In re staff work and coordination:
It was, as you fairly point out, fairly wretched on both sides. However, perhaps we shouldn't hold these people to more modern standards. This was among the very first times in history such large armies were massed against each other over such wide areas, were able to use railroads, and had fairly accurate long-range artillery and infantry weapons. Put the controls were not yet developed. The General Staff concept had not really been invented yet. Also, coordination still depended upon nothing more advanced than the heliograph and telegraph lines of limited reliability between corps headquarters and Washington and Richmond. In actual combat, ,most of the orders were still transmitted by semaphore when possible, mounted couriers, and runners.
In fact, I'd wager that the General Staff concept was born because of the War of Secession.
All excellent points. Something that has always irritated me is the propensity for historians and (on this site) posters to call generals of past wars idiots for not knowing how to tactically handle a new situation.
For instance, Grant was a butcher because he repeatedly assaulted fortifications. But he equally repeatedly tried to flank Lee, but flanking mostly only works when the flankee is incompetent, and that’s one thing Lee wasn’t.
Another example is WWI, where similar criticisms are made. I always want to ask Mr. Brilliant what his recipe for breaking the trench lines would be. Both sides came up with solutions, finally, in 1918, after trying many things that didn’t work. For the Germans it was Stormtroopers, for the Allies it was tanks. Turns out tanks are easier to produce and replace than Stormtroopers, so the Allies won.
One of the issues that amazed me about WBTS when I started reading more historical (as opposed to popular) histories was the extent to which feuding, backstabbing and glory-hounding by generals and even lower-ranking officers affected operations by both armies.
But I guess that went on in wars before and since. And in a war in which almost all the participants were volunteers and used to vigorous participation in politics, it seems inevitable that politics would make its way into the armies, which were of course reflections of their societies.
You would lose. The Prussian General Staff dated to 1806. The U.S. Army general staff was a product of the Second World War.
“In a military sense, the South never paid enough attention to the Western Theater of Operations. “
Part of that is surely due to the untimely loss of Albert Sydney Johnston at Shiloh- Johnston was considered by many to be as fine a commander as Lee.