Posted on 05/23/2017 9:13:55 AM PDT by fugazi
1862: Confederate forces under the command of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson strike, outmaneuver, and – with textbook coordination of infantry, cavalry, and artillery – decisively defeat Union Army forces under Col. John R. Kenly at Front Royal, Virginia.
1943: The most decorated battleship in the U.S. Navy, USS New Jersey (BB-62), is commissioned at Philadelphia. “The Big J” earned 19 battle stars and numerous other commendations during her 48 years of service, which covered actions in the Pacific Theater of World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and the Persian Gulf.
1944: In Italy, VI Corps at the Anzio Beachhead begin their breakout. Fighting is intense – the 3rd Infantry Division suffers nearly 1,000 casualties, the most by any American...
(Excerpt) Read more at victoryinstitute.net ...
I count myself as incredibly fortunate to have not been born in a time or place where I would end up on the receiving end of one of those shells.
My M-16 was self cleaning.
I had to clean it my self...................
Mine too.
L
Same here
When I qualified on the M-16 in the Air Force 20 years ago, I was handed what had to be one of the very first M-16s ever made. It malfunctioned so many times during qualification that I couldn’t remember which targets I had been shooting at and ended up missing marksman (although I shot perfect) because I had too many holes in one target and not enough in another.
My grandfather served in Vietnam and was there when they issued M-16s. He told me how the instructor bragged about not having to clean the new weapon, but the M-16 malfunctioned when he attempted to show off how well it fires in a muddy jungle environment.
They worked the bugs out, but it interests me that we have “leaders” that come up with bright ideas like weapons that magically don’t need to be cleaned, taking guns off fighter planes, or you can win a war without boots on the ground.
I first qualified as ‘Marksman’ in USMC boot camp with the M-14.
Every year thereafter I qualled as ‘Expert’ with the M-16.............
Anzio
It sucked. We got them in early '67 and they started seizing up right away. They would tear the head of cartridge case off during extraction and then stuff a fresh cartridge into that. Crazy tough to clear and fatal if it happened in an intense firefight, which it often, often did. The Marines soon carried assembled cleaning rods, stuffed in a hole in the plastic forend so it could be cleared from the muzzle, like some throwback to the Civil War Springfield.
The sights were stupid - completely nonadjustable while you were using the rifle - and our Marines missed a lot because the rifles were hard to zero and windage was something you adjusted once while you were in the rear, maybe.
The safeties used to stick on Safe, the finish wore off almost as soon as you got them, the stocks were short and fragile and the rounds were often ineffective on the enemy; you could see the dust pop off them when you hit them squarely and they just kept running.
The enemy stuff never jammed - they did their R&D better than we did, apparently.
When I qualified in the Air Force, 1966, I used the first model M-16 without the bird cage suppressor on the muzzle. It worked fine. No problems. I also remember it threw it’s empty cases forward.
Three years later I qualified again. No problems.
Maybe we were using early ammo before the change to ball powder caused the problems.
Thank you for your service. Did you get an upgraded replacement, or were you stuck with the same rifle for your whole tour?
Yep.
5.56mm
It's what happens when you put ivory tower economists, cronies and bean counters in charge of the military.
I went back to our battery’s armory (I was an artillery Scout) and retrieved my M-14. I was the only man in our grunt battalion with an M-14, so I had to fill my magazines by stripping M-60 belts.
My company commander (a fine man and outstanding combat commander) asked me why I still had an M-14 and I fibbed and told that we artillerymen didn’t have the M-16 yet, so he told me to get one when we got them.
When I’d go back to the battery, they’d tell me that my M-16 was in the armory and I’d tell them that “the grunts want me to keep my M-14”.
That probably kept me alive.
“Each of the nine 16-in. barrels on the Iowa-class battleships could be aimed and fired independently, sending a 2,700-lb. armor piercing shell ... pierce 20 inches of armor and 21 feet of hardened concrete. A 1,700-lb. explosive round leaves a 20-ft. deep by 50-ft. wide crater...”
This gets the capabilities mixed together, and details wrong.
The 16 inch/50 cal Mk 7 guns that armed the Iowa class battleships fired two shell types:
1. 2700-pound armor piercing (AP), Mk 8
2. 1900-pound high capacity (HC), Mk 13
AP shells contained a bursting charge of 1.5 percent of the total weight (no 40-ft craters). Armor penetration varied, depending on terminal velocity and angle of impact. Max muzzle velocity was 2500 ft/sec. Reduced-velocity propelling charges were also available: less bore erosion, lower dispersion at reduced ranges.
HC shells, intended for use against shore targets, contained a bursting charge of 8.1 percent of total weight. Max muzzle velocity was 2690 ft/sec.
Some years later, additional HC variants were put into service: variable-time (proximity) fuze, several types of submunition carrier, nuclear.
(pages 73-74, _Iowa Class Battleships_ by Robert Sumrall. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988. LCN 88-71712; ISBN 0-87021-298-2)
“...The enemy stuff never jammed - they did their R&D better than we did, apparently.”
Not so concerning R&D.
The typical Kalashnikov functions reliably because it’s manufactured with very loose tolerances. Results in poor accuracy. Various tinkerers and machinists in the US have improved the accuracy, but the “improved” models always suffer loss of reliability. Which do you want - accuracy or reliability? Can’t have both.
The 5.56mm cartridge for the M16 was a result of infatuation in certain US Army circles with the SCHV (small caliber, high velocity) concept, which envisioned adequate lethality from low-weight bullets at elevated velocities. It promised to bring forth a rifle cartridge with greater effective range and lethality, compared to any full-caliber reduced-power round (such as 7.92x33 of the Third Reich, or 7.62x39 Soviet 043g).
Also dovetailed neatly with the US Army’s doctrine that firepower equaled shots per minute (USMC defines it as hits per minute). Since the 5.56mm round weighed half what a 7.62mm NATO did, each soldier could carry twice as much ammunition.
The SCHV theory wasn’t just smoke & mirrors: USSR started research into their own small-caliber round in the late 1950s, just as US 5.56mm development was ending. Resulted in the 5.45x39mm, adopted as Red Army standard in 1974 and still in use.
Initial M16 reliability problems came about from a combination of factors: sketchy operational testing (possibly compromised by US Army Ordnance officials who preferred the M14), refusal to chrome plate bore & chamber (USSR standard predating WWII, disliked by US Army Ordnance), claims that the rifle was self cleaning (always a poor idea when troops are involved), uncoordinated changes to propellant (unverified changes from chopped-tube to ball powder, use of calcium chloride as a drying/neutralizing agent in ball powder).
The United States Army had been the DoD executive agent for small arms, dating well back before WWI. Pretty much left any requirements out of the mix, for US Marines or the other armed service depts. Interservice competition and contention are never-ending.
Oh I do love Experts!
"The typical Kalashnikov functions reliably because it’s manufactured with very loose tolerances. Results in poor accuracy. Various tinkerers and machinists in the US have improved the accuracy, but the “improved” models always suffer loss of reliability. Which do you want - accuracy or reliability? Can’t have both."
Horsehocky. The AK family is built on a turnbolt design, similar to the Garand but inverted. The tolerances of the critical locking surfaces are excellent as they have to be for the cartridge's chamber pressures. In 1978 I built the world's first semiauto AK - and I have a Master's in Mechanical Engineering, so no smoke-blowing, please. The AK's "accuracy" issues relate to the limitations of the Type PS ball ammunition and the short sight radius and that it's first selector position is full auto.
"The 5.56mm cartridge for the M16 was a result of infatuation in certain US Army circles with the SCHV (small caliber, high velocity) concept, which envisioned adequate lethality from low-weight bullets at elevated velocities. It promised to bring forth a rifle cartridge with greater effective range and lethality, compared to any full-caliber reduced-power round (such as 7.92x33 of the Third Reich, or 7.62x39 Soviet 043g)."
It was the army civilian engineer's infatuation with the concept of throwing huge masses of lead out of the weapons in the theory that they might hit something that way. There is a museum at Ft. Benning that showcases all of the failed attempts to come up with weapons that threw hails of projectiles as supposed offsets for poor training by soldiers. Such as the miserable SPIW - and now the current XM-25. Those civilian engineers never served in uniform and never served in positions where they faced enemy fire and continue to make their excellent money with little practical experience. The 5.56 55-grain projectile fired through a 1 in 12 twist barrel in Vietnam wasn't accurate and it wasn't a reliable killer and the sights were idiotic.
"Also dovetailed neatly with the US Army’s doctrine that firepower equaled shots per minute (USMC defines it as hits per minute). Since the 5.56mm round weighed half what a 7.62mm NATO did, each soldier could carry twice as much ammunition."
Which just meant that soldiers and Marines rabbited off more rounds in the general direction of the enemy. It didn't mean that we killed more of them - which is the whole purpose of a combat weapon. The M-16 was a noisemaker, a fragile, ill-functioning noisemaker and Eugene Stoner was an idiot.
"The SCHV theory wasn’t just smoke & mirrors: USSR started research into their own small-caliber round in the late 1950s, just as US 5.56mm development was ending. Resulted in the 5.45x39mm, adopted as Red Army standard in 1974 and still in use.
All that means is that we tricked the Soviets into following our dumb lead.
"Initial M16 reliability problems came about from a combination of factors: sketchy operational testing (possibly compromised by US Army Ordnance officials who preferred the M14), refusal to chrome plate bore & chamber (USSR standard predating WWII, disliked by US Army Ordnance), claims that the rifle was self cleaning (always a poor idea when troops are involved), uncoordinated changes to propellant (unverified changes from chopped-tube to ball powder, use of calcium chloride as a drying/neutralizing agent in ball powder)."
And all of that mess was funneled into the M-16 chambers by that stupid gas tube system and coupled with the high heat and humidity and filth of the environment in Vietnam, caused us to have a nonfunctioning weapon in our hands when our lives depended on it. Then the dimwits at Aberdeen and Picatinny tried to blame those needless deaths on us.
"The United States Army had been the DoD executive agent for small arms, dating well back before WWI. Pretty much left any requirements out of the mix, for US Marines or the other armed service depts. Interservice competition and contention are never-ending."
It wasn't "interservice rivalry" that killed a lot of very good young men; it was laziness, incompetence, false assumptions, and shoddy operational R&D. I have worked for a Battle Lab for a long time and I know what went on and still goes on. When our sons (and now daughter's) lives depend on what we produce, we need to do better.
“...The AK family is built on a turnbolt design, similar to the Garand but inverted. The tolerances of the critical locking surfaces are excellent as they have to be for the cartridge’s chamber pressures. In 1978 I built the world’s first semiauto AK - and I have a Master’s in Mechanical Engineering, so no smoke-blowing, please. The AK’s “accuracy” issues relate to the limitations of the Type PS ball ammunition ...”
Chainmail fails to convince that he’s seen the insides of a Kalashnikov or an M16-pattern arm. Both are based on a rotating bolt.
“It was the army civilian engineer’s infatuation with the concept of throwing huge masses of lead out of the weapons in the theory that they might hit something...”
Engineers had nothing to do with it.
Based on WWII after-action reports (the most convincing of which were composed by SLA Marshall and his staff from the Army History Office) and studies conducted by the US Army Operations Research Office, senior Army leaders concluded that aimed fire from small arms - rifles - contributed next to nothing to hits on enemy troops. Thus it became the conscious choice of these “experts” that Chainmail deems so unworthy to formalize into Army doctrine the definition of “firepower” as shots per minute.
Whether those leaders decided wisely isn’t the point. The fact that they did so cannot be controverted, and it has affected the course of small arms design ever since. Chainmail free to dislike that course - can’t say I like it much myself - but it happened that way. The oddball concepts evaluated in pursuit of doctrine described so colorfully barely hint at what went on.
“All that means is that we tricked the Soviets into following our dumb lead.”
A common conceit among Americans, but mistaken. Russians - before, during, and after the Soviet period - have a better record of not being misled by trendiness. They are also more patient, more mature, more inclined to take a longer view: their record of hoodwinking and misleading puerile, impatient Americans shows more success.
“...shoddy operational R&D. I have worked for a Battle Lab for a long time ...”
Which Battle Lab?
Gotta say, I hadn’t heard of “operational R&D.” I spent 29 years in uniform, 13 of them in operational testing, and didn’t stumble over it.
There is only R&D, sometimes accompanied by developmental testing, and operational testing. By law. System program offices always yearn to shorten the process, and often attempt to force-fit operational testing onto earlier phases, but it never turns out well. Some constraints cannot be evaded: akin, one gathers, to laws of physics.
Yes, you're correct, the M16 has a turnbolt design - but with a deeply recessed chamber, inaccessible from the outside and I expect that you know that.
Any part of those 29 years in combat - real combat, like in the infantry? If you had that experience, then you'd know that SLA Marshall cooked his study results. The most effective men in combat are the ones that aim and kill deliberately. "Spray and pray" only wastes ammunition. You'd also know that what happened with the introduction of the M16 and for 6 months after in Vietnam was an atrocity. R&D in an operational environment - the operational environment of Vietnam - was insufficiently done in the race to get the M16 mass produced and fielded.
The story of my last day in Vietnam is here:Link Here
You can say anything you want, but I was there and witnessed what happened and saw some our young men dead as a result. Then I saw the upper echelons fall all over themselves to hide from blame and try to either blame us or just treat it as an accident.
I worked for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab for 13 years, so I have had years of work with the different parts of our research and engineering centers. I have worked with JSSAP and seen first-hand how little operational experience the developers of small arms and crew-served weapons have.
The M16 and its mismatched ammunition caused the needless deaths of hundreds of our young men. it remains one of the sorriest episodes in R&D/procurement history.
“Ah, you’re a snide one: 29 years in uniform and that’s the best you can do?”
It’s all right. Not even Chainmail, with his above-average fondness for swagger, can induce me to poormouth any other part of the military (with a tiny exception). I was privileged to work with every specialty there was, in all US armed services, and allied nations too.
It’s mildly encouraging to find one other poster to the forum who knows SLA Marshall’s name, and a bit more besides. And I am aware of the doubts that have been cast on his methods, and his data. Which means nothing to the US Army establishment: SLAM died a hero in their eyes, and no one in their hierarchy has seen fit to pose the first question about the worth or validity of the concepts he gave form to, and they still cling to.
“...Any part of those 29 years in combat - real combat, like in the infantry? ...”
The unanswerable conceit: that only footsoldiers can tell us what “real” combat is - as if that were self-validating rhetoric.
But it is very answerable.
No, I did not see any ground combat. As a rated navigator assigned to B-52 aircrews, and later B-1 aircrews, I had to attend to other priorities.
Chainmail’s condescending pseudo-query can be expanded to, did we receive any hostile fire? Not that I know of. Things were tense at times, as we aviated to places that other Americans know only as names on a chart - if that. Situations were far-flung, and higher authorities were not on hand to tell us what to do, to cope with breaking events few Americans have the first knowledge of - even now. Real trouble was only a button-push away.
Americans assume that if there isn’t a declared war, and there aren’t any ground troops committed, there isn’t any fighting going on. They assume in error.
After being medically grounded, much of the remainder of my active-duty time was consumed in testing various systems for USAF and all armed service departments.
Most efforts were expended in the area of electronic defense: those devices fielded to save the bacon of aviators, sailors, armored troops, and footsoldiers of every stripe, who had to go in harm’s way. You know - all that stuff Chainmail has dismissed as pointless featherbedding that benefits only the evil military-industrial complex. Because only footsoliders are privileged to prosecute and understand “real combat.”
And I rounded out the career in a Joint billet, working in studies and analysis for the senior Army officer in US Strategic Command. It was a revelatory experience that renewed and deepened my respect and admiration for everybody who volunteered to put on the uniform and serve.
Our duties entailed assessing the effectiveness of sundry weapon systems belonging to all US armed services, that were farthest removed from anything Chainmail got involved in: long-range bombers, nuclear artillery, ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines. You know: all those systems that we’d prefer not to employ, but which we’d like to be really, really, really sure of, if we ever had to. Systems that Chainmail and fellow foot troops won’t be able to do anything about, if destruction of that variety rains down on them. Not even if they ditched their M16s for Kalashnikovs. Or M14s. Or M1s. Or even M1903s.
Much of that final tour was strangely like poking one’s fingers into holes in the dike - holes that were always too far apart to let one stretch one’s arms from one hole, to the next, to say nothing about backtracking to re-stop this or that hole that started to leak again. If one clique of GOFOs had just declared victory for their pet system or concept, in no time at all the next clique was trashing the whole idea (system, concept, and all). Everyone was enthusiastic about their special projects, and quick to ignore data they did not like, from the highest ranks to the lowest. Collections of “experts” like Battle Labs could be helpful, or they could be disasters waiting to happen. And we did not have to wait long. Took a deal of jawboning. And convincing. Not to mention patience. Scarcely as bracing as ground combat. But unavoidable, unless the nation was content to let its ground combatants go back to throwing rocks.
All of it merely confirmed my suspicions, that wars are poor places to collect data on system effectiveness, and that system development conducted in an operational environment is a day late. And often several dollars short.
The first evaluation M16s were according to Stoner’s specs. Then the Army changed them for the general issue to grunts in Vietnam, along with dropping the specified powder for the ammo, and used leftover WW2 powder (which fouled the mechanism) .
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