Neither is The Venus. So what's your point?
C.J. Fuller in his dissent very much has presidential eligibility on his mind:
"Considering the circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution, I submit that it is unreasonable to conclude that "natural-born citizen" applied to everybody born within the geographical tract known as the United States, irrespective of circumstances, and that the children of foreigners, happening to be born to them while passing through the country, whether of royal parentage or not, or whether of the Mongolian, Malay or other race, were eligible to the Presidency, while children of our citizens, born abroad, were not."
Fuller specifically refers to the Constitution, "natural born citizen," and presidential eligibility. He complains bitterly that the majority opinion makes someone like Wong presidential eligible. Now, again, if he thought his illustrious predecessor John Marshall had already laid out that Vattel was the source for the Framers' choice of "natural born citizen" why on earth does Fuller omit that? (He omits it because Marshall doesn't say that).
the same as what Story said in Shanks v. Dupont.
The Shamks case and Ignlis v. Trustees of Sailors Snug Harbor were companion cases, argued at the same time and with opinions in both cases referring to the other. In his concurring opinion in Inglis Justice Story CLEARLY adopts a jus soli view on birth citizenship:
“Allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is, and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: first, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign, and secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the allegiance of the sovereign…. That the father and mother of the demandant were British born subjects is admitted. If he was born before 4 July, 1776, it is as clear that he was born a British subject. If he was born after 4 July, 1776, and before 15 September, 1776 [the date the British occupied New York], he was born an American citizen, whether his parents were at the time of his birth British subjects or American citizens. Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto are subjects by birth.”
Read his words: 1) citizenship requires only that birth a) occura on the soil of the sovereign and b) under the protection of the sovereign (i.e., NO mention of "citizen parents"); 2 Inglis's parents were British; and 3) if he was born during the time when the U.S. was in control of New York, then Inglis was a citizen. " Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto are subjects by birth.” Here, he's reciting the same rule laid down by Blackstone.
It is absurd to argue Story stands in support of some "two citizen parent" rule. He was cited in support of the majority opinion in Wong Kim Ark and for good reason.
I don't think you have any actual quote from a decision or a founder that indicates that the English common law was used to determine issues of citizenship.
And you don't have one that says Vattel was used. But I do have a quote from a Founder and Framer -- Alexander Hamilton -- indicating that Constitutional terminology is to be understood by reference to English law. Writing on the matter of the carriage tax, he states:
"What is the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a matter of regret that terms so uncertain and vague in so important a point are to be found in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain for any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms—there is none. . . If the meaning of the word excise is to be sought in the British statutes, it will be found to include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an excise, and then must necessarily be uniform and liable to apportionment; consequently, not a direct tax. {W]here so important a distinction in the Constitution is to be realized, it is fair to seek the meaning of terms in the statutory language of that country from which our jurisprudence is derived.”
What Hamilton urges by way of Constitutional construction foreshadows what the SCOTUS states in Wong Kim Ark -- understand the meaning of our Constitutional language by reference to this language and history of the English common law.
A "subject" is not a "citizen."
Not in all respects. But in stating the birth-status rule, judges and writers used "natural born subject" and "natural born citizen" in interchangeable fashion. Justice Story does that in the excerpt from Inglis above. Another is Zephaniah Swift, writing in 1795:
“It is an established maxim, received by all political writers, that every person owes a natural allegiance to the government of that country in which he is born. Allegiance is defined to be a tie, that binds the subject to the state, and in consequence of his obedience, he is entitled to protection… The children of aliens, born in this state, are considered as natural born subjects, and have the same rights with the rest of the citizens.”
Zephaniah Swift, A system of the laws of the state of Connecticut (1795)
I refer you to the well known letter of John Jay.
Well-known, and well misread by Birthers. Under your proffered meaning of "natural born citizen" (requiring citizen parents, which Washington didn't have) Jay would be suggesting to Washington a presidential eligibility requirement that excluded Washington himself (as well as the entire Revolutionary generation). Yet neither Jay (nor Washington) acknowledges that in the least.
What they meant by "natural born citizen" isn't what you think they meant.
I think citing far removed subsequent legal cases is getting the cart before the horse. It ignores how erroneous ideas get adopted under the legal tu quoque fallacy known as "Precedent."
It has been my observation that Rawle greatly misled subsequent legal minds and the damage he did cannot be overstated. His book was widely circulated, and I believe it played no small part in pushing the jus soli claim into the subsequent legal consciousness of that era.
Rawle knew very well his was a minority opinion amongst the legal minds of Philadelphia with whom he was in contact in the early days of the Republic. Indeed, the others mocked him for some of his arguments about being born twice. ("With revolutionary forceps!"
He was also unanimously struck down by the Pennsylvania Supreme court in his efforts to argue these claims of citizenship back in 1804.
I think that any claim of knowledge regarding founders intent for Article II should have some provenance that traces back to the founders and the convention itself. The Majority in Wong Kim Ark simply ignore things they didn't like, such as the war of 1812.