LOL
On 30 September 2004, the ISG released the Duelfer Report, its final report on Iraq’s purported WMD programs. Among its conclusions were:
Saddam Hussein controlled all of the regime’s strategic decision making.
Hussein’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the regime.
The introduction of the Oil-for-food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the regime.
By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their international support.
Iran was Iraq’s pre-eminent motivator.
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judged that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD.
Saddam ended his nuclear program in 1991. ISG found no evidence of concerted efforts to restart the program, and Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after 1991.
Iraq destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile in 1991, and only a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions were discovered by the ISG.
Saddam’s regime abandoned its biological weapons program and its ambition to obtain advanced biological weapons in 1995. While it could have re-established an elementary BW program within weeks, ISG discovered no indications it was pursuing such a course.
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability, which was essentially destroyed in 1991, after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
Saddam deceived his own army and the best intelligence agencies in the world into believing he still had WMDs because he believed none of his enemies would dare attack him if he had WMDs.
Saddam believed the U.S. and the coalition that threatened to go to war against him if the U.N. resolutions were not met was bluffing.
In March 2005 Duelfer added addenda to the original report, covering five topics:
Prewar Movement of WMD Material Out of Iraq, stating “ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place” but also acknowledging that there was evidence “about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved,” and that this evidence was “sufficiently credible to merit further investigation.” IAG noted that, due to security concerns, it “was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war.”
Residual Pre-1991 CBW Stocks in Iraq, concluding “any remaining chemical munitions in Iraq do not pose a militarily significant threat ... ISG has not found evidence to indicate that Iraq did not destroy its BW weapons or bulk agents”.
Residual Proliferation Risks: People, concluding “former WMD program participants are most likely to seek employment in the benign civil sector, either in Iraq or elsewhere ... However, because a single individual can advance certain WMD activities, it remains an important concern”.
Residual Proliferation Risk: Equipment and Materials, concluding “Iraq’s remaining chemical and biological physical infrastructure does not pose a proliferation concern”.
Iraqi Detainees, concluding “the WMD investigation has gone as far as feasible. ... there is no further purpose in holding many of these detainees”.
In media interviews before the addenda were published, officials went further on the important question of the possible smuggling of WMD to Syria, saying they had not seen any information indicating that WMD or significant amounts of components and equipment were transferred from Iraq to neighboring Syria or elsewhere. Other details surfaced after the Duelfer Report, which helped fill in the blanks left by the ISG investigation. Duelfer also concluded that Saddam planned to resume production of weapons of mass destruction once the United Nations lifted economic sanctions.