USA is using 3500 RuZZian tanks as the denominator for pre-war stocks.
RuZZia can build around 200 tanks per year (if they can import the parts). Say another 300 built since the war started. So 3800.
ORYX has cataloged 2500 RuZZian tanks lost. 2500 / 3800 = About 66% gone.
Gone With The Wind. All for a relatively small amount of US taxpayer dollars! A Great TRIUMP of US foreign policy.
“Russia Has Lost Almost 90% of Its Prewar Army, U.S. Intelligence Says”
“The declassified estimate says 315,000 personnel have been killed or injured in Ukraine”
“The war in Ukraine has devastated Russia’s preinvasion military machine, with nearly 90% of its prewar army lost to death or injury, and thousands of battle tanks destroyed, according to a newly declassified U.S. intelligence assessment shared with Congress.
The intelligence assessment, according to a congressional source, says that 315,000 Russian personnel have been killed or injured since the February 2022 invasion, or 87% of Moscow’s prewar force of 360,000.
Russia has also lost nearly two-thirds of its tank force, or 2,200 out of its 3,500 preinvasion stock, the source said.”
“ORYX has cataloged 2500 RuZZian tanks lost. 2500 / 3800 = About 66% gone.”
Clearly Oryx is an undercount, due to its methodology (especially since they scaled back in recent months). The Ukrainian MoD reports 5,664 (likely an overcount). A reasonable base case is probably around 3,000 to 4,000 Russian tanks lost (about as many, or more than, they had operational Nationwide at the start of the 2022 invasion).
The starting number was also likely a bit less than 3,500 (IMHO). 3,300 were assigned to all the units in the Russian force structure (Active, Reserve, All Services) in 2021.
Clearly, not every one was in a Fully Mission Capable (FMC) status, especially in Reserve units. Some number were likely “Hangar Queens”, used within units to strip for parts, to keep more of their other tanks operational. There is also the well known phenomena of false reporting in the Russian Military. I think that 10% non-FMC is a conservative estimate - or about 3,000 operational tanks at the start of the invasion (and another 300 likely repairable).
3,000 - 3,500 of those non-operational tanks in storage are estimated able to be restored to drive and shoot, albeit many without modern capabilities like stabilized guns, ballistic computers, night vision or modern armor.
So about half of the 6,000-7,000 possible tanks they had are gone, just due to battlefield losses. Additionally, some number are likely out of action due to maintenance - worn out, especially critical parts (engines, barrels, computers, optics) are likely in shortage, and will become a constraint before total tank numbers run dry (that should already be becoming difficult for them).
We don’t have to wait for Russian tank numbers to hit zero, for the effects to be seen on the battlefield. The combat capability of the remaining tanks in the Ukrainian Theater of Operations is already significantly lower than at the start of this invasion (and their crews are generally of much lower quality than at the start).
About half of the total possible tanks they have remaining available, are already on the battlefield, so as they burn through the next 1,000 to 2,000, they are increasingly unlikely to be able to keep the same numbers constantly fielded in Theater.
The days of a plentiful flow out of the storage depots comes to an end in 2024 at current rates. A declining Russian tank force of continually lowering quality should start to be seen during 2024, if Western support is maintained.
ISW (12 Dec) is less optimistic than I was, in estimating Russian tanks losses (citing publicly released US Intel estimates, which were marginally lower than Oryx, and may represent a low end estimate from the IC, to cover their butts in reporting to Congress):
US intelligence also assessed that the war in Ukraine has devastated the pre-war Russian military, although Russia has partially offset these losses and continues to prepare for a long war in Ukraine.
The declassified intelligence assessment reportedly stated that Russian forces have lost 87 percent of the total number of their pre-war active-duty ground troops and two-thirds of the tanks in their inventory before February 24, 2022.
The declassified intelligence assessment reportedly stated that Russian forces lost 315,000 personnel out of the 360,000 personnel, 2,200 out of 3,500 tanks, and 4,400 out of 13,600 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers that participated in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The assessment reportedly stated that Russian ground forces have lost over a quarter of their pre-invasion stockpiles of military equipment as of late November 2023, reducing the complexity and scale of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.
The Russian leadership has undertaken extensive force generation measures to offset manpower losses, however, and Ukrainian intelligence reported in September 2023 that Russian forces had 420,000 personnel in occupied Ukraine.
Partial mobilization began in September 2022 and ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization efforts have very likely offset the Russian losses reported by US intelligence, although new Russian personnel likely have lower combat capabilities than those they replaced. The Russian military command is also pursuing long-term restructuring and expansion efforts to form strategic reserves and prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO, although short-to-medium-term manpower requirements in Ukraine are likely undermining these efforts.
Russia has been gradually mobilizing its defense industrial base (DIB) to address materiel losses in Ukraine and sustain a prolonged war effort, although there are no indications that Russia has made significant progress in offsetting armored vehicle losses in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 11 during a speech at the US National Defense University that Russian President Vladimir Putin is shifting the Russian economy and society to a war-time footing.”