Posted on 07/28/2008 8:37:15 AM PDT by DAVEY CROCKETT
An American Engineer in Stalin’s Russia
The Memoirs of Zara Witkin, 1932–1934
Edited with an Introduction by
Michael Gelb
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley · Los Angeles · Oxford
© 1991 The Regents of the University of California
[Read at above link]
© Center for Defense Information, 2008.
“Information Warfare: Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Security”
by Eric Hundman, CDI Science Fellow
Scommand and control system is virtually nonexistent, but analysis of known threats to commercial networks provides some information that may be pertinIn general, few of the traditional rules about offense, defense, and vulnerability apply to analysis of information warfare – by some accounts, it should even be viewed as an entirely new paradigm of warfare. Surveying the literature about cyber-attacks and vulnerabilities in the commercial arena reveals that, while the economic costs are substantial, the scope of the cyber threat to the actual integrityof critical networks is far from clear. 1
In
C
For instance, the United States is working to improve its offensive and defense cyber-capabilities in the Air Force, the Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Department oHomeland Security, and the National Security Agency; a new National Strategy to SecureCyberspace lays out a framework for securing the nation’s information infrastructure.2 France also highlighted cyber threats in its most recent white paper; it plans reorganizations to further develop its own cyber capabilities.3 Some inside Rworry that the country’s deteriorating nuclear command and control system could be hacked.4
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they use terms like “cyberwar.” Applying a systemic, structured approach to analysis may therefore make the problem simpler. The U.S. Defense Department (DOD) has developed a useful system that classifies most of the possibilities under the broad rubric of Information Operations (IO), then splits IO activities into five core capabilities:
1 The Department of Defense views the “cyber domain” as “similar” to air, land and sea. CRS Information Operations.
2 The White House, “The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,” February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf/.
3 James Acton, “Le Livre Blanc Est Ici,” Arms Control Wonk, June 18, 2008, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1919/le-livre-blanc-est-ici/.
4 M.J. Zuckerman, “Nuclear Doomsday: Is the Clock Still Ticking?” Carnegie Reporter 4, no. 1 (2006), http://www.carnegie.org/reporter/13/doomsday/index.html/.
1) psychological operations,
,
rations, and
he distinction between the computer network operations and electronic warfare is
n
ome of these capabilities are more threatening than others in the particular case of
ilitary Deception (MILDEC)
2)
military deception,
3)
operational security
4)
computer network ope
5)
electronic warfare.
T
particularly important: the former involves attacking, defending, or exploiting purelycomputer-based networks; the latter involves any military action involving the directioof control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy.5 Some or all of these capabilities can certainly be used in coordination, but for the sake of clarity the scenarios discussed here primarily involve a single IO capability.
S
nuclear weapons security; they are examined in detail below, roughly in order of increasing relevance to nuclear weapons command and control (NCC).
M
M
decision makers with regard to friendly military capabilities, thereby causing the adversary to take (or fail to take) specific actions that will contribute to the succesfriendly military operation.”6
W
example, include deceptive preparations for launch of a nuclear-capable missile. Even ithe absence of an actual launch, this could lead the United States to a nuclear alert, heightening the chance of an accidental or preemptive launch. Such deceptive actioncould also lead us to deploy early warning systems poorly – for instance, the seaborne band radar could be sent to an observation area that would leave the U.S. government blind to other attacks. However, compared to other information warfare techniques, MILDEC seems unlikely to pose the strongest potential threat to nuclear weapons security.
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currently available. However, testimony by STRATCOM officials has indicated that theyare using information operations (presumably including MILDEC), through the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC), to support strategic deterrence.7This implies that they see some relationship between the two and that there may be a need to defend against MILDEC threats to U.S. deterrent forces in the future. MILDE
5 Clay Wilson, “Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyber war: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2007.
6 Ibid.
7 “Statement of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, United States Strategic Command, before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, on United States Strategic Command,” House Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2008, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/STRAT022708/Chilton_Testimony022708.pdf/.
would be most effective when combined with computer network operations (CNO) or electronic warfare (EW), as discussed below.
P
P
groups, and individuals by selectively conveying information. With regard to nuclear weapons, this could include, for instance, falsified messages aimed at relevant officialsthe nuclear chain of command. Given that both missile launch crews and other officials up the nuclear chain of command have secure sources of information (in many cases multiple sources of information),8 the risk of this type of information warfare – on its own – threatening the integrity of NCC or early warning systems seems small.
A
NCC or early warning systems seem to be available. However, related studies confirm that NCC incorporates consideration of a command and control failure within the systemin a crisis9 – this implies heavily that the NCC is structured to defend against many potential PSYOP attacks.
O
O
operations and which could enable adversaries to attack operational vulnerabilities”10essentially, restricting knowledge of security loopholes and similar weaknesses. Effectively maintaining OPSEC involves many disparate capabilities: at Los Alamnuclear lab, for example, OPSEC is described to subcontractors as a “systems analysismethodology employing elements of traditional security, intelligence, counterintelligence, and deception…[intended] to keep our critical andinformation from our adversaries by discovering unguarded (unclassified) pathwamay lead to critical and sensitive (classified or unclassified) information and implementing cost-effective countermeasures that will eliminate or minimize or ‘vulnerability.’”11
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weaknesses may lie. In the case of nuclear weapons – again using the Los Alamos document as an example – any facility judged to be “essential to the direction and continuity of the overall [Energy Department] nuclear weapons program” is “ClassWith this classification comes a long list of requirements to preserve OPSEC in such facilities, all of which have potential weaknesses. Most notably, it appears that each organization can have a different OPSEC plan; each of those plans must be continual
8 For instance, nearly all higher-ups and even some missile launch crews now have access to the Internet for independent news. See Nathan Hodge and Sharon Weinberger, “The ever-ready nuclear missileer,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 64, no. 3 (2008): 14-21, http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064003005.pdf/.
9 DSB Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software, p. 28.
10 CRS Information Operations.
11 “Operations Security Program: Guidance for Sub-Contractors,” Los Alamos National Laboratory, July 15, 2008, www.lanl.gov/orgs/sup/procurement/php/files/upload_green_docs/subcontractor_guidance.doc/.
developed, updated, and tested. Given DOE’s historical difficulties when implementing security recommendations, it is probably safe to assume that many of the organizational OPSEC plans are not completely up to date.12
D
the top secret nuclear annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which is not publicly available. The nuclear annex (JSCP-N) to that document also establishes parameters and constraints for nuclear target development, assigns sufficient damalevels for individual installations and groups of facilities, and reportedly “describes situations which could lead to a request for the selective release of nuclear weapons.1996 version of the JSCP-N was released following a Freedom of Information Act request, but was heavily redacted to ensure it contained no specifics regarding potenoperational concerns.
H
prominent in updated versions of the JSCP, in order to increase flexibility in targerelocatable and emerging targets that are not specifically addressed in the planning procedures.14 This type of flexibility may also increase the need for rapid communicand decision making, potentially increasing the danger of OPSEC lapses. These could include inadvertent uses of public communication channels (unsecured email, for instance) and lax physical security, for example.
C
C
“cybersecurity,” including network surveillance, denial-of-service attacks, intheft using a remote computer, viral attacks, and more. DOD defines CNO generally as including the capability to “(1) attack and disrupt enemy computer networks; (2) defend…information systems; and (3) exploit enemy computer networks through intelligence collection.”15
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Gen. James Cartwright, STRATCOM has so far focused primarily on “network defensesto include firewalls, anti-virus protection, and vulnerability scanning” to fulfill its mission of “planning and directing cyber defense within DOD and conducting cybeattack in support of assigned missions.”16 STRATCOM also reportedly has significanoffensive cyber capabilities, including a cyber version of the Single Integrated
12 Ibid; “DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threats,” Government Accountability Office, April 2004, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04623.pdf/.
13 Hans M. Kristensen, “The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Nuclear Supplement,” The Nuclear Information Project, June 16, 2005, http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/jscp.htm/.
14 Ibid.
15 CRS Information Operations.
16 “Statement of General James E. Cartwright, Command, United States Strategic Command, before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee on United States Strategic Command,” Global Security.org, March 28, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/2007_h/070328-cartwright.pdf/.
Operational Plan (SIOP) for nuclear weapons to be launched in the event of hosThe Air Force Cyber Command appears to be building similar cyber-warfighting capabilities, and views cyberspace as “a warfighting domain on par with the air, spground, and maritime domains.”17Additionally, all new software for DOD systems mustbe submitted to the National Security Agency for security testing; security testing for NCC software appears to be even more robust, involving meticulous “reverse engineerand thorough manual analysis” at a level rarely performed even for other sensitive DOD systems.18
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and other nuclear-related facilities. The NCC system has other safeguards as well, though. It is reportedly “air gapped;” physically separated from any other networks19theory, this makes the system impossible to hack into using CNO alone (EW is another matter, as discussed in the next section). However, it is unclear how broadly or effectively such protection is applied – it was apparently not present for at least communications system.20 In addition, the actual definition of air gapping is vague. Often supposedly air gapped networks end up sharing connections, power sources, or other resources for the sake of convenience or efficiency, all of which decrease network security.21
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vulnerabilities for NCC systems. There are, however, countless reports and stuCNO vulnerabilities for other government networks and commercial networks (e.g. banking systems).22 A survey of these shows that the scope of the CNO/cyber threat,even to relatively unprotected commercial networks, is far from clear.
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breaches,24 from government-sponsored Chinese hackers25 to significant decreases
17 Lt. Gen. Bob Elder, “Air Force Cyber Operations Command – Mission: Warfighting,” U.S. Air Force, 5 January 5, 2007, www.au.af.mil/info-ops/usaf/cyber_ops_cmd_5jan07.ppt/.
18 “Findings of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software.”
19 Joshua Green, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism,” Washington Monthly, November 2002, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html/.
20 A backdoor was found in the software for the antennas that transmit launch orders to the Trident fleet. They were clearly not air gapped, despite being part of the NCC system: “Unauthorized persons including terrorists may have been able to seize electronic control of shore-based radio transmitters such as the very low frequency facility at Cutler Maine, and actually inject a launch order into the network.” Bruce G. Blair, “Increasing Warning and Decision Time (‘De-Alerting’),” International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, Oslo, 26-27 Feb. 2008.
21 Philip Coyle, correspondence with the author.
22 See, e.g., John Rollins and Clay Wilson, “Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues,” Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2007.
23 DOE/IG-0738, “Evaluation Report: The Department’s Unclassified Cyber Security Program—2006,” U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audit Services, September 2006.
24 See, e.g., “Cybersecurity’s Leaky Dikes,” Business Week, July 2, 2002; Ryan Paul, “Top U.S. government research labs infiltrated by hackers,” ArsTechnica, December 9, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071209-top-us-military-research-labs-infiltrated-by-hackers.html/.;
satisfactory cyber-security performance at NNSA sites over the past decade.26 Government agencies and military branches are also taking the threat very seriously, with new commands and capabilities being added quickly in recent years and the start of a $30 billion cyber security “Manhattan Project.”27
But while the economic costs of cyber-attacks are clear – on the order of $15 billion worth in 200128 – the danger to the actual integrity of critical infrastructure and particularly of military networks is far more uncertain. Even if hackers were able to gain control of a particular system, critical infrastructure systems often require specialized knowledge to operate; attackers will rarely have such knowledge. And even if attackers are able to gain insider help, power plants or the like are rarely left unsupervised and the intrusion would likely be detected. Essentially, even if it is possible to break in to a system, a hacker won’t necessarily know what he is seeing.
Some analysts also argue that the threat is overblown because critical infrastructure systems, at least in large industrialized countries, are “more flexible and responsive in restoring service than early analysts realized.”29 According to CRS, “simulated cyber-attacks, conducted by the U.S. Naval War College in 2002, indicated that attempts to cripple the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure would be unsuccessful because system redundancy would prevent damage from becoming too widespread;” additionally, “many U.S. counterterrorism experts feel that far-reaching effects from a cyber-attack are highly unlikely.”30
Nevertheless, the U.S. government seems insufficiently prepared to recognize and respond to a cyber-attack. The report of the 2005 Rueschlikon Conference on Information Policy paints a mixed picture, highlighting both the resilience and the vulnerability of critical information infrastructure.31 A 2006 report cited three causes for U.S.
Larry Greenemeier, “Estonian Attacks Raise Concern Over Cyber “Nuclear Winter,” Information Week, May 24, 2007.
25 Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (And the Man Who Tried to Stop Them),” Time, August 29, 2005.
26 “National Nuclear Security Administration: Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs,” Government Accountability Office, January 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0736.pdf/.
27 The U.S. Air Force has a new Cyber Command; see Marty Graham, “Welcome to Cyberwar Country, USA,” Wired, February 11, 2008. STRATCOM also controls the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations and the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, which together have responsibility for defense against cyber attacks; see Clay Wilson, “Information Operations.” On the “Manhattan Project,” see Ryan Singel, “U.S. Has Launched a Cyber Security ‘Manhattan Project,’ Homeland Security Chief Claims,” Wired, April 8, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/04/feds-cyber-cent.html/.
28 Joshua Green, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism.”
29 James A. Lewis, “Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2002. See also Richard Forno, “Shredding the Paper Tiger of Cyberterrorism,” Security Focus, September 25, 2002, http://www.securityfocus.com/printable/columnists/111/.
30 Rollins and Wilson, “Terrorist Capabilities,” p. 10.
31 Kenneth Neil Cukier, Viktor Mayer-Sconberger, and Lewis M. Branscomb, “Ensuring (and Insuring?) Critical Information Infrastructure Protection,” Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of
unpreparedness: a lack of indicators that would show an attack is underway; a lack of clarity about who is responsible for restoring compromised infrastructure; and a lack of dedicated resources for recovery from cyber-attacks.32
NCC systems are almost certainly more protected against CNO attacks than civilian networks, but associated defense networks may be less so – the U.S. National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace makes no mention of missiles but does explicitly mention the need to secure control systems for radars.33 In either case, given the lack of public information on the vulnerabilities of military networks, it seems reasonable to assume that their weaknesses are smaller than but parallel to those of civilian networks. This is especially true as DOD relies increasingly on commercial technology and software for its skyrocketing information processing needs.34
Electronic Warfare (EW)
DOD defines EW as “any military action involving the direction or control of electromagnetic spectrum energy to deceive or attack the enemy.”35 NCC and early warning computer, personnel, and operational security are all very robust, but the whole structure depends on electronic communications that are, to some degree, inherently vulnerable to intercept – EW, therefore, probably represents one of the primary IO vulnerabilities to the NCC and early warning systems.
The U.S. NCC system uses both physical and wireless links to maintain communication. Wireless links between fixed, ground-mobile, and airborne platforms via satellite use a wide variety of signal types, including Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency (VLF/LF) and Extremely High Frequency (EHF). Redundant links between command centers and missile sites via airplane networks use Ultra High Frequency (UHF) signals, as do purely ground-to-air links; communication with submarines is achieved via airplane relays on VLF frequencies. In addition, underground cable links connect silos to command centers and line-of sight radios are sometimes employed as backups. Planned improvements include replacing aged analog technology with digital, upgrading computer terminals, increasing bandwidth capabilities, incorporating Internet routing capability, and implementing laser cross-links between satellites.36
In theory, all of these existing links are vulnerable to EW techniques – attackers could send false launch signals, jam individual radio links, tap into cables and send false
Government, Faculty Working Papers Series, October 2005 http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP05-055/.
32 Ibid.
33 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.
34 See, e.g., Simon Romero, “Military Now Often Enlists Commercial Technology,” New York Times, March 10, 2003, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9406E4D81F3FF933A25750C0A9659C8B63/.
35 Wilson, “Information Operations,” p. 6.
36 Robert D. Critchlow, “Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, May 3, 2006; Bruce G. Blair, “Strategic Command and Control,” pp. 194-207.
signals, or simply eavesdrop. With regards to the early warning radars, for example, it is theoretically possible to create false radar images even of large targets.37
However, all such attacks would require specialized equipment and expertise; they would probably also require some degree of insider knowledge to be successful. VLF communications with submarines, for example, require extremely long antennas (~2.5 miles) in order to broadcast effectively. Traditionally this has been done using large land installations or trailing wires from airplanes. An attacker would need to procure such equipment in addition to securing the relevant encryption, timing, and location data for intercepts and faked signals.
So far, many Pentagon networks have also probably been protected to some degree by the nature of defense procurement. The NCC system and the early warning computer systems were almost certainly developed as proprietary systems; very few people will have expertise in their specific protocols. They will therefore be very difficult to manipulate electronically without insider knowledge. Just as with CNO hacks, even if attackers were to use EW means to get inside a system, they wouldn’t necessarily be able to interpret the data they would receive, much less manipulate it.38
Conclusions
The threat to NCC systems posed by information operations techniques is far from clear, but – similar to terrorism – potential threats will to some extent always be a concern. In the near future, the threat will probably increase. Attackers will become increasingly sophisticated and have greater access to high-level technology. In addition, militaries around the world – especially in the United States – are working furiously to increase their networking and information processing capabilities; such integration will likely increase their vulnerability to information-based attack techniques. Despite the uncertain nature of the threat, the complexity of this issue merits further careful analysis.
37 D.J. Fouts et al, “A single-chip false target radar image generator for countering wideband imaging radars,” IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits 37, no. 6, June 2002, abstract at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1004579&isnumber=21689/.
38 Green, “Myth.”
from:
http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/InformationWarfare.pdf
[History]
This is the html version of the file http://www.numat.at/list%20of%20papers/zaitseva.pdf.
Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.
Page 1
International Dimension of Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and
Other Radioactive Material
Lyudmila Zaitseva and Friedrich Steinhausler
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),
Institute of International Studies, Stanford University
Abstract
Although the FSU remains the major potential source of nuclear and other radioactive
material, it is not the only one. Thefts of nuclear material and radiation sources have been
reported in other countries as well (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo, Germany,
Romania, India, and the United States of America). Also, the incidents involving orphan
radiation sources have demonstrated that the problem of inadequate control of radioactive
material exists in many countries. This paper will describe the international dimension of
these issues and provide recommendations aimed at preventing illicit trafficking of
nuclear and other radioactive material on a global scale.
Introduction
Trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material is a truly international problem.
Over the past 10 years, over 50 countries have been involved in nuclear smuggling either
as the origin of the smuggled material, as transit area, or as final destination.
The
problem of theft and loss of radiation sources has affected countries on all five
continents.
Until now the issue of illicit trafficking has been primarily associated with Russia and
other former Soviet republics. Indeed, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union
(FSU) in 1991, hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material and thousands of
radiation sources were left without adequate control and protection, thus posing a risk for
sabotage, theft and diversion. Out of 660 illicit trafficking incidents recorded in the
Stanford Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO),
at least 370 either took place in the former Soviet Union or involved material that had
reportedly originated from the FSU.
1
Although the former Soviet Union remains the major potential source of nuclear and
other radioactive material, it is not the only one. Thefts of nuclear material and radiation
sources have been reported in many other countries.
Nuclear Material
Apart from FSU, thefts of nuclear material were reported in several other countries, such
as the Congo, Germany, India, and Romania. For example, a uranium fuel rod stolen
An illicit trafficking incident is defined as theft, unauthorized possession, transport and receipt of nuclear
and other radioactive materials.
1
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from the Kinshasa research reactor in the Democratic Republic of Congo was recovered
in Italy in 1998 from the members of Italian organized crime. Although the enrichment
level of the uranium (19.9 % U-235) was just below the enrichment levelconsidered
weapons usable material, the seizure was of great concern. It revealed the deficiency in
physical protection of research reactor in countries other than FSU and made it possible
to assume that such thefts may also take place unnoticed at other research reactors using
highly enriched uranium (HEU). According to the Financial Times, the Congolese
Government has been negotiating with U.S. officials for more than a year to have
uranium removed from the U.S.-supplied reactor at Kinshasa. However, the status of
these negotiations is unknown.
2
Physical protection at HEU fuelled research reactors is questionable in other countries as
well. Realizing the threat to its nuclear material stored at the Vinca research institute, the
former Republic of Yugoslavia shipped about 50 kg of HEU fuel back to Russia, which
had originally supplied the material.
3
Jamaican authorities admitted in May 2001 that
their country, which has a research reactor fuelled by 93% HEU, was completely
unprepared to deal with the threats of terrorism and sabotage.
4
Some countries with
weapons-usable nuclear material do not have measures in place to combat illicit
trafficking, such as detection and effective response to attempts to smuggle nuclear or
other radioactive material outside the country. For example, in 2001, Ghana, which has a
research reactor fuelled by 90 percent enriched uranium, admitted its lack of such
counter-measures and expressed an intent to develop them in order to reduce the threat of
nuclear proliferation.
5
Once the material is stolen, it becomes very difficult to regain control over it, especially
when there are no adequate border detection capabilities. Thus, in 2001, Mexican
authorities admitted that their national customs do not have radiation monitors at the
borders to detect the trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material – and this holds
true for customs organisations of many other countries.
6
Thefts of nuclear material also occurred at facilities other than research reactors. In
Germany, two employees of a Siemens factory in Hanau producing nuclear fuel rods
stole three tubes of uranium oxide pellets from the plant in 1990. The thieves had
planned to smuggle large amounts of nuclear material and sell it, but the potential buyer
they approached informed police.
7
In July 2001, two more incidents of unauthorized
removal of nuclear and radioactive material from nuclear facilities were reported in
Germany. A 74-year-old laboratory assistant who had worked for the Siemens company
in the town of Erlangen, was accused of stealing small quantities of uranium and other
radioactive materials between 1971 and 1981 and storing them at his home. The theft
reportedly included 0.8 grams of HEU. The theft was revealed only after the man,
inflicted with bronchitis, brought the material to be tested at a local environment ministry
in the state of Bavaria in order to claim special compensatory benefits for occupational
disease.
8
In another incident, an employee of a closed nuclear reprocessing facility near
Karlsruhe stole a flask of radioactive material containing plutonium and a contaminated
cloth in early 2001 and brought them home. As a result, the suspect, his wife and her
daughter were exposed to high levels of radiation. According to a report by the Baden-
2
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Wuerttemberg environment ministry, the theft was possible because of the lapses in the
facility’s security system, which did not consider the possibility that an employee would
steal radioactive material at a risk to his or her own health, and so no physical check was
required upon exit.
9
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in September 1991,
Hungarian authorities reported confiscating about half a kilo of defective uranium
dioxide pellets that had been stolen from a fuel fabrication plant in Romania.
10
In June
1992, Romanian TV reported that some 10 kg of uranium had been stolen from the
Feldioara fuel fabrication facility. The police investigation discovered that the material
was stolen in 1991 by a technician working at the facility, who had put aside another 200
kg of uranium to be stolen later.
11
Uranium ore and concentrate allegedly stolen from
Indian uranium mines were seized on several occasions in the 1990s. For example, in
June 1998, three men allegedly trying to smuggle one kilogram of yellow cake to
Pakistan through the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, were arrested by Indian police. One
of the suspects claimed he had stolen the uranium from a container being loaded at the
Jaduguda uranium mines in Bihar state to be transported to a nuclear reactor. According
to police, a similar uranium theft had allegedly occurred in 1994 in the hilly northeastern
state of Meghalaya when police cracked down on a gang trying to smuggle it out of the
country through India’s porous eastern border with Myanmar.
12
Some countries still find their legal systems inadequate to deal with the problem of illicit
trafficking. Thus, the nuclear legislation in Mexico, targets mainly the licensees of
nuclear and other radioactive material, penalizing them for violations. However, it does
not address illicit trafficking, which implies no penalty for the smugglers if they have
been detected. At best, the smugglers can be charged with a simple theft.
13
Radiation Sources
Ionising radiation sources are more widespread around the world as compared to nuclear
material, and therefore the problem of their theft and loss of control has affected more
countries than those affected by the theft of nuclear material. According to the IAEA:
“More than 100 countries may have inadequate control and monitoring programs
necessary to prevent or even detect the theft of these materials.”
14
Apart from the former Soviet Union, thefts of radiation sources have reportedly occurred
in 26 countries worldwide.
15
For example, 20 thefts of radiation sources in the U.S. have
been recorded by Stanford’s DSTO since 1996. This number is a fraction of 1,500
sources reported by U.S. licensees to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as lost or
stolen for the same period. More than half of these sources were reportedly never
recovered. Up to 70 radiation sources are lost from regulatory control each year in the
European Union.
16
As the use of radioactive material is increasing worldwide, the problem of loss of control
over radiation sources threatens developing countries as well. For example, over the past
3
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50 years, some 27 000 sources of ionising radiation have been imported by developing
countries.
17
Several cases of theft or loss of strong radiation sources have resulted in the rupture of
shielding and overexposure of individuals, leading to severe injuries and even fatalities.
For example, in the most notorious loss of control incident, 4 people died and 28 received
radiation burns due to the exposure to a strong (51 TBq) medical radiation source stolen
from an abandoned clinic in Goiania, Brazil.
18
Similar incidents resulting from loss of
control occurred in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Thailand.
19
Recommendations
The current dissatisfactory situation represents a serious threat to man and the
environment. People have been injured and killed as a result of exposure to unshielded
radiation sources. The threat of terrorists using a “dirty bomb” or a crude nuclear device
is not considered to be within the realm of fantastic anymore, as the attempts by the al
Qaeda terrorist organisation to acquire radioactive and nuclear material have come to
light.
20
Therefore, urgent, internationally concerted actions are warranted. Below is a
summary of such actions, which could be implemented in the short-term:
• Protection practices need to be improved at all nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide,
including those housing LEU and yellowcake to prevent their smuggling to countries
with illicit enrichment capabilities;
• Cradle-to-grave security should be strengthened for strong radiation sources with
activities of 1 TBq or more around the world;
• Detection capabilities at borders, airports, and harbours should be improved in all
countries possessing nuclear material of proliferation concern, as well as in the
regions and countries suspected to be used as transit routes, such as the Caucasus,
Central Asia and Turkey;
• Inter-agency training of security- and customs forces in detecting illicit trafficking
should be accelerated;
• Each concerned country should strive to establish a central national database of illicit
trafficking incidents and provide regularly at least the basic information on the cases
to the IAEA;
• National regulatory systems in all concerned countries should address illicit
trafficking and introduce severe penalties for crimes involving nuclear and other
radioactive material;
• Reward systems should be considered by countries most affected by illicit trafficking
to encourage (1) informants to come forward with information about the planned or
in-progress smuggling; and (2) would-be smugglers to surrender the material.
4
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1
Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO), Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Institute of International Studies, Stanford University, 2002 (restricted access).
2
Mark Huband, “Congo ‘sought US help on uranium’, Financial Times (London), September 26, 2002, p.
10.
3
“Safeguards For Nuclear Fuel,” New York Times, August 24, 2002, Section A, p. 12.
4
E.D. Powell, “Protecting Facilities Against Terrorism and Sabotage: Is Jamaica Prepared to Deal with
This Potential Threat?” paper delivered to the IAEA International Conference, “Security of Nuclear
Material Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive
Sources,” Stockholm, May 7-11, 2001. (International Atomic Energy Agency, Proceedings, C&P Papers
Series 12/P (Vienna, August 2002), p. 195)
5
C. Schandorf, J.K. Amoaki, S.D. Asiamah, “Development of Measures to Deal with Illicit Trafficking of
Nuclear Materials in Ghana,” paper delivered to the IAEA International Conference, “Security of Nuclear
Material Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive
Sources,” Stockholm, May 7-11, 2001. (International Atomic Energy Agency, Proceedings, C&P Papers
Series 12/ P (Vienna, August 2002), p. 512).
6
Ramirez Guerrero, R., “Measures Taken in Mexico to Improve the Control of Illicit Traffic of Nuclear
Material,” paper (IAEA-SM-367/4/07) presented at the IAEA International Symposium on International
Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, Austria, 29 October - 2 November 2001.
7
Alfred Behr, “Plutonium Thief “Sophisticated”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 31, 2001; in DSTO.
8
“A Second Nuclear Theft Case in South Germany”, Berlin (IRNA), July 21, 2001; in DSTO.
9
“Security holes blamed for German plutonium theft”, Agence France Presse (Berlin), July 24, 2001; in
DSTO.
10
Mark Fritz, “Scams or Omens? Soviet Radioactive Goods Hit Black Market”, Associated Press, April 4,
1992; in DSTO.
11
“Stolen uranium recovered with help of Hungarian police,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June
10, 1992 (Orig. source: Romanian TV, Bucharest 1700 gmt 4 June 1992); in DSTO.
12
“Indian politician accused of smuggling uranium”, BBC World: South Asia, Tuesday, June 16, 1998; in
DSTO. Available at URL http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_113000/113674.stm
13
Ramirez Guerrero, R., “Measures Taken in Mexico”.
14
“Controlling Radioactive Sources,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1, p. 2.
15
DSTO.
16
“Controlling Radioactive Sources,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1, p. 2.
17
Friedrich Steinhausler, Morten Bremer Maerli, and Lyudmila Zaitseva: Assessment of the Threat from
Diverted Radioactive Material and “Orphan Sources” – An International Comparison, paper delivered to
the IAEA International Conference, “Security of Nuclear Material Measures to Prevent, Intercept and
Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources,” Stockholm, May 7-11, 2001.
(International Atomic Energy Agency, Proceedings, C&P Papers Series 12/P (Vienna, August 2002), p.
273)
18
Zuniga-Bello, P., Croft, J., Glenn, J.: “Lessons Learned from Accident Investigations,” Proc. of the
international conference “Goiania: 10 Years Later”, Goiania, Brazil, 26-31 October 1997, p.72.
19
DSTO.
20
The suspected member of al Qaeda, Jose Padilla, who was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 and charged
with plotting a terrorist attack using a radiological dispersal device, the so called “dirty” bomb, had
reportedly traveled to one of the Central Asian countries in April 2002 hoping to buy there radioactive
material. See Associated Press, “Radioactive Market Booms in Central Asia”, New York Times Online
Edition, June 14, 2002. For a detailed description of al Qaeda’s reported attempts to acquire nuclear
material, see Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, “WMD Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden”, CNS
Report, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, California,
USA, 2001. Available at URL: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm
we have a problem...we must of know this because we sent aid in through Trukey<<<
I read some where, that going through the Turkey area was the shortest/quickest route to get the aid to Georgia.
I also read that one reason we must be careful in this war, is the space station, that we depend on Russia to deliver supplies to the people there.
The space station, as I understand it is a joint effort, so that neither of us will be ahead of the other in being ready for a space war or control of the space.
And of course their is always the nuclear threat.
Nonetheless, the move has aroused criticism within some circles in Kadima. Some party members question the wisdom of forming an alliance with Russia’s ruling party in light of the escalating tensions between Moscow and the West over the recent Russian-Georgian hostilities.<<<
Talk about the stuff of nightmares.
Israel must have fools in its congress too.
Pragmatism on the road to Damascus
By Joseph A. Kechichian, Special to Gulf News
Published: August 20, 2008, 23:44
http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10238735.html
Lebanon and Syria are close neighbours that are destined to live side by side forever. Still, while a mere 85 kilometres separate Beirut from Damascus, President Michel Sulaiman flew into a different time zone altogether last week. Given legitimate Lebanese fears, perhaps even dislike, of the Baathist regime, can Sulaiman succeed in laying down the foundations of an authentic relationship?
To be sure, President Bashar Al Assad agreed to fulfil his July 13 promise to French President Nicolas Sarkozy, towards the establishment of full diplomatic relations. This much was pledged although many detractors dismissed Syria as a regional nemesis that should be opposed or, at the very least, relegated to United Nations dungeons. They quickly pointed out that Sulaiman returned empty handed, and highlighted what else was needed. Of course, opponents insisted that no rapprochement should be contemplated before the fate of several hundred Lebanese prisoners in Syrian jails, is satisfactorily determined. While this is a critical issue, which must not be dismissed as a secondary detail, equally valuable concerns abounded.
Chief among these was the choice of the best mechanism to bury the troubled past between the two countries. In fact, Sulaiman and Bashar may benefit from a change of personalities, since part of the reasons why unpleasant chapters continue to strain ties are the many superficial and dull officials who have outlived their political values. Since there will be no miracles anytime soon, given that the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri and leading Lebanese politicians hang on Damascene necks like a Damocles sword, only good will and hard work by less tainted hands will make a difference.
It is now a fact that while Syria will eventually recognise its neighbour as an independent state, Sulaiman must ensure Damascus perceives Lebanon as a sovereign entity, even if it is a collection of nations. Though the Lebanese president could not secure the release of any prisoners, he nevertheless broached the topic of a formal demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border with his counterpart, which is the stuff of nation-states. Indeed, the time is long overdue for this frontier to be clearly defined, and while Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem and his Lebanese counterpart Fawzi Saloukh prefer that this question be tied to various regional issues, neither country should accept the status quo.
In the event, Damascus will not make a leap forward, because Bashar is not in a hurry. Therefore, it is up to Sulaiman to help his counterpart close the gap, by welcoming Bashar in Beirut. Such a call would be Assad’s third trip - after his March 3 and 27, 2002, turnouts - but the initial one in an emergent Lebanon. It is up to Sulaiman to ensure that Bashar carries with him presents that will be mutually beneficial.
Regional position
If the former commander of the Lebanese Army endured the embarrassment of travelling on the day when a bomb killed 18 people - most of them soldiers - in Tripoli, Sulaiman should remind Bashar that Syria can better enhance its regional position by accepting the establishment of a powerful central authority in Beirut. In fact, he needs to transform his significant personal victory into political accomplishments for his country and, towards that end, may want to seek assistance from Damascus on Hezbollah’s weapons as well as the fate of Palestinians in Lebanon. On both fronts, Lebanon and Syria need each other, because of the latter’s relationships with the Party of God and various Palestinian groups.
Without a resolution of what to do with Hezbollah’s thorny weapons issue, there can be no peace in Lebanon, and it cannot be done by force. Hezbollah is a legitimate political party and that aspect concerns the Lebanese alone. As far as its weapons are concerned, however, Damascus is the key participant because it is the chief supplier as well as the premier conduit.
Consequently, Sulaiman must painstakingly unburden Syria of this negative image, and rely on Bashar to help him integrate Hezbollah - men and weapons - within the Lebanese Armed Forces. Ultimately, it is in Syria’s interests to have a stable military force next door, to remove any temptations for regional conflicts that will backfire on everyone.
The Lebanese also need Syrian assistance to address the fate of Palestinian refugees. Like in Syria itself, there is a consensus that Palestinians should not receive Lebanese nationality, but neither should they remain refugees forever. For Lebanon, Naher Al Bared was probably the tip of the iceberg, and the time has come to close the camps permanently both in Lebanon as well as in Syria. Sulaiman should show Bashar the way this can be done - legalising the status of every Palestinian - by granting them rights and privileges short of citizenship. In other words, rather than treat them as refugees, Lebanon should grant Palestinians “residency” so that all can work, earn decent wages, live wherever they can afford to, and travel as they wish. Even go to Syria.
Of course, resolution of these heavy files will not bury all the bitterness of the past between the two countries, but with the right advisers who can dream of genuine solutions, both men can address core differences. Since the two states will never be equals in the true sense of the word, it behooves their leaders, and especially their advisers, to distance themselves from grandiose schemes that no one can resolve. It may be useful to remember that Syria needs Lebanon as much, if not more, than many assume. Beirut provides Damascus with strategic depth vis-Ã -vis Israel, but also with Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. Only Lebanon is truly a reliable friend of Syria even if the latter seldom appreciated what the former provided over the years.
Sulaiman is a focused and disciplined man who will probably forgive - but should never forget - that Bashar send him home bare handed. Although the Lebanese called for patience as he tries to figure out how to extract Lebanon’s independence from its neighbour, Sulaiman’s immensely difficult, perhaps impossible, task cannot focus on promises but must converge on substance. For the relationship to be authentic, it is up to Sulaiman to show Bashar how it is done, with respect and creativity.
Dr Joseph A. Kechichian is a commentator and author of several books on Gulf affairs.
__._,_.___
August 21, 2008 Anti-Terrorism News - UnitedStatesAction.com
(Iraq) Detained Iraq Sunni leader son caught planting bombs — Muthanna Dulaimi
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080821/wl_mideast_afp/iraqunrestpoliticssunni_080821110759;_ylt=Aq0qY8KAQMv40wP98B8ZZ1xX6GMA
(Iraq) Al-Qaida in Iraq says it killed US-allied Sunni — on Sunday
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/08/21/africa/ME-Iraq-Attack-Claim.php
(Iraq) Grooming a female suicide bomber
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-women21-2008aug21,0,7359694.story
(Iraq) Terror propaganda takes hit in Iraq
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-20-propaganda_N.htm
(Afghanistan) US coalition: 30 militants killed in Afghanistan — Laghman and Kabul provinces
— also three Polish soldiers killed in Ghazni
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080821/ap_on_re_as/afghanistan_40;_ylt=AkscD.0ceDdh6eqfTqOrAhHOVooA
(Pakistan) Suicide bombers kill 70 outside main Pakistan military complex - in Wah, Punjab attacks
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4581116.ece
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/2596039/Pakistan-suicide-bombers-hit-arms-factory.html
— Taliban claim Pakistan suicide blasts
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080821/ap_on_re_as/pakistan_explosion_8;_ylt=AuZ_oDq4_R0DzvmZKXXIY4zzPukA
(Pakistan) FATA: ‘Cross-border’ missile strike kills six — in Zari Noor area of South Waziristan
http://www.dawn.com/2008/08/21/top6.htm
— see also: Al Qaeda safe house targeted in South Waziristan strike - in Wana
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/al_qaeda_safe_house.php
(Pakistan) FATA: 14 militants, 3 women killed in Bajaur
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_5
(Pakistan) FATA: Khyber tribesmen kill four Taliban
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_7
(Pakistan) FATA: Operation imminent in Kurrum
http://www.dawn.com/2008/08/21/top5.htm
— FC kill 15 Taliban in Kurram Agency
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_6
(Pakistan) NWFP: Unidentified gunmen kill army soldier in Pakistan — in Kohat
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932755&Language=en
(Pakistan) NWFP Assembly told Swat operation not to stop until peace
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_53
(Pakistan) NWFP: ‘Armed people force’ set up in Mardan
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_14
(Pakistan) NWFP: 2 children killed in Swat violence
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_58
(Pakistan) NWFP: ‘Militants destroyed 125 girls’ schools in 10 months’
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_39
(Pakistan) Billboard: Pakistan Will Prove To Be A Grave For United States
http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/9314.htm
Pakistan: Recent attacks raise questions about intelligence body — ISI
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2426888403
Pakistan: PM Gilani says terrorists are greatest threat
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Politics/?id=1.0.2427110680
(Pakistan) New Zawahiri message lamenting the deaths of two recent Al Qaeda members to be released shortly
http://www.lauramansfield.com/subscribers/
Pakistan Bans Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan — Roznama Khabrain report
http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/9315.htm
(Pakistan) Post-Musharraf, banned terror outfits resume activities — in Karachi — Lashker-e-Toiba, which was
renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawa
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/Post-Musharraf_banned_terror_outfits_resume_activities/articleshow/3388832.cms
(Pakistan) Zardari to be next president
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg1_1
— see also Jeffrey Imm’s June 10 posting
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/06/pakistan_sharia_threat.php
India army says fired at from Pakistan border
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2008/August/subcontinent_August731.xml§ion=subcontinent
Indian Maoists attack police, eight dead — in Bihar
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/B27316.htm
(India) Ahmedabad blasts: Anti-Terrorism Squad probes Haywood’s links with mystery man Mohammed Ali
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Cities/ATS_probes_Haywoods_links_with_mystery_man_/articleshow/3387270.cms
(India) Ahmedabad blasts: Haywood back in Phoenix; steers clear of media
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Cities/Haywood_back_in_Phoenix_steers_clear_of_media/articleshow/3387717.cms
(India) Jaipur blasts: SIT tracked suspects but failed to follow up
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Cities/SIT_tracked_suspects_but_failed_to_follow_up/articleshow/3387396.cms
(U.S.) Another tack in terror-financier lawsuit — new efforts in lawsuit for 9/11 attacks - more discovery against
National Commercial Bank and executives
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/front_page/20080820_Another_tack_in_terror-financier_lawsuit.html
-— special report on lawsuit
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/hot_topics/19374964.html
(U.S.) State Department Documents: 1998 US strike aided bin Laden-Taliban ties
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080821/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_bin_laden_4;_ylt=AuLdPk_TfcXqZVvFCJDuzYcTv5UB
U.S. still naked to EMP threat — New emergency plan doesn’t address alarming nuclear scenario in revised
disaster response
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=72801
— see also UnitedStatesAction.com background
http://www.unitedstatesaction.com/electrical-threat.htm
(UK) MI5: Terrorists not frustrated religious loners — concludes there is no single pathway to violent “extremism”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2593626/MI5-Terrorists-not-frustrated-religious-loners.html
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932773&Language=en
— Islamic terrorists could be from any race, warns secret MI5 report
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1047577/Islamic-terrorists-race-warns-secret-MI5-report.html
— see also Guardian news report
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1
UK resident in Guantanamo wins UK evidence ruling — Binyam Mohamed
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932805&Language=en
— see also AFP report
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080821/wl_uk_afp/usattacksguantanamobritaincourtethiopia_080821124723;_ylt=AgFLRS03cNmNlFIwJ6IS8LITv5UB
(Lebanon) Beirut warned on Hezbollah status
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=236917&version=1&template_id=37&parent_id=17
(West Bank) Israeli troops detain 15 Palestinians in West Bank — Radio
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932754&Language=en
Report: “Hamas Formalizes Relationship With al Qaeda”
http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/193688.php
‘Israel will wipe out Hamas leaders if position on Schalit not softened’
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219218607183&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Somalia: 10 More Killed in Mogadishu Market Shelling
http://allafrica.com/stories/200808210749.html
Somalia: Death Toll Hits 20 As Al Shabaab Capture Kismayo
http://allafrica.com/stories/200808210508.html
Somalia: Al-Shabab Snubs Djibouti Peace Deal
— Sheikh Moqtar Robow Abu Mansur: “The Jihad will keep on, there is no peace agreement, the martyrers will move
ahead to the Jihad bath even if Ethiopians pull out” — says hostilities can be ended by establishing Sharia in Somalia
http://allafrica.com/stories/200808210505.html
(Algeria) Death Toll Rises to 12 in Wednesday Algeria Bomb Attacks (my title)
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080821/ts_afp/algeriaattacks_080821014343
Algerian suicide attacks show weakness - General
http://africa.reuters.com/country/DZ/news/usnLL158988.html
(Algeria) Why is Al Qaeda back in business in the Islamic Maghreb ?
http://www.france24.com/en/20080820-why-al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-back-business
(Kenya) Four arrested in city over Fazul link — in search for terrorism fugitive “Abdalla Fazul”
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/461328/-/tk7j9i/-/index.html
Yemen extradites eight wanted for security cases — to Saudi Arabia
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932789&Language=en
(Yemen) Al-Watan: Report: Senior Al-Qaeda Official In Yemen Funded By Iran, Libya
http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/9316.htm
— Naif Muhammad Al-Kahtani aka Abu Hamam
Nigeria: MEND Accuses FG of Killing 20 Militants
http://allafrica.com/stories/200808210793.html
(Turkey) Explosion in Turkey wounds 16 people — city of Izmir
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932770&Language=en
(Italy) Ex-imam in Italy acquitted of terror links agrees to extradition — Abdelmajid Zergout to face terror charges
in Morocco
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219218602508&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Denmark) Danes face worst terror threat in years
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\08\21\story_21-8-2008_pg7_4
(Canada) Ottawa: Khawaja judge to allow ‘hearsay’
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=677633
— Khawaja not part of London plot, defense argues
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=737510
— Jihad emails ‘out of character’: Khawaja defense
http://ottsun.canoe.ca/News/OttawaAndRegion/2008/08/20/6514806.html
(Canada) Ontario: Khadr’s brother denied bail
http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=d1505db6-4420-48f0-9252-acc62172edc9
— Abdullah Khadr will stay in jail as he fights extradition to the U.S. on allegations he was an arms supplier for
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
(Philippines) 4 Muslim rebels die, 5 Philippine troops wounded in clashes — Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
rebels have killed 102 people and displaced nearly 150,000 residents in at least five southern provinces since last
week
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/news/article_1425827.php/4_Muslim_rebels_die_5_Philippine_troops_wounded_in_clashes__Roundup_
— see also Jeffrey Imm August 21 posting
http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/08/transnational_jihad.php
Philippines says to review, not cancel, peace deal — with Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/8/21/worldupdates/2008-08-21T152225Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-351122-3&sec=Worldupdates
— Philippines to scrap peace deal with rebels: govt
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/darticlen.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2008/August/theworld_August1327.xml§ion=theworld&col=
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/function/0,,12215_cid_3583956,00.html?maca=en-rss-en-all-1573-rdf
(Philippines) Supreme Court: Gov’t must prove MOA-AD with MILF won’t be signed
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080821-156046/Govt-must-prove-MOA-AD-wont-be-signed
(Philippines) MILF’s Commander Bravo strikes again
http://www.inquirer.net/specialfeatures/mindanaopeaceprocess/view.php?db=1&article=20080819-155492
Indonesia Islamist On Trial Amid Tight Security
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspxcontent/NewsStory.aspx?cpath=20080821\ACQDJON200808210221DOWJONESDJONLINE000322.htm&&mypage=newsheadlines&title=UPDATE:%20Indonesia%20Islamist%20On%20Trial%20Amid%20Tight%20Security
— Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam aka FPI) leader Rizieq Shihab
— Sharia promoting FPI has previously launched attacks on U.S. Embassy
— June 2008: Indonesia: Islamists threaten to kill church leader
http://www.compassdirect.org/en/display.php?page=news&lang=en&length=long&idelement=5417&backpage=&critere=&countryname=&rowcur=
(Australia) Jury hears of ‘do-it-yourself jihad’ book — trial of Belal Saadallah Khazaal — Evan Kohlmann
testifies could be used by “homegrown cells” in combination with other instructions
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,24220321-421,00.html
(Australia) Hezbollah TV live in Australia
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,24219076-29277,00.html
Sri Lanka helicopters bomb rebels, fighting kills 40
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/COL189967.htm
Sri Lanka’s air force attacks Tamil rebels
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/08/21/asia/AS-Sri-Lanka-Civil-War.php
— infantry clashes killed eight rebels and two soldiers
North Korea says war games could impede nuclear deal
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080820/wl_asia_afp/skoreausnkoreamilitaryexercisenuclearweapons_080820135337;_ylt=AjJYvtvOcHZHWLnwQX9gwKeCscEA
(China) More than 100 Uighurs arrested in Kashgar — following the August 4 attack in Kashgar city
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/227229,more-than-100-uighurs-arrested-in-kashgar.html
(China) 35 ‘suspicious’ Games spectators from Pakistan detained
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/35_suspicious_Games_spectators_from_Pak_detained/rssarticleshow/3387729.cms
Other News:
(India J&K) Separatist students march in Indian Kashmir (my title)
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/08/21/asia/AS-Kashmir-Shrine-Protests.php
— Chant “Burn the Indian institutions”
— “raised an Islamic green flag at the clock tower in the city’s main bazaar”
(U.S.) Nation of Islam: Muslim leader brings convention to Detroit — Imam W. Deen Mohammed
http://www.examiner.com/a-1548023~Muslim_leader_brings_convention_to_Detroit.html
— Nation of Islam listed among “hate groups” in Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) map
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/map/type.jsp?DT=3
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/map/hate.jsp#s=MI
(U.S.) Chicago Area: Frankfort Township Assessor Paul Ruff stands by e-mail on Islam, immigrants
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-assessor-email_both_21aug21,0,4041765.story
(U.S.) TSA Fires Back: Blames Airline for ‘Security Violation’
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=5624381&page=1
(U.S.) FEMA phones hacked; calls made to Mideast, Asia
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080820/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/fema_phones_hacked
(UK) Islamic saving plan could appeal to “ethical” non-Muslims
http://www.saveborrowspend.co.uk/articles/news/1605-islamic-saving-plan-could-appeal-to-ethical-non-muslims
(UK) Britain Being Colonized by Islam: Shariah Banks Set to Grow in Number
http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/2008/08/20/britain-being-colonised-by-islam-shariah-banks-set-to-grow-in-number/
(France) Paris: Appeal against loudspeaker sermons
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2008/08/paris-appeal-against-loudspeaker.html
(Netherlands) Rotterdam: Court rules for municipality in handshaking case
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2008/08/rotterdam-court-rules-for-municipality.html
— Rotterdam court disallows Muslim’s job claim
http://www.expatica.com/nl/articles/news/Rotterdam-court-disallows-Muslim_s-job-claim.html
“Dutch court has ruled that the local council was justified in denying a job to a Muslim man who refused
to shake hands with women.”
Winds of Jihad Site Down
http://ibloga.blogspot.com/2008/08/winds-of-jihad-site-down.html
http://www.sheikyermami.com
__._,_.___
If reposting elsewhere, please credit source of this research as UnitedStatesAction.com
A Special Note from David Horowitz
Dear Fellow American,
As part of our Terrorism Awareness Project, I’m sending you a powerful tool in the Freedom Center’s effort to expose more and more Americans to the Islamo-Fascist enemy — an enemy that has repeatedly proclaimed open war against the United States.
Click on this link to view a special Flash video — Jihad in Academia.
http://oldbluewebdesigns.com/MSA.swf
Jihad in Academia visually details the relationship between the radical Muslim Brotherhood and the nearly 150 chapters of the Muslim Student Association found on college and university campuses across America.
Dramatic Flash videos like this provide you and your fellow Center members with a genuine weapon in the battle against jihad. How?
By forwarding it to your personal E-mail list you provide information that most of your friends and neighbors simply aren’t getting from the mainstream, left-leaning media.
I believe this is a critical time. We’ve turned the table on al Qaeda in Iraq. This is great news, of course. But this is a multi-headed enemy, still capable of inflicting great harm to us at home and abroad.
It is not a time to become complacent — though that is precisely what many on the radical left are hoping for. As you watch the video, you will discover that Muslim Student Associations have become quite adept at classic Marxist tactics of blurring the truth with lies and slanders.
Take a few moments now to watch Jihad in Academia. Then, I hope you will forward it to the friends, co-workers and family members you care about. They should know the enemy and the stakes we face.
Thank you so much for all you have done for the Freedom Center. You are a powerful ally in all we do.
Sincerely,
DHFC_email_sig
David Horowitz, President & Founder
If reposting elsewhere, please credit source of this research as UnitedStatesAction.com
U.S. Navy Ships Head to Georgia
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 21 Aug.’08
Two U.S. Navy ships, including a guided missile destroyer USS McFaul,
and a U.S. Coast Guard cutter are getting underway to transport
humanitarian assistance supplies to Georgia, U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) said on August 21.
It said USS McFaul (DDG 74) departed from Souda Bay, Crete, on Wednesday
and the cutter Dallas (WHEC 716) will depart later this week.
McFaul and Dallas are scheduled to transit into the Black Sea and arrive
in Georgia within a week, according to the U.S. European Command.
The announcement comes after it was reported that Turkey gave its
go-ahead to sail through its straits into the Black Sea.
“The ships will transport thousands of blankets, hygiene items, baby
food and infant supplies to save lives and alleviate human suffering,”
U.S. European Command said.
The Associated Press reported quoting unnamed U.S. official in Turkey
that USS Mount Whitney would be among those three vessels expected to
arrive in Georgia.
Anatoly Nogovitsin, deputy chief of the general staff of the Russian
armed forces, said at a news conference in Moscow on August 21, that the
Russia’s Black Sea fleet continued “providing security regime for
maritime in the eastern part of the Black Sea.”
“There is no need to further reinforce it [the fleet],” he added.
Meanwhile, a team of U.S. European Command, led by Army Brig. Gen. John
Miller, is already in Tbilisi “to assess the current humanitarian
situation and make recommendations on continued humanitarian support to
senior military leadership.”
“The EUCOM team will conduct a deliberate and focused assessment,
encompassing variables such as transportation, infrastructure, manpower
and many other life support considerations,” the U.S. European Command said.
And on August 21, the head of the U.S. European Command, Gen. John
Craddock, who is also NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, also
arrived in Tbilisi.
http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19239
Yahoo! Groups Links
To visit group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/chechnya-sl/
Russia Pulls Back Some Forces, But Still Holds Key Positions
August 21, 2008
By RFE/RL
Even as Moscow says it has begun the promised pullback of its forces
from inside Georgia, reports indicate Russian forces continue to occupy
strategic positions around the country and show little sign of leaving.
According to Russia’s Interfax news agency, a Russian armored column
left central Georgia on August 21, and a Reuters cameraman in the South
Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, saw dozens of tanks and armored personnel
carriers arriving from the south. Interfax said the column was heading
north toward the Russian border.
A Reuters reporter on the border between Russia and South Ossetia said
the only heavy armor heading north on August 20 via the crossing was a
column of Georgian equipment seized by Russian forces.
But in the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti, Russian troops have
reportedly dug in at the entrance to the city, with armored personnel
carriers and trucks blocking the bridge that is the only land access to
the port.
Russian forces also continue to hold positions around the key central
town of Gori and in Igoeti, about 50 kilometers northwest of Tbilisi on
the main east-west highway.
RFE/RL’s Georgian Service correspondent in Gori has reported that the
number of Russian troops there is essentially the same, and he refuted
reports of a russian pullout. He also reported that the Georgians and
Russians have made another exchange of prisoners, with 63 Georgian
civilians swapped for eight “fighters” captured during the early stages
of the conflict.
Moscow has promised to pull its forces back from Georgia proper by
August 22 under an EU-sponsored cease-fire, but there has yet to be any
other sign of significant troop movement.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev reportedly told French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, whose country holds the rotating EU Presidency, in a
telephone conversation on August 19 that all but 500 Russian troops
would be pulled out of Georgia over the next two days.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says Russia intends to keep 500
troops in a security zone surrounding South Ossetia.
“[On August 22], eight checkpoints will be established in the security
zone in which 500 peacekeepers will be deployed, no more than that,”
Lavrov told reporters. “Other peacekeepers will be moved to South
Ossetia, while other troops will be moved to Russia.”
Lavrov did not specify how many troops Russia planned to keep in South
Ossetia.
“I want to state this clearly and unequivocally that Russia is carrying
out in full the six principles agreed between Medvedev and Sarkozy,” he
said.
The United States accused Moscow on August 20 of dragging its feet,
saying the size and pace of the Russian pullout had been insignificant
and needed to increase.
The West fears Moscow may use ambiguities in a cease-fire deal and
previous agreements to keep large numbers of troops in and around the
breakaway region of South Ossetia and step up economic and political
pressure on Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.
Saakashvili told AP that Russia was thinning out its presence in some
occupied towns, but was seizing other strategic points. He described the
Russian actions as “some kind of deception game.”
Buffer Zone
Moscow originally promised to begin pulling its forces out of Georgia on
August 18, but the West has complained that Russia has not kept its side
of the bargain.
The Russians have countered, however, that they are abiding by the terms
of the cease-fire agreed last week, because it allows Russia to carry
out “additional security measures” in South Ossetia.
Moscow says that includes a zone extending several kilometers beyond the
South Ossetian border into the rest of Georgia.
Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, the deputy head of Russia’s General
Staff, said that this means that “we have the right, under certain
conditions, to advance to the boundaries of the whole zone of
responsibility.”
“At the first stage, [we will set up] eight outposts, less than a
battalion, 272 men, and later a second line of outposts already along
the administrative border of Ossetia, which, of course, need to be
equipped from the point of view of engineering and be prepared for
providing support to peacekeepers,” Nogovitsyn said.
He said Russian troops also have a mandate to operate in a buffer zone
around Abkhazia, another separatist Georgian region. Nogovitsyn said
that zone includes the key road hub Senaki, where the Georgian military
had a military base.
RFE/RL’s Georgian Service correspondent in the central town of Gori says
that in a meeting with the commander of Russian troops there, the
commander presented a map that seemed to show around 50 Georgian
villages near Gori, north of the central highway, as being under Russian
control. He said this would ensure Russian control of two villages on
the main east-west highway.
Diplomatic Tensions
Against this backdrop, diplomatic tensions have flared between Russia
and the West at meetings of NATO and the UN Security Council.
NATO said it was freezing regular contacts with Moscow until all Russian
troops leave Georgia. Russia shot back, with Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov saying NATO was trying to make a victim of Georgia’s “criminal
regime.”
And at the United Nations, Russia rejected a draft resolution calling on
it to withdraw is forces to pre-fighting positions, as required by the
French-brokered peace deal.
Moscow said the text did not include and endorse the full six-point
peace plan signed by Georgia and Russia.
But if the focus of the crisis is now on the Russian troop withdrawal
and upon diplomatic sparring, it could shift to events in Georgia’s
breakaway region of Abkhazia.
On August 20, the Abkhaz parliament voted in favor of asking Russia to
recognize the province as an independent state.
Georgian Reintegration Minister Temur Iakobashvili dismissed the appeal
as meaningless.
But in Moscow, the speaker of Russia’s upper house of parliament, the
Federation Council, said on August 20 that lawmakers are ready to
recognize the independence of separatist regions in Georgia. The council
is to hold an emergency session on August 25.
All this sets the stage for yet another escalation of tensions in the
Georgia crisis. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are officially
recognized internationally, including by Russia, as part of Georgia.
with agency reporting
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Pulls_Back_Some_Forces_But_Stills_Holds_Key_Points_/1192734.html
One of the “major” attacks killed FIVE people.
I’ll go back to worrying about slipping in the bathtub.
Thanks for the ping!
This was hilarious! Thanks! or - tenkuberrymud.
August 21, 2008 PM Anti-Terrorism News - UnitedStatesAction.com
(Afghanistan) Eight troops dead in Afghanistan in 24 hours: military
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080821/wl_sthasia_afp/afghanistanunrest_080821184413;_ylt=AqAQqMk6XaVIzG_ViMUv7jXOVooA
Pakistan: Taliban threatens more attacks after factory bombing
http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.2427110859
(Pakistan) NWFP Police Chief: Foreign Hand In Hospital Suicide Blast - Dera Ismail Khan
http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/9333.htm
(Pakistan) General Kiyani: Pakistan Is Eliminating Root Causes Of Terrorism
http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/9335.htm
— “through talks and by raising the living standards through economic and development projects”
(U.S.) Justice delays new rules on terror investigations
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080821/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/terror_profiling_5;_ylt=AvFY9Sh17l3QdIwmeKwyuEITv5UB
Finding Nemo, the Terrorist Librarian
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,408301,00.html
(India) Mumbai serial blasts accused says he was living with Dawood in Karachi
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Mumbai_serial_blasts_accused_says_he_was_living_with_Dawood_in_Karachi/articleshow/3390585.cms
(India) Ahmedabad blasts: They are engineering ‘jihad’
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Cities/Ahmedabad/They_are_engineering_jihad/rssarticleshow/3391227.cms
(India) Two insurgents gunned down in encounter in northeast India - in Manipur
http://www.kuna.net.kw/NewsAgenciesPublicSite/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=1932845&Language=en
(Israel) IDF says there are increased alerts of plans to abduct soldiers
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219218612841&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Somalia) Insurgents attack Somali president’s house, six killed
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Top_Headlines/Insurgents_attack_Somali_presidents_house_six_killed/articleshow/3390563.cms
(Somalia) Pirates hijack 3 ships off Somalia
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/21/somalia.pirates/index.html
(Thailand) Bombs rock South - journalist killed, 20 others wounded - second bomb ambush when police arrive
- in Narathiwat province’s Sungai Kolok
http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories/topstories.php?id=129836
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/08/22/headlines/headlines_30081202.php
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/08/21/asia/AS-Thailand-Southern-Violence.php
Philippines: Mindanao civilians under threat from MILF units and militias
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/STRI-7HQQ9A?OpenDocument
(Australia) Accused’s book a ‘rare’ guide for al-Qa’ida’s enemies - Belal Saadallah Khazaal trial update
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24221721-5001561,00.html
- additional quotes by Evan Kohlmann: “(But) what is rarer is manuals directing you to use this knowledge in a
co-ordinated manner to have a real impact”
China Asks For Details on 13 Pakistani Suspects
http://www.thememriblog.org/urdupashtu/blog_personal/en/9332.htm
Other News:
(India J&K) Jammu: Protesters attack Congress leader
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Jammu_tense_protesters_attack_police_station/articleshow/3389045.cms
(India J&K) ‘Martyred’ Hurriyat leader was not killed by police
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Martyred_Hurriyat_leader_was_not_killed_by_police/articleshow/3391067.cms
Saudis warn: Israeli products cancerous
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219218611089&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(U.S.) Feds: Fires took down building next to twin towers
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080821/ap_on_go_ot/attacks_collapse
(Russia) Moscow halts all cooperation with NATO alliance
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1219218612434&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
__._,_.___
If reposting elsewhere, please credit source of this research as UnitedStatesAction.com
Thank you FARS. I love that, have sent it out in email before too!
Finding Nemo, the Terrorist Librarian
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,408301,00.html
From the terror news in 837, if you have not read this one, take a few minutes to check it out.
Who is he?
Not 007 ?
Not really news to Freepers, but fun, as Mike Savage is playing the clips of the Obama rants on how many houses McCain owns, at this minute.
granny
Just released: The RNC’s Tony Rezko fact sheet [PDF]
http://www.gop.com/images/research/082108Research1.pdf
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