Free Republic

Lets just see when the deal goes down. Mayer is out.

Thanks right-right. I don't like to flame so will reserve my comment on the "arses" part. I gave up my local newspaper and started reading Freep-News because I found it to be much more stimulated reading than the local paper force fed me. The anointed part, well, everyone has an ego some bigger than others.

"Dick Shooting"...lol... I think your on to something. Thank god he was holding the right end of the shotgun.

link requested:
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/dubai/transshipment-milestones.html

This is the country we want to run our ports?

Volume 11 Number 4 (July-August 2005)

1971: The United Arab Emirates is formed by the following states: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm al Quwain. Ras Al Khaimah joins the U.A.E. in 1972.

1972: The U.A.E. signs the Biological Weapons Convention.

1972: Port Zayed opens in Abu Dhabi.

1972: Port Rashid opens in Dubai.

1976: The U.A.E.'s first container terminal opens in Port Khalid, Sharjah.

1977: Saqr Port opens in Ras Al Khaimah.

1979: Jebel Ali Port, asserted to be the largest man-made harbor in the world, opens in Dubai.

1982: Fujairah Port opens.

1982: Alfred Hempel of West Germany sends 70 tons of heavy water from China to Dubai, from where 60 tons are forwarded to India and 10 tons to Argentina. At this time India is pursuing and Argentina is interested in atomic weapons.

1983: Hempel delivers to India, via the U.A.E, 15 tons of heavy water from Norway and 6.7 tons from the Soviet Union.

1983: Hank Slebos, of the Netherlands, reportedly tries to export a high-speed oscilloscope without a license to the U.A.E.'s Assaf Electrical Establishment. The ultimate destination is believed to be Pakistan, and in 1985 Slebos is reportedly jailed for one year for exporting strategically sensitive material.

1985: Jebel Ali Free Zone is established in Dubai. Companies are exempt from all domestic capital and ownership requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

1985: According to documents from Germany's customs investigation unit, employees of Leybold-Heraeus manufacture uranium enrichment components that are sent to Dubai via Switzerland and France. French investigators reportedly allege the final recipient is Pakistan.

1987: Fujairah International Airport opens.

1987: Fujairah Free Zone is established adjacent to Fujairah Port and near to Fujairah International Airport. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership requirements and import duties on goods for re-export.

1987: Iranian officials reportedly meet associates of Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, a Pakistani citizen, in Dubai. Iran is reportedly offered a phased supply of centrifuge drawings, as many as 2,000 centrifuges and auxiliary items, including casting equipment for manufacturing the bomb core.

1988: Ajman Free Zone is established. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic capital and ownership requirements, income and corporate taxes, and import and export duties.

1988: Ahmed Bin Rashed Free Zone is established in Umm Al Quwain. Companies in the zone are exempt from corporate taxes as well as import and export duties.

March 1989: A firm owned by the Indian government reportedly ships 60 tons of thionyl chloride, which can be used to manufacture mustard gas and nerve agents, to Iran via Dubai.

May - June 1989: 100 metric tons of centrifuge-grade maraging steel are reportedly delivered from Belgium through Dubai to Iraq. The supplier thought the steel was destined for Pakistan.

June 1989: Rheineisen Chemical Products arranges for 257 tons of thionyl chloride, a mustard gas and nerve agent precursor, to be shipped from India to Dubai's Shatif Trading Company for transshipment to Iran. Rheineisen, a West German firm owned by an Iranian family, cancels the contract amid concerns about its legitimacy, and the chemical is returned from Dubai to India. Seyed Kharim Ali Sobhani, an Iranian diplomat who had brokered three shipments of thiodiglycol (a precursor of mustard gas) from the U.S to Iran between 1987 and 1988, is reportedly implicated in the deal.

1990: A Greek intermediary claiming to represent A.Q. Khan offers Iraq an atomic bomb design, promising that any required materials could be procured from Western countries and shipped via Dubai.

1991: The management of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali Port is combined under Dubai Ports Authority. Dubai Ports Authority is the sixteenth busiest container harbor in the world, with a capacity of over one million TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units).

1993: The U.A.E. signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.

1993: A third berth is commissioned for Sharjah's Khorfakkan Container Terminal.

1994 - 1995: Bukary Syed Abu (B.S.A.) Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in Dubai, allegedly organizes the transshipment of two containers of centrifuge components from Dubai to Iran, on behalf of A.Q. Khan, for $3 million.

1995: Sharjah Airport International Free Zone (SAIF-Zone) is established. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership and capital requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

September 1995: The U.A.E. signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

October 1995: Seven persons are indicted by the United States for conspiring to export, without the required license, $500,000 of sensitive U.S. electronics to Iran between 1991 and 1994. Controlled goods, including encryption devices, were allegedly shipped via Hanofeel General Trading Est. of Dubai to Iran's Tak Neda Co. Ltd. Elham Abrishami, of Afshein, Inc. in the U.S., pleads guilty in 1997.

November 1995: Hamriyah Free Zone is established in Sharjah. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership and capital requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

1996: Ajman Free Zone is granted autonomous status by the ruler of Ajman.

1996: Dubai Airport Free Zone is established near the Dubai Cargo Village. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic capital and ownership requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

1996: The German government warns its exporters that Iranian companies active in procurement for weapons programs are present in Dubai. Among the entities that arrange and finance technology transfers via front companies in Dubai are Iran's State Purchasing Organization, and Bonyad Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation.

June 1996: Dubai's Guide Oil Equipment Company is identified in a U.S. court as a corporation that ships impregnated alumina, which can be used in the manufacture of nerve gas, through Dubai or the United Kingdom to Iran. In 1998 Abdol Hamid Rashidian and Henry Joseph Trojack are convicted for conspiring to ship impregnated alumina to Iran.

July 1996 - March 1998: IGI, Inc. sold $400,000 of poultry vaccine from the U.S. to Iran via Dubai, violating the U.S. embargo on Iran.

1997 - 1998: Pars Company Inc. of the U.S. exports two STX gas monitors to the U.A.E. and transships them to Iran. Pars Company did not obtain the required license for the monitors, which can be used in chemical and biological weapons production, and is fined $10,000. The U.S. Department of Commerce subsequently imposes a nine year denial of export privileges in
2002. The U.S. firm Industrial Scientific Corporation is also implicated, and pays a $30,000 fine.

1998: According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Jabal Damavand General Trading Company of Dubai transfers U.S.-origin ferrography laboratory equipment to Iran without authorization. In 2002 the U.S. bans Jabal Damavand for ten years from engaging in any activity subject to the Export Administration Regulations.
March 1998: According to the U.S. government's Iraq Survey Group (I.S.G.), the Iraqi Intelligence Service uses bribes to circumvent customs inspections in Dubai, which is a transshipment point for military equipment being sought from Romania.

May 1998: A new Sun Ultra Enterprise 1 Work Station is located in Iraq's National Computer Center, which was involved in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Iraq claims to have imported workstations from the U.A.E. and Jordan.

May 1998 - June 1999: According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Dubai's Ibn Khaldoon Drug Store Est. participates in the unauthorized export of medical equipment from the U.S. to Iran, in contravention of the U.S. embargo. Ibn Khaldoon is ordered in 2004 to pay a $40,000 fine.

May 1998 - May 2002: Biocheck Inc. of the U.S. allegedly exports medical diagnostic kits without authorization to Iran via Italy and the U.A.E. Biocheck is later fined $32,000 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and pays the U.S. Department of Commerce $22,500.

September 1998 - February 2001: NEC Engineers of India allegedly sends 10 shipments of materials used in the manufacture of rocket propellant and missiles to Dubai and Jordan without the required export license. Indian court documents state that the consignments, shipped for $791,343, "appear to have been diverted to Iraq for assisting their weapon building programme," violating the U.N. embargo. NEC Engineers is accused of mis-declaring goods and attempting to export consignments in the name of associated companies. The Dubai companies Target General Land Transport and Indjo Trading are reportedly involved.

November 1998 - February 2000: Mohammad Farahbakhsh, co-owner and managing director of Dubai's Diamond Technology LLC, allegedly tries to export U.S. computer items to Iran via Diamond Technology. The alleged purchaser is Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which is a branch of the Iranian Ministry of Defence and subject to U.S. sanctions for its involvement in cruise and ballistic missile development.

1998 - 2000: Mazyar Gavidel and his company Homa International Trading Corp. violate the U.S. trade embargo against Iran by illegally transferring approximately $2 million of laundered money through Dubai. Gavidel and Homa International are convicted by the U.S. in August 2002.

January 1999: Abu Bakar Siddiqui, a
British exporter of Pakistani origin and an alleged procurement agent for A.Q. Khan, allegedly attempts to ship special aluminum sheets to Dubai.

May 1999: British customs authorities reportedly seize up to 20 tons of components, including high-grade aluminum, believed to be ultimately destined for Pakistan. The cargo arrived from the U.S. and was allegedly about to be shipped to Dubai. The exporter is allegedly Siddiqui, who is convicted in the United Kingdom in 2001 for illegally exporting strategic materials to Pakistan, including high-strength aluminum bars.

2000: Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone is established near Saqr Port. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership and capital requirements, as well as income and corporate taxes.

2001: U.A.E. companies act as intermediaries in the partial delivery of fiber-optic and military communications contracts from South Korea to Iraq, according to the I.S.G.
2001: Dubai's Ports, Customs & Free Zone Corporation is established to take over customs operations from the Dubai Ports Authority and Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority.

June 2001: Bef Corp. allegedly exports photo finishing equipment to SK of Dubai, which transships the equipment to Iran, in violation of U.S. sanctions.

September 2001: The U.A.E.'s Advance Technical Systems purchases $16,000 of military radar components from the U.S. and transships them to Pakistan after declaring that they were for the Bangladeshi Air Force. Following guilty pleas delivered in June 2003 for the illegal export of parts for howitzers, radars and armored personnel carriers, two U.S. citizens and one Pakistani are imprisoned.

October 2001: A U.A.E.-based firm acts as an intermediary to facilitate the trade in ballistic missile-related goods from China to Iraq, according to the I.S.G.

May 2002
The German government warns its exporters that since 1998 Iraq has been increasingly engaging in procurement activities through Dubai. Germany believes that North Korea has also increased its operations in Dubai.

August 2002: The U.S. firm Mercator, Inc. agrees a $30,000 settlement with the U.S. Department of Commerce, which had alleged that Mercator had exported chemicals to Dubai with the knowledge that they would be re-exported to Iran without prior authorization.

December 2002: The U.S. Navy accuses Dubai's Naif Marine Services of smuggling to Iraq polymers that could be used to manufacture explosives.

2003: Ajman Port, which is adjacent to Ajman Free Zone, now serves over 1,000 ships a year.

January 2003: Spare parts for Mirage F-1 aircraft and Gazelle attack helicopters are transferred to Iraq. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes that parts were purchased from France by Dubai's Al Tamoor Trading Co., and then smuggled to Iraq through at third country, reportedly Turkey.

May 2003 - February 2004: U.A.E.-based Diamond Technology LLC and its managing director Mohammad Farahbakhsh allegedly export a U.S. satellite communications system to Iran without the required license.

June 2003: 311 companies attend the third U.A.E. Trade Exhibition in Iran. Trade with Iran exchanged through Dubai's ports was 12 billion dirhams in 2001, an increase from 4.3 billion in 1997.

October 2003: 66 triggered spark gaps, which can be used to detonate nuclear weapons, are shipped without the required license from the United States to Top-Cape Technology in South Africa. They are subsequently transshipped via Dubai to AJMC Lithographic Aid Society in Pakistan. In 2004 Asher Karni, an Israeli living in South Africa, pleads guilty to conspiring to export controlled commodities to Pakistan without validated export licenses. In 2005 the U.S. indicts Humayun Khan of the Pakistani company Pakland PME for violating export restrictions and being the ultimate purchaser.

October 2003: Five containers of centrifuge components, sent by B.S.A. Tahir and shipped through Dubai, are seized en route to Libya. The items are part of four shipments made by Malaysia's Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) between 2002 and 2003 to Dubai's Aryash Trading Company. One of the four consignments lists the addressee as Gulf Technical Industries, but is diverted to Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, also based in Dubai.

October 2003: According to B.S.A. Tahir, the BBC China, the ship carrying the seized centrifuge components, was also transporting an aluminum casting and dynamo for Libya's centrifuge workshop. The consignment was allegedly sent via Dubai by TUT Shipping on behalf of Gunas Jireh of Turkey.

October 2003: Two weeks after the seizure of the centrifuge components, B.S.A. Tahir arranges the transshipment to Libya, via Dubai, of an electrical cabinet and power supplier-voltage regulator on behalf of Selim Alguadis, an associate of A.Q. Khan.

December 2003: Hamid Fathaloloomy, principal of Dubai's Akeed Trading Company, allegedly attempts to export U.S. pressure sensors to Iran.

2004: Over 400 companies are operating in the Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone, 38% of which are Indian.

2004: Dubai Ports Authority's capacity passes six million TEU.

April 2004: The U.A.E. freezes the accounts of SMB Computers as part of its investigation into B.S.A. Tahir, who is the Group Managing Director.

April 2004: Elmstone Service and Trading FZE is sanctioned for two years by the United States for transferring to Iran equipment and/or technology of proliferation significance since 1999.

June 2004: 1383 companies are operating in SAIF-Zone.

August 2004: The U.S. indicts Khalid Mahmood, of Dubai, for breaking the U.S. embargo to Iran. Mahmood allegedly attempted to arrange the sale of forklift radiators from the U.S. to Iran, by concealing the final destination in the sale.

September 2004: The I.S.G. lists 20 U.A.E. firms that are suspected of having acted as intermediaries or front companies for Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and says that the U.A.E. was a transit location for prohibited goods, with companies using deceptive trade practices. The I.S.G. also concludes that the U.A.E. and Iran were the most frequent destinations for Iraqi smuggled oil and owned the majority of smuggling vessels involved.

December 2004: The U.A.E. agrees to join the U.S.' Container Security Initiative (C.S.I.), becoming the first country in the Middle East to do so. U.S. customs officials will be stationed in Dubai to help target and screen suspect cargo bound for the United States.

2005: More than 300 Iranian companies are known to have operated in Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone.

2005: Over 300 companies operate in the Fujairah Free Zone.

2005: Dubai is the sixth largest port in the world for container traffic.

February 2005: The Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority launches an expansion project to develop its manufacturing in industry specific sectors, including medical products, food processing and the chemicals sector.

March 2005: Dubai's participation in the C.S.I. becomes operational.

May 2005: Dubai signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. to join the Megaports Initiative. Dubai will be the first government in the Middle East to participate in the scheme, which is intended to detect and seize shipments of radioactive material

United Arab Emirates Transshipment Milestones
Risk Report
Our friends.....ya right

Volume 11 Number 4 (July-August 2005)

1971: The United Arab Emirates is formed by the following states: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Umm al Quwain. Ras Al Khaimah joins the U.A.E. in 1972.

1972: The U.A.E. signs the Biological Weapons Convention.

1972: Port Zayed opens in Abu Dhabi.

1972: Port Rashid opens in Dubai.

1976: The U.A.E.'s first container terminal opens in Port Khalid, Sharjah.

1977: Saqr Port opens in Ras Al Khaimah.

1979: Jebel Ali Port, asserted to be the largest man-made harbor in the world, opens in Dubai.

1982: Fujairah Port opens.

1982: Alfred Hempel of West Germany sends 70 tons of heavy water from China to Dubai, from where 60 tons are forwarded to India and 10 tons to Argentina. At this time India is pursuing and Argentina is interested in atomic weapons.

1983: Hempel delivers to India, via the U.A.E, 15 tons of heavy water from Norway and 6.7 tons from the Soviet Union.

1983: Hank Slebos, of the Netherlands, reportedly tries to export a high-speed oscilloscope without a license to the U.A.E.'s Assaf Electrical Establishment. The ultimate destination is believed to be Pakistan, and in 1985 Slebos is reportedly jailed for one year for exporting strategically sensitive material.

1985: Jebel Ali Free Zone is established in Dubai. Companies are exempt from all domestic capital and ownership requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

1985: According to documents from Germany's customs investigation unit, employees of Leybold-Heraeus manufacture uranium enrichment components that are sent to Dubai via Switzerland and France. French investigators reportedly allege the final recipient is Pakistan.

1987: Fujairah International Airport opens.

1987: Fujairah Free Zone is established adjacent to Fujairah Port and near to Fujairah International Airport. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership requirements and import duties on goods for re-export.

1987: Iranian officials reportedly meet associates of Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan, a Pakistani citizen, in Dubai. Iran is reportedly offered a phased supply of centrifuge drawings, as many as 2,000 centrifuges and auxiliary items, including casting equipment for manufacturing the bomb core.

1988: Ajman Free Zone is established. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic capital and ownership requirements, income and corporate taxes, and import and export duties.

1988: Ahmed Bin Rashed Free Zone is established in Umm Al Quwain. Companies in the zone are exempt from corporate taxes as well as import and export duties.

March 1989: A firm owned by the Indian government reportedly ships 60 tons of thionyl chloride, which can be used to manufacture mustard gas and nerve agents, to Iran via Dubai.

May - June 1989: 100 metric tons of centrifuge-grade maraging steel are reportedly delivered from Belgium through Dubai to Iraq. The supplier thought the steel was destined for Pakistan.

June 1989: Rheineisen Chemical Products arranges for 257 tons of thionyl chloride, a mustard gas and nerve agent precursor, to be shipped from India to Dubai's Shatif Trading Company for transshipment to Iran. Rheineisen, a West German firm owned by an Iranian family, cancels the contract amid concerns about its legitimacy, and the chemical is returned from Dubai to India. Seyed Kharim Ali Sobhani, an Iranian diplomat who had brokered three shipments of thiodiglycol (a precursor of mustard gas) from the U.S to Iran between 1987 and 1988, is reportedly implicated in the deal.

1990: A Greek intermediary claiming to represent A.Q. Khan offers Iraq an atomic bomb design, promising that any required materials could be procured from Western countries and shipped via Dubai.

1991: The management of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali Port is combined under Dubai Ports Authority. Dubai Ports Authority is the sixteenth busiest container harbor in the world, with a capacity of over one million TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units).

1993: The U.A.E. signs the Chemical Weapons Convention.

1993: A third berth is commissioned for Sharjah's Khorfakkan Container Terminal.

1994 - 1995: Bukary Syed Abu (B.S.A.) Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in Dubai, allegedly organizes the transshipment of two containers of centrifuge components from Dubai to Iran, on behalf of A.Q. Khan, for $3 million.

1995: Sharjah Airport International Free Zone (SAIF-Zone) is established. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership and capital requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

September 1995: The U.A.E. signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

October 1995: Seven persons are indicted by the United States for conspiring to export, without the required license, $500,000 of sensitive U.S. electronics to Iran between 1991 and 1994. Controlled goods, including encryption devices, were allegedly shipped via Hanofeel General Trading Est. of Dubai to Iran's Tak Neda Co. Ltd. Elham Abrishami, of Afshein, Inc. in the U.S., pleads guilty in 1997.

November 1995: Hamriyah Free Zone is established in Sharjah. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership and capital requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

1996: Ajman Free Zone is granted autonomous status by the ruler of Ajman.

1996: Dubai Airport Free Zone is established near the Dubai Cargo Village. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic capital and ownership requirements, import and export duties, and personal and corporate taxes.

1996: The German government warns its exporters that Iranian companies active in procurement for weapons programs are present in Dubai. Among the entities that arrange and finance technology transfers via front companies in Dubai are Iran's State Purchasing Organization, and Bonyad Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation.

June 1996: Dubai's Guide Oil Equipment Company is identified in a U.S. court as a corporation that ships impregnated alumina, which can be used in the manufacture of nerve gas, through Dubai or the United Kingdom to Iran. In 1998 Abdol Hamid Rashidian and Henry Joseph Trojack are convicted for conspiring to ship impregnated alumina to Iran.

July 1996 - March 1998: IGI, Inc. sold $400,000 of poultry vaccine from the U.S. to Iran via Dubai, violating the U.S. embargo on Iran.

1997 - 1998: Pars Company Inc. of the U.S. exports two STX gas monitors to the U.A.E. and transships them to Iran. Pars Company did not obtain the required license for the monitors, which can be used in chemical and biological weapons production, and is fined $10,000. The U.S. Department of Commerce subsequently imposes a nine year denial of export privileges in
2002. The U.S. firm Industrial Scientific Corporation is also implicated, and pays a $30,000 fine.

1998: According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Jabal Damavand General Trading Company of Dubai transfers U.S.-origin ferrography laboratory equipment to Iran without authorization. In 2002 the U.S. bans Jabal Damavand for ten years from engaging in any activity subject to the Export Administration Regulations.

March 1998: According to the U.S. government's Iraq Survey Group (I.S.G.), the Iraqi Intelligence Service uses bribes to circumvent customs inspections in Dubai, which is a transshipment point for military equipment being sought from Romania.

May 1998: A new Sun Ultra Enterprise 1 Work Station is located in Iraq's National Computer Center, which was involved in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Iraq claims to have imported workstations from the U.A.E. and Jordan.

May 1998 - June 1999: According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Dubai's Ibn Khaldoon Drug Store Est. participates in the unauthorized export of medical equipment from the U.S. to Iran, in contravention of the U.S. embargo. Ibn Khaldoon is ordered in 2004 to pay a $40,000 fine.

May 1998 - May 2002: Biocheck Inc. of the U.S. allegedly exports medical diagnostic kits without authorization to Iran via Italy and the U.A.E. Biocheck is later fined $32,000 by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and pays the U.S. Department of Commerce $22,500.

September 1998 - February 2001: NEC Engineers of India allegedly sends 10 shipments of materials used in the manufacture of rocket propellant and missiles to Dubai and Jordan without the required export license. Indian court documents state that the consignments, shipped for $791,343, "appear to have been diverted to Iraq for assisting their weapon building programme," violating the U.N. embargo. NEC Engineers is accused of mis-declaring goods and attempting to export consignments in the name of associated companies. The Dubai companies Target General Land Transport and Indjo Trading are reportedly involved.

November 1998 - February 2000: Mohammad Farahbakhsh, co-owner and managing director of Dubai's Diamond Technology LLC, allegedly tries to export U.S. computer items to Iran via Diamond Technology. The alleged purchaser is Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which is a branch of the Iranian Ministry of Defence and subject to U.S. sanctions for its involvement in cruise and ballistic missile development.

1998 - 2000: Mazyar Gavidel and his company Homa International Trading Corp. violate the U.S. trade embargo against Iran by illegally transferring approximately $2 million of laundered money through Dubai. Gavidel and Homa International are convicted by the U.S. in August 2002.

January 1999: Abu Bakar Siddiqui, a British exporter of Pakistani origin and an alleged procurement agent for A.Q. Khan, allegedly attempts to ship special aluminum sheets to Dubai.

May 1999: British customs authorities reportedly seize up to 20 tons of components, including high-grade aluminum, believed to be ultimately destined for Pakistan. The cargo arrived from the U.S. and was allegedly about to be shipped to Dubai. The exporter is allegedly Siddiqui, who is convicted in the United Kingdom in 2001 for illegally exporting strategic materials to Pakistan, including high-strength aluminum bars.

2000: Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone is established near Saqr Port. Companies in the zone are exempt from all domestic ownership and capital requirements, as well as income and corporate taxes.

2001: U.A.E. companies act as intermediaries in the partial delivery of fiber-optic and military communications contracts from South Korea to Iraq, according to the I.S.G.

2001: Dubai's Ports, Customs & Free Zone Corporation is established to take over customs operations from the Dubai Ports Authority and Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority.

June 2001: Bef Corp. allegedly exports photo finishing equipment to SK of Dubai, which transships the equipment to Iran, in violation of U.S. sanctions.

September 2001: The U.A.E.'s Advance Technical Systems purchases $16,000 of military radar components from the U.S. and transships them to Pakistan after declaring that they were for the Bangladeshi Air Force. Following guilty pleas delivered in June 2003 for the illegal export of parts for howitzers, radars and armored personnel carriers, two U.S. citizens and one Pakistani are imprisoned.

October 2001: A U.A.E.-based firm acts as an intermediary to facilitate the trade in ballistic missile-related goods from China to Iraq, according to the I.S.G.

May 2002: The German government warns its exporters that since 1998 Iraq has been increasingly engaging in procurement activities through Dubai. Germany believes that North Korea has also increased its operations in Dubai.

August 2002: The U.S. firm Mercator, Inc. agrees a $30,000 settlement with the U.S. Department of Commerce, which had alleged that Mercator had exported chemicals to Dubai with the knowledge that they would be re-exported to Iran without prior authorization.

December 2002: The U.S. Navy accuses Dubai's Naif Marine Services of smuggling to Iraq polymers that could be used to manufacture explosives.

2003: Ajman Port, which is adjacent to Ajman Free Zone, now serves over 1,000 ships a year.

January 2003: Spare parts for Mirage F-1 aircraft and Gazelle attack helicopters are transferred to Iraq. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes that parts were purchased from France by Dubai's Al Tamoor Trading Co., and then smuggled to Iraq through at third country, reportedly Turkey.

May 2003 - February 2004: U.A.E.-based Diamond Technology LLC and its managing director Mohammad Farahbakhsh allegedly export a U.S. satellite communications system to Iran without the required license.

June 2003: 311 companies attend the third U.A.E. Trade Exhibition in Iran. Trade with Iran exchanged through Dubai's ports was 12 billion dirhams in 2001, an increase from 4.3 billion in 1997.

October 2003: 66 triggered spark gaps, which can be used to detonate nuclear weapons, are shipped without the required license from the United States to Top-Cape Technology in South Africa. They are subsequently transshipped via Dubai to AJMC Lithographic Aid Society in Pakistan. In 2004 Asher Karni, an Israeli living in South Africa, pleads guilty to conspiring to export controlled commodities to Pakistan without validated export licenses. In 2005 the U.S. indicts Humayun Khan of the Pakistani company Pakland PME for violating export restrictions and being the ultimate purchaser.

October 2003: Five containers of centrifuge components, sent by B.S.A. Tahir and shipped through Dubai, are seized en route to Libya. The items are part of four shipments made by Malaysia's Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) between 2002 and 2003 to Dubai's Aryash Trading Company. One of the four consignments lists the addressee as Gulf Technical Industries, but is diverted to Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, also based in Dubai.

October 2003: According to B.S.A. Tahir, the BBC China, the ship carrying the seized centrifuge components, was also transporting an aluminum casting and dynamo for Libya's centrifuge workshop. The consignment was allegedly sent via Dubai by TUT Shipping on behalf of Gunas Jireh of Turkey.

October 2003: Two weeks after the seizure of the centrifuge components, B.S.A. Tahir arranges the transshipment to Libya, via Dubai, of an electrical cabinet and power supplier-voltage regulator on behalf of Selim Alguadis, an associate of A.Q. Khan.

December 2003: Hamid Fathaloloomy, principal of Dubai's Akeed Trading Company, allegedly attempts to export U.S. pressure sensors to Iran.

2004: Over 400 companies are operating in the Ras Al Khaimah Free Trade Zone, 38% of which are Indian.

2004: Dubai Ports Authority's capacity passes six million TEU.

April 2004: The U.A.E. freezes the accounts of SMB Computers as part of its investigation into B.S.A. Tahir, who is the Group Managing Director.

April 2004: Elmstone Service and Trading FZE is sanctioned for two years by the United States for transferring to Iran equipment and/or technology of proliferation significance since 1999.

June 2004: 1383 companies are operating in SAIF-Zone.

August 2004: The U.S. indicts Khalid Mahmood, of Dubai, for breaking the U.S. embargo to Iran. Mahmood allegedly attempted to arrange the sale of forklift radiators from the U.S. to Iran, by concealing the final destination in the sale.

September 2004: The I.S.G. lists 20 U.A.E. firms that are suspected of having acted as intermediaries or front companies for Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and says that the U.A.E. was a transit location for prohibited goods, with companies using deceptive trade practices. The I.S.G. also concludes that the U.A.E. and Iran were the most frequent destinations for Iraqi smuggled oil and owned the majority of smuggling vessels involved.

December 2004: The U.A.E. agrees to join the U.S.' Container Security Initiative (C.S.I.), becoming the first country in the Middle East to do so. U.S. customs officials will be stationed in Dubai to help target and screen suspect cargo bound for the United States.

2005: More than 300 Iranian companies are known to have operated in Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone.

2005: Over 300 companies operate in the Fujairah Free Zone.

2005: Dubai is the sixth largest port in the world for container traffic.

February 2005: The Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority launches an expansion project to develop its manufacturing in industry specific sectors, including medical products, food processing and the chemicals sector.

March 2005: Dubai's participation in the C.S.I. becomes operational.

May 2005: Dubai signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. to join the Megaports Initiative. Dubai will be the first government in the Middle East to participate in the scheme, which is intended to detect and seize shipments of radioactive material.

Washington, D.C. The 35th Container Security Initiative (CSI) port becomes operational today at the port of Dubai as announced by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner Robert C. Bonner and Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Executive Chairman, Dubai Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, United Arab Emirates (UAE). CSI is the only multinational program in place in the world today that is protecting global trade lanes from being exploited and disrupted by international terrorists. The United Arab Emirates became the first Middle Eastern country to join CSI when the declaration of principles was signed in Dubai on December 12, 2004. A CBP deployment team will work closely with the UAE government personnel to target high-risk cargo containers destined for the United States. Dubai Customs Administration officials are responsible for screening any container identified jointly with CBP officers as a potential terrorist risk.
“I applaud the government of Dubai for assuming a leadership role in this region of the world. Dubai has acknowledged the absolute importance of securing cargo against terrorists. The Port of Dubai, which includes the much larger seaport of Jebel Ali, are modern and extremely efficient ports and I am confident that the CBP officers stationed there will benefit greatly from this remarkable opportunity,” said Commissioner Bonner. “The core elements of CSI allow for the mutual risk assessment of every oceangoing container headed for the U.S. before it is loaded on a vessel in a foreign port and before that vessel is bound for U.S. seaports. The CSI security blanket continues to expand and strengthen as it encompasses the port of Dubai.”
“I congratulate the government of Dubai in partnering with the United States and being in the forefront of protecting the global trading system,” said U.S. Ambassador to the UAE, Michele Sison.
The primary purpose of CSI is to help protect the global trading system and the trade lanes between CSI ports and the United States. By collaborating with foreign customs administrations, CBP is working towards a safer, more secure world trading system. Under CSI, CBP has entered into bi-lateral partnerships with other governments to identify high-risk cargo containers and to pre-screen them before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. Today, 21 administrations have committed to joining CSI and are at various stages of implementation.
On average, every day about 25,000 seagoing containers are offloaded at America’s seaports. Commissioner Bonner, confirmed by Congress shortly after 9/11, made maritime cargo security one of his top priorities. The Container Security Initiative was launched in January 2002. CSI has been accepted globally as a bold and revolutionary initiative to secure maritime cargo shipments against the terrorist threat.
The 35 operational ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and North America include: Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver, Canada; Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Le Havre and Marseille, France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium; Singapore; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, Japan; Hong Kong; Göteborg, Sweden; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport, and Tilbury, United Kingdom; Genoa, La Spezia, Naples, Gioia Tauro and Livorno, Italy; Busan, Korea; Durban, South Africa; Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Piraeus, Greece; Algeciras, Spain; Laem Chabang, Thailand; and Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
CSI will continue to expand to strategic locations around the world. The World Customs Organization (WCO), the European Union (EU), and the G8 support CSI expansion and have adopted resolutions implementing CSI security measures introduced at ports throughout the world.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland Security charged with the management, control, and protection of our Nation's borders at and between the official ports of entry. CBP is charged with keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing hundreds of U.S. laws.

No beating intended to Mr. Bilkey or anyone else. I just found it an odd exchange between Blitz and Bilkey. Obviously Mr. Bilkey is quite qualified for his position and there is nothing wrong with his firm trying to make a buck. That said, I am not the one who claimed to have a Senator as a father. It simply could of been a slip on Mr. Bilkey's part not hearing the question from Blitz properly. I still don't believe that a foriegn company should be able to own 6 of our eastern ports. Also, the secretive way in which this deal went down begs for a further explanation. Mr. Bilkey is also a veteran like myself and I salute him for that. President Bush says that it wouldn't look good for our country to have bias to Muslim countries trying to do business here, I agree, however wasn't there bias with countries on his part over rebuilding contracts in Iraq ?