Posted on 11/10/2015 3:46:14 AM PST by sukhoi-30mki
PARIS --- The unilateral decision by the United States to locate all F-35 software laboratories on its territory, and to manage the operation and sustainment of the global F-35 fleet from its territory, has introduced vulnerabilities that are only beginning to emerge.
The biggest risk is that, since the F-35 cannot operate effectively without permanent data exchanges with its software labs and logistic support computers in the United States, any disruption in the two-way flow of information would compromise its effectiveness.
All F-35 aircraft operating across the world will have to update their mission data files and their Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS) profiles before and after every sortie, to ensure that on-board systems are programmed with the latest available operational data and that ALIS is kept permanently informed of each aircraft’s technical status and maintenance requirements. ALIS can, and has, prevented aircraft taking off because of an incomplete data file.
Given that the United States hopes to sell hundreds of F-35s to allies in Europe, Asia and Australia, the volume of data that must travel to and from the United States is gigantic, and any disruption in Internet traffic could cripple air forces as the F-35 cannot operate unless it is logged into, and cleared by, ALIS.
For example, “Mission data load development and testing is a critical path to combat capability,†Pentagon OT&E director Michael Gilmore said in his fiscal 2014 report. “Accuracy of threat identification and location depend on how well the mission data loads are optimized to perform in ambiguous operational environments.â€
Updating and uploading mission data loads depends on a functioning Internet, and as Wired.com noted in an Oct. 29 story, “undersea Internet cables are surprisingly vulnerable.†It quoted Nicole Starosielski, a media scholar at New York University, as saying that “people would be surprised to know that there are a little over 200 systems that carry all of the internet traffic across the ocean, and these are by and large concentrated in very few areas. The cables end up getting funneled through these narrow pressure points all around the globe.â€
Recent activity by Russian ships near crucial undersea cables has added to concerns about the vulnerability of Internet, as recently illustrated by the New York Times, which noted that “Russian submarines and spy ships are aggressively operating near the vital undersea cables that carry almost all global Internet communications, raising concerns among some American military and intelligence officials that the Russians might be planning to attack those lines in times of tension or conflict.â€
The fear is that an “ultimate Russian hack on the United States could involve severing the fiber-optic cables at some of their hardest-to-access locations to halt the instant communications on which the West’s governments, economies and citizens have grown dependent,†the article said.
Whatever the other repercussions, such an event would severely limit the ability of the world’s F-35 fighters to fly – due to a loss of ALIS link – and to operate effectively, as their fighting ability would disappear if their software and mission data files could not be updated.
No Internet, No F-35 Operations
In a recent article, Aviation Week explored how F-35 operators “are being compelled to fund $150 million software laboratories, based in the U.S. and almost 50% staffed by U.S. personnel, that generate data crucial to the fighter’s ability to identify new radio-frequency threats.â€
It noted that the MDFs “are twice as large as the equivalent data load in the F-22,†and that there are 12 packages covering different regions.
The JSF program is establishing two centers to produce and update MDFs, at Eglin AFB, Florida, and NAS Point Mugu, California. The latter will support Japanese and Israeli F-35s, Aviation Week reported, while an Australia/U.K. facility and a laboratory to support Norway and Italy will be established at Eglin. (Click here for a description of the Point Mugu reprograming lab.)
Given that the ALIS mainframe is located at Fort Worth, Texas, operating the F-35 will require three very large data conduits to and from these locations, again using Internet cables as the volume of data is too great for satellite transmission.
In fact, if the F-35 performs as advertised, it should gather very argue amounts of tactical data during each mission – data that it will have to transmit to the software labs in the US so they can be used to update the mission data files, adding another large volume data flow in both directions.
In addition, according to the OT&E FY 2014 report, 18,049 Joint Technical Data (JTD) modules have been developed for the aircraft, 3,123 for its engine and 1,775 for Supportable Low Observables; all are required for ALIS to operate as designed. While no information is available as to the data volumes involved, it seems logical to assume it is considerable.
The OT&E report mentions that “Maintenance downloads using the ground data receptacle … usually takes an hour, delaying access to maintenance information.†This is an indication of the data volume involved, especially as the upgraded ALIS runs on a standard Windows 7 operating system.
This was confirmed by Lt Gen Christopher Bogdan, the head of the F-35 Joint Program Office, in recent Congressional testimony.
“Currently, the pilot debrief timeline is too long as it takes approximately 1.5 hours to download a 1.5 hour flight. This is unacceptable and [we] are in the process of fielding an improved system [which] will decrease the timeline to download mission data by a factor of 8, meaning a 1.5 hour flight will be downloaded in about fifteen minutes,†he told the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Oct 21.
-ends-
The F-35 is entirely dependent on the ALIS system for its maintenance, and on US-based software laboratories for its mission data loads, so that its operation requires secure and high-speed Internet links between its operating bases and the US. (USAF photo)
I was crushed by Justin Trudeau’s election victory, but I agree with cancelling the Canadian F-35 purchase. The RCAF is probably going with Super Hornets instead.
>>The F-35 is entirely dependent on the ALIS system for its maintenance, and on US-based software laboratories for its mission data loads, so that its operation requires secure and high-speed Internet links between its operating bases and the US. (USAF photo) <<
No way can that be hacked! (/sarc)
More proof the flying anvil is useless.
I don’t understand why the Marines want this thing.
Where the hell are the Indian H1Bs who wrote the software?
Make them fix it!
I agree completely with this policy.
Right on, for once.
Now about the rest of the economy, elect Donald Trump to start with. :D
Reminds me of the new Battlestar Galactica, in which the Cylons destroyed the Colonial Fleet by hacking into its integrated network, which controlled most of the Battlestars and the late model Vipers, and shutting it all down.
They didn’t understand this when they bought them?
This article is BS.
They just want access to our secure software and sites
——the F-35 cannot operate unless it is logged into, and cleared by, ALIS.——
So, does ALIS have a lawyer check off box to permit the sortie?
Result?
The USMC was largely kept away from high value spec ops missions for years, which led to them finally giving up in 2005 and the creation of MARSOC and the entry of MARSOC into SOCOM. Unfortunately, the men from MARSOC came from the Force Recon teams, which were essentially raided, and it took years for Force Recon to build back it's numbers. More importantly, it is hard for them to keep numbers up. Think of it this way ...any mission involving Marines that is spec ops in nature can go to MARSOC or to Force Recon, and MARSOC will almost always get the first shot since it is part of SOCOM (together with the Green Berets, Navy SEALs and Airforce PJs), while Force Recon is now just a small independent outfit wholly operated by the USMC. MARSOC keeps getting the best from Force Recon.
Anyway, looking at the F 35, I doubt the USMC had much of a choice. They needed a new plane as the AV-8 Harriers are getting old (and the F-35 is more capable than they are), as are the F/A-18Cs, and apart from the F-35 there was no other option. Now, one can say that the SuperHornet can replace the legacy Hornets operated by the USMC, but there was no other replacement for the AV-8.
They didn't have much of a choice.
Understood. Go Raiders! :)
Which is what they should have done all along.
BS
I’d be willing to bet that there are a few spare cables laying around that are dark and not publicized. Even one fiber optic cable (of multiple strands) can carry _lots_ of information. It would really be a crap shoot for the Russians to hope that they would get enough of them to shut down the internet.
cite?
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