherson region. We decided that we had an obligation to disclose this information. Perhaps, at least now we will begin to punish those responsible for such tragedies.
Firstly, according to updated data, 62 military personnel were killed, including seven officers. About 30 people were injured.
Secondly, the blow was struck against the soldiers who were being prepared for assault operations in Krynki ( unfortunately, we have not captured them yet, no matter what Sergei Shoigu told the president ). They had a formation before the arrival of the “high authorities”, during which the enemy struck.
Thirdly, there are rumors that Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, commander of the Dnepr group of troops, was supposed to personally come to the formation.
“Teplinsky missed the blow by 10 minutes. He could have died,” said one of our interlocutors at the General Staff. He believes that the blow could have been an attempt on the general’s life, and the information about his arrival at the training ground was “leaked” to the enemy by Mikhail Yuryevich’s ill-wishers.
Our sources close to Teplinsky and other interlocutors among the military have so far refused to comment on this information. Therefore, it requires additional confirmation.
At the same time, the Ministry of Defense said that they would look into whether Teplinsky ordered the formation of fighters at the training ground. And they promise to seriously punish the general and report his offense to Vladimir Putin ( if, of course, Mikhail Yuryevich committed such an offense ).
We are not sure of such accusations, but we await with interest Teplinsky’s comments on this matter.
The IMF forecasts 2.6% growth in Russia’s GDP in 2024, which is almost wholly accounted for by just their increase in Defense spending, over the 2023 budget.
Defense has surged to 38% of their Federal budget - a full on wartime economy.
Consumption is declining, while production is increasing, just like it did in the Soviet Union.
Putin has restored the Soviet Union, but just inside Russia.
Looks like they have gotten their act together, to make a concerted push in the North, to retake up to the Oskil River, as an Operational objective.
ISW reports:
"Russian forces are conducting a cohesive multi-axis offensive operation in pursuit of an operationally significant objective (to seize the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast) for nearly the first time in over a year and a half of campaigning in Ukraine.
The prospects of this offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector are far from clear, but its design and initial execution mark notable inflections in the Russian operational level approach. Russian efforts to seize relatively small cities and villages in eastern Ukraine since Spring 2022 have generally not secured operationally significant objectives, although these Russian operations led to large-scale fighting and significant Ukrainian and Russian losses.
Russian forces likely pursued more operationally significant objectives during their Winter-Spring 2023 offensive, but that effort was poorly designed and executed...
Russian offensives to this point have generally either concentrated large masses of troops against singular objectives (such as Bakhmut and Avdiivka) or else have consisted of multiple attacks along axes of advance that were too far away to be mutually supporting and/or divergent. The current Russian offensive in the Kharkiv-Luhansk sector, by contrast, involves attacks along four parallel axes that are mutually supporting in pursuit of multiple objectives that, taken together, would likely generate operationally significant gains...
...Russian forces appear to be attacking along mutually supporting axes, something Russian forces have often failed to do in the past, which suggests possible improvements in Russian operational planning at least in this sector of the front. The areas in which Russian forces are trying to advance are mutually supporting because they are roughly parallel with one another and close enough together to generate pressure on the same groupings of Ukrainian defenders...
...Mutually supporting operations also set conditions for the tactical envelopment or encirclement of Ukrainian forces in some areas if Russian forces can advance rapidly enough or if Ukrainian defenders make mistakes...
...The likely Russian offensive operation towards the Oskil River appears to be a much more sustainable effort than previous Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. The following observations are based on the current tempo of Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and it is unclear if many of them would hold in the event of a significant intensification of the Russian offensive effort. Ukrainian artillery shortages and delays in Western security assistance are creating uncertainty in Ukrainian operational planning and are likely prompting Ukrainian forces to husband materiel.
These constraints on Ukrainian operations are likely limiting Ukraine’s ability to degrade and pressure Russian forces and logistics along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and it is unclear if the Russian military would be able to conduct a relatively sustainable offensive operation in the absence of these Ukrainian constraints.
Russian forces attacking along the Luhansk-Kharkiv axis appear to be attempting to use some of the principles of Soviet deep battle theory, particularly the principle of conducting multiple simultaneous attacks to pin the defender’s frontline forces and reserves...
...The current tempo of Russian offensives along the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis, Russian force generation efforts, and the Russian ability to conduct operational-level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to conduct offensive operations along each axis of advance without pulling manpower away from another. The tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine is generating personnel losses at a rate roughly equal to the rate at which Russia is currently generating new forces through crypto-mobilization efforts... making Russian offensive efforts at current levels of intensity sustainable.
The losses Russian forces have taken in their effort to seize Avdiivka prompted the Russian command to transfer elements from other sectors of the front to support that effort, but the Russian elements attacking along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line are doing so in a way that has not thus far required the commitment of reserves from other sectors of the front...
...The apparent sustainability of the Russian offensive effort and the mutually reinforcing directions of Russian advance suggests that the Russian command may be learning from previous operational design failures. Russian forces have previously conducted offensive operations at tempos far beyond their ability to replace losses in manpower and materiel...
...The Western Grouping of Forces‘ current offensive operation may be the first instance of a large formation capturing and implementing at least campaign design lessons.
Russian offensives along the Oskil River have not shown tactical improvements or innovations, however. Russian tactical engagements continue to display many of the same mistakes Russian offensive operations have repeatedly shown, causing high losses of men and materiel for limited gains. Russian learning and innovation thus appear to be partial and possibly confined thus far to operational level planning and force generation...
...A successful Russian advance to the Oskil River would very likely result from months of accumulated marginal tactical Russian gains at very high cost...
...Russian interdiction efforts will likely have greater chances of isolating the battlespace on the east bank of the Oskil River than elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces are conducting offensive operations, however. Six bridges (both railway and roadway bridges) cross the Oskil River between Kupyansk and the Oskil Hydroelectric Power Plant. Satellite imagery from mid-January suggests that many of these bridges have sustained some damage and a few appear unlikely to be usable by heavy equipment...
...The Kremlin may believe that delayed Western security assistance to Ukraine will give Russian forces opportunities to accelerate advances in the coming months, although it is unclear if this belief is accurate...
...The Russian command may hope that the east bank of the Oskil River is a sector that Ukrainian forces are willing to cede in order to continue responding to Russian offensive operations elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.
The longer the Russian military maintains the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine the more opportunity the Western Grouping of Forces has to achieve its operational objective of pushing Ukrainian forces off the east bank of the Oskil River."
Denmark signs bilateral Military support agreement with Ukraine.
Kyiv Post reports:
“Denmark, one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies, said Thursday it had reached a 10-year security agreement with Kyiv, following similar deals signed recently by Berlin, London and Paris.
Ukraine has been keen to shore up its security with bilateral agreements while it waits in hope of someday joining the NATO defence alliance.
“The agreement means that future military and civilian support will be established in a framework for the next 10 years in a bilateral political agreement,” Denmark’s foreign ministry said in a statement.
The support will be financed by Denmark’s Ukraine Foundation, currently valued at 69.1 billion kroner ($10 billion), it said.
Denmark is the fourth-biggest donor of military aid to Ukraine, according to recent data from the Germany-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy...
...”The commitments build bridges to Ukraine’s future EU and NATO membership,” the government said in its statement.”
Italy about to also...
Kyiv post reports:
“Antonio Tajani, Italy’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, announced that Rome is about to sign a bilateral security cooperation agreement with Ukraine, ANSA reported.”
The Guardian reports:
US announces more than 500 sanctions against Russia
“Washington (announced on Friday, 23 Feb, that it) would issue more than 500 new sanctions targeting Russia as the US seeks to increase pressure on Moscow to mark the second anniversary of its war in Ukraine.
The measures, Biden has said, seek to hold Russia to account over the war and the death of opposition leader, Alexei Navalny. Friday’s measures will target individuals connected to Navalny’s imprisonment as well as Russia’s financial sector, defence industrial base, procurement networks and sanctions evaders across multiple continents.”
Reportedly, they are also designed to further reduce energy revenues to Russia
Hungary signs deal to buy Swedish fighter jets amid preparations to approve Sweden's NATO bid
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban met his Swedish counterpart Ulf Kristersson in Budapest on Feb. 23 and agreed to purchase four Swedish JAS Gripen fighter jets.
After almost two years of delays, Hungary's parliament is set to bring Sweden's NATO accession to a vote on Feb. 26. The ruling Fidesz party has pledged its support for the ratification, making its passage all but ensured...
..."We not only keep our air defense capability but will increase it ... which means our commitment to NATO will strengthen, and so will our participation in NATO's joint operations," Orban said at a joint press conference with Kristersson.
Kyiv Independent reports:
“Czech President Petr Pavel said at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 17 that the Czech Republic identified around 800,000 artillery shells in non-NATO countries that could be sent to Ukraine within weeks if provided funding ($1.5 Billion) from other partners...
...Unnamed sources told the FT that some EU countries have already contributed to the fund...
...Germany has voiced opposition to proposed reforms to the European Peace Facility (EPF), the EU’s funding mechanism for sustaining European military supplies to Ukraine.
Currently, the EPF primarily functions on a reimbursement model, in which the EU refunds countries for military supplies they send to Ukraine. Germany, which has a substantial preexisting military-industrial complex, would like to see a change to the EU directly funding arms contracts.
Other countries, such as France and Greece, have said that EPF funds should only be used to purchase shells from other EU countries or Norway, which would be at odds with the proposed Czech plan.”
Kyiv Post reports:
“The European Council, according to its official press release, has adopted its thirteenth package of restrictive measures against Russia, marking the second anniversary of the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
These measures target individuals and entities supporting Putin’s regime and perpetuating the “illegal, unprovoked, and unjustified war of aggression.”...
...The Council’s latest actions include tightening restrictions on Russia’s military and defense sector, with a focus on entities in third countries supplying equipment. Additionally, measures target those responsible for the illegal deportation and military re-education of Ukrainian children.”
Kyiv Post reports:
Russia Focuses Attacks on Ukraine ‘Hot Spot’ Maryinka
“Russia claimed to have captured Maryinka, west of Donetsk, in December 2023, while Ukraine said its forces remained on the outskirts. Fighting was frozen mainly until recent days.”