Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
Belousov followed Shoigu’s path. What is the Minister of Defense afraid of?
Remember how Andrei Belousov’s people offered us money in May , but we refused. [ see
https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6398#6398 ] It seems that the associates of the Minister of Defense have found someone to pay this money to. Usually we don't answer when someone says that we are crests, lying, and so on. We don't want to waste time on all this. They were not going to respond to this
https://nemez1da.ru/rassledovaniya/ukrainskoe-czipso-ih-kanaly-i-fejki/ article which ill-wishers sent through their telegram networks. Well, people earn their pretty penny, so why bother them? But the situation is too serious not to react to it. That's why we are forced to do this.
Firstly, we have already commented on all the claims made against us in this article here https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/2552 and here https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/2891
It says there how they hacked us, posted posts in Ukrainian on this channel, and so on. We don't want to repeat ourselves. Read it and don't trust fakes anymore under the guise of “fighters against fakes.”
Secondly, we would not react to all these stuffing. But there is a problem. Very big. Last year we were hacked, fake news was written about us, and so on, for money allocated by personal order of Sergei Shoigu. The Minister of Defense has changed. There were hopes for change. But nothing has changed. It's just a disaster. At the front, by the way, changes are also happening at the same rate. Andrey Removich, maybe you won't be distracted by the war with us? Will you fight with the crests? Sorry for the emotions.
Thirdly, according to our sources close to the Minister of Defense, the attack on us is connected with Belousov’s fears. “Andrei Removich, to be honest, is afraid of a lot. The fact that demobilization will fail, and he will be blamed for it. That they won't be able to win, that they will find out how he paid for his support. The fact that Vladimir Vladimirovich will be dissatisfied when he finds out about our real problems and losses. He's afraid, it sounds strange, but the fact is that God will abandon him, and we will lose the [special operation in Ukraine], ” a general close to Valery Gerasimov and familiar with the situation explained to us.
Such fears are, of course, very bad. And if the Minister of Defense asked us for help in such a situation, we would help. But he chose the path of intimidation. Well, we didn't start this war. We propose to finish it, because we don't want to fight with our own people.
Fourthly, to disrespected colleagues who decided to denigrate us. You have undertaken to refute the news that Russian soldiers died because of Ramzan Kadyrov . Does money really smell that bad? Or were you intimidated? Write to us if so. But to neglect the lives of Russian soldiers for the sake of the head of Chechnya... This is too vile.
One more thing. We know where everyone who created the fake news about us lives. With addresses, family details and so on. We will not publish this information so that a Khokhlyatsky rocket does not fly to you or thugs from the GUR come to you. Although you are drowning more for the Chechens, you are still Russians. But we kindly ask you to stop writing nasty things about us. I hope we are heard.
We will no longer respond to the dirt that is poured on us. But let's start writing about what we could keep silent about. You yourself wanted this.
Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine. The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II (the chamber in charge of the ICC’s Ukraine-related investigations and prosecutions) announced on June 25 that it had issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for “the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects” in Ukraine.[1] The ICC noted that there is reasonable evidence to believe that both Shoigu and Gerasimov bear individual responsibility for the war crimes of causing incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian objects and the crime of inhumane acts, both of which are violations of the Rome Statute. The ICC also emphasized that even in the case of Russian forces targeting “installations that may have qualified as military objectives at the relevant time,” the incidental civilian harm was excessively weighed against the expected military advantage—contrary to the international legal principle of proportionality.[2] The ICC concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s military decision-making intentionally inflicted serious bodily harm and suffering on Ukraine's civilian population.
The ECHR’s Grand Chamber also ruled on June 25 that Russia has committed various human rights violations in Crimea since the beginning of its illegal occupation of the peninsula in February 2014.[3] The ECHR found that Russian officials and forces in Crimea committed numerous violations of the European Convention of Human Rights, including violations of the right to life, prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment, right to liberty and security, right to no punishment without law, right to respect for private and family life, right to freedom of religion, right to freedom of expression, right to freedom of assembly, right to property, right to education, and right to freedom of movement, among other human rights violations. The ECHR’s ruling emphasized that the evidence that the Ukrainian government has provided to the court amounts to “a pattern or system of violations” perpetrated by Russia in Crimea. The decision is the first in which any international legal body has recognized Russia's widescale and systemic violation of human rights spanning over a decade in occupied Crimea.[4]
Russia imposed countersanctions against 81 European Union (EU)-based news outlets on June 25 following EU sanctions against four Russian state-affiliated news outlets on June 24.[18] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced that it had blocked access to EU-based media outlets, including: Germany's Der Spiegel and Die Welt; Denmark's Berlingske; Spain's El Mundo, El Pais, and EFE; Italy's La Repubblica; Poland's Belsat; France's Le Monde, Radio France, and Agence France-Presse (AFP); Estonia's EER and Delfi; and more general sites including Politico's European service, Svoboda Satellite Package, and EU Observer.[19] The Russian MFA noted that these sanctions are specifically in response to the EU blocking Kremlin-affiliated news sites RIA Novosti, Rossiskaya Gazeta, and Izvestia, but did not mention the new EU sanctions against the Voice of Europe — the joint venture of Kremlin-affiliate Artem Marchevsky and former pro-Russian Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk.[20]
Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov ordered investigations into the personal records of senior Dagestani officials following the June 23 likely Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in Dagestan, indicating that the Kremlin may be intensifying efforts to address Islamist extremist threats in the North Caucasus as it attempts to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy. Melikov stated in a June 25 address to the People's Assembly of Dagestan that he ordered an audit of the personal files of “everyone who holds leadership positions in Dagestan, including deputies of the People's Assembly.”[21] Melikov dismissed Dagestan’s Sergokalinsky district head Magomed Omarov on June 24 after Russian sources reported that that two of his sons were identified as two of the Makhachkala attackers whom Russian law enforcement killed during the attack.[22] Russian security services reported on June 25 that they detained Omarov and Russian law enforcement reported that Omarov may face charges of aiding terrorists.[23] A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin is “reconsidering its approach” to preventing extremism in the North Caucasus and “raising more questions” about Melikov who has yet to curb the “growing radical sentiment among [Dagestan’s] youth” following the June 23 Dagestan terrorist attacks.[24] ISW assessed that the Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack and posture Russia's alleged multiethnic and multi-religious unity.[25] Russian milbloggers widely criticized local officials who they claimed are aware of rising extremism and also criticized Dagestani youth policy for its alleged endorsement of youth mixed martial arts fight clubs, which they claim breeds extremist ideology.[26] Russian milbloggers’ outrage at Dagestani authorities is a tacit admission that they are not interested in amplifying the Kremlin's efforts to link the June 23 Dagestan terrorist attacks to external actors such as Ukraine or the West.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024
An awkward question for Vladimir Solovyov
Vladimir Rudolfovich. Please tell me. In private conversations, you tell everyone you know that Tabakerka [this Telegram channel] is Patrushev’s channel. And at the same time, you repost the fake news that we are the “Ukrainian CIPSO”.
It's awkward somehow. Maybe you could call Nikolai Platonovich and explain everything? You understand, it wouldn't be good if he called you first. Or maybe you don't have Patrushev’s direct number?
Or just delete this repost? You don't have to delete it. We are for freedom of speech. But then, if anything happens, don't be offended.
The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus. Russian sources, including prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers and Russian opposition media, amplified reports of two armed men firing on police in Makhachkala on the evening of June 25 and amplified footage of the alleged gunmen and gunfire in the area.[1] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that police deployed to central Makhachkala and cordoned off select areas, but Dagestan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that it did not introduce an “interception” plan to apprehend the alleged gunmen.[2] Dagestan’s MVD reported on June 25 that police received reports about an armed man in central Makhachkala but that the reports were false and that there were no violations of public order in the city.[3] Many Russian sources amended their earlier reports to label the shooting as fake and claimed that the footage was from the June 23 terrorist attacks and not the evening of June 25.[4] The apparent widespread misreporting of the shooting and the relatively heavy police response to the false reports suggests heightened fear and expectations in the Russian information space that there will be further terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus.
The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack and posture Russia's alleged multiethnic and multi-religious unity but is likely so far failing to reassure the public that there will not be further attacks.[5] The March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow and increasingly frequent Russian counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus have previously prompted tensions within the Russian information space, exacerbated by calls for increased controls on migration to Russia, appeals to Russia's multiethnic and multi-religious makeup, and outright xenophobia and racism.[6] The Kremlin has struggled to balance its appeals to anti-migrant Russian ultranationalists, its reliance on recruiting migrants for its war effort in Ukraine, and its need for migration to address labor shortages within Russia.[7] Heightened fears about religious extremism will further complicate the Kremlin's efforts to balance between these competing priorities. A Russian insider source directly commented on this nexus in response to the Dagestan attacks and claimed that Dagestan’s force generation efforts caused practitioners at a government-friendly mosque to turn to a more radical mosque with alleged Wahhabi connections.[8] ISW has previously assessed that Russian force generation efforts and Russian ultranationalist rhetoric are alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.[9]
The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism. Kadyrov held a meeting with Chechen law enforcement agencies on June 25 in connection with the Dagestan attacks and called on Chechens to be especially vigilant and prevent their relatives from succumbing to religious extremism.[10] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's North Caucasus service Kavkaz Realii reported that Kadyrov stated in Chechen that Chechen authorities would kill the relatives of those suspected of Wahhabism in a “blood feud.”[11] Kadyrov has routinely threatened the family members of those he deems a threat to his control over Chechnya.[12] Kadyrov appears to be attuned to heightened Russian fears about further attacks and is posturing himself as an attentive and ruthless strongman who can prevent instability in the North Caucasus. Kadyrov invoked the memory of the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s and claimed that his father, Akhmad, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prevented “international” efforts to use Chechnya to destroy Russia.[13] Akhmad Kadyrov supported Russian forces in the Second Chechen War (1999–2002), in which the Russian military brought Chechen separatism to heel through excessive force including the almost complete destruction of Chechnya's capital, Grozny.[14] Kadyrov has long modeled himself in the image of his father, a strongman loyal to the Kremlin and whom the Kremlin can rely on to ensure stability in the region.[15] Kadyrov consistently appeals to Putin's favor and is likely aware that further terrorist activity in the North Caucasus may threaten his standing with the Kremlin.[16] Kadyrov also claimed that religious extremism is emanating from Europe and suggested that outside actors aided the Dagestan attackers, supporting Kremlin efforts to tie the attacks to the war in Ukraine while also downplaying the threat of an endogenous religious extremism threat in the North Caucasus.[17]
Russia and Iran signed a memorandum on June 26 regarding the supply of Russian gas to Iran, following reported disagreements between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Russian supply of gas to the PRC. Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom Head Alexey Miller signed the memorandum with the National Iranian Gas Company in Iran at a ceremony attended by Acting Iranian President Mohammad Mokhber.[36] Miller also met with Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji about implementing the new memorandum and other areas of energy cooperation. Neither Russia nor Iran provided details about the new memorandum, but Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company were negotiating unspecified deals worth about $40 billion as of October 2023.[37] Miller's visit to Iran and agreement with the National Iranian Gas Company follows a recent Financial Times (FT) report that Russia and the PRC are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues including the Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) gas pipeline, resulting in Miller not travelling with Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing in May 2024 — likely aimed at extracting concessions from Russia given Gazprom’s recent economic struggles and the PRC's upper hand in the energy sphere.[38] Iran may benefit from this new deal with Russia to reduce its reliance on existing gas swap deals it has with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to mitigate summer electricity shortages that could fuel domestic unrest.[39]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2024
Russian blogger
Important note about the investigation into the murder of Russell Bentley
Friends, unfortunately, we have to admit that no one cares about Russell Bentley (call sign “Texas”), who was raped and murdered in Donetsk . The day before, certain Telegram channels began spreading the “sensation” that Luhansk investigators were investigating. This has long been known.
Despite the fact that Luhansk is in the LPR, interlocutors close to the head of the DPR (where the murder took place) say that the head of the republic, Denis Pushilin, is keeping the investigation under personal control. How? It is unclear.
It is worth recalling : Russell Bentley was detained by our military in Donetsk at the landing site. He was suspected of espionage, detained, and then raped and killed. By the way, we were the first to report this. Now a video message from relatives of the military who were detained in Donetsk in early May is being circulated online . They confirmed that their husbands detained Russell, but explained what happened next by the fact that he spoke English and waved a gun at the landing site.
Dear readers, we draw your attention to the fact that no one has seriously investigated the rape and murder of Russell Bentley . This should be a show trial. After all, Texas gave 10 years of its life to Donbass, and this is how it was thanked. Other foreign volunteers and journalists are now admitting that after this story they are not eager to go to Donbass, even for a lot of money.
An investigation must be conducted. The perpetrators must be punished. And you, dear readers, pay attention to how many war correspondents remain silent while their colleague was treated this way. And they are silent, alas, for a reason. Draw your own conclusions.
https://t.me/s/kremlin_secrets
Putin does not seem to be slowing down on his sacrifice of troops. Perhaps that is why he is seeking Nork bodies. I just wonder how many Nork volunteers might decide to NOT go home once they are near free territory?
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 27, 2024
Russian officials and information space actors continue to frame migrants as a threat to Russian society amid ongoing efforts to utilize migrant communities to address Russia’s force generation needs. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum on June 27 that migrant crime is spreading across Russia and intensifying in various Russian federal subjects, including Moscow and St. Petersburg.[17] Bastrykin claimed that migrants committed 38,936 crimes in Russia in 2023 and that an increased percentage of crimes committed by migrants were “especially serious” and “extremist” crimes.[18] Bastrykin advocated for a change in Russia’s migration policy and suggested that Russia should strictly regulate migration and hold employers responsible for the actions of their employees who are migrants. Bastrykin claimed that Russian officials have identified and registered 30,000 recently naturalized migrants for military service since October 2023 and sent 10,000 of these recently naturalized migrants to the “special military operation zone” in Ukraine.[19] Bastrykin claimed that the migrants are digging trenches, building fortifications, and replenishing rear Russian units. Bastrykin claimed that the Russian Constitution requires naturalized Russian citizens to register for military service and participate in the war in Ukraine if necessary. The legal mechanism that the Russian government is using to recruit and deploy recently naturalized migrants to Ukraine is unclear and is unlikely to be part of Russia’s existing conscription system or reserve mobilization system. The Russian government may be offering naturalized migrants the opportunity to sign a contract for military service or volunteer units in order to avoid deportation or jail time.
Russian milbloggers seized on Bastrykin’s speech to levy increasingly xenophobic criticisms against migrants. Several Russian milbloggers praised and defended Bastrykin’s recommendation to restrict Russia’s migration policy and criticized other Russian officials for not taking steps to address Russia’s ongoing migration issues.[20] One milblogger insinuated that labor migrants are stealing job opportunities from ethnic Russians.[21] Another milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase penalties for migration violations, while another Russian source claimed that Russian authorities should confiscate Russian passports from any recently naturalized migrants who refuse to fight in Ukraine.[22] A Russian milblogger blamed Russia’s migration policy for the perceived recent growth in terrorism and extremism in Russia and amplified a statement that Russian authorities should bury Islamic terrorists with a pig’s head in order to defile their bodies.[23] ISW previously assessed that the recent likely Islamic State (IS) affiliated Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further terrorist attacks and instability in the North Caucasus.[24] The IS also claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at the Crocus City Hall concert venue in Moscow in March 2024.[25] The terrorist attacks coupled with Bastrykin’s speech appear to have encouraged increased xenophobic rhetoric within the ultranationalist Russian information space, which, alongside exploitative force generation efforts, may be exacerbating the radicalization of migrants. A Russian insider source recently claimed that Dagestan’s force generation efforts caused practitioners at a government-friendly mosque to move to a more radical mosque with alleged Wahhabi connections, where the June 23 attackers were supposedly radicalized.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russian force generation efforts and ultranationalist rhetoric are alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities in Russia and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.[27]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024
There is currently no evidence supporting recent reports that North Korea may be sending engineering forces to rear areas of occupied Ukraine, and ISW has been unable to locate the North Korean confirmation that some Western amplifications allege has been made. Western news outlets circulated reports that North Korea is planning to send engineering forces to occupied Ukraine, largely citing a June 25 statement from Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Pat Ryder.[36] Ryder stated that he questions a hypothetical North Korean decision to send “forces to be cannon fodder” in Russia's war in Ukraine, and the reports implied that Ryder's statement confirms that North Korea is sending engineering forces to Ukraine.[37] Ryder did not confirm these reports, however; Ryder was responding to a question claiming that the North Korean Central Military Commission “confirmed” the report, and Ryder himself hedged his answer by stating that “that's something to keep an eye on.”[38] ISW has been unable to find any such statement by the North Korean Central Military Commission. The most recent press release from the North Korean Central Military Commission is from its Vice Chairperson Pak Jong Chon on June 24, in which Pak expresses support for Russia in its war in Ukraine but does not confirm any force deployments to Ukraine.[39] Similar statements from North Korean officials mentioning Russia or Ukraine since June 21 also do not mention any force deployments.[40] As ISW has recently reported, the original report regarding North Korean engineering troops deploying to Ukraine came from South Korean television network TV Chouson, which reported on June 21 that an unspecified South Korean government official stated that South Korea expects North Korea to dispatch engineering forces for reconstruction efforts in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[41]
At this time, all actors involved have either explicitly denied or refused to confirm reports that North Korea may be sending engineering forces to support Russia in occupied Ukraine. Claims that such reports are “confirmed” by US officials are inaccurate. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on June 27 that the Kremlin is unfamiliar with recent reports that North Korea may send engineering units to occupied Ukraine.[42] US Department of State Spokesperson Matthew Miller was also asked on June 26 about the alleged North Korean troop deployments, which the question described as having been officially “announced,” but Miller responded that he does not “have any specific comment” and that he “had not seen that report.”[43] ISW will continue to monitor North Korea's evolving relations with and military assistance to Russia, including continued provision of weapons for use in Ukraine and speculation of force deployments to Ukraine.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024
One school of thought is that Putin started attacking Ukraine with the “NATO meme” to distract rank-and-file Russians from the egregious suppression of civil liberties he was implementing. It wasn’t the cakewalk he promised, and now he’s riding that tiger with no way to get off. Despite the constant domestic propagandizing, there’s got to be considerable unrest due to all the body bags coming home. (BTW it’s a felony in Russia to publish lists of the dead - did you know that?) Using NORK troops would ameliorate that for a while.
Ukraine ping
Chad: [One school of thought is that Putin started attacking Ukraine with the “NATO meme” to distract rank-and-file Russians from the egregious suppression of civil liberties he was implementing. It wasn’t the cakewalk he promised, and now he’s riding that tiger with no way to get off. Despite the constant domestic propagandizing, there’s got to be considerable unrest due to all the body bags coming home. (BTW it’s a felony in Russia to publish lists of the dead - did you know that?) Using NORK troops would ameliorate that for a while.]
And death benefits amounting to $150K represent decades of income. It’s 30 years of firefighter pay at $400 a month. This may be in part be why we keep seeing these grisly videos of maimed Russians killing themselves with grenades or their personal weapon. As cripples, they become lifelong burdens to their families, many of whom are barely making ends meet, in a Russia where injured vets get neither treatment nor adequate disability payments. Their self-sacrifice is how they get their families set for life.
The Koreans would fill a big fiscal hole. I expect they’re not getting $2K a month, and the death benefit is likely a fraction of what’s available to Russian draftees.
The issue for Russia is that it is fighting a big war with a counterinsurgency budget. The supplemental budget is about $50b, roughly what the US used individually against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those were conflicts in which negligible amounts of US equipment were destroyed and not much in the way of expensive munitions was used. Much of it represented transportation cost, of moving men and equipment across oceans, paying tolls to insurgents because we weren’t allowed to eliminate or move hostile populations who straddled our supply routes and flying strike aircraft from distant air bases, which required parts replacements on an accelerated basis, due to flying hours racked up.
Whereas Russia has lost thousands of artillery pieces and tanks, averaging perhaps $1m and up. In peacetime, Russian servicemen got $400 per month. Combat pay has jacked that up to $2K. Assuming 1m Russians in Ukraine, that’s $20b of Russia’s $50b annual war supplement. Assume 100K annual KIA (under 300 a day), due to these massed infantry charges, and that’s another $15b out of the $50. So $35b out of the $50b supplement is combat pay and death benefits.
When you stack up (1) munitions usage ($1m ballistic and hypersonic missiles), (2) fuel requirements for shuttling men and equipment back and forth, (3) arming, feeding and watering men on the battlefield, (4) supply and equipment attrition from Ukrainian attacks, there’s not much left for new weapons development or even production of existing weaponry.
Putin is fighting this war on a shoestring. His military budget, including Ukraine, is 10% of GDP. Germany’s prewar military budget, 2 years into Hitler’s rule, was 10%. Deep into WW2, it peaked at 70%.
For Putin, the upside of such a small war supplement is it limits the sacrifices incurred by the Russian population. Unlike WW2 Russia, no one is starving to death due to forcible government requisitions made to feed the war machine. This means Russia has the means to fight on for years, maybe decades, at this pace, without any threat to Putin’s tenure. The downside is he may have to fight for years, maybe decades, to win in Ukraine. His principal hope is of (1) a sudden collapse in Ukrainian morale, (2) a lucky streak on the battlefield or (3) a collapse in the willingness of Ukraine’s allies to fund its war effort.
Since the biggest issue with the war effort is Putin’s decision to limit spending so as to minimize risks to his continued tenure, he will continue to tinker at the edges, cutting costs where he can. If the Korean men are being taken on at a significant discount to what’s paid to Russian servicemen, this initiative may be a way to cut personnel costs to open up room in the budget for more and better equipment.
Russian blogger:
There is enough money until autumn. What next?
It is no secret that in many regions, payments for contract soldiers have increased significantly. The reason is obvious, although they try not to talk about it publicly - the number of people willing to participate in the SVO [invasion of Ukraine] is decreasing. Even for big money.
Moreover, the regions have been tasked by Moscow to ensure the availability of personnel. And here is the most interesting thing - competition has begun between the regions. Richer regions and governors allocate more funds to recruit fighters, and residents of neighboring regions come to them to sign contracts. A striking example is St. Petersburg. In St. Petersburg, they promise a payment of 1.3 million rubles just for signing a contract. In the neighboring Pskov Region, regional payments upon signing a contract are not provided. So future SVO participants are going to St. Petersburg.
Politically, the heads of rich regions are trying to demonstrate loyalty to the plans of the central government. Plus, many have elections coming up. We talked to two governors to understand the real situation with funding and providing contract soldiers. One of our interlocutors voiced the usual words - about the need for Victory at any cost, about civic duty and the need to protect our Motherland. At the same time, he himself has never been to the front and, according to our information, has repeatedly refused offers to go to the military, citing his busy schedule. The governor refused to talk about financial matters in his not very rich region. “We help as much as we can,” he said, adding that “Victory will be ours.” Quite recently, payments in this region were raised.
We have known the second governor for a long time. He was more open and confirmed that the regions are indeed forced to pay contract soldiers a lot extra due to the lack of a large number of volunteers. “We are given a plan for volunteers, which is difficult to fulfill. We come up with benefits, add money, but there are not as many people as needed. At the same time, funding needs to be found somewhere. According to our calculations, there will be enough money to provide for contract soldiers and their families until the end of autumn. Where to get money next is not entirely clear. We are negotiating with big business, with small entrepreneurs, but this is a drop in the ocean,” the governor said. According to him, there are rumors among governors about the Kremlin’s plans to increase “funeral payments” (for those killed in the SVO zone) at the expense of regional budgets.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/4300
i.e. an indicating that this is correct: Russian Economy Stagnates Amid Claims of Growing Global Influence
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-economy-stagnates-amid-claims-of-growing-global-influence/
The only variable is how well Koreans integrate into Russian command and control and perform in this kind of battle.
True, but the integration will be very difficult.
Ukraine ping
Chainmail: [In other words, it’s a lot cheaper to throw Koreans into the meatgrinder and it reduces the pressure from Russian mothers.
The only variable is how well Koreans integrate into Russian command and control and perform in this kind of battle.]
What if Putin adds a supplement on top of the supplemental, adds 250K Koreans to the 1m Russians in-country? Then he may find out whether the issue with previous meat assaults was insufficient meat.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.