… and the Privateer Option against al Qaeda (Let Loose the Dogs of War)

Roaming the oceans of the world, ranging in size from a small freighter to several of the largest container ships afloat, 20 to 30 vessels owned or controlled by Osama bin Laden are plying the world's trade routes, biding their time, waiting for the right moment.

Sailing under flags of convenience, these ships move men and materials from port to port, distributing al Qaeda resources to where they are needed next. By flying the flag of Tonga, Panama, Liberia, Cyprus or the Bahamas, these ships benefit not only from lower registration costs, reduced taxes and virtually non-existent safety and labor regulations, they are entirely exempt from international regulation and scrutiny.

This practice of registering ships in regulation-free Third-World countries has created a gaping hole in maritime accountability. The lure of flags of convenience - "open registries" in the parlance of maritime insurers - has devastated the merchant fleets of the First World.

The open registries result in ships with substandard equipment and navigation so that accidents are routine. In 1996, of the nearly 30 ships lost at sea worldwide, 22 were flying flags of convenience. The lax regulations "governing" these ships generally do not require crews from the "host" countries. So when a Tonga ship with a Ukrainian crew turns up missing, who cares?

Or when a Liberian ship crewed by mid-Eastern types disappears at sea, and another Bahamian registered ship crewed by these same mid-Eastern types appears with a newly painted name on its stern, nobody notices. Two open-registry ships meet at sea and transfer parts of their unregistered cargo, but nobody knows because they are not on anybody's radar screen.

The Europeans have adopted stringent new regulations that effectively bar open-registry tankers from European ports. This was in response to the oil spill off Spain last month. But it doesn't address the vast majority of vessels flying flags of convenience, the ones that don't carry oil, but do carry other things, nearly all of which are not accounted for anywhere.

And it especially doesn't address those vessels owned or controlled by bin Laden and his cronies.

The Europeans have taken a step in the right direction, but it is small and entirely ineffective when it comes to stopping international terrorism. Unfortunately, the United States hasn't even gone this far. For example, in 2001, 97 percent of cargo entering the United States arrived on foreign vessels, most of them flying flags of convenience.

There is good reason to believe that Saddam Hussein has already built several nuclear devices (see "A Nuclear-Armed Iraq Must Be the Next Target," DefenseWatch, Dec. 12, 2001). If this is true, it is entirely possible that one or more of these devices could have ended up inside a container on one of bin Laden's open registry vessels.

Iraq and Al Qaeda have both stockpiled biological agents in apparently large quantities. These are easy to conceal and transport, especially in unregulated, unwatched vessels on the high seas.

We have no effective legal means of policing these ships until they actually dock at a U.S. port. By then, it will be too late - if the ship is carrying a dirty nuke or a biological weapon.

Without specific information, U.S. Navy ships cannot stop and board vessels in international waters. Since there is no central registry, no uniform way of keeping track of these vessels, there is no way to track shipments, especially when the shippers are trying to keep their cargos secret.

We can pass laws that prohibit imports on any but U.S.-flagged ships, but it is unlikely. We can pass laws that allow boarding and inspection of vessels long before they arrive at our ports, but we won't.

Fortunately, we have another option, one that has a long history of high-level effectiveness.

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress with the right to grant "Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which is to say that Congress has the power to commission private vessels as privateers - pirates fighting for a cause.

Privateering evolved from a method of restitution for ship owners from one country who had been wronged by a citizen of another. Bonded Privateers boarded ships from the wrongdoers' country and brought them to a friendly port. There a neutral admiralty court determined whether or not the seizure was just. Unjust seizures forfeited the privateers' bond to the owners of the seized ship.

Ship and cargo of a just seizure were sold at auction. The privateer's owners and all volunteer crews received most of the proceeds. Investors viewed these venture as high risk, high pay investments.

During the Revolutionary War, 800 privateers commissioned by the U.S. Congress played an instrumental role in our ultimate victory - private ships with the power to stop and board vessels anywhere in the world; private ships not subject to the kind of strict rules of engagement that control Navy warships. The British lost a total of 2,266 vessels between 1793 and 1797, due primarily to French Privateers.

During the War of 1812, Congress commissioned 526 privateers, who captured or sank 1,750 British vessels, significantly affecting England's second defeat by the Americans.

Earlier, French privateers captured 3,384 English or Dutch merchant ships and 162 warships during the War of the League of Augsburg, from 1689 to 1697.

But as governments gained greater control over their countries and their militaries, the role of privateers disappeared. Their cost-effectiveness and tremendous success posed a significant threat to the naval officers of every major nation. Private ships of war had become unwelcome players in the game.

Today we face a new threat, one that is not amenable to control by conventional means, by navies and their warships. Private warships, however, operating under official Letters of Marque and Reprisal can play an effective role in our war against terrorism.

Edward Lozzi, a resident of Beverly Hills, Cal., has formed a group of well-heeled businessmen who intend to put up $1 billion, payable to any person or group that successfully captures or kills Osama bin Laden and his governing group. Couple this reward with the potential riches to be gained from successful capture of the 20 to 30 vessels controlled by bin Laden, and you create a very powerful incentive for 21st-century privateers to topple terrorism wherever it exists.

Thomas Jefferson once said, "Every possible encouragement should be given to privateering in time of war."

Robert G. Williscroft is a DefenseWatch Senior Editor. He can be reached at dwnavyeditor@argee.net.

Well, let's not be stingy with only a link you peg leg.

Here's the article (privateered, of course)

September 30, 2001
Let Privateers Troll for Bin Laden
Larry J. Sechrest*

In the wake of the Sept. 11th attacks, a group of American businessmen has decided to enlist the profit motive to bring the perpetrators to justice. Headed by Edward Lozzi of Beverly Hills, California, the group intends to offer a bounty of $1 billion—that’s billion with a “b”—to any private citizens who will capture Osama bin Laden and his associates, dead or alive.

Paying private citizens to achieve military objectives seems novel but is hardly untried. Recall Ross Perot’s successful use of private forces to retrieve his employees from the clutches of fundamentalist Muslims in Iran in 1979.

We are all familiar with bail bondsmen, who employ bounty hunters to catch bail-jumping fugitives. Less familiar are two U.S. companies, Military Professional Resources Inc. and Vinnell Corporation, which provide military services to governments and other organizations worldwide.

Historically, private citizens arming private ships, appropriately called “privateers,” played an important role in the American Revolution. Eight hundred privateers aided the seceding colonists’ cause, while the British employed 700, despite having a huge government navy.

During the War of 1812, 526 American vessels were commissioned as privateers. This was not piracy, because the privateers were licensed by their own governments and the ships were bonded to ensure that their captains followed the accepted laws of the sea, including the humane treatment of those who were taken prisoner. Congress granted privateers “letters of marque and reprisal,” under the authority of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.

Originally, privateering was a method of restitution for merchants or shipowners who had been wronged by a citizen of a foreign country. Privateers captured the ships flying the flag of the wrongdoers’ nation and sailed them to a friendly port, where a neutral admiralty court decided whether the seizure was just. Wrongful seizures resulted in the forfeiture of the privateers’ bond to the owners of the seized ship

If the seizure was just, the ship and cargo were sold at auction, with the bulk of the proceeds going to the privateer's owners and crew. The crews were volunteers who shared in the profits, and the investors viewed the venture as remunerative—albeit risky.

Privateering soon evolved into a potent means of warfare. Self-interest encouraged privateers to capture as many enemy ships as possible, and to do it quickly. Were privateers successful in inflicting serious losses on the enemy? Emphatically, yes. Between 1793 and 1797, the British lost 2,266 vessels, the majority taken by French privateers.

During the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697) French privateers captured 3,384 English or Dutch merchant ships and 162 warships, and during the War of 1812, 1,750 British ships were subdued or destroyed by American privateers. Those American privateers struck so much fear in Britain that Lloyd’s of London ceased offering maritime insurance except at ruinously high premiums. No wonder Thomas Jefferson said, “Every possible encouragement should be given to privateering in time of war.”

If privateering was so successful, why has it disappeared? Precisely because it worked so well. Government naval officers resented the competitive advantage privateers possessed, and powerful nations with large government navies did not want to be challenged on the seas by smaller nations that opted for the less-costly alternative -- private ships of war.

In sum, the armed forces of the U.S. government are not the only option for President Bush to defeat bin Laden, his al Qaeda network, and “every terrorist group with a global reach.” The U.S. military is not necessarily even the best option.

Let’s bring back the spirit of the privateers. By letting profits and justice once more go hand-in-hand, victims and their champions can have an abundance of both, rather than a paucity of either.

Additional articles on “The War on Terrorism” and “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”

* Larry J. Sechrest is a research fellow at The Independent Institute in Oakland, California, and a professor of economics at Sul Ross State University. He is the author of the Independent Institute Working Paper, Privateering and National Defense, and a contributing author to the forthcoming book, The Myth of National Defense (Ludwig von Mises Institute).

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Lyrics:

BARRETT'S PRIVATEERS
by Stan Rogers
Oh, the year was 1778, HOW I WISH I WAS IN SHERBROOKE NOW!
A letter of marque come from the king,
To the scummiest vessel I'd ever seen,
CHORUS:
God damn them all!
I was told we'd cruise the seas for American gold
We'd fire no guns-shed no tears
Now I'm a broken man on a Halifax pier
The last of Barrett's Privateers.
Oh, Elcid Barrett cried the town, HOW I WISH I WAS . . .
For twenty brave men all fishermen who
would make for him the Antelope's crew
(chorus)
The Antelope sloop was a sickening sight,
She'd a list to the port and and her sails in rags
And the cook in scuppers with the staggers and the jags
(chorus)
On the King's birthday we put to sea,
We were 91 days to Montego Bay
Pumping like madmen all the way
(chorus)
On the 96th day we sailed again,
When a bloody great Yankee hove in sight
With our cracked four pounders we made to fight
(chorus)
The Yankee lay low down with gold,
She was broad and fat and loose in the stays
But to catch her took the Antelope two whole days
(chorus)
Then at length we stood two cables away,
Our cracked four pounders made an awful din
But with one fat ball the Yank stove us in
(chorus)
The Antelope shook and pitched on her side,
Barrett was smashed like a bowl of eggs
And the Maintruck carried off both me legs
(chorus)
So here I lay in my 23rd year,
It's been 6 years since we sailed away
And I just made Halifax yesterday
(chorus)
Extracted from /pub/music/lyrics/files/misc.folk/songs.txt
by Doug Henkle "henkle@vaxa.cis.uwosh.edu"

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