Russian military convoy has advanced from Ivankiv to outskirts of Kyiv, satellite images show (17 miles long)

The “Liberty of Russian Legion released a message in Tartar (Google translated several errors)

We do not recognize the quasi-referendum of 2014 and the Russian invasion of the peninsula. Legion, in order to be able to build a clean conscience or a Russia, recognizes it as a matter of duty to return its own daughter to Ukraine. We need you to get closer to our middle ground.

❗️Please let us know the following things:
▪️working order, two-way settlement points and residential addresses (geographical connection of coordinates),
▪️ the places where the occupation ordusıñ reberligiñ live (geographical connection of the coordinates),
▪️ arby tehnikaniñ bulunğanı places and routes,
▪️ ıyerli insularınıñ aqiqiyı information that the enemy cooperated with (address of residence and location, geographic location of coordinates, name and surname, position and workplace);
▪️ persons sympathetic to the occupiers and other supporters of the occupying power and their information.

qaıñız from these objects. If you live nearby and are loyal to Ukraine, let us know. Er ayat bizün içün degerlidir ve er şey acıgımız ıçün ıçün ızın ızının.

We are already close!

https://twitter.com/legion_svoboda/status/1666450297684652034

Who are the Tatars? | Largest ethnic minority in Russia

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCgN2EY-44g

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2023

The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials continued to accuse Russian forces of destroying the KHPP dam out of fear that Ukrainian forces would land on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
The New York Times (NYT) reported that engineering and munitions experts believe that a deliberate explosion was the likely cause of KHPP dam’s collapse on June 6.
Russian forces and occupation authorities are responding to the flooding in Kherson Oblast with a great degree of disorganization and thereby exacerbating harm to the civilian population of occupied areas.
Select Wagner Group-affiliated Russian senior military officers continue to posture as effective commanders to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by capitalizing on high-profile military events.
The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Wagner-affiliated commanders’ reactive public relations campaigns may not be sufficient to deflect from battlefield realities.
Russian and Ukrainian officials each accused the other state of damaging an ammonia pipeline that runs through Kharkiv Oblast and causing an ammonia leak.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Kreminna.
Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction as of June 7.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 7.
Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly engaged in skirmishes in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian authorities continue to restrict international travel for those eligible for military service.
Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied territories in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2023

Youtube, Ukraine Matters:

"Ru sources claim a massive tank led assault is underway in the Orikhiv area towards Tokmak.
The assault began late at night.
Details later"

My speculation:

Tokmak is on the route to Melitopol. Taking Melitopol would divide the Zaporizhia Oblast along its narrowest axis. The distance between the Dnipro River and the Molochnyi Estuary is 50 miles/80 km. Russia would lose a direct land connection to Western Zaporizhia, Southern Kherson and Crimea except over the Kerch Bridge. Together with the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam cutting off fresh water to Crimea, holding these areas becomes impossible.

Assuming the US and NATO knew in advance, should Ukraine achieve this goal, then they will show they can deliver on what was promised and continue getting aid. It will also show Russia is incompetent militarily and politically, weakening their international standing even more.

Like Kherson and Kharkiv, during the first few days there is the Ukrainian news blackout and Russian disinformation making what is happening unclear. Given the importance of what is happening, it make take several more days for even a small amount of clarity to happen.

Putler normally participate (since 2001) in an annual televised political event in Russia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Line_with_Vladimir_Putin

But not now:

According to Kommersant’s information, the direct line of Russian President Vladimir Putin is tentatively planned to be held in November-December this year. According to an informed source close to the presidential administration, it was originally assumed that it would take place earlier, possibly even this summer. But a couple of weeks ago, it became clear that at this time it was no longer worth waiting for, says the interlocutor of Kommersant.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6029752

What could he say today? Besides, he's not quite OK. There will be none of this and soon someone else will be in the Kremlin.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 8, 2023

Ukraine has conducted counteroffensive operations with differential outcomes in at least three sectors of the front as part of wider counteroffensive efforts that have been unfolding since Sunday, June 4.
Ukrainian forces conducted a limited but still significant attack in western Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of June 7 to 8. Russian forces apparently defended against this attack in a doctrinally sound manner and had reportedly regained their initial positions as of June 8.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to the Ukrainian attack with an uncharacteristic degree of coherency and praised Southern Military District elements for repelling the attack and regaining lost positions.
Russian sources provided explanations for claimed Russian successes during the June 8 attacks, praising Russian forces’ effective use of electronic warfare (EW) systems, air support, and landmines against Ukrainian forces.

Russian forces appear to have executed their formal tactical defensive doctrine in response to the Ukrainian attacks southwest of Orikhiv. Russian doctrine for a defending motorized rifle battalion calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, with a second echelon of forces counterattacking against an enemy breakthrough.[16] Russian forces apparently operated in this fashion in this sector – Ukrainian forces penetrated the initial defensive lines; Russian forces pulled back to a second line of fortifications; and Russian reserves subsequently counterattacked to retake the initial line of defenses.[17] This maneuver is a regular feature of defensive operations and has been executed by both Ukrainian and Russian forces throughout the war. Early control of terrain changes day to day should thus not be misconstrued as the overall result of a wider attack.

Ukrainian attacks in western Zaporizhia on June 8 do not represent the full extent of Ukrainian capabilities in the current counteroffensive.
It is additionally noteworthy that the Russian Southern Military District Forces deployed in this particular area are likely to be a higher quality force grouping than Russia has elsewhere in theater, and their defensive performance is unlikely to be reflective of defensive capabilities of Russian groupings elsewhere on the front.
Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to exacerbate the humanitarian ramifications of the flooding resulting from the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam break.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has reportedly postponed his annual press conference from June 2023 until November or December 2023.
Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and around Kreminna.
Ukrainian forces made limited gains around Bakhmut, and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
The Russian MoD continues to posture itself as a firm authority over the defense industrial base (DIB) through emphasizing its ability to transport new equipment to the front.
Russian occupation authorities are reportedly resorting to punitive measures against civilian populations in occupied Ukraine due to Russian occupation authorities’ decreasing influence over civilians.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2023

Browder: ‘West must hand Russian Central Bank's $350 billion to Ukraine for reconstruction’

London-based American investor Bill Browder says people call him the “number one enemy” of Russian President Vladimir Putin and, more recently, an official “Friend of Ukraine.” Browder has spent the last 13 years campaigning to freeze Putin's assets hidden in the West. Now, he's fighting for them to be transferred to Ukraine. His motivation is justice for Ukraine and for his lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, who was killed by Russia's kleptocratic regime: prison guards beat him to death in 2009 in an attempt to conceal the large-scale financial crime he had uncovered.

Magnitsky was jailed for exposing law enforcement, judiciary, tax officials, and bankers in, what Browder calls the largest tax refund fraud in Russian history. Magnitsky claimed they helped steal $230 million from the Russian government in Browder’s Hermitage Fund tax return. Journalists helped Browder to trace the crime back to Putin by discovering that some of the stolen money ended up in foreign accounts of his old friend, cellist Sergei Roldugin. By now, 16 countries have opened probes into money laundering, which led to the freezing, confiscation, or settlement of around $38 million.

Browder’s international advocacy campaign pushed 35 governments to adopt laws best known as Magnitsky Acts that introduce visa bans and money freezes for corrupt individuals and human rights abusers. The United States alone sanctioned 687 people under the Magnitsky Act. Now Browder says he offers his vast expertise to help Ukraine seize Russian assets for itself. “I spent 13 years working with governments and parliaments all over the world to freeze Russian assets connected to human rights abuse. It's not a big stretch to use the same networks in the same relationships to seize the $350 billion of (Russian) Central Bank reserves,” Browder told the Kyiv Independent. “That's my big priority. That was my New Year's resolution for 2023.”

A fierce critic of Putin, Browder faces 18 years in prison on trumped-up charges of deliberate bankruptcy and tax evasion among others, if ever extradited to Russia. This could happen twice in 2018.

https://kyivindependent.com/browder-west-must-hand-russian-central-banks-350-billion-to-ukraine-for-reconstruction/

Thanks Bill.

The real catch is this:
1. Putin 28%
2. Mishustin 21%
3. Prigozhin 19%

https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=4408#4408

Now this:

A little-noticed fact is that Chinese President Xi Jinping is cultivating Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in quite a blatant fashion.

Curiously, Xi had a separate meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, contrary to strict Chinese protocol.

As a follow up, Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang invited Mishustin, his Russian counterpart, to Beijing for an official visit in late May. Mishustin is the highest-ranking Russian official to visit China since the start of the Ukraine invasion in February 2022. On the second day of his visit, Xi Jinping received Mishustin at the Great Hall of the People, once again completely beyond the ordinary bounds of Chinese and Russian protocol.

by apparently excluding Mishustin from his two most recent Security Council meetings, Putin has indicated that he has paid attention and dislikes these recent developments. The standard procedure would have seen Putin calling Mishustin to the Security Council to report what he had learned in China.

Mishustin has carefully avoided saying anything in public about the war in Ukraine or his visit to China. His father is considered to have served in the KGB, and he has been both the head of the Russian tax service and a wealthy investment banker. Mishustin is often overlooked in analysis of power dynamics in today's Russia, but his relationships with both Putin and China should be watched carefully.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-china-preparing-for-a-post-putin-russia/

Georgy Fedorov:

What awaits us if the internal situation goes haywire, a great turmoil and a war of all against all begin? Main risks:
- Loss of territories that joined Russia. If the central government loses control, the enemy and external forces will not fail to take advantage of the situation;
- Territorial tension. The regions, like 30 years ago, will start their game, using the accumulated resources and power structures formed around local elites;
- Large redistribution of property. Private military companies created with public money will begin to establish control over strategic enterprises;
- A fight between new centers of power for large cities, which in the future configuration can become sources of internal and external legitimacy;
- Criminal wars due to the inability of law enforcement agencies to centrally combat organized crime;
- Interreligious and interethnic tension as in the last years of the existence of the USSR with all the ensuing consequences.
- And much more.

https://t.me/georgy_fedorov/1872

Nathan Ruser has done a good job: Russian fortifications

While Ukraine's offensive in Zaporizhia is starting to ramp up, Russia has spent the last 2 months fortifying defensive lines across the entire oblast. I've made an interactive map that shows the most recent satellite imagery and these lines.

The satellite imagery shows land over the past two months (since April 15th). Overall, around 1,000 fortification lines have been mapped in the area. These certainly present a challenge to Ukrainian forces trying to move through the landscape and attack in depth.

This is based purely on satellite analysis and therefore will likely miss some smaller fortifications, and the nature of the imagey being captured over 2-months means that more recent additions may be hard to see. It is unending work to map these, and I'll try to keep it updated.

https://nrg800.users.earthengine.app/view/russianfortifications

https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1667119808494829568

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2023

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 9, making further gains around Bakhmut and in Western Donetsk.
Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 9 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive recently began and noted that Ukrainian forces still have offensive potential, a departure from previous Kremlin efforts to downplay Ukrainian counteroffensives.
Contrarily, much of the Russian information space prematurely claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed after Russian forces damaged more Western-provided Ukrainian military equipment on June 9.
Ukrainian officials directly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces expect to suffer equipment losses during counteroffensive operations.
The Russian command structure responsible for areas of southern Ukraine is unclear and likely overlapping.
Russian forces carried out missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9.
Several independent sources reported additional evidence that an internal explosion likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6.
The White House revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, underscoring the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.
Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov discussed increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation with Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli on June 9.
Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited and localized ground attacks south of Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia continues to evade international sanctions and has reportedly restored access to key Western microchips and electronics that Russia needs to produce military equipment.
A Ukrainian report states that Russian authorities may be preparing evacuations from northern Crimea.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 9 that Russia will begin deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in July 2023, and this is not an escalation from Putin’s prior nuclear weapons rhetoric.

Details:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2023

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.