elfman2 replies: betty boop, If movement for instance “is universal in living systems,” is that also “all the more reason to doubt it has a naturalistic cause.” Of course not. That needs to be rethought.
Okay. Let’s rethink it. But let me clear about your presupposition here. You appear to allege that movement and consciousness are "like" phenomena (i.e., they are "alike" each other); and being a naturalist (I gather), you view both as purely “natural” phenomena.
Now movement does indeed appear to be a “natural” phenomenon. Absolutely everything in nature is moving all the time, at all levels from the microscopic to the macroscopic. We perceive it to be the result of cause-and-effect relations as natural bodies come into proximity with each other. And then the natural (mechanical/physical/chemical) laws kick in to determine what happens next. This is essentially the classical or Newtonian view, which pertains to a 3-space (three-dimensional) universe. [I contend that human beings do not live in a three-dimensional universe. But I'll save that argument for another time.]
Some questions immediately arise: Where did the natural laws come from? Are they themselves the products of nature? And, if so, since nature is ever-changing, how do we explain how these laws acquired their leading characteristic of changelessness and universality? [This speaks to my contention that “finite things do not constitute universal things.”]
An even more interesting question (to me) is epistemological in character. As you know epistemology is the science of knowledge and knowing. It asks the questions: What do I know? How do I know it? And how do I know I know it? You might think such are tiresome, merely pedantic questions. And yet the very foundations of truthful knowledge depend on them.
The interesting epistemological question pertains to the so-called law of cause-and-effect itself, of which the universal phenomenon of movement is the by-product. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume analyzed this question as follows:
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses…. I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other….Hume was sensible of “the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations.” He attributes this infirmity to the apparent fact that “the mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.”When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matters of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning this relation? it may be replied in one word: Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication…. [E]ven after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or on any process of the understanding….
As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of … precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which, for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question….
These two propositions are far from being the same, I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow … that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning….
To put it in a nutshell, Hume avers the so-called universal law of cause and effect is fundamentally a matter of human habit or custom, based on experience, rather than anything necessarily intrinsic in the natural world. If there is an intrinsic connection between our perceptions of the world and the actual facts of reality, there is no way for the human mind to discover it by either observation or reason, let alone “prove” it.
Further, what “reality” can be captured by the human mind is based on perceptions of unique, concrete events, which are then extrapolated from the unique (in space and time) to the universal (spaceless and timeless). If Hume is correct in his view — that all human beings can ever know is based on sense, memory, and past experience — it is a great leap to simply presume that the constant basis of human experience never changes, such that our past experiences will always be a reliable guide to predicting and understanding future events.
In short, human reason itself has limits which cannot be overcome. Far from being the “god” that many modern intellectuals have made it, there are things in nature which are not accessible to reason, or explicable by it. Such an observation is confirmed simply by reference to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, or to Heisenberg’s uncertainty (indeterminacy) principle.
Uncertainty is an absolute fact of life. It simply cannot be gotten rid of by the operations of human reason. Even the “exact sciences” are not “exact.” This being the case, we do well to recall that the universal laws of nature are not themselves so much causal, as descriptive. The only reason they look like laws is because that which they describe has a given form, a pattern, an order, a structure which experience, but not reason, can confirm.
And it is evident to me that such an order or structure cannot be the result of a concatenation of random natural events in three-dimensional reality.
The takeaway is: Reason goes wrong when our presuppositions are faulty. Therefore, we must always be willing to test our presuppositions. But this is rarely done nowadays.
To reconnect with our original question, part of its answer is: Movement, though ubiquitous and universal, is not a universal, in the sense of a law of nature. Rather it appears to be an "effect" of the cause-effect relation which, as Hume suggests, is an artifact of limited human observation, experience, and custom. If it's an "effect," it can't also be a "law." For an effect takes place in space and time, and a law validly operates without reference to space and time. In other words, a law is a true universal.
What of consciousness? It seems that you want to make consciousness merely an epiphenomenon of physical brain activity. If true, this would have the virtue of placing consciousness firmly within the naturalistic framework of cause and effect — i.e., all "super"-natural causes are ruled out a priori. This view holds the brain is simply doing what brains do according to the physico-chemical laws, and what we call consciousness is simply an ineffectual by-product of its activity, of no real consequence. With respect to the brain you say that “evidence points to it as a process like “running,” “revolving,” “computing.” And that’s an interesting, if ultimately misleading analogy.
For a computer has nothing to do until an intelligent agent comes along and gives it a task to perform. Plus to say that the mind or consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain does not at all explain how an epiphenomenon can serve as a cause of events in the objective world exterior to ourselves. And yet this “epiphenomenon” has been known to cause all kinds of hell to break loose in our world. That is the thrust of the saying, “Ideas have consequences.”
The question then becomes: Are such ideas the brain’s ideas? What would motivate the brain to entertain such questions as, e.g., love and war, the nature of reality, the condition and fate of humanity?
If the brain is a natural physical object (as seems clear), then it is conditioned wholly by the physico-chemical laws of nature. Where in these laws is there any basis that could motivate and enable the brain to entertain such topics?
Especially since they are such enormously vast and complex topics? New insights from information science suggest the physical brain (as a computer-like system) likely would be wholly overtaxed by the sort of questions posed above. For now it is widely recognized that the algorithmic complexity of the physical laws which explain brain activity is remarkably low. (The mathematician Gregory Chaitin estimates it as ~1,000 bits.) And then you bump into Kahre’s Law of Diminishing Information (Kahre, 2002), which states that physical systems cannot produce more information at their output than was present at their input. Thus, to put the matter very crudely, the brain ain’t smart enuf to write Shakespeare….
One last point: “…if our thought processes are determined, we have no basis for rationality. So if we are to take reason seriously, we must assume that humans are nondetermined creatures. This point is particularly significant when we recall that a free action is one that is explained in terms of reasons, which … are distinct from causes.” [Burson & Walls, C. S. Lewis & Francis Schaeffer, 1998, p. 104]
You wrote, “The burden of proof for the existence of a soul (or anything else) is on those promoting it. Science (like myself) simply disregards it. If the soul’s possible existence is to be considered evidence based, its proponents need to present evidence.” Each of the above considerations, to me, serves as evidence the hypothesis that the brain is what “thinks” is, to put it mildly, fundamentally and fatally flawed. For myself, I think it more reasonable to entertain the hypothesis that the brain is the “tool” or instrument that the mind (or consciousness) uses. In the degree that our thoughts have consequences in external reality, we can’t say consciousness is “merely” an epiphenomenon of the brain, giving rise to illusions only, which by naturalist definition can have no causal effect, because ultimately they are unreal.
And thus we get into the domain of the soul; or perhaps we should just refer to it by its ancient Greek name, psyche, thus to denude the term of specifically religious connotations. I’ll start by observing that the scientist who begins by asserting the non-existence of the psyche effectively involves himself in self-contradiction and ultimately self-denial. For if the psyche does not exist, and only the physically-determined material brain does, then for all the above reasons, not only could there be no reason in the world, but there is also no “subject” (thinker) to have any thoughts about the world, or any ability to communicate his observations and insights to any other person, or enter into reality as a causal agent.
For psyche — soul — is an autonomous, enduring, and durable complex of feeling, sentience, consciousness, and cognition. Both the hard-nosed philosophical pragmatist, medical doctor and psychologist William James, and the scholastic philosopher and churchman Antonio Rosmini, seem to be in agreement on this definition. James won’t call this autonomous cognitive center “soul” (he was constitutionally allergic to anything he considered “metaphysical"); he simply calls it “Thought.” But as they say, “a rose by any other name….”
By the way, James’ method was intensively experimental. It was on the basis of replicable experiments and observation that he concluded the phenomenal reality of this thing he called (not “self,” not “I,” not “ego,” not “soul”), but Thought.
Well I see that I’ve run on long here. Time to put a sock in it! (For now.) Thank you, elfman2, for raising such fascinating topics, and for your kindness in engaging them with me.
Excellent post, betty!
“For myself, I think it more reasonable to entertain the hypothesis that the brain is the “tool” or instrument that the mind (or consciousness) uses.”
I have always believed the same thing.
The metaphorical split(between them) is small.. the reality is dynamic..
The simile goes further, the brain is already computer.. but a "computer" is an extension/tool/aid of the brain..
The brain could be/is a tool of the spirit/operator..
For operating in "this dimension"/sphere..
When the computer ceases to operate or burns out..
The programmer may not.. but continues..
If the machine needs an operator to function..
Where does the operator come from?..
Where does the operator go? when divided/separated from the machine?..
Excellent sidebar(subthread) there, I would say..
Could make and fill a whole thread itself..
Truly, it is irrational to think of the psyche as an epiphenomenon of the physical brain, a secondary phenomenon which cannot cause anything to happen.
And what a penetrating insight to the presupposition of cause/effect, that it is based on experience and not reason.
The usual arguments given are that physical brain injury affects the mind and that responses can be physically provoked.
The latter is puppetry and actually makes the point that the brain is the tool the mind uses.
And the former is no more remarkable than the kind of changes one would expect in the performance of his television or computer if he took a hammer to it.