Five days that shook world politics

Asia Times ^ | 03.01.05 | M K Bhadrakumar

[Dr. Marten]

Five days that shook world politics
By M K Bhadrakumar

There is no Cold War ahead. Yet the period between February 20 and 24 was extraordinary. Seldom have fault-lines in world politics surfaced with such clarity.

If the principal objective of President George Bush's European tour (February 20-24) was to heal trans-Atlantic rifts stemming from the great differences over the Iraq war, it was a success. Europe was willing to let bygones be bygones. But it became apparent during Bush's harmonious tour of "Old Europe" that profound differences remained between the European vision and the neo-conservative world view that the Bush administration subscribed to during its first term.

Fundamental to the differences is the growing assertion by France and Germany in advancing the European project. Underlining this institutional rivalry between the US and "Old Europe", German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has called for a "strong European pillar" within a "strong multilateral system".

Iran, Iraq and China figure as major differences in the trans-Atlantic divide. European powers insist on a constructive engagement of Iran, firmly rejecting the US neo-conservative agenda ("coalition of the willing", preemptive strikes, "regime change", etc). On Iraq, while willing to let the US off the hook, the five leading European countries refuse to put their troops on the ground in Iraq. At best, Europe is willing to launch civilian training missions in Iraq and to co-host an international conference on Iraq's reconstruction.

Economic interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region; estimation that the US is simply incapable of undertaking an Iraq-like invasion of Iran (for reasons both of lack of financial resources and imperial overstretch); widely prevalent antipathy toward the Bush administration in the European public opinion; expanding Muslim populations in Europe (specially in France and Germany); and the sheer diminution of European dependency on the US for its security ever since the removal of the Soviet threat in the East - all these are contributing factors in the European calculus.

But it is over the question of China that trans-Atlantic rivalries are poised close to a flare-up. Central to the dispute is the European decision to lift an arms embargo against China in June (imposed in the wake of the Tiananmen incidents of 1989), despite strident warnings of grave consequences by Washington. European countries are keen to claim a slice of China's military spending - estimated by the Pentagon to be in the region between US$50 billion and $70 billion. (The US-Japan joint statement on collaboration over security in the Far East was released in Washington on the eve of Bush's visit to Europe.) US apprehensions regarding the European move to lift the embargo against China are to be seen not only in security terms but also the competitive disadvantage for US firms in the Chinese market.

Equally so, trans-Atlantic economic rivalries could erupt over China. Apart from the business interests in the Chinese market (Airbus versus Boeing aircraft, etc), the fact is China is subsidizing the US budget deficit by holding US government bonds. With the steady weakening of the US dollar, the euro could become attractive to China as an alternative reserve currency. Many countries are likely moving in this direction - Russia, Indonesia, Bahrain, South Korea, etc. Admittedly, this will be an incremental process stretched over time. But getting China out of its embrace of the US dollar in favor of the euro is a high-stakes game that could cut into America's flesh. There could be blood in the water.

In other words, similar to the US-China-USSR equations of the Cold War era (when any two pillars of the triangle could together trump the third - the logic of the Nixon-Kissinger initiative toward China in 1972), a three-way equation involving the US, the European powers and China could be in the making - with far-reaching consequences for the US global domination of the 21st century.

Thus when Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bratislava last Thursday at the end of his European tour, both Washington and Moscow were keen to work on a balancing of mutual interests. The Bratislava summit made it clear that anyone who thought there was going to be a "cold war" around the corner was simply barking up the wrong tree. The summit was a triumph of the "conservative realists" in the US foreign-policy establishment vis-a-vis the neo-conservatives and the liberals. (Henry Kissinger would seem to have contributed to preparing the ground for Bratislava!)

The US has been making optimal use of the "democracy" card in recent weeks to keep Russia-Europe relations off balance (and to pressure Moscow), but in the event, at Bratislava, Bush drew Putin into the matrix of a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship for the coming four-year period. Moscow had worried that a bullish second-term Bush administration might ignore Russia's global standing and trample on its national interests, including in the former Soviet republics.

Washington's interest in present-day Russia is focused on three specific areas: nuclear proliferation, the "war on terror", and energy cooperation. In actual substance, Russia's cooperation with the US oil companies lies at the core of this cooperation.

The US would like to draw Russia away from Europe (and China) toward the US energy market. Russia is not only holding vast reserves of energy but is also flush with oil-revenue cash to invest. The Russian economy is in better shape than ever before: the investment climate is improving; it is keen to repay debts ahead of schedule; and, with high oil prices, things could get still better for Russia's economy. Thus, whereas Russia's planned expansion into the US energy market was originally meant to take place by 2010 or so, the Bratislava summit brought the date forward to 2008 (running concurrently with Bush's term in office).

Ahead of the Bratislava summit, it was announced in Moscow on February 12 (when Kissinger was in town) that Gazprom was "determined" to choose its US partners within the next two to three months on a project to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the US market.

Among Gazprom's tentative partners are ExxonMobil, ConocoPhilips and ChevronTexaco. It plans to collaborate with these US partners for developing its most promising gas fields of all, the Stockman gas condensate deposits in the Barents Sea center that is evaluated at holding 3.2 trillion cubic meters of gas plus 32 billion tons of gas condensate. Gazprom has estimated that even the initial stage of the Stockman project for gas extraction, liquefying and shipment to the US market can be valued at $10 billion. According to Gazprom officials, "The US administration is willing to see Russia in the American market and we are eager to come to the American market and take part in gas distribution and supply to the end user. We are making it a point to engage in the entire process, deposit development, liquefied-gas production, transport and work in the US market."

Washington has closed the Yukos file. Bush did not even refer to Yukos at Bratislava - a festering wound with multiple scabs that was meant to be at the very heart of Putin's authoritarian tendencies. Again, according to Russia's Novosti agency, quoting a "disclosure" by an unnamed "high-ranking US administration spokesperson", Bush and Putin simply "merged their positions" over Iran.

In briefings, US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley went out of his way to play down the highly excitable issue of "democracy" in Russia. He drew attention to the "very constructive relationship with Russia", a "complex relationship" with "common areas of endeavor" and "some important areas of collaboration". As for democracy, Hadley patiently explained what Bush really had in mind: "We understand that democracy will not look the same in all countries, that it will reflect - that it cannot be imposed, it has to be found and fought for, and developed internally, and it will reflect culture and history. And I think it is important to say that for all the discussion there has been about Russian democracy, this is not the Soviet Union you're seeing. That is history. This is Russia."

Hadley was harking back to a time much before the Cold War - to a time before the Bolsheviks spoiled it all by needlessly injecting ideology into human endeavors.

M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for more than 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

[Huck]

this institutional rivalry between the US and "Old Europe"

There was much gnashing of teeth when that phrase "old Europe" first appeared. Who was it? Rumsfeld? And yet it seems to have taken hold. Truth has a way about it. Seems like maybe those old European countries were wrong about democracy in the middle east. Not hard to understand how new europe would be more appreciative of the power and promise of self government.

[Valin]

Europe was willing to let bygones be bygones.

Well GOSH! That gets me all warm and fuzzy inside.

[spinestein]

[Europe was willing to let bygones be bygones.]

A more accurate metaphor would be; President Bush went from country to country with a clipboard and pen and asked "Can we count on you to be with us in the Middle East, now that my policies are being demonstrated as right?"

[SunkenCiv]

The US-Japan joint statement on collaboration over security in the Far East was released in Washington on the eve of Bush's visit to Europe.

Good point. That was in regard to China's drive to annex Taiwan on its own terms, as well as its failure to bring North Korea to heel. But, in their never-ending quest to talk about peaceful solutions while guaranteeing violence and bloodshed, the Europeans must also have been in mind.