Posted on 12/07/2010 7:43:52 AM PST by sukhoi-30mki
Time to Split the Baby
A solution to the Air Force’s tanker woes.
John Noonan
December 13, 2010, Vol. 16, No. 13
Few defense acquisition tales have been as sordid as that of the U.S. Air Force’s new refueling tanker, the KC-X. The tanker acquisition program first popped up on the national radar screen in 2001, when Senator John McCain called into question a no-bid contract that would have leased modified Boeing 767s to the Air Force instead of purchasing a new tanker outright. An ensuing corruption scandal marred the leasing deal beyond recognition. In the years since, the issue has been punted by both the Pentagon and Congress to new administrations and new budgets, tangled up by defense contractors’ waffling between new bids, no bids, and retracted bids, and unnecessarily delayed by elected officials’ squabbling over jobs and pork.
The need for a new tanker aircraft is pressing. The backbone of the aerial refueler fleet, the KC-135, was initially fielded in the 1950s. Though heavy modifications have managed to keep the plane flying into its sixth decade of service, corrosion and age have inflated maintenance costs to troublesome levels. The tanker fleet was originally designed to support Strategic Air Command’s storied bomber force, giving long range B-52s the legs to hit targets deep inside the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War and the rise of America’s new role as chief custodian of global stability, the refueler armada has been tasked with a much broader mission.
America projects military power through two key avenues—air and sea. Tankers provide a capability similar to that of aircraft carriers, in that they provide our fighters and bombers the range to penetrate enemy airspace and return. Refuelers allowed B-2 bombers to strike targets in the Middle East from their home base in Missouri and fighter aircraft to loiter indefinitely over hostile territory in Afghanistan. They transport troops and cargo as well as fuel, serving as some of the most versatile assets in the Pentagon’s inventory.
So it is astonishing that it has taken Congress so long to replace a tool critical to America’s far-reaching global responsibilities. Since the 2001 scandal, the fight to replace the aging tanker fleet has grown uglier. After the corruption investigation resulted in indictments for several senior company officials, Boeing reinvented itself, returning to the tanker fight in the mid-2000s with a snazzy new bid. By this time, an alliance of Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense & Space Company (EADS) had submitted a bid of their own, ultimately upsetting the heavily favored Boeing to win the KC-X contract in 2008. Boeing protested through the Government Accounting Office, a political bar fight erupted, Northrop Grumman withdrew its bid, forcing EADS to go it alone, and two years later the Air Force is still without its long overdue replacement tanker.
Both proposed aircraft, the KC-30 built on an Airbus model by Northrop-EADS and the KC-767 constructed by Boeing, have a fair claim to the contract. The KC-30 is a larger jet and can carry 20 percent more fuel, 20 percent more passengers, and 30 percent more cargo than its Boeing counterpart. In short, it’s a more capable aircraft. Further, the Boeing 767 is at the end of its service life. That makes it a somewhat dubious replacement given that the KC-X is intended to fly for the next 40 years.
But the Boeing plane has a strong appeal to those in Congress who are interested in both creating jobs and saving money. Their economic argument is powerful. Innovations in refueling technology allow for the 767 to transfer gas more efficiently, and—being the smaller of the two planes—it consumes less fuel than the EADS bird. Smaller size, says Boeing, is an advantage in that it allows more planes to cram into the crowded flight lines on U.S. bases in Asia. And independent studies have found that the KC-767 would be 20 to 25 percent cheaper to own and operate than the Airbus model. Further, Boeing is an American company and the creator of the KC-135, which has proven to be a fantastic aircraft that has lasted far beyond initial projections. Selection of Boeing’s model means that the tanker fleet’s maintenance and logistical jobs would stay in the States instead of being exported to France. These dueling claims, coupled with an uneven developmental history, have turned the KC-X debate into the Gordian Knot of the defense acquisition world.
Fortunately, there is a way to cut that knot. The Air Force tanker force structure is currently an 80/20 split between “big and little” tankers—80 percent little (the KC-135) and 20 percent big (the KC-10 Extender). This strategy was laid out in a time when the KC-10 was still relatively new. Now that jet is creeping up on its fourth decade of service and is beginning to show its age.
With Airbus and Boeing producing capable aircraft with unique advantages, Congress could split the baby with a 50/50 buy from Airbus and Boeing, replacing both the KC-10 and the KC-135. It should also be noted that the Air Force rejected a mixed-fleet replacement for the KC-135 in 2007, claiming that it would unnecessarily inflate costs. But that math is fuzzy and didn’t factor in replacing the KC‑10 as well. With a budget to buy 15 airframes a year, splitting the fleet would force strong competition between Boeing and Airbus to control construction and sustainment costs.
One fact that has emerged from the gnarly world of defense acquisition is that competition is a proven cost-control mechanism. The so-called F-16 “engine wars” during the 1980s ended up saving the Pentagon billions, as did comparable fights over cruise missile and Navy systems contracts. As the KC-X program is projected to last 40 years, allowing for either EADS or Boeing to have a monopoly on logistics, maintenance, and refurbishment, contracts could significantly inflate both the ownership and operation price tag.
Further, this approach makes the most sense from a capabilities standpoint. In 2008, the entire fleet of C‑model F-15s was grounded owing to a structural flaw. As a result, Canada’s limited inventory of CF-18 interceptors had to take over a significant portion of the North American air defense mission. A similar flaw in the new tanker, should we hold ourselves to a single model, could be catastrophic. F‑15Cs have a sole mission: air interdiction. The KC-X will have many. The effects of a grounding would be felt throughout the entire military, and it would instantly reduce the combat capability of the rest of the Air Force fleet, hamper our capacity to transport men and materials to overseas stations, and also restrict the range of Navy and Marine aircraft that rely on Air Force refuelers. Pragmatic redundancy in the military world is never a bad thing; indeed, it is one of the guiding principles of modern warfare.
Given the deep complexities of the KC-X fight, there is no silver bullet here. But both Congress and the Pentagon should be careful to keep the interests of our fighting men and women at the forefront of this debate. A hybrid fleet of Airbus and Boeing planes provides the best solution to a tough problem, both from a cost perspective and—more important—from a capabilities standpoint.
In the end, the real enemy is further dallying. The Air Force needed this jet a decade ago; the longer we wait, the more the overall buy will cost. Crafting a strong, annual competition between Boeing and EADS, replacing both the KC-135 and the KC-10, and swiftly standing up squadrons of new tankers should be a top priority of the new Congress.
John Noonan is a policy adviser at the Foreign Policy Initiative.
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Makes too much sense. Thus it cannot be allowed to happen.
Ok I have a question...Why if we originally built KC-135s and KC-10s why can’t we just use those molds and make some more. I mean if the United States Taxpayer paid for these airplanes once why can’t we do it again...I mean we do own these molds...don’t we?
I am all for a split buy if they double the procurement budget. The KC-X contract calls for 15 aircraft per year, way too slow.
15 KC-767s and 15 KC-45s would be a nice pace, and easily funded with unspent TARP money.
nice thought, but with very few exceptions, aircraft are not made from “molds” but I think you may have hit on an idea there.
Only a small difference in load, not enough to split the fleet, however there is a huge difference in quality and reliability. The Boeing product is far superior to Airbus.
The Airbus would be sitting on the ramp broke, waiting for parts. It’s an over engineered, overpriced piece of junk, a throw away a/c that breaks up into tiny little pieces.
The Boeing… a 767 is proven, with much higher reliability and lower maintenance cost. Just make sure to hang Pratts on it.
For the military there is but one intelligent choice… Boeing 767 / Pratts
I'm sure that Chevrolet owns the molds for '55 Bel-Aires, but they're not going to simply just crank out more whenever they feel like it.
KC-135s haven't been built since the 1960s. KC-10s the 1980s.
This KC-X competition was supposed to take an off-the-shelf airliner airframe and modify it for the tanker role, which in theory should have been much easier, cheaper, and faster than trying to restart production on a 50 year old airframe.
Unfortunately, whenever the Pentagon buys a new something, they go overboard with the "it's also gotta have..."-itis, cramming so much new technology into the airframe that it takes years to figure it all out.
If all you want is a simple tanker, both the KC-767 and the KC-30 are ready today. If you want a boom that must deliver x amount more fuel then the existing models, then we get this long drawn out competition that is in its third iteration.
So why did the USAF select the Airbus product in 2008???
Someone with more background than I should weigh in regarding the specs of the KC-10, KC-135 and KC-X, but I suspect that in the design universe of payload-speed-range, the KC-X is asking for more than either of the previous designs could deliver. I'm good with that concept. The USAF should have the best idea of what kind of tanker they need in the 21st century.
The bigger problem is twofold. First, USAF has totally screwed the pooch in its attempts to award a contract. I've seen it done badly any number of times, but I've never seen it done this badly and this consistently for a given procurement. Second, this ENTIRE procurement is about politics and lying to the American people. The morning drive in the DC area is an amazing experience. In addition to the madness on the highways, we get radio ads for government procurement. Computer services, ships, and aircraft are hawked like they were just the most normal thing to be spending your money on, don't you know. Lately, the Boeing ads have been incredible half-truths and apples v. bananas comparisons between their design and the EADS plane. Whether the subject is the percentage of American content, whether Americans or foreigners will be building the plane, or any other topic - the fact that Boeing is now a Chicago-based company is pretty obvious. About the only thing they haven't done is to publicly threaten to kneecap someone. As an example (and I don't have the current figures), most Americans are probably not aware that in the original proposals the EADS plane would have had more American content and American labor hours than the Boeing plane, and OBTW, it carried more fuel to dispense to its fighter-customers.
Why buy new tankers when you can spend the billions on extended unemployment benefits instead? It just doesn’t make any sense! /s/
Unfair decision where major mistakes were made in the selection process.
Additionally, please read why we are now headed to that same unfair decision (again):
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/tanker-wars—why-boeing-is-losing?a=1&c=1171
Senior executives at Boeing have grown pessimistic about their prospects for prevailing in the latest Air Force tanker competition. Their counterparts at competitors EADS — the parent company of Airbus — are correspondingly confident. This is surprising, because the Boeing entry in the competition has much lower life-cycle costs than the bigger EADS entry, while still carrying much more fuel than the plane it would replace. Many observers thought that when Northrop Grumman dropped out of the tanker competition and EADS had to go it along, the European company would be hobbled in competing against Boeing. So what went wrong for Boeing?
The biggest thing that went wrong was that the Air Force chose to ignore a ruling by the world's preeminent trade body that Airbus has engaged in a 40-year pattern of predatory business practices to expand its share of the commercial transport market. The reason this matters is that the two rivals are both offering modified airliners in their tanker proposals, and the Airbus entry was built using $5.7 billion in illegal subsidies. By failing to take that finding into account, the Air Force has enabled Airbus to price its plane more aggressively than any purely commercial company could, leveling what otherwise would have been a huge disparity in the acquisition cost of the two planes.
A second and related factor is that the Air Force has calculated the post-production life-cycle cost of the Airbus plane using assumptions that tend to minimize the higher cost of operating a bigger plane. Because the EADS entry has 40 more feet of wingspan than the Boeing plane and corresponding greater weight, it burns over a ton more fuel per flight hour. Its dimensions are so much bigger than those of the Eisenhower-era tankers being replaced that the Air Force will need to modify hangars and other ground infrastructure to accommodate the EADS plane. But Boeing's team is convinced the Air Force has failed to capture the full life-cycle burden of fuel and construction for the bigger plane, and thus made the Airbus transport look more affordable than it really is.
A third factor is the calculation of warfighting effectiveness ratings — the metrics which the Air Force inadvertently released to the wrong teams last month. As in the first round of competition, the complex warfighting model used to calculate effectiveness in stressing wartime scenarios continues to favor the larger Airbus plane due to its greater fuel-carrying capacity. But what many outside observers have failed to note is that the success of the EADS entry in that comparison is tied directly to the fact that its planes were allowed to access bases denied to the Boeing planes. The Airbus tanker literally cannot complete the specified missions without access to those bases, and yet Boeing was not allowed access in the modeling of comparative wartime performance.
A fourth factor weighing against Boeing in the comparisons is a pattern of allowances made for the EADS entry that amounted to bending the rules to keep its proposal viable. First, the Air Force delayed the deadline for the EADS proposal. Second, it allowed EADS to respond late to engineering inquiries from evaluators. Third, it deleted a performance requirement concerning secure communications from the solicitation because EADS could not meet it. Fourth, it waived duties on the importation of certain key parts required in the EADS plane. Finally, it sought to minimize EADS wrongdoing in viewing competition-sensitive information that Boeing did not view. Cumulatively, these various instances can be construed as a pattern of bias favoring the European team.
Boeing has not concluded from all this that the tanker competition is irretrievably lost, but I have. When the customer allows a team to bid below cost by leveraging illegal subsidies, understates operational cost differences, permits only one team to access key bases in warfighting models, and repeatedly bends rules in favor a particular side, the outcome is obvious. The question is what Boeing intends to do about it.
Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D.
Ditto! Remember this goes back well over 10 years. The USAF almost had Boeing continuing the 767 line for this and other platforms (including a Joint STARS/AWACS variant), but the entire effort started over after the scandal with that female General. She went to jail if I am not mistaken. I was OK with the competition for the KC-X until Northrop Grumman dropped out. Now it has to be Boeing, IMHO.
More jobs with an Airbus ?
More jobs for military mechanics. The dispatch rate is horrible, will sit broken out in the cold, and won’t fit in our hangars. It’s a piece of crap.
The Boeing 767 is a perfect choice.
Do you have a dog in this fight?
Goofy, only our government would by a car too big to fit in the garage.
Goofy, only our government would by a car too big to fit in the garage.
Goofy, only our government would buy a car too big to fit in the garage.
Little Tommy "Tax Cheat" Daschle's wife Linda was a paid Boeing lobbyist for the over priced leased 767s deal, iirc.
Nope, just 28 years of experience
Just hoping they purchase ‘the best tool for the job’
The Boeing 767 is a far superior product. Newer design doesn’t mean it’s better.
The Airbus was built for the airlines to save fuel cost. It’s too lightweight for military purposes.
It has all the bells and whisles but in the end will sit broke when the 767 keeps on truckin’
KISS’
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