“Please explain, then, how they beat the British.
You credit Washington with the idea of using the guns from Fort Ticonderoga but downplay the fact that he didn’t buy them on the open market or make use of privately owned guns.
Please explain why the Founders included the Second Amendment.” [William Tell, post 134]
The fledgling American nation of 1770-1783 did not “beat” the British in the conventionally understood sense of that word, in terms of conclusively winning a stand-up, flat-out military clash.
During the entirety of AWI, American forces attained clear-cut strategically consequential victory in only one instance: the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and the Battle of Bemis Heights, fought back-to-back on the timeline in early autumn 1777, near Saratoga, about 185 miles north of New York City, on the west bank of the Hudson.
George Washington wasn’t even there.
American senior leaders and strategists realized that they could not overcome the British in a straightforward manner, so they concentrated on not getting beaten: in effect, avoiding “real battle.” Running away.
By keeping an organized force (however tiny & tatterdemalion) active in the field, they thus kept the American cause alive through times of the darkest doubt, when a decisive defeat of the Continental Army would have finished off the fledgling nation for good.
This went on until the diplomats - Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, John Adams, and others - were able to convince the French to enter the war on the American side in early 1778. Spain later entered the alliance, and then the Dutch.
The British were suddenly faced with a larger conflict against major Euro powers, and a worldwide strategic situation of greater complexity. Operations against the Thirteen Colonies receded in importance.
But the French alliance did not guarantee instant, total success of the American cause.
Things teetered on the brink more than once over the ensuing years - even after a French fleet blocked the Royal Navy from rescuing Lord Cornwallis’ forces at Yorktown in September/October 1781. The Americans and the British endured an armistice, troubled by minor engagements all through 1782 and much of 1783. The Continental Army came close to mutiny at Newburgh, NY in March 1783.
It must be emphasized that during spring 1775 the Colonial cause (not yet the cause of American independence, remember) was not in any sense being prosecuted by a central American government, nor supported by an organized military establishment with an approved mission or clear strategies.
Benedict Arnold was not a ranking officer, he was a hotheaded merchant vessel owner/master of Connecticut, who scurried toward Boston without permission or followers. The Massachusetts Legislature gave him a Colonel’s commission when he sold them on the idea of taking Ticonderoga; he decamped immediately, almost alone, encountering Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys entirely by chance, and they spent the rest of the journey trying to outdo each other, galloping over roads so bad that us postmoderns cannot believe what they were like, unless we’ve gone there and eyed the territory.
The success of Allen & Arnold in taking Ticonderoga was due as much to luck and lack of British preparedness, and it barely succeeded at that. The Americans were like the proverbial dog chasing the school bus, who has no idea what to do after catching it. Only months later, as the siege of Boston dragged on into a grinding winter, did any American leader get the notion of using Ticonderoga’s heavy artillery to swing events in eastern Massachusetts in American favor. And no one knew how the British occupiers might react, after spotting the weapons aimed down at them from Dorchester Heights.
There were cannon foundries in the 13 Colonies in the 1770s, but few were capable of turning out really heavy pieces, and all were bedeviled by lack of funds, uncertain supplies of materials, and very unstable labor situations. Only a part of the problems facing the American cause during the entire AWI: funds, food, arms, munitions, manpower were always in short supply. The French did help, but they could not fix everything.
Linking the advent of the Second Amendment too closely to British misbehavior and AWI seems to me a mistake: the framing of the Constitution, the creation of early Amendments, and their final ratification belong more to the war’s aftermath and the public debate over just what kind of American nation (and culture, and society) We the People ought to create.
Fortunately for we who have come after, the Founders and the rest of the populace were by then in a more deliberative mood. They undertook to think in boarder terms and in lengthier timelines (enough did so, at any rate).
There was a general fear of the potential for tyranny by any organized military establishment. The living examples they eyeballed in Europe and elsewhere did little to dispel their doubts; a conscious choice was made to reduce American military forces. By 1794 (best recollection), West Point was the only garrisoned army post, its garrison numbering about 80, including but one full Colonel.
My support for the Second Amendment, and my approval of the concept of an armed populace outside control of any official organization, isn’t based strictly on the advent & founding of the USA 1763-1789. After direct military experience, and a lot of dabbling in historical research & study, I came to the conclusion that no one will take us seriously unless we are armed.
And I mean “us” in the absolute widest sense. My notion applies to all humans everywhere, at every level of organization, from individuals & families, on up through city-states, nations, empires, modern alliances & supra-national organizations. Applies to the citizen on the street, carrying concealed on the chance of encountering the criminal element. Applies to the creation & sustainment of a national military establishment.
And it applies to any populace in relation to its government - any government no matter how kindly & disinclined to abuse powers. If we are not armed, some other party will make a move to work their own will. Won’t be good for us.
It's a good point to remember the lesson that "not losing" is essential and takes priority over trying to win. That's a good lesson for patriots everywhere.