Posted on 02/26/2009 7:52:23 PM PST by Pharmboy
One of the most oft-repeated mantras about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that there is no military solution; the only solution is to talk with our enemies. This mantra also has a popular corollary: Because we must ultimately negotiate with the Palestinians, decisive military action is counterproductive - it merely sows hatred that makes the inevitable dialogue that much harder.
It is ironic that the leading proponents of these theories are Jews and Europeans - two groups well acquainted with the obvious counterexample: The Allies never negotiated with the Nazis either during or after World War II; they destroyed Nazi Germany and executed its leaders. The same went for Tojo's Japan.
But World War II was a state-to-state conflict fought by regular armies; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not. And many people deem that difference crucial. That why I found David McCullough's history of an earlier nonstate conflict, America's War of Independence, so illuminating.
McCullough's 1776 describes the war's first year, when America's Continental Army was a ragtag collection of men with almost no military training or discipline, few uniforms, only the most basic weapons and insufficient ammunition for them. George Washington recognized that given this reality, frontal combat with the well-trained, well-equipped British army would be suicidal, so he essentially conducted a guerrilla war: lightning strikes followed by swift retreats rather than capturing and holding territory.
What was noteworthy, however, was Britain's attitude toward the war. The British commanders, Admiral Richard Howe and General William Howe, believed that their goal was not to defeat Washington's army, but to promote reconciliation with the American colonies. They even worried that killing too many American soldiers might foment hatred that would impede reconciliation. Hence at several critical junctures during that first year, the British army failed to exploit opportunities to destroy Washington's forces, preferring instead to dialogue.
IN SEPTEMBER 1776, for instance, the British had completely routed American forces on Long Island, forcing the battered remnants to retreat to indefensible positions in New York City. But instead of pursuing and wiping out the Continental Army, Richard Howe decided this was the perfect opportunity for peace talks.
The peace conference achieved nothing for Britain, McCullough noted, but it did buy Washington time to regroup: "The British had suspended operations during what could have been a golden opportunity to attack, as one perfect, late-summer day followed another." Eventually, the British did chase the Americans from New York and then New Jersey. But at numerous points along the way, when a final push could have destroyed Washington's army, William Howe held back, because he did not see defeating the army as his goal. He simply wanted "to keep the Americans on the run," McCullough wrote, in the hope that chasing them out of more and more territory "would bring the deluded American people and their political leaders to their senses and end their demonstrably futile rebellion."
You can hear Howe echoing down the ages in Israeli leaders who explain that the goal is not to "defeat" the Palestinians, but to "sear their consciousness" and make them understand that dialogue is preferable to terror.
ULTIMATELY, HOWE'S STRATEGY gave Washington time to achieve two militarily insignificant but morale-boosting victories, in Princeton and Trenton, at the tail end of that year. That was critical, because the American soldiers' enlistments all expired on December 31, 1776. It was these victories that convinced them to keep fighting rather than quit, as thousands of deserters had done during the months when the war looked hopeless. And that preserved the army to fight another day.
Moreover, as the war dragged on without Britain achieving decisive victory, its European enemies, who had initially sat on the fence, decided that helping the Americans made sense. First came desperately needed financial aid from both France and Holland, and then assistance from the French navy, without which the final defeat of British forces at Yorktown in 1781 would have been impossible.
In 1776, the British could have ended the revolution. But they wasted numerous opportunities to decisively defeat the Continental Army, and that army, as McCullough noted, was "the key to victory." Thus what should have been an easy win over the American "rabble" became a humiliating defeat - not because Britain could not have won, but because it repeatedly chose not to, since its goal was not victory but dialogue and reconciliation.
The crucial point that Britain failed to understand was that dialogue was not possible without first achieving victory, because the Americans had no interest in dialogue as long as they had any hope of achieving victory themselves. Hence at the September peace talks, American envoys refused to discuss anything except full independence - which, of course, was unacceptable to Britain.
THE PARALLELS to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are obvious. Over and over, our leaders have refrained from seeking a decisive defeat of hostile Palestinian forces, either because they themselves believed it would undermine the ultimate goal of reconciliation, or because the world believed it, and pressured us to comply. This began with the First Lebanon War in 1982, when we had a chance to wipe out the entire PLO leadership but instead let it escape to Tunis due to American pressure. And it continued right through the recent Gaza operation, when the IDF was ordered to stop well short of destroying Hamas forces.
But by refusing to seek victory, Israel has also effectively prevented dialogue - because as long as Palestinians believe that they have a chance of achieving victory, meaning the eradication of the Jewish state, dialogue and reconciliation will be impossible. That is why even the "moderate" Mahmoud Abbas refuses to concede the "right of return," a euphemism for destroying the Jewish state demographically by flooding it with millions of Palestinian refugees and their descendants.
Hence if this country, or the world, truly wants an Israeli-Palestinian peace, the necessary first step is not negotiation, but victory - because, as America's history shows, only decisive victory by one side can convince the other to concede its own dreams of victory. And until the Palestinians concede their dreams of destroying the Jewish state, no compromise will be possible.
This writer for the JP obviously does.
Speak truth to Evil. But they seldom relent.
Then Evil must be destroyed.
Ultimately it will be. You and I may not see it, but it will be in the end.
Not a revwar ping...
I’m curious how the author would define “victory” in this context.
Hamas isn’t the Third Reich. While I realize there are parallels, there are also huge differences.
Since the 1967 War, one of the most stunning military events of history, didn’t result in a permanent Israeli victory, I’m curious what military action could.
I think we both do...see it, that is.
The Israelis have tried to trade land for peace to no end. So what is the answer? Or perhaps there is none...other than the Israelis' perseverance.
Ultimately it may come down to mutual destruction.
Because we must ultimately negotiate with the Palestinians, decisive military action is counterproductive - it merely sows hatred that makes the inevitable dialogue that much harder. It is ironic that the leading proponents of these theories are Jews and Europeans - two groups well acquainted with the obvious counterexample: The Allies never negotiated with the Nazis either during or after World War II; they destroyed Nazi Germany and executed its leaders. The same went for Tojo's Japan.Thanks Pharmboy.
Israel made a critical error in 1967. Though they won decisively they did not behave victoriously. They did not stake claim to the areas they gained (West Bank, Sinai Peninsula). Instead they sought to return the areas in exchange for “peace” and secure boundaries. Had they immediately annexed the land and built upon it, the victory would have been permanent and the picture today would be different.
The Israelis could not have annexed the West Bank and Sinai to Israel unless they also expelled the existing population. Or perhaps let them stay as permanent non-citizens, which would give cries of “apartheid” a good deal of validity.
There is just no military solution, no “victory,” possible as long as the Israelis accept the principles of multi-culturalism and “democracy” that are so deeply embedded in the modern psyche.
Here were their basic options:
1. Kill all the Palestinians, or at least millions of them, enough to thin the herd a bunch and reduce their potential majority. Not acceptable for obvious reasons, particularly for Jews who get so much of their mental baggage from being anti-Holocaust. Also wouldn’t end the fighting. With no more Palis around, all Arabs would forever be their enemies. Kill 250M Arabs and all Muslims would be their eternal enemies. There are 1B+ Muslimes. Are the Israelis going to kill them all? Can they? Would the rest of the world, including the USA, let them?
2. Annex the conquered area and rule the Arabs as second-class citizens, or perhaps non-citizens. Not acceptable due to the insistence that “all men are created equal” and the principles of non-discrimination. There is also the obvious fact that this wouldn’t secure the borders, it would merely move them. They would still have to defend the borders and if they took Sinai those borders would have been much longer.
3. Annex the conquered areas but expel the Palestinians as enemies. Not acceptable due to the whole “ethnic cleansing” bit. (Although a great deal of etchnic cleansing took place after WWI and WWII, by the good guy victors.) Also still have to defend the longer borders. The war wouldn’t be over, it would just move next door.
4. Annex the conquered areas, accept the inhabitants as full citizens, and be outvoted in a few decades. Not to mention having to deal with massive “domestic” terrorism in the interim.
None particularly good choices. Military “victory” results when the other side is either unable to continue to fight or gives up. I see nothing whatsoever that would be acceptable for Israel to do that would cause either result.
I get very tired of calls for Israel to “achieve victory” without the author defining what this would look like and how it can be achieved.
If you'd like to be on or off, please FR mail me.
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iiuc, the grand poobah/mufti/rock worshipper was PACKING UP as the Israelis were approaching and moshe dayann, great general but secular idiot, said “no, please stay, we don’t need control over the ONLY RELGIOUS SITE WORTH ANYTHING TO JUDAISM...” (and which the mufti’s exit from would have signalled “time to go!” for many more arabs...)
Forty years of Judgement deferred has now expired. HaShem's Judgement will now fall on Israel for Moshe Dyan's decision. Moshe Dyan rejected and gave away HaShem's Holy Mount.
shalom b'SHEM Yah'shua HaMashiach Adonai
Is this before or after the "rapture"?
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