Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
Ukrainian anti-aircraft units shot down a Russian Tu-22M3 bomber for the first time, Air Force Commander Mykola Oleshchuk said on April 19.
According to Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov, the Russian plane crashed in the region’s Krasnogvardeysky District. Vladimirov claimed two pilots ejected from the aircraft. One pilot was allegedly killed and another crew member is missing. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed the aircraft crashed due to a “technical malfunction” while returning to its base airfield after completing a combat mission, according to Russian state-controlled media.
The Ukrainian Air Force claimed to have shot down the aircraft: “For the first time, the anti-aircraft missile units of the (Ukrainian) Air Force, in cooperation with Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence, destroyed a Tu-22M3 long-range strategic bomber – the carrier of Kh-22 cruise missiles, which the Russian terrorists use to attack peaceful Ukrainian cities,” Oleshchuk said.
According to Ukraine’s military intelligence, the Russian aircraft was shot down around 300 kilometers from Ukraine with the “same means that were previously used to shoot the Russian A-50 long-range radar detection and control aircraft.”
The Ukrainian Air Force also reported downing two Kh-22 cruise missiles.
Russian forces regularly use Tu-22M3 long-range strategic and maritime strike bombers, commonly armed with AS-4 heavy anti-ship or X-22 cruise missiles, in airstrikes against Ukraine. Some of these planes carried out the heavy bombardment of Mariupol in 2022 using unguided bombs.
In August 2023, military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov said Russia fielded 27 operable Tu-22M3 strategic bombers. “Ukraine needs more means, more missiles, in order to better protect its front line territories from Russian terrorism,” Oleshchuk said.
https://kyivindependent.com/air-force-ukraine-downs-russian-tu-22m3-bomber-for-first-time/
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov signaled Russia's intent to seize Kharkiv City in a future significant Russian offensive operation, the first senior Kremlin official to outright identify the city as a possible Russian operational objective following recent Ukrainian warnings that Russian forces may attempt to seize the city starting in Summer 2024. Lavrov stated during a radio interview with several prominent Russian state propagandists on April 19 that Kharkiv City “plays an important role” in Russian President Vladimir Putin's idea of establishing a demilitarized “sanitary zone” in Ukraine to protect Russian border settlements from Ukrainian strikes.[1] Lavrov stated that Putin has very clearly stated that Russian forces must push the frontline far enough into Ukraine – which Lavrov explicitly defines as into Kharkiv Oblast – to place Russian settlements outside of the Ukrainian strike range. This requirement is a very vague definition that could include the entirety of Ukrainian territory as long as an independent Ukrainian state exists and is willing to defend itself. Lavrov stated in response to a question about where Russian forces will go after creating a “sanitary zone” that Russian authorities are “completely convinced” of the need to continue Russia's war against Ukraine. Lavrov responded in seeming agreement to a comment from one of the interviewers, who suggested that Lavrov’s earlier remarks meant that Russian forces will have to continue to attack further into Ukraine after creating the “sanitary zone” to protect the settlements that would then be within the zone and Ukrainian strike range. Lavrov’s remarks suggest that the Kremlin will likely use the idea of a constantly shifting demilitarized “sanitary zone” to justify Russian offensive operations further and further into Ukraine.
Prominent Russian propagandist and state television host Olga Skabeyeva framed Russia's drone and missile strikes against Kharkiv Oblast as part of Russia's efforts to create the “sanitary zone” during a speech on April 19, suggesting that additional prominent Kremlin mouthpieces are also laying the informational groundwork to justify ongoing Russian strikes and a future offensive operation against Kharkiv City under the pretext of defending Russian citizens.[2] Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, have recently identified the threat of a possible Russian summer offensive operation aimed at seizing Kharkiv City.[3] ISW continues to assess that a Russian offensive operation to seize Kharkiv City would be an extremely ambitious undertaking that would pose significant challenges to both the Russian forces responsible for the effort and to the wider Russian campaign in Ukraine.[4] ISW also assesses that US military assistance is vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against any summer Russian offensive operation, including against Kharkiv City.[5]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-19-2024
Russia said “The Russian Federation has not been involved in the deportation of citizens of Ukraine on the territory of the Russian Federation”
However, a UN Committee claimed Russia has forcibly deported 16,221 children from Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/defencehq/status/1781669204917121250
Ukraine will likely be in a significantly improved operational position by June 2024 regardless of delays in the arrival of US security assistance to the frontline, and the Russian military command will likely consider significant changes to the large-scale offensive operation that it is expected to launch in June, although it may still proceed as planned. Ukrainian forces will likely leverage sufficient US security assistance to blunt Russian offensive operations in June 2024, which Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov recently highlighted as the likely month that Russian forces will launch their expected large-scale summer offensive effort.[17] The Russian military has likely been assessing that Ukrainian forces would be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance. This assumption was likely an integral part of Russia's operational planning for this summer.[18] Russian forces have been establishing operational- and strategic-level reserves to support their expected summer offensive effort, but likely have been doing so based on the assumption that even badly-trained and poorly-equipped Russian forces could make advances against Ukrainian forces that lack essential artillery and air defense munitions.[19] Ukraine is also addressing its own manpower challenges and will likely continue to conduct rotations to rest and replenish degraded units, although it will take time for these efforts to generate large-scale effects.[20]
Ukrainian officials have previously indicated that Russian forces will likely continue to conduct offensive operations this summer focused on seizing the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but may also launch an offensive operation to seize Kharkiv City.[21] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably signaled on April 19 Russia's intent to seize Kharkiv City.[22] The Russian military command may have envisioned that simultaneous offensive efforts towards Kharkiv City and along the current frontline in eastern Ukraine would stretch and overwhelm poorly-provisioned and undermanned Ukrainian forces and allow Russian forces to achieve a major breakthrough in at least one sector of the frontline. The Ukrainian forces with improving materiel and manpower supplies that will likely hold the frontline in June 2024 will undermine this operational intent of simultaneous Russian offensive operations across a wider front. The Russian military command will likely have to consider if the intended areas and objectives of its summer offensive effort are now feasible and if the current means that Russian forces have been concentrating and preparing are sufficient to conduct planned offensive operations considering the expected resumption of US security assistance to Ukraine. ISW offers no forecast of the decisions the Russians will make at this time.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2024
Long-range ATACMS missiles will be sent to Ukraine by the end of next week, - chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
The Crimean bridge has just felt the tension…👀
https://twitter.com/maria_drutska/status/1782074187172950254
The Russian and Chinese navies signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation on April 21 amid recent reports of China's increased support for Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseev signed a memorandum of understanding and cooperation with Chinese Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Hu Zhongming regarding naval search and rescue operations during Moiseev’s visit to China.[31] Moiseev and Hu also discussed Russian and Chinese naval cooperation, and Moiseev will participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao on April 22-23, where he will meet with China‘s and other unspecified countries’ senior navy officials.[32] Moiseev’s visit to China notably precedes US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s travel to China from April 24 through April 26.[33]
The Kremlin blocked domestic access to the website of the French non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), depriving Russians of access to independent assessments of Russian freedom of speech and press. Independent Russian non-governmental organization Roskomsvoboda reported on April 21 that the RSF website was blocked in Russia alongside other resources that publish information about Russia's war in Ukraine.[34] Roskomsvoboda noted that the official Russian register of blocked sites did not include the federal agency responsible or the official reason for blocking RSF and assessed that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office was the likely responsible party.[35] RSF publishes an annual “Freedom Index,” in which it scores and ranks 180 countries based on a quantitative analysis of abuses against media and qualitative analyses of journalists’ answers to a survey that gauges five contextual indicators: political, economic, and sociopolitical contexts, legal framework, and safety. The Freedom Index ranked Russia between 148 and 150 out of 180 between 2015 and 2020 before sharply downgrading to 155 in 2022 and 164 in 2023 due to the 2022 censorship laws criminalizing “fake” or “discrediting” information about the Russian military, ongoing disinformation campaigns, and declaring almost all independent media organizations as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations” since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[36] The Kremlin has been slowly increasing its physical and informational control over the Russian information space, including by arresting journalists and other opposition voices, implementing laws depriving certain media organizations and figures of their income, and forcing international telecommunications operators to comply with Russian data laws.[37] Blocking the RSF’s site now deprives Russian citizens of a resource to evaluate the impact of such measures on freedom of speech and press in Russia.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2024
Why there are not enough armored vehicles at the front
Some military observers authoritatively state that the Russian army is using successful tactics and is advancing on a number of sectors of the front. On the one hand, they are right. The Russian Armed Forces actually managed to take several settlements only recently. And yet the progress continues.
At this stage, the Northern Defense Forces actively use FABs against enemy positions. Then comes the deployment of small assault groups that seize positions. And here is an important point - the advancement of the Russian Armed Forces occurs with minimal use of tanks and armored vehicles. But with great losses .
There are several reasons. Firstly , the large number of FPV and other drones does not contribute to the use of technology for breakthroughs. Secondly , and this is important, stocks of Soviet-made armored vehicles have been greatly reduced.
Now Russian armored personnel carriers withdrawn from Karabakh will go to the front, but this will not be able to radically affect the situation. The trouble is the inability to launch mass production of modern armored vehicles. Alas, due to the lack of armor even for evacuation, we are losing our military, who could be saved.
The search for armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles abroad continues, but recently this has not yielded any results. In the future, armored vehicles may become our weak point. And this is a situation where the problem cannot be solved in a month or two. This is a complex and lengthy process. According to our information, the president is not informed about real problems with armored vehicles. But in vain.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/3977
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 22 that Finland is taking concrete steps to protect itself against Russian hybrid operations weaponizing Russian-manufactured migrant crises on the Russian-Finnish border.[18] WSJ noted that the Finnish government believes that Russia has sent waves of migrants to the Finnish border as part of a wider hybrid operation meant to intimidate Finland and test its security services following Finland's accession into NATO. WSJ reported that in addition to the manufactured migrant crisis in late 2023, Russia has also escalated cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns against Finland. Finnish diplomat and former Finnish Ambassador to Russia Heikki Talvitie told WSJ that recent Russian hybrid efforts against Finland have fundamentally changed the Finland–Russia relationship and that it is now “existential.” The Kremlin explicitly threatened Finland on April 6 and accused Finland of pursuing a “destructive course” in its relationship with Russia in order to undermine Finnish sovereign decision-making and NATO accession.[19] ISW has consistently assessed that such Russian statements against NATO states are meant to force NATO leaders into self-deterring against taking concrete actions to protect themselves against Russian hybrid efforts.[20]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2024
The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran. Russian State Duma Deputy and head of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch Adam Delimkhanov stated on April 22 that he met with Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian during a visit to Iran on Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s orders.[17] Delimkhanov reported that he and Ahmadian discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Middle East and the prospects of Russo-Iranian cooperation in countering national security threats to both states. Iran is pursuing its own interests in the North Caucasus, especially Muslim-majority regions, and is likely interested in strengthening bonds with Chechen officials to expand its influence in the region. Representatives of Iranian airline Mahan Air met with Chechen Prime Minister Muslim Huchiev in December 2023 to discuss the prospect of opening regular flights between Chechnya and Iran to strengthen trade, economic, and cultural ties between the two.[18]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024
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