Posted on 09/29/2001 2:11:46 PM PDT by maquiladora
As the United States proceeds with its war on terrorism, one of the darkest clouds hanging over the campaign is the question of whether the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 horrors could strike again, this time with nuclear weapons.
It seems doubtful that U.S. intelligence can definitively answer this question. Absent perfect foresight, one can nonetheless outline some of the plausible threats and identify the range of U.S. responses that could reduce the exposure of citizens and troops to nuclear attack.
A Dirty Bomb
The most accessible nuclear device for any terrorist would be a radiological dispersion bomb. This so-called 'dirty bomb' would consist of waste by-products from nuclear reactors wrapped in conventional explosives, which upon detonation would spew deadly radioactive particles into the environment. This is an expedient weapon, in that radioactive waste material is relatively easy to obtain. Radioactive waste is widely found throughout the world, and in general is not as well guarded as actual nuclear weapons.
In the United States, radioactive waste is located at more than 70 commercial nuclear power sites. Enormous quantities also exist overseas in Europe and Japan in particular. Tons of wastes are transported long distances, including between continents (Japan to Europe and back).
In Russia, security for nuclear waste is especially poor, and the potential for diversion and actual use by Islamic radicals has been shown to be very real indeed. In 1996, Islamic rebels from the break-away province of Chechnya planted such a device in Moscow's Izmailovo park to demonstrate Russia's vulnerability. This dirty bomb consisted of a deadly brew of dynamite and one of the highly radioactive by-products of nuclear fission Cesium 137.
Such gamma-ray emitting bombs would not kill quite as many people as died on Sept. 11. A worst-case calculation for an explosion in downtown Manhattan during noontime: more than 2,000 deaths and many thousands more suffering from radiation poisoning. Treatment of those exposed would be greatly hampered by inadequate medical facilities and training. The United States has only a single hospital emergency room dedicated to treating patients exposed to radiation hazards, at Oak Ridge, Tenn.
A credible threat to explode such a bomb in a U.S. city could have a powerful impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign and military policy, and could possibly have a paralyzing effect. Not only would the potential loss of life be significant, but also the prospect of mass evacuation of dense urban centers would loom large in the minds of policy-makers.
Attack on Nuclear Power Plants
A terrorist attack on a commercial nuclear power plant with a commercial jet or heavy munitions could have a similar affect to a radiological bomb. If such an attack were to cause either a meltdown of the reactor core (similar to the Chernobyl disaster), or a dispersal of the spent fuel waste on the site, extensive casualties could be expected. In such an instance, the power plant would be the source of the radiological contamination, and the plane or armament would be the explosive mechanism for spreading lethal radiation over large areas.
Diversion of Nuclear Material or Weapons
The threat from radiological dispersion dims in comparison to the possibility that terrorists could build or obtain an actual atomic bomb. An explosion of even low yield could kill hundreds of thousands of people. A relatively small bomb, say 15-kilotons, detonated in Manhattan could immediately kill upwards of 100,000 inhabitants, followed by a comparable number of deaths in the lingering aftermath.
Fortunately, bomb-grade nuclear fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) is relatively heavily guarded in most, if not all, nuclear weapon states.
Nonetheless, the possibility of diversion remains. Massive quantities of fissile material exist around the world. Sophisticated terrorists could fairly readily design and fabricate a workable atomic bomb once they manage to acquire the precious deadly ingredients (the Hiroshima bomb which used a simple gun-barrel design is the prime example).
Russia
A primary source of diverted weapons or material could be Russia. No Russian bombs have been officially reported missing, and Russian authorities maintain that no nuclear material has been lost. Rather, the outstanding question is whether a bomb, or fissile material in sufficient quantity to make one, has disappeared without Moscow's knowledge. While few outside observers dispute this, none are privy to the raw data that could validate or refute the Russian claim.
One concern long has been the allegations voiced by the former chairman of Russia's Security Council, Gen. Alexander Lebed. After conducting an exhaustive inventory of Russian nuclear weapons in the 1990s, he found that 50 or more "suitcase" nuclear bombs had vanished from the Russian arsenal.
The prevailing judgment among Western experts is that Russia may have lost track of the paper trail for any number of bombs, but that the bombs themselves probably have been dismantled or tucked away in storage, rather than having been stolen. The infamous Russian accounting system using hand receipts stored in shoe boxes provides ample grist for this theory.
While there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Russian military and civilian leaders who have shouldered the custodial duties for Russian nuclear weapons, it is nonetheless possible that Russian nuclear security has been compromised from the inside without detection.
As noted, such a bomb could be transported to the United States inside one of the countless containers arriving at American ports every day. This avenue seems especially easy to arrange by bin Laden's al Qaeda network, which has extensive business connections around the world. Such a container could accommodate a good-sized atomic bomb, which could be unloaded and carted off in a small truck or van to any destination in the lower 48 states. Indeed, once unloaded from a ship, one of Russia's 'missing' suitcase bombs, which are thought to weigh some 60 pounds and measure the size of a small refrigerator, practically could be carried as a back-pack by a strong person.
Disconcertingly, it is conceivable that Russia may have built even smaller bombs, comparable to the truly attaché-class atomic bomb secretly built by the United States in the late 1970s. This U.S. bomb design was so compact and lightweight that it could have been covertly transported as innocent hand-luggage by any reasonably strong individual. In fact, a replica with proxy nuclear material and conventional explosives in place of the real stuff was disguised as a briefcase, and actually hand-carried on commercial airline flights from California to Washington in the early 1980s.
Pakistan
Another potential source of diversion is the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, estimated to number around 30-50 atomic bombs with explosive yields ranging from 1 to 15 kilotons. The weapons are probably assembled at Wah (50 miles from Afghanistan), and are stored primarily at Sargodha near a missile complex close to the border with India and only about 250 miles from Afghanistan. Pakistan's military government is walking a tightrope between pressure from the Bush administration on one side and anti-American Islamic militants on the other. Growing street opposition from the latter could certainly de-stabilize or even topple the regime, and in the midst of such dissolution, the weakening of nuclear security would inevitably occur. The ranks of government and military personnel are also fairly riddled with sympathizers of the radical Islamic faction, posing a distinct risk of insiders colluding to spirit away a bomb or two for bin Laden or other terrorists. In any case, control over Pakistan's arsenal could all too readily buckle in a serious crisis inside the country. Pakistani weapons are believed to lack sophisticated locks and other safeguards to prevent their unauthorized use. Loose nukes in the region would have unpredictable consequences, almost all of which would militate against the U.S. cause, not to mention the safety of U.S. forces dispatched there.
If you kill only the guilty, they have thousands waiting to take their place with an even greater fervor. The point of war is to make the consequences so horrible that the perpetrators are scared to risk causing it again. Unfortunately, that means innocents will have to die. The guilty have demonstrated with perfect clarity that their own lives mean nothing, so you must attack something that does mean something to them.
MM
Of course, the Constitution does not require that the US allow foreign national non-citizens to live in this country indefinitely. In fact it specifically empowers Congress "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization". And what good is such a "Rule" if it cannot be enforced?
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