Posted on 09/06/2002 9:40:38 AM PDT by OldMetMan
In the current scenario, you need to reduce your enemy's ability to engage in terrorism. This is somewhat easier to do.
What a terrorist needs most is a place to hide where the local authorities will not harrass him. The vast majority of nations can be convinced that they should not permit this through a combination of incentives and threats. The reletively few who cannot be convinced that they should not harbor terrorists are few that must be dealt with militarily.
When these nations are attacked, we need not eliminate their ability to wage war. We just have to either get them to "see the light", or overthrow their governments. While this is, by no means, easy, at least it seems doable.
I don't really see how we have any other options, other than just sitting around and waiting for these folks to blow up our cities from time to time.
"So, what is terrorism? A very useful definition suggests that terrorism is planned violence intended to have a psychological effect on politically relevant behavior (Hutchinson 1972.)” In addition to a useful conceptual definition of terrorism, it is also helpful to have an operational definition, as well. According to Martha Hutchinson, there are four key factors that should be taken into account in such a definition.http://216.239.35.100/search?q=cache:iG6e2nu92McC:www.usna.edu/NAFAC/Papers/table12/Models_of_Terrorism_by_Simeon_Poles.doc+terrorism+definition+strategies+tactics&hl=en&ie=UTF-8First, terrorists use violence to seize power from an existing government by influencing its political agenda. The attempt to seize power need not be explicitly designed to overthrow that government, but even so, there is a clear loss of both legitimacy and power when terrorists are successful in gaining concessions from a government through their actions.
Second, terrorists use strategies of violence that are politically and socially unacceptable, and it is the deviance of the action that produces the desired psychological effect. Following from this second characteristic, terrorists select targets that are symbolic and psychologically meaningful to the population and government they are trying to affect. This would explain the choice of targets on September 11th, given that the World Trade Center and Pentagon are not only very useful sites, but also highly symbolic. Fourth and finally, the symbolism of the targets chosen by terrorists is what makes the threat real and tangible in the minds of those they are trying to coerce.
According to H. Edward Price, in his book The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terorism (1977), terrorism produces three categories of victim (52.) These categories are differentiated mostly by how close or relevant the victim is to the actual attack. The first category of victim is the physical victim, those who are directly affected by attack. Those people whose misfortune it was to find themselves onboard one of the hijacked planes, in the World Trade Center towers or the Pentagon, or near the site of the attacks are part of this category. The second category is that of the parallel victim. These victims are those people who are characteristically similar to the physical victims of the attack. If, for example, a Cypriot terrorist organization bombed a series of Greek cultural centers in New York City, the Greek population of the city would be classified as a parallel victim, because the terrorists intended message to them is, “You may be next.” The third category is that of the resonant mass, namely those people who are the greater populace of the state or actor against which the terrorist act is launched. In that sense, they aren’t victims in the conventional sense of the word; rather they are victimized only to the extent that their sentiments are influenced (and hopefully changed) by the use of force and violence.
As we have seen, terrorists employ their strategy of violence with a distinct goal in mind, and their actions have the intended consequence of making victims of ordinary people for political purposes. However, there is a question that arises when considering these things: Why do terrorists engage in this activity at all? Answering this question is worthy of an exhaustive writing in itself, but a brief and encapsulated answer would suggest that terrorists act in this fashion because they are, at some level, otherwise not empowered to achieve the changes they desire. Whether that disempowerment be financial, political, or a combination of both, it is this sense that leads terrorists to use violence and force to achieve means to an end. Hence,
The attractiveness of terrorism to insurgents who lack the means is the reason it is often called ‘the weapon of the weak’ and many strategic models of insurrection situate it as the first phase in the conflict followed respectively by guerilla and then conventional warfare as the insurgents grow stronger (Hutchinson 1972.)
Because terrorists need to create a change in the thought processes of the population at large, it is important that they create an ideological parity with other weak members of the society (Hutchinson 1972.) In the case of the radical Islamic terrorists who attacked America, the terrorists have sought to create that ideological parity with other fundamentalist Muslims, and the Muslim community at large. These terrorists have chosen to create that parity through the use of TV and other forms of media – most notably through outlets like the Al-Jazeera television network – using those media to spread a message that essentially blames the United States for forcing them to resort to such tactics. As Price argues, this is a classic strategy in the psychological battle to win the war of public sentiment and opinion, and use this victory to justify and legitimize the terrorist organization, their message, and their methods for spreading that message. Ideological parity, then, is vital to establishing legitimacy. (Hutchinson 1972, Price 1977, C.C. O’Brien 1979.)
Like any other group, terrorists must have a way of considering their chances of success or failure. Just as firms consider the relative risk versus reward of a particular ad campaign or merger/acquisition opportunity, terrorists also engage in this kind of analytical behavior. Terrorists, then, must take three general questions into account: First, do they have the expertise to undertake a particular operation – scientific, technical, or otherwise (Hutchinson 1972)? Without this consideration, it is easy to see how an operation like the one used of September 11th becomes immeasurably difficult to undertake. Second, how will the target government react? Will that government bend to their demands to avoid further bloodshed? Will it simply ignore them? Or will it respond with force? The second consideration is likewise essential because the answer to these questions form the basis for anticipating the overall success or failure of the mission vis-à-vis whether or not the target state will favorably change the policy in contention. Third, how will the populace of the target state react to the use of force? Furthermore, terrorists must understand whether or not the people’s reaction will sufficiently move the state to act, and it what action it will produce (Hutchinson 1972.)
Regardless of how much the terrorist organization tries to anticipate the answers to the questions and considerations above, there are still very acute risks involved in terrorist operations, and terrorists engage in a thorough consideration of these things, as well. Hutchinson argues that there are three risk factors that terrorist must take into account before they act, mainly because they have the capacity to greatly affect the overall mission.
Terrorists, first and foremost, run a great risk of arousing hostility in the resonant mass instead of the fear and instability that is usually essential to achieving their objective. Hostility in the resonant mass creates an unfavorable political climate in which to achieve the desired changes, and is therefore to be avoided, if possible.
Secondly, there is the risk that the government will respond with overwhelming force and crush the organization; this consideration is ever-present in the minds of those who plan and implement terrorist attacks. However, like most rules, there is an exception. In some cases, terrorist organizations may actually hope for a reflexive and disproportionate response by the state in question, even at the expense of its own membership, because it allows them to paint that government as violent and repressive, thus further legitimizing themselves and their mission. It has been widely speculated that Osama bin Laden’s larger goal was to achieve this kind of response from the American government in order to do just that, legitimize himself and the Al-Qaeda network as legitimate warriors in a struggle against an aggressive and imperialistic America (Hutchinson 1972.)
Thirdly, terrorists risk losing mental control of themselves because of their continued involvement with the use of violence. Hutchinson concedes, however, that this risk is far less likely than the other two, and concerns terrorist organizations far less as well. While this researcher is not aware of any concrete or scientific study into the matter, it seems very unlikely that terrorists as ideologically driven as those who were willing to smash planes into skyscrapers would be likely to suffer mentally as a result of those efforts (Hutchinson 1972.)
Having considered the analytical process of terrorist organizations, and their methods for evaluating the operational risks of their operations, it is also useful to consider the strategic and tactical considerations of terrorist behavior. There are generally three tactics employed by terrorist organizations to achieve their objective: kidnapping, assassination, and indiscriminate violence (Price 1977.) All three are very useful tools in the attempt by terrorists to bring about the kinds of changes they seek, but each is used in different circumstances and for different reasons, which we will now explore...
I agree with what you are stating here, which is why the decision to attack Iraq is so confusing to me. The Baath party is a secular party, which the US supported at one time, specifically because we tilted towards Iraq in its war with Iran, because we saw this as the best way to contain the Islamic revolutionary sentiment that was then in danger of spreading out from Iran to infect the rest of the region.
If we now go ahead and attack Iraq, which does not have ties to Islamic terrorism, but does enjoy the sympathies of its neighbors in the wake of eleven years of bombing and sanctions, then it will further destabilize the region, inflame anti-american sentiment and drastically reduce the level of cooperation we're likely to get from in our attempts to capture and/or kill the members of the organization (AL Queda) which actually did attack us!
The arab leaders have told us we should take care of the Israeli-Palestinina situation first, and that if we attack Iraq now they will not be able to control their own population. Well, why should we care, right? Because, if those regimes topple, they are likely to be replaced by "Islamic Revolutionaries," and then we;ll REALLY have ahornet's nest on our hands...
Well, that's how I see it, anyway. Look at Britain - they didn't respond to the IRA by dropping air-fuel bombs all over Ireland, because in so doing they would have killed 19 innocent people for every one terrorist, and then the families of these 19 people wopuld have become terrorists! The British treated it like a police action, which is why they eventually won. That's how we should respond to the Al-Queda threat, IMHO. We have enough enemies already, we don't need to make make more, if we really absolutely feel like its necessary to turn the entire arab world against us, then there will always be time for that later. First, we need to deal with AL Queda! Instead we are just playing into their hands... its very shortsighted.
All I can say is.....what is your point?
OK, they were terrorists, thanks for enlightening us.
Paralysis by analysis...
--Boris
eshu
1.We backed Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath party and sold them billions of dollars worth of dual-use military techonologiues which he has used to develop chemical weapons. If you think this was a good decision, I would be curious to hear your justification.
2.We started training camps in Afhghanistan for the Mujhadeen "freedom fighters" (including Osama Bin Laden) and so that they could fight the SOviets. Again, If you think this was a good decision, please tell me why. It seems to me that this blew up in our face, but hey. personally I don't like AMerica being made a target.
3.We supported Khadafi, another real winner. I would be very pleased to hear any reasons you could give me any reasons why taking action to support that maniac was a good idea and helpful to the US in the long run.
I could actually give you dozens o9f examples, but these three are a good place to start. It constantly amazes me how many "true blue patriot" typoes think that being a patriot meaning overthrowing third world government and replacing nutball anti-american dictators who torture and kill their own citizens with nutball pro-american dictators who torture and kill their own citizens. The first choice stinks, but at least we don't turn entire regions of the world against us when we leave them alone. ALso, it seems to have an extremely poor track record - ie., this just plain doesn't work in the long run.
Here's an example - we wanted a "regime change" in Iran so we overturned tehir election and installed the Shah. The Shah imprisoned and tortured approx. 10,000 opposition party members, journalists, professors, etc. Eventually the Iranians overthrow the Shah in a revolution and *big surprise* the new govt. is viruntly anti-American. Now, really, how did this all help the US in the long run? WHat advantage was it to us to interfere in a foreign country's elections and install someone they all hated?
WHat is so patriotic about making AMerica hated? That is the part I don't egt. But, if you could explain it to me i'd be very grateful.
Sadly there are many here who couldn't give a rat's patootie about the constitution and are only too eager to drag the US into the holy wars of the middle east. I don't understand why, that's for sure, America is supposed to be a republic, not an empire, it is not our job to have troops in 141 countries, we had no business supporting Hussein, Ghadafi, the Shah of Iran, Noreiga, and all of those other fruitcakes in the first place.
But, the american people have a short memory, so i suppose this will just keep happening again and again. We're probably grooming some sort of "strongman" Iraqi politician to replace Hussein even as I type this.
The SOlution: US out of the UN. Use our troops to defend our own borders, not police the rest of the world. Cut off foreign aid to africa, asia, the middle east, europe.... and worry about our own hemisphere for a change.
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