Posted on 05/02/2002 6:48:03 AM PDT by handk
Well, I wasn't really making any such presumption. I was only citing Galileo and Copernicus as well-known examples of a rather common - dare I say universal - phenomenon. I don't know about you, but in my experience, people usually have an innate desire to learn. (Does the word fascination mean anything to you?) When that desire is quashed - as in the case with your son - is when learning is associated with having to do work, especially when one would rather be doing something else, like playing. But even playing involves making sense of one's environs. For Galileo (and many, many others, myself included) looking through the telescope was a form of play.
We don't require doctors and engineers to study calculus because they're all budding little Galileo-wannabes.
I think you're getting ahead of yourself a little. Why are they becoming doctors and engineers in the first place? Sure, some of them (doctors particularly) are doing it for the social benefits (read: cash), but those aren't the one's I'd feel confident in. Take it a step further and ask why people become chemists, physicists, and even mathematicians? Are these considered glamour jobs by society at large? (sure, they're respected, but that's not quite the same) For that matter, why do you study all those pedantic Latin phrases that you admittedly enjoy employing? (and are any coming to mind now?)
As for those doctors who are made to study calculus despite not feeling particularly inclined towards the subject, the fact that people wish to learn doesn't mean that they want to learn everything, and especially doesn't mean that they want to learn what someone else orders them to learn.
Onto another subject: Okay, I think I'm with you then. So what you're suggesting is that morality is a matter of fundamental and universal truth, that we discover as part of the universe around us.
I'd say it's more that we discover it within us, but you get the general idea.
The two problems I see are, how do you answer when someone asks you where that truth comes from?
I don't see how that's a "problem", for present purposes. We haven't settled the issue of where the law of gravity comes from either.
And second, how do we know when some proposed moral principle is really a matter of universal truth, and not just someone's opinion?
Well, it's not easy, as human history attests. But that doesn't mean these principles don't exist. The way to begin is by accepting as a matter of principle that these - well, principles - do exist, and aren't just matters of opinion. Getting at them, as I said in an earlier post, involves honest introspection; and from your comments regarding Eichmann and other matters, it seems that you understand that on some level. Reason can be used to elucidate and extrapolate from there, but it can't in and of itself provide a starting point.
And BTW, isn't this some kind of Pascals Wager?
Not believing in God, you do not think yourself to be God’s creature. And not believing in God you do not think the universe has been created by God. That is to say, you think of yourself and the world as just being there. Now if you actually are God’s creature, then your present attitude is very unfair to Him. In that case it is even an insult to Him. And since you have insulted God, His displeasure rests upon you. God and you are not on “speaking terms.” And you have very good reasons for trying to prove that He does not exist. If He does exist, He will punish you for your disregard of Him. You are therefore wearing colored glasses. And this determines everything you say about the facts and reasons for not believing in Him. You have, as it were, entered upon God’s estate and have had your picnics and hunting parties there without asking His permission. You have taken the grapes of God’s vineyard without paying Him any rent, and you have insulted His representatives who asked you for it.
What I also found very strange is this sentence:
You have cemented your colored glasses to your face so firmly that you cannot take them off even when you sleep.How can he be so sure that not he is wearing those colored glasses?
You've nailed me there. I was that kid, too, in many ways, so I guess I won't plug him with the .45. (although I can't say I'm not TEMPTED:^)
I think that karma is not the same concept as the law of sowing and reaping. We do tend to reap what we sow (a little Biblical lingo, there) but karma is the inveterate enemy of forgivness.
Cordially,
I think Van Til was explicit in his acknowledgment that he did not have the power to convince the reader. The point was, I think, and this is the reason I replied with parts of the essay, to clarify our respective allegiances and how they affect our views of the nature and extent of things like evidence. I think he would probably agree with me that you can not come to God unless God first draws you, any more than Lazarus could have raised himself from the dead by himself.
How can he be so sure that he is not wearing those colored glasses?
Well, if Van Til was right he no longer needs glasses of any kind, as he has passed on from this world to his reward. But you are right; we also wear glasses. We all need them. We are blind without them. Ours are just of a different kind, and made by a different Maker than yours. Yours you fashioned yourself. But Perhaps Van Til would agree with me that our glasses are ones made by the One who also made our eyes.
Cordially,
Yepp, I read that. But then one has to ask oneself why he wrote this essay. As I already suspected he merely tries to confirm his faith by errecting a strawman unbeliever and knocking him down. Well, this this method works if you want to strengthen the faith of those who already believe.
I think he would probably agree with me that you can not come to God unless God first draws you...
...or to Allah or Vishnu or Juju. I hope you see that adherents of every religion can make this argument and once you believe in a god everything points to this particular god.
But you are right; we also wear glasses.
Obviously.
Ours are just of a different kind, and made by a different Maker than yours. Yours you fashioned yourself.
They are different, that one's clear but it's also possible that you are the maker and you only believe that Someone Else made them ;-D
Regards
Yes, but why don't we just let anyone hang out a shingle and call themselves a doctor? Heck, I bet lots of people want to be doctors, but those darn requirements for studying math and science keep getting in the way. But stubbornly, we require doctors to study math and science anyway. Why? Because doing so makes them better doctors than they otherwise would be.
Why do we make laws at all? Because they make us feel good about ourselves when we craft a brand spanking new law? Of course not - we make laws because it's good for society that we do so.
Me: The two problems I see are, how do you answer when someone asks you where that truth comes from?
You: I don't see how that's a "problem", for present purposes. We haven't settled the issue of where the law of gravity comes from either.
Sorry - maybe I wasn't clear. I'm not saying we should resolve where it comes from, I'm asking you where you think it comes from. Where does this universal truth we call "morality" come from?
Well, it's not easy, as human history attests. But that doesn't mean these principles don't exist.
Sure, granted. But on the other hand, if we can't tell the difference between universal truth and someone's opinion of what that truth is, how do we know there is such a thing? Even if I grant your assertion that such universal truths exist and are not matters of opinion, I don't see any way for some third party to differentiate between your "universal truth" and my personal opinion, especially if I forego the label of opinion and present my opinions as matters of universal truth.
For example, I assert the universal truth of the moral principle that says that goods and services should be distributed from each according to his means, to each according to his needs. This is universally true, and a moral principle that we should organize society around.
How on earth can you possibly refute my assertion that this principle is a universal truth, and therefore a moral imperative?
I believe I addressed that point in the following sentence that you seem to have passed over: "As for those doctors who are made to study calculus despite not feeling particularly inclined towards the subject, the fact that people wish to learn doesn't mean that they want to learn everything, and especially doesn't mean that they want to learn what someone else orders them to learn."
Sorry - maybe I wasn't clear. I'm not saying we should resolve where it comes from, I'm asking you where you think it comes from.
And I'm declining to get into that right now.
But on the other hand, if we can't tell the difference between universal truth and someone's opinion of what that truth is, how do we know there is such a thing? Even if I grant your assertion that such universal truths exist and are not matters of opinion, I don't see any way for some third party to differentiate between your "universal truth" and my personal opinion, especially if I forego the label of opinion and present my opinions as matters of universal truth.
I agree it doesn't present a cut and dried solution, but it involves having a certain amount of faith that, on the deepest levels, we all have the same understanding, or ability to understand moral truth, even though as different individuals may try to convince themselves otherwise - something you might call "living in denial". For example, I think we've more or less settled the issue between us about a human right to life. I think it's a pretty safe bet (though there's no way of testing it objectively) that pretty much anyone who would be completely honest with himself, would know that he has a right to live and to not have pain inflicted on him needlessly, and the general right to be left alone, unharassed by others. And as I've said earlier, once he could see that, it's easy enough to extrapolate and say that if he has these rights, everyone else does, too. But you're right, there are some who'd come up with a whole plethora of arbitrary rules for people, and claim that they're speaking from universal truth. All I can say is that I believe that they're not being honest with themselves, or they're not being honest with us. But if you are being honest, and you know something to be true, it doesn't make it any less true if you can't prove it objectively, and it doesn't lessen your obligation to act on that truth. Not easy, I know, but such is our lot in life as mortals.
LOL - even if I let you off the hook here, I don't think you'll be able to avoid that question forever. Sooner or later, the answer will have to come, and then I think you'll find that a surprising number of people on this earth are of the opinion that your "universal" truth only applies to a "universe" that consists almost entirely of the Christian West. IOW, your claims to universal truth are going to evaporate as soon as you present where you think those universal truths come from to the athiest, the Hindu, the Shintoist - okay, maybe not the Hindus. IIRC, part of Hinduism is the belief that everything is an extension of their gods, including other religions. They'd claim your God as nothing more than a facet of theirs ;)
Be that as it may, claims to universal truth can only carry weight with someone who already accepts the thing you are using as a foundation - you can really only preach to the choir, so to speak. Unless you're going to duck the question ;)
I agree it doesn't present a cut and dried solution, but it involves having a certain amount of faith that, on the deepest levels, we all have the same understanding, or ability to understand moral truth, even though as different individuals may try to convince themselves otherwise - something you might call "living in denial". For example, I think we've more or less settled the issue between us about a human right to life. I think it's a pretty safe bet (though there's no way of testing it objectively) that pretty much anyone who would be completely honest with himself, would know that he has a right to live and to not have pain inflicted on him needlessly, and the general right to be left alone, unharassed by others. And as I've said earlier, once he could see that, it's easy enough to extrapolate and say that if he has these rights, everyone else does, too. But you're right, there are some who'd come up with a whole plethora of arbitrary rules for people, and claim that they're speaking from universal truth. All I can say is that I believe that they're not being honest with themselves, or they're not being honest with us. But if you are being honest, and you know something to be true, it doesn't make it any less true if you can't prove it objectively, and it doesn't lessen your obligation to act on that truth. Not easy, I know, but such is our lot in life as mortals.
Or, if I might be so bold as to restate - first we start with some axioms. Some people might claim certain things as axiomatic that ought not to be, so we'll need to discuss and decide which of those proposed principles are actually axiomatic, and which we'll actually use to guide us. Then, we'll reason our way to the law itself.
See, now I'm reading this and wondering what we're disagreeing about in the first place.... ;)
In other words, if people can't agree on what the source of moral truth is, there's no way they can agree on what the nature of that truth is? I very much disagree.
See, now I'm reading this and wondering what we're disagreeing about in the first place.... ;)
Aside from what I stated above, what I think we're disagreeing about is that you, I think, seem to be saying that the axioms we should start with can themselves be determined by reason. Alternatively, you might be saying that they're something we should just pick out, the way one picks out a new dress style. Either way, I don't think you seem to be agreeing with me that the axioms exist as matters of truth, and that it's simply our job to make sure we know that truth.
What I'm saying is that your presumption of what universal truth is, is necessarily predicated on what you think has been given to you by a particular deity. And when what your deity says conflicts with what someone else's deity says, you're at an impasse with no clear resolution. Consider what I said about abortion earlier - either elective abortion is a wrong, as a matter of fundamental universal morality, or it is not (setting aside the notion of situational ethics for the moment).
Now, there are lots of people who are convinced that it is a universal truth that elective abortion is morally wrong. And that presumption of truth is predicated on a particular worldview, a particular notion of what God says about right and wrong. But the Jews, their God says otherwise. They don't share that belief that God says it's always wrong, so they don't accept claims about the universal truth of the proposition that says that elective abortion is a moral wrong.
It won't always be the case, but clearly, unless there is agreement on the source of the universal truth, there will not be agreement on what that universal truth is - what God says to Christians is simply not going to coincide always and everywhere with what God says to Jews and Muslims and Hindus and whatever. God says one thing to you, and quite another to them - who's got the universal truth? You? Them? Someone else entirely?
Alternatively, you might be saying that they're something we should just pick out, the way one picks out a new dress style. Either way, I don't think you seem to be agreeing with me that the axioms exist as matters of truth, and that it's simply our job to make sure we know that truth.
What I'm saying is that it doesn't matter whether it's a universal truth or not - you can't ever really know if some proposed moral principle is a matter of universal truth. There is simply no objective way of determining whether my pronouncements are universally true, or just my particular opinion. So why behave as though you can know something you cannot?
Okay, you say, we look within ourselves for the truth. Which, it seems to me, sounds as though we judge for ourselves the rightness or wrongness of some proposed universal truth, and then proceed...by consensus? ;)
Well said General.
I don't think you have any basis for making that claim. I'd be interested in seeing you try to back it up somehow.
What I'm saying is that it doesn't matter whether it's a universal truth or not - you can't ever really know if some proposed moral principle is a matter of universal truth. There is simply no objective way of determining whether my pronouncements are universally true, or just my particular opinion. So why behave as though you can know something you cannot?
You've partially repeated an argument I already made, that there is no objective way of determining moral truth, just as there's no objective way of describing the color green, or describing pain. That those last two exist is not a matter of contention, though. As for the first, I agree that it's a bit harder for a person to resolve, because there's a lot of emotional clutter that gets in the way; but that doesn't mean he can't get at it. So, to answer your last question, I behave as though I can know something because I can.
Okay, you say, we look within ourselves for the truth. Which, it seems to me, sounds as though we judge for ourselves the rightness or wrongness of some proposed universal truth, and then proceed...by consensus? ;)
You're still not getting my point - or maybe you are. We need to be precise in our meanings here. When you say, "judge for ourselves", do you mean decide for ourselves or determine for ourselves? My point is it would be wrong to assume that there are no wrong answers - that whatever we judge to be the case is by definition valid, because we have judged it to be so. I realize that may seem to leave us back where we started because you'd then reply that therefore we can't know what the truth is. Well, we can, we just can't prove it objectively. So it really just comes down to who can scream the loudest. OK...maybe not. But still, if I can know it, and you can know it, then we both can know it, without having to prove it to each other.
I realize that if I leave it at that, we're prone to start cycling again through the same routine. So if I still haven't gotten my point across clearly enough, I'll break it down step by step, and start by asking you, Do you agree that it's possible, in the abstract, to know the truth about something without being able to prove it objectively?
You: I don't think you have any basis for making that claim. I'd be interested in seeing you try to back it up somehow.
Okay, then, I'll revist my earlier question, and now I must insist on an answer - where, precisely, do you believe universal truth comes from? What, precisely, do you feel is the source of morality?
So, to answer your last question, I behave as though I can know something because I can.
...
Do you agree that it's possible, in the abstract, to know the truth about something without being able to prove it objectively?
Define what it means to "know" something. Once we get round that bend, we may make some further progress ;)
Okay, then, I'll revist my earlier question, and now I must insist on an answer - where, precisely, do you believe universal truth comes from? What, precisely, do you feel is the source of morality?
HA HA HA! Nice try. But you don't need me to answer anything in order to back up your claim. If you stand by such a claim, then you would already have the information you need to back it up.
Define what it means to "know" something. Once we get round that bend, we may make some further progress ;)
D'Ohh!!! OK, let's see... Would you say that you "know" what pain is?
Why, I do - I have inferred what I need in order to conclude it to my own satisfaction. I am convinced of it. However, you have asked me to convince you of it - why I have to persuade you that you believe what you believe seems a bit strange to me, but there you go.
In any case, seeing as how you're a rigorous and thoughtful person who might not accept my inferences as proof enough, I have elected to attempt to construct an irrefutable case about your beliefs, by simply asking you what they are. I will demonstrate that your beliefs are some particular thing by simply asking you to verify them.
Now, this is predicated on the assumption that your own words are enough to convince you of what your opinion is, but you don't strike me as particularly schizophrenic, so I think I'm fairly safe in that assumption ;)
So, where does universal truth come from?
Would you say that you "know" what pain is?
Well, you've certainly given me plenty of opportunity to trot out some serious sophistry of my own. Let's see where we go with this, then.
The dictionary says pain is a "usually localized physical suffering associated with bodily disorder (as a disease or an injury); also : a basic bodily sensation induced by a noxious stimulus, received by naked nerve endings, characterized by physical discomfort (as pricking, throbbing, or aching), and typically leading to evasive action"
Insofar as I understand the definition, I can say with reasonable confidence that I do occasionally experience such a sensation in response to the expected stimuli. Of course, I can't really vouch for whether or not you do - I assume you do, but I don't think I can know that you do as a matter of certainty.
And I'm sort of curious as to whether you "know" that I experience pain - is my statement alone enough for you to consider that you know that I understand pain?
Well, I'd be very interested in hearing what it is that led you to infer that. Because at no point in our entire discussion did I appeal to any sort of deity to back up my postition. My whole point has been that one can determine moral law (or whatever you want to call it) merely by looking within, and without having to ID its source. Now you can agree or disagree, but in order to disagree, you'd need to give reasons. Simply saying "No, suh!" doesn't quite cut it. The burden is on thee, not me. Why does one need to believe in a source of moral law in order to believe that moral law exists?
And I'm sort of curious as to whether you "know" that I experience pain - is my statement alone enough for you to consider that you know that I understand pain?
Good question. I have no direct knowledge of whether or not you feel pain the way I do. But I know that you seem to be constructed along the same basic plan that I was (I mean, I'm assuming - unless the Internet has started to sprout its own intelligence or something); there was nothing unique that I can see about my birth, or conception; and people around me seem to react more or less the same way I do to a wide range of stimuli. So it just comes down to what the standard of knowledge is that we're going to demand. Someone earlier on this thread asked how we could know that we weren't just all created yesterday, with our memories implanted. If we can't know that, then there's next to nothing much else we can know, so there'd be no point in continuing. But if we're willing to say, Look, the evidence is so overwhelming, and there's no evidence at all to the contrary... I think it would be the height of unreasonableness for me to assume, or even fail to assume otherwise, that you don't feel pain the same way I do, in all the relevant details. Sound acceptable?
Right, fine. But my point has been that, whether or not you think you need to ID the source, as soon as someone asks you to ID the source, the game's over. Because whether you answer or not, someone else will posit a source of their own that doesn't necessarily jibe with what you think moral law is. IOW, you decline to answer, so I fill in the blank for myself by saying that Ba'al commands me to drink the blood of the unbeliever, as a moral imperative. How do you counter that?
Now you can agree or disagree, but in order to disagree, you'd need to give reasons. Simply saying "No, suh!" doesn't quite cut it. The burden is on thee, not me.
Why? I don't feel particularly compelled to persuade you of this, particularly when there's an easy way to verify whether or not I am correct in my inferences - you could blow me out of the water instantly by denying that you feel that moral law flows from some particular moral law-giver. You ask me what led me to infer that you won't deny such a thing - the fact that you duck the question leads me to believe that I am correct in my inferences, among other things ;)
The way I see it, you have a couple of possible answers to the question of where moral law comes from. One, you could tell me that moral law comes strictly from within, which you seem to have been toying with. However, the implication of that answer would be that moral law is inherently subjective, and a matter of personal opinion, since you have no way of knowing that what I see within me is what you see within you. Since you wish to posit that moral law is objective and universal, rather than subjective and personal, and you are clever enough to recognize the implications of saying that it comes from entirely within ourselves (among other things, it would put you squarely in agreement with me, which you seem not to want to do), I think it unlikely that you would choose to answer in this manner.
Two, you could answer that it doesn't really come from anywhere at all. However, this is tantamount to saying that moral law is eternal and uncaused also, as God is. And then I would have to ask how many exceptions you intend to carve out to the idea of causality. As this answer is likely to be truly rare indeed - I have never heard anyone posit such a thing - and because I think that you are a clever person who recognizes that this answer opens up a whole new can of worms, I find it unlikely that you will choose to answer in this manner either. Although it is just barely possible that you would believe such a thing, you would be a rare bird indeed to hold such an opinion.
Three, you could choose to do an about-face and deny that there is such a thing as universal moral law altogether. Since this would directly contradict your position to this point, and I have no overweening illusions of my own powers of persuasion, I find it unlikely that you would choose to answer in this manner also.
Four, you can answer that moral law and universal moral truths flow from some particular source. As this is the most common position among those who believe in universal moral laws, and as the other options seem rather unlikely, by process of elimination, I am led to conclude that this position is the most likely one for you to hold.
But, of course, you could prove me wrong by simply answering the question. So tell me - where, exactly, does moral law come from?
And when you answer, then we'll know how well my powers of deduction are working these days ;)
Why does one need to believe in a source of moral law in order to believe that moral law exists?
I don't say that belief in a source of moral law is necessary to believe in moral law itself - indeed, I explicitly allow for the possibility that it is not above. I merely infer that you believe that there is a source of moral law. I don't really believe that it's a necessity at all, but even if it isn't necessary, it's still an option. And an option that I think you have availed yourself of.
Of course, you could prove me wrong by answering the question ;)
But I know that you seem to be constructed along the same basic plan that I was (I mean, I'm assuming - unless the Internet has started to sprout its own intelligence or something)
Funny, I was going to suggest that very possibility - neither of us know whether the other is even a real person or not. ;)
So it just comes down to what the standard of knowledge is that we're going to demand.
And that's exactly it. And exactly the sort of game the sophists (and their postmodern cousins, BTW) play - define "know" so stringently that it turns out that we don't really know anything at all, and everything we think we know is simply a matter of belief. This is what I was alluding to about trotting out the sophistry for myself.
But ultimately, that sort of relativism is self-refuting. The problem that the pomos have is the same problem that all relativists have had since the days of Protagoras - ultimately, what it boils down to is the notion that there's no such thing as objective fact, just people's opinions. But when presented with that statement, the immediate question one should ask is, well then, is that statement itself objectively true, or is it just your opinion? And neither answer is particularly palatable to the relativists, for obvious reasons.
So, while I could play that game, I'm not a through-and-through relativist (nor a postmodernist), so I don't find it particularly convincing.
Someone earlier on this thread asked how we could know that we weren't just all created yesterday, with our memories implanted. If we can't know that, then there's next to nothing much else we can know, so there'd be no point in continuing. But if we're willing to say, Look, the evidence is so overwhelming, and there's no evidence at all to the contrary...
Well, I think I might answer that a bit differently. No, we don't know that, but more importantly, we can't know that to be true, even if it is. So why behave as though it is? Even if that is true, we can only operate based on the information we have before us, and the information we have before us tells us that we weren't just created yesterday, even if it is true that we were. So acting as though we have information that we do not strikes me as irrational. And anyway, even if we knew that to be true, so what? What are we supposed to do about it?
I think it would be the height of unreasonableness for me to assume, or even fail to assume otherwise, that you don't feel pain the same way I do, in all the relevant details. Sound acceptable?
Well, I suppose you could try to add to the evidence supporting such an assumption - you could set me on fire or something, and try to observe whether or not my behavior matched what you would expect from someone who senses pain. But you, not unreasonably at all, infer inductively that you don't really have to do such a thing. And that's what you really did in your post - you inductively reasoned that what was true of you is also true of me.
But there's a nasty fact hiding underneath that sort of thing also, and it'll sound sort of like the sophists' arguments at first, but it isn't at all, really. In a much earlier post, I mentioned David Hume and how he showed that the study of history was a form of petitio principii, or begging the question. But that's actually just an amusing side-effect of what he was really doing - what Hume was really doing was showing that there's no way to prove the validity of any sort of inductive reasoning at all. IOW, what philosophers call the "inductive principle" is necessarily a matter of belief, and one that cannot be proven to be valid. Now, inductive reasoning has proven to be useful enough that we accept the validity of it, even though we can't prove the validity of it - it appears to be empirically valid, even though we can't prove that it must logically be valid. But truthfully, at its core, you have nothing more than an assumption that I am like you, and you reason based on that assumption.
S it differs from the relativists in the sense that it allows that we can know the things we deduce to be true, but it leaves us with the nasty fact that we can't really know the truth of what we reason out inductively, since we can't really know whether induction is itself valid.
But, while all that is very interesting (and I highly recommend Hume to you for that, and the fact that he pretty convincingly wrecks Aquinas's "proofs" of the existence of God), we do generally accept that induction is valid. So, ultimately, I accept your reasoning that there is this thing we call "pain", and that when you and I refer to "pain" we have a common understanding of a thing that actually exists. We can't prove it to be true, but we grant it to be true as a foundational starting point - it is one of our unprovable axioms, if you like.
At least not up until now. But further down in your post, you wrote, "S it differs from the relativists in the sense that it allows that we can know the things we deduce to be true...." So now I caught you in a typo, which means you must be human. Either that or some kind of English-speaking alien.
I don't say that belief in a source of moral law is necessary to believe in moral law itself - indeed, I explicitly allow for the possibility that it is not above. I merely infer that you believe that there is a source of moral law.
Well, that clears it up a little better. Earlier you said (#732), "What I'm saying is that your presumption of what universal truth is, is necessarily predicated on what you think has been given to you by a particular deity." (my emphasis) Your use of the word "necessarily" led me to believe that you intended for your statement to apply to anyone who believes in moral truth, not just me. Instead, you were simply making an inference about my beliefs specifically. Well, that's fine, then. You can infer all you want. It doesn't have any bearing on the present discussion.
IOW, you decline to answer, so I fill in the blank for myself by saying that Ba'al commands me to drink the blood of the unbeliever, as a moral imperative. How do you counter that?
By proceeding along the lines we've been proceeding along below. Let's continue, shall we?
So it differs from the relativists in the sense that it allows that we can know the things we deduce to be true, but it leaves us with the nasty fact that we can't really know the truth of what we reason out inductively, since we can't really know whether induction is itself valid. (corrected version :-p )
That doesn't seem like much of a difference to me. If you can't rely on any form of induction, then you're not left with much to deduce from.
IOW, what philosophers call the "inductive principle" is necessarily a matter of belief, and one that cannot be proven to be valid.
OK, but this is the impasse that we're at: the fact that something is a matter of belief doesn't mean that it's a matter of fantasy. It can still be a fact. As G.K. Chesterton said, "Reason is itself a matter of faith. It is an act of faith to assert that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all." It's a matter of just accepting that there's a point beyond which you can't break things down any further. You actually slipped ahead of me when you asked me how I can know that you feel pain the way I do, and vice versa. I'd like to take it back to my original question, and simply ask you if you know that you can feel pain - never mind about anyone else just yet. Because the point I'm trying to establish is whether or not you can know something to be true (in this case, your perception of pain), without being able to prove it objectively.
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