Replies

"All right then, if Vattel wasn't used then what was used in the formulation of our laws?"

They based it on English Law.

"Mr. DICKENSON mentioned to the House that on examining Blackstone's Commentaries, he found that the terms, "ex post facto" related to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently restrain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some further provision for this purpose would be requisite."James Madison, August 29, 1789, "Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention"

Alexander Hamilton told as where to find the meaning of the terms in the Constitution. In a 1795 legal brief about direct and indirect taxes, he says, "where so important a distinction in the Constitution is to be realized, it is fair to seek the meaning of terms in the statutory language of that country from which our jurisprudence is derived.”

And there is Chief Justice Marshall,

“The constitution gives to the president, in general terms, "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States."

"As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it.” Chief Justice Marshall, in United States v. Wilson 1833

And Justice Wayne,

"At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, American statesmen were conversant with the laws of England, and familiar with the prerogatives exercised by the Crown. Hence, when the words to grant pardons were used in the Constitution, they conveyed to the mind the authority as exercised by the English Crown or by its representatives in the colonies. At that time, both Englishmen and Americans attached the same meaning to the word "pardon." In the convention which framed the Constitution, no effort was made to define or change its meaning, although it was limited in cases of impeachment."

"We must then give the word the same meaning as prevailed here and in England at the time it found a place in the Constitution. This is in conformity with the principles laid down by this Court in 30 U. S. 280, and in Flavell's Case,@ 8 Watts & Sargent 197; Attorney General's brief.” Mr. Justice Wayne in ex parte Wells 1855

And Chief Justice and Former President of the United States William Howard Taft,

"The language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted. The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention who submitted it to the ratification of the Conventions of the thirteen States were born and brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and spoke in its vocabulary. They were familiar with other forms of government, recent and ancient, and indicated in their discussions earnest study and consideration of many of them but when they came to put their conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft, they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that they could be shortly and easily understood.” Chief Justice William Howard Taft, in Ex Parte Grossman, 1925

Of course, Justice Scalia,

"I think people are concerned principally about the use of foreign law in the interpretation of the United States Constitution. Even there I have to tell you I cannot say it is never relevant. Of course, the foreign law I think is relevant is very old foreign law. Very old English law—because what is meant by the terms of our federal Constitution depended upon what Englishmen in 1791 considered due process of law, what they considered to be cruel and unusual punishments, and so forth. So I use foreign law all the time. But it is all very old English law..” Justice Scalia, February 21, 2006, Remarks at American Enterprise Institute

and

"What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended” (A Matter of Interpretation, Federal Courts and the Law, 1997)

BTW, this might help you out so you can give some context next time.

CARRIAGE TAX

The Constitution gives power to Congress to lay and collect the taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, requiring that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.
Here duties, imposts, and excises appear to be contradistinguished from taxes, and while the latter is left to apportionment, the former are enjoined to be uniform.
But, unfortunately, there is equally here a want of criterion to distinguish duties, imposts, and excises from taxes.
If the meaning of the word excise is to be sought in the British statutes, it will be found to include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an excise, and then must necessarily be uniform and not liable to apportionment; consequently not a direct tax.
An argument results from this, though not perhaps a conclusive one: yet where so important a distinction in the Constitution is to be realized, it is fair to seek the meaning of terms in the statutory language of that country from which our jurisprudence is derived.