Is America pulling strings in Iran?

IRANIANS are once again taking to the streets to criticise their clerical rulers. On June 11th and 12th, thousands of people demonstrated in Tehran, the capital, in the biggest anti-establishment protests for several months. The ostensible reason for the unrest is anger at plans to privatise Iran’s colleges, though many of the protesters are frustrated by the slow pace of political and social reform. Police and Islamic militia groups prevented the demonstrators from approaching Tehran’s university buildings—the scene of violent protests four years ago—and the government gave warning that “illegal activities” would not be tolerated. By Friday June 13th, with thousands of riot police on the streets and many roads blocked, the number of demonstrators had fallen back to a few hundred.

Iran’s leaders are blaming America for their latest spot of bother. The Islamic nation’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who supervises the country from a pedestal of unaccountability, said Washington had been stirring up trouble and encouraging people to take to the streets. “Now America itself is openly saying it wants to create disorder inside Iran,” he said in a speech broadcast on state television. “Their solution is creating disputes among the nation and separating the nation from the system.” America is certainly doing nothing to discourage the unrest. The administration of George Bush views both Mr Khamenei and Muhammad Khatami, the twice-elected and reform-minded president, as defenders of a detested theocracy.

Some evidence supports this view. In February’s local elections, once-enthusiastic voters stayed away; in Tehran, a miserable 12 percent of the electorate cast a ballot. The reformist parliament that was elected in 2000 has been a failure. Deputies recently ratified two presidential bills designed to hobble unelected conservative institutions, only for the bills to be rejected by the most egregious of those institutions, a de facto upper house called the Council of Guardians. Women’s rights, press freedom, trial by jury: in all these areas, Mr Khatami’s supporters have enacted enlightened legislation, only for it to be vetoed—in the case of trial by jury, more than a dozen times.

Last month, a majority of reformist deputies addressed a remarkable letter to the supreme leader. They accused institutions under his purview of creating the impression that Iran cannot change. Mostly because of the deputies’ elliptical call for Mr Khamenei to step aside, newspapers were forbidden to print the letter, and the signatories are under pressure to withdraw their names. Thugs disrupt their speeches. The office of one was bombed. The conciliatory Mr Khatami vows to renegotiate the passage of the two blocked bills, one of which would make it hard for conservatives to stop reformists standing in the next parliamentary elections, in 2004. Few expect him to succeed.

In spite of these setbacks for reform, the European Union wants to engage with Iran and is negotiating a trade and co-operation agreement. Unengaged Americans are less patient. Since he was elected, Mr Bush has resisted detente in favour of co-operation on specific issues. Iranian special forces helped the Northern Alliance during the war in Afghanistan and gave America useful intelligence. Iran’s role in Afghanistan’s political reconstitution was mostly constructive. Last year, Iran encouraged an Iraqi group it influences, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), to team up with other groups that were being organised by America into an opposition to Saddam Hussein. During the war, the Iranians turned a blind eye to American violations of their airspace and coastal waters.

But America identifies a deeper pattern of transgression. At the beginning of 2002, Iran was caught shipping arms to the Palestinians. Al Qeada agents in Iran may have had a hand in last month’s lethal bombings in Riyadh. In Iraq, the Americans have detained SCIRI operatives on suspicion of attacking American forces. Most damaging of all, on June 6th, Iran’s improbable claim that it does not seek nuclear weapons was further undermined by leaks from a UN report asserting that it had withheld sensitive information.

Few of these misdeeds had much to do with Mr Khatami; a few, in fact, may not be misdeeds at all. The president apparently knew nothing about the cache of arms before Israel intercepted it. (Hardliners, who control a panoply of military and intelligence organisations, were almost certainly responsible.) Even now, there is disagreement about what kind of support to give Islamic rejectionist groups. According to one well-travelled parliamentarian, the fall of Saddam Hussein has restricted Iran’s ability to ship arms, destined for rejectionists, across Iraq to Syria. According to a knowledgeable western official, there is no evidence of Iranian collusion with suspected Al Qeada members.

When it comes to Iran’s nuclear programme, however, outside worries are more warranted. Nuclear development is one of the few issues on which Iranians on both sides of the political divide agree. They have come to regard their ambiguous nuclear status as a protective cloak, especially since Mr Bush included Iran in his axis of evil. Many Iranians are convinced that Mr Bush is determined to topple the Islamic Republic. But Iranian fatalism with regard to the president’s intentions may be premature. The Bush administration, for want of a consensus within it, gives every impression of having deferred a decision on what sort of policy to have towards Iran.

The administration clearly wants the Iranian regime to change. But for some in Washington’s right-wing think-tanks, and for elements in the Pentagon, this is not enough. They believe that the Iranian regime must be changed. Indeed, they say, evidence against Iran on the nuclear question and terrorism is stronger than the evidence that was used against Saddam.

If this argument is to be acted on, it makes sense to identify Iranian opposition figures capable of putting the case for regime change and willing to help achieve it. But the difficulty of this has been highlighted by suggestions that the Pentagon wants to use the People’s Mujahideen, an armed Iranian opposition group based in Iraq, as an Afghan-style Northern Alliance.

A front for the Mujahideen, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, has been a useful conduit for embarrassingly accurate revelations, thought to have been collected by western intelligence agencies, about Iran’s nuclear programme. The Mujahideen’s military forces are trained and used to be well armed—their heavy weapons are now in the possession of American forces in Iraq. For the moment, however, they make unsuitable partners. The State Department considers them terrorists. Their leader, Massoud Rajavi, has strange ideas about the cult of personality (his own). In Iran, their association with Saddam, who provoked the terrible Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, will not easily be forgiven.

Most Iranians have little time for a second candidate to lead the opposition, Reza Pahlavi. The son of the former shah is American in manners—he lives in Virginia—and a professed democrat. Back home, however, he has an image problem. His father ran a state that was decidedly less democratic than Mr Khamenei’s. The people who ousted Pahlavi père, even if they regret what arose in his place, are unlikely to welcome Pahlavi fils.

The main reason for the dearth of attractive leaders outside Iran is their abundance inside it. Many, even if they acknowledge the failure of Mr Khatami’s movement, describe themselves as reformists and lean towards a version of democracy that the Bush administration would endorse. To the frustration of expatriates living in America, few of them are inclined to use violent methods, or to lay down their lives, to end the stalemate. In this, they typify the vast majority of Iranians. —Economist

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:

"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on

IRAN

Iran is vigorously pursuing programs to produce indigenous WMD—nuclear, chemical, and biological—and their delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, it seeks foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how that have enabled it to produce some complete weapon systems, with their means of delivery, and components of other weapons. During the reporting period, Iran focused particularly on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe.

Despite Iran's status in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran has sought assorted foreign fissile materials and technology. Such capabilities also can support fissile material production for Tehran's overall nuclear weapons program.

Despite Bushehr being put under IAEA safeguards, Russia's provision of expertise and manufacturing assistance has enabled Iran to develop its nuclear technology infrastructure—which, in turn, can benefit directly Tehran's nuclear weapons R&D program. In addition, Russian entities continued associations with Iranian research centers on other nuclear fuel-cycle activities.

Iran has attempted to use its civilian nuclear energy program, which is quite modest in scope, to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel—cycle capabilities. Such capabilities, however, are well suited to support fissile material production for a weapons program, and we believe it is this objective that drives Iran's efforts to acquire relevant facilities. For example, Iran has sought to obtain turnkey facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility (UCF), that ostensibly would be used to support fuel production for the Bushehr power plant. But the UCF could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material production needed for a nuclear weapon—specifically, production of uranium hexafluoride for use as a feedstock for uranium enrichment operations and production of uranium compounds suitable for use as fuel in a plutonium production reactor. In addition, we suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and technology for weapons development as part of its overall nuclear weapons program.

Facing economic pressures, some Russian entities have shown a willingness to provide assistance to Iran's nuclear projects by circumventing their country's export laws. Enforcement of export control laws has been inconsistent and ineffective, but the US Government continues to engage the Russian Government in a cooperative export control dialogue. For example, an institute subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) had agreed to deliver in late 2000 equipment that was clearly intended for atomic vapor laser isotope separation, a technology capable of producing weapons-grade uranium. As a result of US protests the Russian Government halted the delivery of some of this equipment to Iran, and as of the end of the reporting period, these shipments remained suspended.

China is completing assistance on two Iranian nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that will enable Iran to produce cladding for reactor fuel.[1] As a party to the NPT, Iran is required to accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear material. The IAEA's Additional Protocol requires states to declare production of zirconium fuel cladding and gives the IAEA the right of access to resolve questions or inconsistencies related to the declarations, but Iran has made no moves to bring the Additional Protocol into force. Zirconium production, other than production of fuel cladding, is not subject to declaration or inspection.

Ballistic missile–related cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the reporting period has included equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran, already producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). In addition, Iran publicly has acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, is a more capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran's Defense Minister has also publicly mentioned a "Shahab-5." Such statements strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability.

Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from entities in Russia and China that could further efforts at achieving an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously has manufactured. It probably also has made some nerve agents.

Foreign dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise, primarily, but not exclusively, from entities in Russia and Eastern Europe, continued to feature prominently in Iran's procurement efforts. Such materials have legitimate uses, but Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could benefit from them.

Iran continues to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Since Russia announced in November 2000 that it was abrogating the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, the Russian and Iranian Governments and firms have engaged in high-level discussions on a wide variety of military services and equipment — including air defense, naval, air and ground weapons, and technologies. In October 2001, Tehran and Moscow signed a new military-technical cooperation agreement, which laid the groundwork for negotiations and created a commission for future arms sales, but did not itself include sales contracts.

Contract negotiations, which can take years to complete, continued in the following months but only one sale—apparently for helicopters—was concluded. Various Russian officials and academicians have suggested that sales under this new agreement could, in the next few years, make Iran Russia's third-largest arms customer, after China and India. Until that agreement is concluded, Russia will continue to deliver on existing contracts, but few new weapons contracts are likely to be completed. Iran and Russia have agreed on the transfer of additional Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-171 transport helicopters. Estimates of conventional arms sales to Iran of $300 million per year would put Iran's share of Russian sales worldwide at roughly 10 percent, compared to more than 50 percent going to China and India.

To facilitate new arms agreements, Russian oil enterprises entered an agreement with the Russian state arms trading firm Rosoboronexport to promote arms exports. Russian and Iranian arms dealers are to include such firms as Lukoil to coordinate "commercial conditions" and participate in projects proposed by the customer.

Outside the Russian market, Iran's search for conventional weapons is global and continues to meet with results. In particular, Iran capitalizes on the specialized weapons services and lower prices China and North Korea have to offer. Elsewhere, Iran seeks out products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, that are superior in quality to those available from Russia or that have proven difficult to acquire through normal government channels.

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and

(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."

At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.

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