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Well, I suggest that you read for yourself Story's majority opinion in Shanks v. Dupont for yourself where he says that the common law of England to the Framers was mere municipal law and that in matters such as citizenship they looked to the law of nations.

I read it. Your intrepretation is odd. The exact quote:

The incapacities of femes covert provided by the common law apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. These political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.

If your read the rest of the case, Justice Story is stating the decision is based on treaty of 1783. He does not say the common law was to the Framers "mere municipal law." And like others, I fear you have fallen into the error of confusing a general body of law "law of nations" with a specific book, "Law of Nations" by Vattel.

If you really want to know what Justice Story thought of common law, you might read Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States from 1833. Selected passages:

§ 79. And so has been the uniform doctrine in America ever since the settlement of the colonies. The universal principle (and the practice has conformed to it) has been, that the common law is our birthright and inheritance, and that our ancestors brought hither with them upon their emigration all of it, which was applicable to their situation. The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon the original foundations of the common law.

and

§ 855. It is observable, that the language is, that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity," arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. What is to be understood by "cases in law and equity," in this clause? Plainly, cases at the common law, as contradistinguished from cases in equity, according to the known distinction in the jurisprudence of England, which our ancestors brought with them upon their emigration, and with which all the American states were familiarly acquainted. Here, then, at least, the constitution of the United States appeals to, and adopts, the common law to the extent of making it a rule in the pursuit of remedial justice in the courts of the Union. If the remedy must be in law, or in equity, according to the course of proceedings at the common law, in cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, it would seem irresistibly to follow, that the principles of decision, by which these remedies must be administered, must be derived from the same source. Hitherto, such has been the uniform interpretation and mode of administering justice in the courts of the United States in this class of civil cases.

Your second hand quote, if Story's opinions are studied, misrepresets his position on point.

Argue with Justice Gray, as he quoted it in WKA; tell him he's misrepresenting Story's opinion.

You quote the passage from Shanks v. Dupont in which Story plainly says that political rights, as opposed to the ordinary rights at common law come from the law of nations and then go on to ignore what he says. The "law of nations" was taught extensively at the time as distinct from the common law.

You then quote from his well known work on common law as to the application of common law and our practice of proceedign under it as our inheritance. Nowhere in his work on common law does he discuss citizaenship as being determined by the common law and you have not cited any such passage. Moreover the reason that Vattel gave his book the title was precisely because the law of nations was recognized as being different from the common law and thus sthe entire work is devoted to it. As Chief Justice Marshall, probably the only early Supreme Court Justice of greater prestige than Story said in the The Venus many of that day found Vattel the most satisfactory writer on the subject. Natural law was one subject and common law was another as taught in that day. You are confusing the fact that Vattel chose the subject for the title of his book with the subject. That is called sophistry.

Gray, in WKA, did not contradict Story in his opinion. WKA was after all an opinion written after the enactment of the 14th Amendment and was about citizenship or ordinary people, not Presidents, under the Amendment. To posit that WKA addressed the issue of the Article II eligibilty requirement, which was not an issue presented in the case, is to put words in Gray's mouth and is also sophistry. Gray understood what you refuse to understand, namely, that the 14th Amendment cut across the line of distinction between the two subjects with regard to those to whom it applied, leaving no need to refer to, and no room to refer to, the law of nations. An amendment becomes part of the Constitution with regard to that to which it does apply, which, in the case of the 14th Amendment, as recognized by SCOTUS in Schneider v. Rusk does not include the eligibilty clause of Title II. You are misrepresenting matters and sowing confusion.

What I am saying about the application of the law of nations to citizenship was made plain by the most prominent authority on common law in the fledgling United States at the time, St. George Tucker. And in his American edition of Blackstone, the most prominent work on Blackstone's common law commentaries of the time is evident in the post notes to his edition of Blackstone, which is available on line. His authority is taken note of by SCOTUS into recent times.

To sum it up. You misrepresent what you yourself quote because you do not take cognizance that in the discourse of that day the law of nations and the common law were two separate subjects within the law.