That will make my next visit a little more personal.
Posted on 07/01/2009 6:12:42 AM PDT by mainepatsfan
July 1, 1863 The Battle of Gettysburg begins
The largest military conflict in North American history begins this day when Union and Confederate forces collide at Gettysburg. The epic battle lasted three days and resulted in a retreat to Virginia by Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.
Two months prior to Gettysburg, Lee had dealt a stunning defeat to the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville. He then made plans for a Northern invasion in order to relieve pressure on war-weary Virginia and to seize the initiative from the Yankees. His army, numbering about 80,000, began moving on June 3. The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Joseph Hooker and numbering just under 100,000, began moving shortly thereafter, staying between Lee and Washington, D.C. But on June 28, frustrated by the Lincoln administration's restrictions on his autonomy as commander, Hooker resigned and was replaced by George G. Meade.
Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac as Lee's army moved into Pennsylvania. On the morning of July 1, advance units of the forces came into contact with one another just outside of Gettysburg. The sound of battle attracted other units, and by noon the conflict was raging. During the first hours of battle, Union General John Reynolds was killed, and the Yankees found that they were outnumbered. The battle lines ran around the northwestern rim of Gettysburg. The Confederates applied pressure all along the Union front, and they slowly drove the Yankees through the town.
(Excerpt) Read more at history.com ...
Thanks for the post! Gonna read it while doing this root canal on Ms Finkle....
If I can get my DVD player to work properly, I want to watch Civil War this weekend... or at least Gettysburg.
If I can get my DVD player to work properly, I want to watch Civil War this weekend... or at least Gettysburg.
I think this was the battle where the townsfolk nearby brought their picnics to watch the battle - until they were IN the battle and skedaddled outta there.
The ultimate what-if question is whether the outcome of the battle would have been different had Stonewall Jackson not been mortally wounded at Chancellorsville?
IIRC, it was Ewell’s Corps that did not move against Cemetery Hill as quickly as they could and should have, thus allowing the Union troops to occupy it and solidify their position.
It was always my impression that Lee wanted a battle at a time and place of his choosing and the inability of the ANV to control the high ground forced him into improvising an offensive plan.
"Straight as the needle to the poll he went to the effectuation of my purpose" RE Lee on hearing of Jackson's death.
But Jackson was not there on the evening of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg and so Culp's Hill was not taken and the entire course of the war probably went a different way.
I think that you are referring to First Bull Run (1861). Most of the people around Gettysburg (1863) were either hiding their livestock or hunkered down in their cellars to avoid arty. The novelty of War had kinda worn off over the course of 2 years of combat.
I think that you are referring to First Bull Run (1861). Most of the people around Gettysburg (1863) were either hiding their livestock or hunkered down in their cellars to avoid arty. The novelty of War had kinda worn off over the course of 2 years of combat.
I think that IF the CSA had taken Culps Hill on the first day, the entire Union position would have been invalidated. The AoP would have withdrawn into northern Maryland in all likelihood. Question is: would Lee have pursued? Or would he have ‘summered’ in PA around Harrisburg as he originally intended?
In my opinion he would had to have pursued. The Union Cavalry force after Brandy Station was too dangerous to his extended lines of supply. Lee would have had to force a battle wherever the AoP took up defensive positions.
I think a bit different, that he could have summered around Harrisburg, very rich farm country, allowed Virginia farmers to get their crops grown and harvested and relieved the pressure. Then in late summer, he could have decided, if the war was even still on, what next? Philadelphia, a move that would sever DC from the rest of the nation would have been a good choice, because the Feds likely would have been dug in good in front of DC by then. In any case, the war would have likely ended by the fall and history would be radically different for all of us.
the old brain... Manassas is exactly it!
Maybe we should put the NEW Congress critters on the front line for the new civil war...
It would have been an interesting Campaign of Maneuver instead of the set-piece, 3-day slugfest it became. Lee would have really missed Jackson in that scenario. Lee’s Lieutenants weren’t as good as they had been and needed greater supervision. On the other hand, the AoP Corps commanders had gained a lot of valuable OJT and were getting pretty competent.
No, that was first Manassass, though it happened at other battles as well.
I believe the South captured one of the congresscritters, threatened him, cuffed him about a bit, but eventually released him.
I think he would have pursued. Unlike Hannibal (and McClellan), Lee knew what to do with a victory.
No, I think that he would have considered that every day that the North continued to resist the right of secession was another day for them to build an eventual irresistable force. In other words, he KNEW time was his biggest enemy. He would have chased and attempted to destroy the AoP while he had it on the ropes. IMO, which is worth what you paid for it.
As I said in another post, it might have been too risky for Lee to stay given that the AoP could have withdrawn to cover DC a little more closely, then sent their cavalry on massed raids into the Shennandoah as had been done at Brandy Station.
Lee could have loitered long enough to tear-up the extensive rail net connecting Pittsburgh & the Ohio Valley with the East, and gathered in some provisions before pulling out. But it was July, so there weren’t any mature crops yet. He would have had to wait a couple of months and I just don’t think that the Union would have sat on its hands that long.
I highly value your opinion, but if it had come to that, wouldn’t it have turned into an early version of Petersburg, but on yankee turf? And if it had, would the South have been able to remain supplied during an extended siege?
Longstreet was correct that defensive warfare was the only way to deal with the mechanization of combat at the time, but there was no precedent of modern siege warfare on which to estimate the outcome. He was certainly proved correct that infantry charges against high ground were no longer possible to succeed at, and after Petersburg no line of battle ever marched against another line of battle again.
I am hoping to get to Gettysburg sometime in the next year.
Let’s not forget that in three days after the first day of Gettysburg, Vicksburg surrendered, the Union controlled the Mississippi, and the War in the West moved up a notch.
Unless Lee destroyed the Union Army at Gettysburg [even if he took Culp’s Hill], his options were very narrow. Leave the AoP in his rear, and strike for D.C? Don’t think so. Drive the AoP TOWARD DC? Doesn’t help. The Union troops are falling back on their supplies. And DC was too heavily fortified for Lee to take, especially with the AoP in the neighborhood.
Continue his raid [which is what his ‘invasion’ really was]? To what purpose? He’d already stripped the Pa. farms of their provender. Best bet was if he wins a tactical victory at Gettysburg, he winds up doing what he did four days later. Retreating.
The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that Lee really had no other choice but to pursue. A victory at Culps Hill really didn’t change the strategic calculus or the operational realities enough for him to remain in Pennsylvania. He needed to inflict a major defeat on the AoP. To me that means making it combat-ineffective for the rest of the Summer at least.
Up to that point in the Battle of Gettysburg, Lee had beaten up I and XI corps pretty decisively and mauled portions of II corps. There were still other units that hadn’t been engaged at all. On balance the AoP was still a formidable force.
Just as the Confederates were compelled to sustain heavy casualties to defend Richmond, so the Yankees would be forced to fight at a disadvantage.
There is no question but that you are right, a prolonged siege could not be sustained by the Confederates in the north and I think both Lee and Longstreet were thinking politically as much as militarily in forcing a battle in the north which they hoped would be sharp and decisive.
The AoP was formidable, but was led by George Meade, who got rather lucky at Gettysburg. In the months following, Lee consistently outmaneuvered Meade and Meade was unable to make any real progress. Had Gettysburg not been fought, Lee may have been able to achieve a significant success later in the summer.
In no way would I dismiss Stonewall Jackson’s military acumen. His Valley Campaign stands on its own as a classic of maneuver and surprise.
But in the cases of Chancellorsville and the Valley Campaign, I sometimes wonder if the ANV’s best friend were not Jackson and Lee but rather the timidity of the Union commanders.
Had Hooker not hesitated twice during the Chancellorsville campaign (once after crossing the Rapahannock River and the other after seeing the tail end of Jackson’s flank march), there stands a strong chance that he could have inflicted a severe beating on the ANV.
It is my opinion that Ewell could not have taken Cemetery Hill. There was a fresh Union brigade already positioned there along with artillery as a rallying point. Culp's Hill on the other hand is another matter.
Agreed. Lee and Jackson deserve credit for taking advantage of the opportunities Hooker gave them.
It’s unfortunate that the rest of the fighting on Little Round Top has been eclipsed by the action between Chamberlain and Oates’ men.
I’m a little confused about the fighting at Devil’s Den. Wasn’t Devil’s Den a small collection of boulders within which the Southern sharpshooters fired up at Little Round Top?
Were there a LOT of sharpshooters? Was there any Union presence at all down in Devil’s Den?
I live in CA but took my 2 oldest boys to Gettysburg two weeks ago. We also visited Fredericksburg that week.
Agreed. Lee was looking for an Austerlitz...not another Fredricksburg in which the Army of the Potomac could simply afterwards lick it’s wounds to fight another day.
Yes, Culp’s Hill is correct. I was thinking that it was Cemetery Hill instead of Culp’s Hill.
In brief yes Devil’s Den are a collection of boulders at the edge of Houck’s Ridge in front of Little Round Top. The Union had a brigade defending the position but they were overwhelmed by superior Confederate numbers. The Confederates who took the ridge did fire on Union positions on top of Little Round Top. Most of them were not sharp shooters but regular infantry.
Ironically the Confederates came close to taking both hills on the night of July 2.
I hope for Mrs. Finkle's sake you're a Union supporter.
For example, in the Valley campaign, once Jackson popped up in Front Royal, Bank's strategical position was untenable and he had about three choices, none of them very good. This was the direct result of Jackson's ability to position himself secretly at the fulcrum of the strategic situation.
Similarly, when Jackson retreated from Harpers Ferry up the Valley Pike and only narrowly missed the "snapping jaws" of the federal pincers coming from the west in the form of Fremont's army and from the east in the form of Shield' s forces, Jackson very carefully gauged the time he would have to slip the trap. In this calculation he accurately assessed his adversaries and their ability to move aggressively. Having slipped the noose, Jackson kept his adversaries separated where he could defeat them piecemeal by strategically positioning himself according to the flooded rivers. This was not a matter so much of ineptitude or timidity on the part of the federal's as it was genius on the part of Jackson.
The risks that the Confederates assumed in Jackson's great flank marches at Chancellorsville and second Manassas were not unknown to them but were forced upon them by circumstances.
There could hardly be a more dramatic moment in American arms than the last conference between Lee and Jackson when each man knew that they must inevitably be crushed by the weight of numbers at Chancellorsville. Their one hope was a flank march by Jackson around Hooker's right running risks, as you point out, of exposure and destruction. Even if not exposed, Lee's remnant was vulnerable to direct attack by Gen. Hooker's hordes. Can you imagine the character and courage of these two men when, after they had resolved on the flank march by Jackson and Lee asked him, "how may men will you take with you?" Jackson replied, "my whole Corps." In a tremendous example of moral courage Lee unhesitatingly replied, "go ahead then." And with that simple statement, Lee was taking perhaps the biggest single risk of the war leaving himself utterly vulnerable to Hooker's much larger force and exposing himself to the verdict of history should the gamble fail.
In making this assessment, Lee surely calculated the character of Hooker, Just as Jackson calculated the character of Banks, Fremont and Shields in the Valley. That is part of genius.
It would have been almost the reverse of the Union lines. Meade would have been forced to attack because of pressure from Washington and the fact he had more manpower available and arriving. He had just taken command and would not have moved out of Gettysburg without a fight.
Keeping that line of hills would have given the AoV a very strong defensive position. Stuart was still out there and would have been arriving from a good direction to flank the Union right, even worn out as his troopers were.
The fact is Buford remembered his mission, and didn't have enough dog in the fight to keep the AoV from advancing. He did, however, know how to form an effective blocking position until Reynolds could come up.
Ah but even had Jackson lived there is no way of saying he would have been in position to do any better. Lee was committed to dividing the Army of Northern Virginia up into three corps, feeling rightly that two corps were each too large to be effectively handled by one commander, and most likely would have done so even had Jackson lived. Odds are that Ewell would have commanded the corps anyway, being senior to Hill, and could very well wound up in the same position
One could argue that Lee and Davis overturning Johnston’s order for Ewell to join him rather than reinforce Jackson in the valley was one of the great turning points of the entire war.
So the question then would have become would Ewell had done a better job coordinating the attacks along the Chambersburg Pike that morning and afternoon than Hill?
Or would he have gone home? Heavy fighting over a day or two would have left Lee with thousands of wounded to care for and his ammunition supply depleated. Stuck hundreds of miles in Union territory without a secure line of supply he may well have been forced to return to Virginia with the supplies he had already gathered.
Lee had no authority to countermand that order because he was only an adviser to Davis at that time. Jackson knew only Davis could order the countermand and he also knew Lee could persuade him to do it.
The Union fought and regrouped, fought and regrouped. The Southern forces fought every chance the Union gave them and would keep fighting unless the Union forces ran too far, too fast.
That all changed when conscripts became more a part of the Union forces than volunteers, and guy named Grant came along. He took hold and didn't let go.
Oh the war would still have been on. Vicksburg would still fall on July 4th, the confederacy would still be cut in half, and while Lee took his army north in part to avoid having it parceled out in a vain attempt to keep Vicksburg from surrendering, once it had would Davis not order Lee back home in response to that catastrophe? Regardless of Gettysburg I think Lee's time in the North would have been shortened, and that Philadelphia or Baltimore were never in danger. What would Lee have done with them even had he captured them? He couldn't garrison them. He couldn't feed them. They would have been an impediment to him.
“Question is: would Lee have pursued?”
YES...
Remember, there was politics at work here, as well.
The whole point of the excercise was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, and bring it to a final battle, one that if the South won, would bring recognition from England and Europe, and set the stage for a negotiated end to the war.
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