Again, you replace facts with innuendo, attitude and contempt. First of all, you haven't cited anyone who is "in jail" from those cases you cited. Second of all, you haven't shown where those cases invoked the specific arguments and IRC statutes I did in the analysis? Let me remind you of what they are:
1) An officer or employee of a listed type of corporation; AND 2) Under a duty to perform an act; AND 3) In respect of said act, a violation occurs.
So what does this difference in the definitions of the term "person" mean? It means that the definition of "person" the government can punish for tax violations, is NOT the same definition of "person" that is used in the rest of Title 26.
More specifically, it means that the only "persons" the government can impose tax violation enforcements against, are officers or employees of a corporation, who have a duty to act in some way regarding tax laws on behalf of their corporation, and who violate those tax laws on behalf of the corporation they officially represent.
Do you represent a corporation in an official capacity to the government, on behalf of that corporation's tax obligations? If not, then you are not a §§ 6671 (b), 7343 and 6332 (f) "person" who can be liable for violating the tax enforcement laws.
SO, once again, are the cases you cited ones that invoke the definitions found in §§ 6671 (b), 7343 and 6332 (f)? And if they are not (and I know they are not), then why are you citing those cases, when they have nothing to do with my argument? Are you TRYING to misrepresent things?
Even apart from comparison clauses in the IRC, your interpretive "logic" is irrational. You wrote before:
In fact, section 7701(c) of the Internal Revenue Code says that "[t]he terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" [emphasis added]. So saying that, for purposes of criminal enforcement, the term "person" "includes" an officer of a corporation means that the term "person" also still includes anything else within the usual meaning of "person."
You translate "shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined" as meaning "the term 'person' also still includes anything else within the usual meaning of "person."
LOL, and what, pray tell, is "the usual meaning of 'person'" when that "usual meaning" is "not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined"?
Again, you're fooled by the "not be deemed to exclude other things" part, and in doing so, miss the qualifier: "otherwise within the meaning of the term defined."
WITHIN THE MEANING, got that part?
So if there is, for example a "person" with no corporate responsibilities, and a "person" WITH corporate responsibilities, and the IRC says that corporations and persons are liable, then WHICH "person" is WITHIN THE MEANING "otherwise" of the "term defined"?
Well, the person WITH corporate liabilities is WITHIN THE MEANING of the "corporation" with similar liabilities. And, the non-corporate person is WITHOUT the meaning, i.e. outside of the meaning, that pertains to liabilities.
And that's just the definition of terms. Then you have to ad the comparison lists, and the fact that at three different places, §§ 6671 (b), 7343 and 6332 (f), the IRC specifically and identically REPLACES, for specific and declared purposes, its general definition that you found at Section 7701(c).
So if you're asking me why people might lose in Court because they accept the Section 7701(c) definition that seems to include them, and don't invoke the §§ 6671 (b), 7343 and 6332 (f) definitions that specifically exclude them, I'd say it's for two reasons. The first is that no, the US Attorney is not going to show them the way out. And the second is that they had someone like you for their lawyer.
Only because you didn't read the cases I cited. The defendants made exactly the argument you did, citing the statute you cited, and the courts nonetheless affirmed their convictions--and their prison sentences.
In United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1981), the defendant challenged his conviction for willfully failing to file an income tax return, arguing that he was not a “person” who could be convicted of tax crimes under section 7343 because he wasn't an officer of a corporation. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as a “nigh frivolous non-sequitur,” explaining that section 7343 “obviously” was “not intended to exclude individual[s] or to limit the ordinary meaning of the term `person’ so as to exclude individuals or `natural persons,’ in counsel’s phrase, from their responsibility to comply with the tax laws.” (Emphasis in original.)
In United States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 749-750 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the district court correctly refused to instruct the jury that section 7343 did not include “natural persons”; the Court of Appeals described the proposed instruction as “inane,” and held that the word “includes” as used in section 7343 “is a term of enlargement not of limitation, and the reference to certain entities or categories is not intended to exclude all others.” (Emphasis added).
Section 7343 specifically lists corporate officers because otherwise there would be a loophole in the criminal enforcement provisions of the tax laws: if Joe Blow signed a false tax return as President of XYZ Corp., he wasn't evading his own taxes, and could have argued that only the corporation could be prosecuted. Hence the need for the "includes" clause in 7343-- as a term of enlargement, not limitation.
But perhaps you can show me one case in the history of the federal income tax that ever accepted your argument?