No, I'm afraid not.
The entire case that he was a citizen was based on the precedents for NATURAL BORN citizenship, and those were based on the precedents for NATURAL BORN subjectship in both England and the early United States.
And the Court quite specifically said that the terms "citizen" and "subject" were CONVERTIBLE terms. In other words, what had always applied to "subjects" when we used that term, later applied to "citizens" when we swapped the term "citizen" for "subject."
Here's what the Court said, after DOZENS of pages of discussion of natural born subject/citizen:
"It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established."
So what is this rule, when applied in the United States? That the children of aliens are "natural born SUBJECTS?"
Not exactly. The Court also clearly specifies:
The term "citizen," as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term "subject" in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before was a "subject of the king" is now "a citizen of the State."
In other words, the rule, applied in the United States, is that:
"ALIENS, WHILE RESIDING IN THE DOMINIONS POSSESSED BY [THE UNITED STATES], ARE WITHIN THE ALLEGIANCE, THE OBEDIENCE, THE FAITH OR LOYALTY, THE PROTECTION, THE POWER, THE JURISDICTION OF [THE COLLECTIVE BODY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE], AND THEREFORE EVERY CHILD BORN IN [THE UNITED STATES] IS A NATURAL-BORN [CITIZEN] UNLESS THE CHILD OF AN AMBASSADOR OR OTHER DIPLOMATIC AGENT OF A FOREIGN STATE OR OF AN ALIEN ENEMY IN HOSTILE OCCUPATION OF THE PLACE WHERE THE CHILD WAS BORN."
That is a simple substitution of everything the Court has explicitly told us we can substitute.
First they said the SAME RULE has always applied in England and then in the United States. So if we want to know the rule in the United States, we can take the wording of that rule and substitute "the United States" every place where it originally said "England."
Then they told us that "citizen" was a PRECISE ANALOGUE to "subject." So that means that when writing out the rule as it applies in the United States, we can absolutely substitute the word "citizen" every place where we see the word "subject."
And they also told us that the sovereign, or KING has been substituted for the collective body of the people of the United States. So we can make that substitution as well, when writing out what they are telling us the rule is FOR THE UNITED STATES.
All of this is very elementary use of the English language. It is unavoidable. It is inescapable, and to pretend this is not what the Court is saying is absolutely disingenuous.
In that North Carolina case Judge Gaston's references to "our law" and "our constitution" are references to the statutes and Constitution of North Carolina. As North Carolina has a reception statute the cited sentence is true in North Carolina. The same can not be said for the federal government which does not incorporate common law via Constitution, reception statute, or any other method.
You misunderstand and are being mislead.
The holding of the United State Supreme Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark
The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties were to present for determination the single question stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parent of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States. For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative.