The whole of this statement is a non sequitur. Freedman notes, "Marshall's statement that courts created by written law could only exercise the powers explicitly granted by such laws was simply an ipse dixit conveniently brought forth for the occasion." The empowerment of the Courts by legislation, and the courts' abiltiy to issue the writ, had nothing to do with the "Suspension Clause" in Section 9, but rather, from the establishment of the courts clause in Art III, Section 1. It can be reasonably argued that a court's power to issue the writ is found in the common law. It needs no further constitutional or legislative mandate.
...yet another term of art from antiquity that you neither understand nor recognize. To be a non-sequitur there would have to be a logical leap in the statement, yet if one breaks it down it is evident that no such leap exists. Each item derives directly from the previous
Habeas Corpus clause --> Judicial Act of 1789 --> Supreme Court issues writs of habeas corpus.
Freedman notes, "Marshall's statement that courts created by written law could only exercise the powers explicitly granted by such laws was simply an ipse dixit conveniently brought forth for the occasion."
Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur. Your going to have to do better than appealing to the alleged authority of a fringe crank scholar who has an obscure personal beef with John Marshall that leads him to arbitrarily label anything he doesn't like as "politically motivated" or "convenient." In reality the only thing "convenient" going on around here is Freedman's arbitrary dismissals of passages by Marshall that he doesn't like on the basis that he doesn't like them. No wonder you like this guy, capitan!
The empowerment of the Courts by legislation, and the courts' abiltiy to issue the writ, had nothing to do with the "Suspension Clause" in Section 9, but rather, from the establishment of the courts clause in Art III, Section 1.
So you have gratuitously claimed. Unfortunately for that claim the case itself still says otherwise:
It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it."Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus.
Pay close attention to that last sentence. "Under the impression of this obligation," the obliged matter being Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, "they give," that being Congress giving by way of the Judicial Act of 1789, "to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus." No amount of loose constructionist spin, contortions from a fringe crackpot lawyer, or arbitrary and convenient declarations of "obiter dictum" will ever make that passage go away.