Replies

Taitz files a: citation of supplemental authorities with the 9th circuit court:

"On May 2, 2011 undersigned conducted oral argument in the abovecaptioned case in front of Honorable Justices Berzon, Fisher andPregerson. Please, see below additional information per FRAP 28 (j).
On May 11, 2011 Judge Joseph Wilkinson in Eastern District of Louisiana issued anorder granting leave of court to file my Reply to opposition to intervene in case10-1663 Hornbeck v Salazar. (Exhibit 1)_Reply and exhibits were filed. Decisionregarding motion to intervene was issued on May 12, 2011. (Exhibit 2) This orderand exhibits bear vital importance in the case at hand and show the following:
1. Other courts and districts refrain from deciding the issue of Barack Obama’s legitimacy for US presidency, relying on the 9 th Circuit to make a determinationin this matter.
2. Exhibits provided in Hornbeck v Salazar, particularly sworn affidavit of typographic and scanning machines expert, Mr. Douglas Vogt, provideirrefutable proof that Mr. Obama indeed posted on the official site WhiteHouse.gov a forgery and not a true and correct copy of an original birthcertificate, issued in 1961.
3. This fraud and uttering of a forged birth certificate, along with invalid SocialSecurity number, by an individual occupying the position of the President andcommander in chief of the US military, is so egregious and represents such aclear danger to US National Security, that this issue needs to be decided in themost expedient matter and appeal should be granted expeditiously.
4. I believe that the forgery, submitted by Mr. Obama, possibly included a birthcertificate number, originally issued to one Virginia Sunahara, born August 4,1961 in Wahaina hospital and transferred to Kapiolani hospital, due to medicalcomplications, and deceased at Kapiolani and around August 5, 1961. In addition to vital records for Mr. Obama, previously requested in thiscomplaint, I am requesting a court order of discovery of vital records of deceased Virginia Sunahara, as well as birth certificate for Mr. Obama’s half sister, Maya Soetoro, believed to be issued under statute 338-17 for a foreignborn child of a Hawaiian resident."

The Judge Wilkinson's Order in the HORNBECK v. SALAZAR case in LA that Taitz refers to in the filing at the 9th:

" ORDERED: XXX : DENIED. Local Rules 7 .2 and78.l provide that motions will be decided solely on briefs, without oral argument, unless a party requests oral argument no later than "three days after receipt of opposition memorandum to a motion," and the court permits it. No request for oral argument as required by the local rules was made in this case. Nevertheless, the proposed intervenor, Dr. Orly Twtz, proceeding pro se and having traveled to the court from California under the mistaken impression that a live hearing would be conducted, was permitted to be heard orally. Opposing counsel were notified, appeared and presented argument. Having considered the oral argument, together with the written submissions in connection with the motion, including the government's opposition, the record as a whole and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED for the following reasons.
Movant concedes that she does ngt seek intervention ofright, but only permissive intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Record Doc. No. 252-2 at p. 7,.[f 25. As to permissive interventiono Rule 24(b) provides: "(1) On timel)' motion, the court malz permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. . . . (3) In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the interventionwill unduly delay orprejudice the adjudication ofthe original parties' rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(l), (3) (emphasis added).
Intervention may be permitted only "on timely application," Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(l) (emphasis added). When determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, a court must consider: (1) how long the potential intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of her stake in the case into which she seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice, if any, the existing parties may suffer because the potential intervenor failed to intervene when she knew or reasonably should have known of her stake in that case; (3) the prejudice, if any, the potential intervenor may suffer if the court does not let her intervene; and(4) any unusual circumstances that weigh in favor of or against a finding of timeliness. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d 244, 247-48 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257,263-66 (5th Cir. 1977)); Effiohn Int'l Cruise Holdings, Inc. v. A&L Sales. Inc. ,346 F .3d 552, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2003). ).
In addition, "[i]f there is no right to intervene under Rule 24(a), it is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under Rule 24(b), and even though there is a common question of law or fact, or the requirements of Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention. . . . If the would-be intervenor already is a party to other litigation in which the intervenor's rights can be fully determined, . . . this may persuade the court to deny leave to intervene." 7C Charles Alan Wright, ArthurR. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure $ 1913 at 476 and n.5 (citing Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 806 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir. 1987)) and 487-89 (3d ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
Considering the foregoing factors in this instance, this court must exercise its considerable discretion to deny intervention. I cannot conclude that the proposed intervention shares any common issue of law or fact with the main case. While the intervenor - like the original plaintiffs - asserts the invalidity of the moratorium action taken by defendants, the legal and facfual basis of intervenor's claim - i.e., the President's place of birth or citizenship - is entirely different from the legal and factual assertions ofthe original claimants. Evaluating the timeliness factors also weighs heavily againstpermittingthis intervention. The intervenor's actual stake inthe original litigation is negligible when compared to the stake of the original plaintiffs. The prejudice to the existing parties in permitting the intervention would be extreme, given the wholly extraneous nature ofthe proposed intervenor's legal and factual assertions to the claims and defenses raised by the original parties. It appears from the proposed intervenor's submissions that her claims have already been the subject of similar efforts by her in a "pending civil suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Record Doc. No. 252-3 at p.36, u's 17 and 18, which she advised at oral argument is now pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where she recently made an appearance before that court. This is a strong indicator that any prejudice to intervenor in denying the motion to intervene in this case would be slight, since her claims have already been asserted in another lawsuit in her home venue and any decision by that court may well have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in this court. Finally, the o'unusual circumstances" of the timing of the assertion of intervenor's claims and the President's recent public postings contesting those claims, which the proposed intervenor and her experts assert in the reply papers are forgeries, weigh against any exercise of this court's discretion to permit this intervention in a different existing case.
For all ofthe foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED. This intervention should not be permitted. "